Wikileaks blows lid on secretive Trans-Pacific Partnership

[David Guyatt]

Sounds about right...

WikiLeaks publishes secret draft chapter of Trans-Pacific Partnership

Treaty negotiated in secret between 12 nations 'would trample over individual rights and free expression', says Julian Assange

• Alex Hern and Dominic Rushe
  
• theguardian.com, Wednesday 13 November 2013 18.12 GMT
  

Demonstrators protest against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) after the May Day rally in Tokyo, Japan. Photograph: EPA/Kimimasa Mayama

WikiLeaks has released the draft text of a chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, a multilateral free-trade treaty currently being negotiated in secret by 12 Pacific Rim nations.
The full agreement covers a number of areas, but the chapter published by WikiLeaks focuses on intellectual property rights, an area of law which has effects in areas as diverse as pharmaceuticals and civil liberties.
Negotiations for the TPP have included representatives from the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Mexico, Malaysia, Chile, Singapore, Peru, Vietnam, and Brunei, but have been conducted behind closed doors. Even members of the US Congress were only allowed to view selected portions of the documents under supervision.
"We're really worried about a process which is so difficult for those who take an interest in these agreements to deal with. We rely on leaks like these to know what people are talking about," says Peter Bradwell, policy director of the London-based Open Rights Group.
"Lots of people in civil society have stressed that being more transparent, and talking about the text on the table, is crucial to give treaties like this any legitimacy. We shouldn't have to rely on leaks to start a debate about what's in then."
The 30,000 word intellectual property chapter contains proposals to increase the term of patents, including medical patents, beyond 20 years, and lower global standards for patentability. It also pushes for aggressive measures to prevent hackers breaking copyright protection, although that comes with some exceptions: protection can be broken in the course of "lawfully authorised activities carried out by government employees, agents, or contractors for the purpose of law enforcement, intelligence, essential security, or similar governmental purposes".
WikiLeaks claims that the text shows America attempting to enforce its highly restrictive vision of intellectual property on the world and on itself. "The US administration is aggressively pushing the TPP through the US legislative process on the sly," says Julian Assange, the founder and editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks, who is living in the Ecuadorean embassy in London following an extradition dispute with Sweden, where he faces allegations of rape.
"If instituted," Assange continues, "the TPP's intellectual property regime would trample over individual rights and free expression, as well as ride roughshod over the intellectual and creative commons. If you read, write, publish, think, listen, dance, sing or invent; if you farm or consume food; if you're ill now or might one day be ill, the TPP has you in its crosshairs."
Just Foreign Policy, a group dedicated to reforming US foreign policy, managed to crowdfund a $70,000 (£43,700) bounty for Wikileaks if the organisation managed to leak the TPP text. "Our pledge, as individuals, is to donate this money to WikiLeaks should it leak the document we seek." The conditions the group set have not yet been met, however, because it required the full text, not individual chapters.
Related to the TPP is a second secret trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which ties together regulatory practices in the US and EU. George Monbiot, writing in this paper, referred to the treaty as a "monstrous assault on democracy". Ken Clarke, the minister without portfolio, replied that it "would see our economy grow by an extra £10bn per annum".
Campaign group Fight for the Future has already collected over 100,000 signatures in an online petition against what it calls the "extreme Internet censorship plan: contained in the TPP.
Evan Greer, campaign manager for Fight for the Future, said: "The documents revealed by WikiLeaks make it clear why the US government has worked so hard to keep the TPP negotiatons secret. While claiming to champion an open Internet, the Obama administration is quietly pushing for extreme, SOPA-like copyright policies that benefit Hollywood and giant pharmaceutical companies at the expense of our most basic rights to freedom of expression online."

[Magda Hassan]

A shocking document. All done in secrecy like most crimes. George Monbiot is right.

[Peter Presland]

What it reveals is indeed shocking.

But I have a question for Wikileaks, who are behaving increasingly like MSM gatekeepers, who would have us believe that they are the best arbiters of what we should and should not be allowed to see.

Have a look at what this site is attempting on this subject

It all has a familiar ring to it eh? - shades of Glen Greenwald et al striving to 'be responsible' in what they allow us to see - yeah yeah, pull the other one, it's got bells on.

The plain fact is that the Western SIS's are all over these big whistle-blower initiatives like a rash. We should be VERY careful to consider just why THIS is being released and not THAT or THE OTHER - just who is making those decisions? That is what I would like to ask Wikileaks and Snowden's 'minders' and I'm pretty sure of the tenor and content of the replies I would get too - but then I'm just a died-in-the-wool old cynic by now.

[Magda Hassan]

It my understand that the IP draft was leaked some time ago. I can't remember if I posted here or not but I did have a copy of at least some of it and so did others about 2 years ago. I think perhaps this is a bigger amount of information or perhaps the full amount of what I saw earlier. It is still a draft. My guess re the timing is because there are meeting about to occur (in secret) and the pressure needs to be put on them to make it public so we can have the debate about its appalling contents. It's not in anyone's interest for this to go ahead. I've seen there has been a big crowd sourcing effort to raise funds to pay for the full transcript of the TPP. So WL haven't got all of the TPP so are unlikely to be sitting on this one at least. But I agree it can't all be left up the WL either. There should be no secrets from the people but in the mean time there should be many avenues to leak and publish.

[Peter Presland]

Re-reading my post3 above, I'm probably being a bit harsh on both WL and Greenwald etc.

The principles alluded to remain valid though. Both WL and Greewald and his embryonic new organisation are clearly of major interest to the SIS's and will have a vast array of capabilities deployed to blunt manipulate or otherwise use them to SIS purposes. I don't know what the answer is either, beyond encouraging as big an array of potential leakers and leak publishers as possible.

[Peter Lemkin]

TPP Exposed: WikiLeaks Publishes Secret Trade Text to Rewrite Copyright Laws, Limit Internet Freedom

WikiLeaks has published the secret text to part of the biggest U.S. trade deal in history, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). For the past several years, the United States and 12 Pacific Rim nations have been negotiating behind closed doors on the sweeping agreement. A 95-page draft of a TPP chapter released by WikiLeaks on Wednesday details agreements relating to patents, copyright, trademarks and industrial design showing their wide-reaching implications for Internet services, civil liberties, publishing rights and medicine accessibility. Critics say the deal could rewrite U.S. laws on intellectual property rights, product safety and environmental regulations, while backers say it will help create jobs and boost the economy. President Obama and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman reportedly wish to finalize the TPP by the end of the year and are pushing Congress to expedite legislation that grants the president something called "fast-track authority." However, this week some 151 House Democrats and 23 Republicans wrote letters to the administration saying they are unwilling to give the president free rein to "diplomatically legislate." We host a debate on the TPP between Bill Watson, a trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute, and Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch.

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: WikiLeaks is back in the news after it published Wednesday part of the secret text of a massive new trade pact called the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP. For the past several years, the United States and 12 Pacific Rim nations have been negotiating behind closed doors on the sweeping agreement. On Wednesday, WikiLeaks released a 95-page draft of a TPP chapter focusing on intellectual property rights. WikiLeaks editor-in-chief Julian Assange appeared in a YouTube video Tuesday talking about the leak.

JULIAN ASSANGE: We released today the secret internationalthe secret intellectual property chapter, what they call intellectual property, but it's actually all about how to extend the monopoly rights of companies like Monsanto, which has genetic patents over wheat and corn; extending the ability of Disney to criminally prosecute people for downloading films, prosecute Internet service providers; Japan introducing something they call a patent prosecution highwayJapan has. And so, we released all this, their secret negotiating positions for all 12 countries.

AMY GOODMAN: The WikiLeaks release of the text comes a week before a TPP chief negotiators summit in Salt Lake City, Utah. President Obama and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman reportedly wish to finalize the TPP by the end of the year and are pushing Congress to expedite legislation that grants the president what's known as "fast-track authority." However, this week some 151 House Democrats and 23 Republicans wrote letters to the administration saying they're unwilling to give the president free rein to, quote, "diplomatically legislate."
Well, for more, we go to Washington, D.C., where we host a debate on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Bill Watson is trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. And Lori Wallach, the director of the fair trade group Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch.
We welcome you both to Democracy Now! Bill Watson, why do you support the TPP?
BILL WATSON: Well, we need to remember, whenwhen we see some of these reports about the intellectual property chapter, we need to remember that the free trade agreements are about fundamentally something very different: They are about free trade. And the value of free trade, I think, is really incontrovertible. The United States has been lowering its barriers for 50 years to engage in the global economy in a way that increases growth economically, that improves the quality of life of people in the United States. We still have a number of protectionist measures in the United States that an agreement like the TPP will address. Particular to Asia that are at interest in this agreement are tariffs, quotas and subsidies dealing with things like footwear and clothing, consumer items that these barriers really act as taxes on the poor, mostly, who end up paying a larger portion of their income to support an economic policy that benefits a select few.
The protectionist measures in place, these trade barriers, are special-interest handouts to big businesses that have good lobbying efforts in Washington, D.C. The purpose of a free trade agreement is to overcome an inherent political difficulty in getting rid of those barriers. We know we want to get rid of the barriers, but it's hard to counteract these special interests because they have a lot of influence in Congress. So, the idea of a reciprocal free trade agreement, where the U.S. lowers its barriers and, in exchange, other countries lower theirs, is a way to gaintoreally, to gain special-interest support for the free trade agreement that U.S. industries that benefit from export access abroad will lobby. They have a concentrated benefit in the agreement. And so, they will counteract the special interests that are supporting the existing barriers. The end result, ideally, is open markets at home and abroad. And this is a very good outcome.
The problem at this point, if you can say there's a problem
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Bill Watson, if we can, if we could bring in Lori Wallach to respond to some of your comments, especially in terms of thewe've had lots of publicity over pharmaceuticals and the huge disparities in prices of pharmaceuticals around the globe and how this might affect theunder the TPP agreement. Lori?
LORI WALLACH: Well, free trade is a pretty theory, but as yesterday's WikiLeaks showed, the TPP has very little to do with free trade. So, only five of the 29 chapters of the agreement even have to do with trade at all. What's in that intellectual property chapter? What the Cato Institute would call rent seekinggovernments being lobbied by special interests to set up special rules that give them monopolies to charge higher prices. What does that mean for you and me? In that agreement, we now can see the United States is pushing for longer monopoly patents for medicines that would increase the prices here. They're looking for patenting things like surgical procedures, making even higher medical costs. They're looking to patent life forms and seeds. And with respect to copyright, the U.S. positions are actually even undermining U.S. law. So, for Internet freedom, if you didn't like SOPA, the Stop Online Piracy Act, the domestic law that Congress and amazing citizen activism killed last year when it was attempted to be pushed here domestically, huge chunks of SOPA are pushed through the backdoor of this intellectual property chapter.
Now, what the heck is that doing in a free trade agreement? I would imagine the Cato Institute is also wondering: Are Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the free trade philosophers, rolling in their graves? Because that is protectionism. This is patent monopolies. This is copyright extensions. This is actually exactly what Bill just talked about, which is powerful special interestsBig Pharma, Disney and the other big-content guysundermining us as consumersour access to the Internet, our access to affordable medicineand they're using their power to put that into an agreement that they've got misbranded as "free trade." That's what's the real TPP. So maybe, actually, we agree, between the consumer group Public Citizen and Cato, that what's in TPP, whatever you think about free trade, ain't so good for most of us.
BILL WATSON: This is a rare occasion where I do agree with Lori Wallach. I agree that what's going on in the IP chapter is a special-interest free-for-all, a grab bag, that U.S. companies are pushing to get what they want in these agreements. And the problem, really, with that is that intellectual property is not a trade issue, and it shouldn't be in the agreement. Originally, adding intellectual property into the agreement was a way to bring on more political support, to be able to bring in U.S. companies to counter other U.S. companies that would oppose the agreement. At this point, I think we've gotten to where the intellectual property chapters are so expansive that what you're seeing is a domestic constituency, people concerned about copyright and patent reform, who are opposing the TPP, not because of anything having to do with trade, but just because it's going to reform U.S. copyright and patent laws. So, thewhat I would say is that we need to have a renewed focus within these trade agreements to be more about free trade and less about some of these other issues like intellectual property rights.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: But, Bill Watson, why should we even have to depend on WikiLeaks to provide information on what's in this proposed agreement? Isn't the actualjust the super secrecy under which this agreement has been worked out, raise questions for ordinary citizens about why all the secrecy?
BILL WATSON: You know, I'm certainly glad that WikiLeaks published this report. Personally, I like to be able to read it. It's very interesting. I wish that they would publish the rest of it, to show us the rest of the draft text. I don't think that it would be, at this point, particularly harmful to the agreement to let us know something about the countries' negotiating positions.
But I reallyI really disagree that the TPP negotiations are especially secret. There's a lot that goes on in Congress that the public doesn't know about. When Congress writes a law, we don't know in advance what it's going to be before it gets proposed. So, they're still trying to figure out what the contents of the agreement will be. They don't know yet; they're working on it. So, eventually, we'll see something. We'll see it well in advance of when it becomes law, and Congress will have a chance to decide to vote yes or no on the agreement.
AMY GOODMAN: Lori Wallach, what most surprised you about seeing the TPP agreement for the first time yesterday, you know, the WikiLeaks leak?
LORI WALLACH: Well, first of all, this is extraordinarily secret. I've followed these negotiations since 1991 with NAFTA. And during NAFTA, any member of Congress could see any text. In fact, the whole agreement between negotiating rounds was put in the Capitol, accessible for them to look at. In 2001, the Bush administration published the entire Free Trade Area of the Americas text, when it was even in an earlier stage than TPP is right now, on government websites. They've even excluded members of Congress from observing the negotiations. I mean, this is extraordinary.
And so, to me, what was the most horrifying, I would say, is the ways in which the U.S. negotiators are using this agreement to try and rewrite U.S. law. I mean, I find it morally repugnant and outrageous that the U.S. negotiators be pushing Big Pharma's agenda to raise medicine prices for the developing countries in the TPP. People in Vietnam, in all the developing countries that have HIV/AIDS, that have malaria, they need access to generic medicines, and this would cut it off. But they're actually doing it also to us. So, to the extent, theoretically, they're sort of supposed to be representing our interests, it would make cancer drugs in this country more expensive. Evergreening of patents, changing just a little tweaky thing, the six-hour versus 12-hour version of a medicine, you get 20 more years of monopoly. Also undermining our Internet freedom by rewriting U.S. law? There's language in there where U.S. law says there's an exception for liability for U.S. Internet service providers. The U.S. is the only country in that bracket that's saying, "No, we shouldn't allow that in TPP." It's backdoor diplomatic legislating.
And that ties into that business with fast track. Why wereand it's now 27 Republican members, because there was a second letter that came out of the Republicans, and 151 Democratswhy were they all saying together, in the last 36 hours, "No fast-track trade process. We don't want to give away our constitutionally granted authority over trade policy"? And a big piece of the reason is, the left and right in Congress may disagree on what the policies should be, but they actually believe that, constitutionally, Congress gets to write our legislation. So the notion of this backdoor legislating, that we saw actually revealed in this WikiLeak, is precisely what is uniting, animating congressional outrage at the notion that after being left out of these negotiations uninformed, somehow they should volunteer to handcuff themselves so they can be thoroughly steamrollered and have even their legislating authority undermined through this so-called trade agreement. That's really a backdoor coup d'état on domestic policymaking.
AMY GOODMAN: Bill Watson, might this be another place where you and Lori Wallach agree?
BILL WATSON: Not really, no. I seeon fast track, let me just say that I don't have a lot of confidence in Congress's ability to come in and resist special interests and make good policies on these areas. But, actually, fast track is a way for Congress to exert its influence over these agreements. When itwhen Congress passes fast track, it imposes a number of negotiating objectives. One of those, if Congress imposes fast track, is tois to have strong IP measures in the agreement. So, you know, you don't necessarily want Congress's input, you know, if you're trying to get a good policy here. But you do get it through fast track, and you get increased transparency. Fast track will set the rules for what the presidentwho the president has to talk to and inform in Congress and how Congress participates in the agreement.
But let me also say, you know, when Lori talks about how increased patent law on pharmaceuticals is going to harm people in poor countries like Vietnam, I'd like to point out also that trade barriers harm people in countries like Vietnam. Our trade barriers harm them; their trade barriers harm them. It stunts the growth of their economy, prevents them from engaging in commerce that increases their quality of life. What we need to do is not ditch the free trade agreement because some parts of it are harmful; we need to get rid of the harmful parts and recognize the value of these agreements in improving quality of life around the world.
AMY GOODMAN: Lori Wallach?
LORI WALLACH: I'm sorry, right now under the so-called trade authority system, there are 600 corporate advisers who, with the executive branch, are behind closed doors making these rules, seeing the text. I, myself, have much more faith in the U.S. Congress, the U.S. public and the U.S. press and the democratic process, with all of us who will live with the results, messy though democracy may be, having the ability to make sure these policies work for us. I don't want a bunch of unelected U.S. "trade negotiators" and 600 corporate advisers dictating my future through so-called trade agreements.
I mean, these agreements, once they're implemented, you can't change a comma unless all the other countries agree. It locks into place, super-glues, cements into place one vision of law that, as we've seen, has very little to do with trade. It's about domestic food safety. Do we have to import food that doesn't meet U.S. safety standards? It's about setting up international tribunalscan't imagine the Cato Institute likes that, global governance and allwhere U.S. government could be sued and our Treasury raided by foreign corporations, who are rent seeking, compensation for not having to meet our own laws that our domestic companies have to meet.
And I've got to say something about fast track, which is, in fact, empirically, Bill, fast track is a huge giveaway of Congress's authority. And for anyone who wants to get into the weeds, please take a look at my book, The Rise and Fall of Fast Track Trade Authority . You can get it on tradewatch.org, http://www.tradewatch.org. We looked at the history of trade authorities since the founding of the country. Because of the old Boston Tea Party, Congressthe Founders put Congress in charge of trade, so the king couldn't just dictate, with a few special interests, what would be our trade policy. And historically, Congress has had the steering will, the emergency brake. Nixon came up with fast track in '73. It's anomalous. Sixteen agreements ever have used this handcuff procedure. Why are Democrats and Republicans together saying, "No more"? Not because they want to have a seat at the negotiating table, but because they want a role in the formative aspects of trade agreements.
In the end, how they vote on it ain't the issue. The question is up front: Is it going to be in our interests, with accountability and actually not having these corporate advisers making the calls, or is it going to be a trade agreement like TPP, which, Cato must agree, really is not about free trade but has become, really, the Trojan horse for all these other issues? So, in the end, the process is really important. And historically, we've had a new trade negotiating mechanism every 20 years until now. President Obama, as a candidate, said he'd replace it. You can find out if your member of Congress was amongst the 200 who said they would hold on to their constitutional authority, or if you need to do a little conversation with your member. You can see all of that at exposethetpp.org. That's a website, exposethetpp.org.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Lori, if Iif I can bring Bill Watson in, on this issue ofbecause you, yourself, Mr. Watson, admit that there are objectionable parts to this agreement that need to be changed, but how would that change occur if the pact is being negotiated essentially in secret and then fast-track legislation would require Congress to vote it up or down? How will the changes occur?
BILL WATSON: It's very good question. And, you know, to be honest, the problem with issues like intellectual property is not just in free trade agreements. Congress is not very good about intellectual property, either. So, I think that we need to be more active in explaining to Congress what the right policies are, to use the democratic process. Fast track and, indeed, these negotiationnegotiated agreements are not really a way to bypass Congress. Congress still has say. They still have to approve the agreement. They canthey can do a number of things to exert pressure on the administration to include certain things. They don't always include very good things. So going to Congress is not really the best way to get the agreements through. And indeed, fast track is a way to increase the power of Congress, in a number of ways, and so mayI agree with Lori Wallach there are some dangers to using fast track, butbut in the end, I just don't see Congress, and even a little bit more transparency, as really a panacea for solving these problems. This is a larger issue.
AMY GOODMAN: As we wrap up, Bill Watson, we gave you the first word; Lori Wallach, you've got the last.
LORI WALLACH: The bottom line of all of this is we need a new procedure to replace fast track that gives the public the role and Congress the role to make sure what will be binding, permanent, global laws do not undermine either our democratic process of making policies at homethat we needor that lock us into retrograde policies that the current 600 corporate trade advisers are writing to impose on us. So, we need a new way to make trade agreements to get different kinds of agreements. And the bottom line with TPP, as this WikiLeak just showed, it's very dangerous. It's not about trade. You've got to find out about it. And you've got to make sure your member of Congress maintains their constitutional authority. Democracy is messy. But I, myself, more trust the American public, the press and this Congress rather than 600 corporate advisers. We need to make sure what's in that trade agreement suits us, and you all are going to be the difference in doing that.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, we'll certainly link to the document that WikiLeaks has just leaked, the draft TPP proposal. Lori Wallach, thanks for being with us, director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, and Bill Watson, trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute.

[Magda Hassan]

Jeremy is an internet and software lawyer based in Kuala Lumpur

Jeremy Malcolm ‏@qirtaiba4m
Thinking back to all those talks with #TPP negotiators about their intentions on IP concerns we had. So many of them were flat out lying.

[Magda Hassan]

Here is the document from a couple of years ago.
What is demonstrated in the document is that it is made by a group called the US Business Coalition and their members. The TPP is not a people powered initiative. It is top down and dictatorial and not democratic. Unelected business is writing the legislation and pulling the government strings. For a list of the Coalition businesses see the pdf below. All the usual suspects.

tppcoalition.org/Members%20of%20the%20Coalition.pdf

900 17th St., N.W., Suite 1150, Washington, D.C. 20006 Phone 202.659.5147 Fax 202.659.1347
U . S . B U S I N E S S C O A L I T I O N F O R T P P
Coalition Members
Companies
3M
Abbott Laboratories
ACE Group
Advanced Medical Technology Association
AFJ & Associates
Aflac International
ALEC
American Apparel and Footwear
American Auto Council
American Chemistry Council
American Farm Bureau Federation
American Feed Industry Association
American Institute of Architects
American Insurance Association
American Meat Institute
American Soybeans Association
Amway
APL
Apple
Applied Materials
Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM)
Baker McKenzie
Barnes Richardson
Biotech Industry Organization
Boeing
Business RoundTable
CA Technologies
California Apple Commission
Cargill, Incorporated
Caterpillar Inc.
Chevron
Citi
CompTIA
Conoco Phillips
Cotton Council International
Crop Life America
Denner Group International
Distilled Spirits Council of the United States
Dove
Dow Chemical
EBay
EEA
Exxon Mobil Corporation
Facebook
FedEx
Financial Services Forum
Florida Citrus Mutual (FCM)
Fluor
FMI Corp.
Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America
Ford
Gap, Inc.
General Electric Company
General Motors Company
GlaxoSmithKline
Global Prospects LLC
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
Grocery Manufacturers Association
Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA)
Halliburton
Hanesbrands
Hanesbrands Inc.
HP
IBM Corporation
Idaho Potato Commission
IDFA
Information Technology Industry Council
Intel
International Business-Government Counselors, Inc.
International Dairy Foods Association
International Development Systems
International Intellectual Property Alliance
Johnson & Johnson
Kraft
Lilly
Louis Dreyfus Commodities
Mars, Inc.
McLarty Associates
Meat Import Council of America (MICA)
MetLife
Microsoft
Mondelēz International
Monsanto
Morgan Stanley
Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association
MPAA
National Association of Manufacturers
National Cattlemen's Beef Association
National Center for Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation
National Chicken Council
National Corn Growers Association
National Cotton Council
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
National Foreign Trade Council
National Milk Producers Federation
National Oilseed Processors Association (NOPA)
National Pork Producers Council (NPPC)
National Potato Council
National Retail Federation
National Trucking & Supply Chain Company
National Turkey Federation
News Corporation
Northwest Horticultural Council
Novartis
Oracle Corporation
Outdoor Industry Association
Pet Food Institute
Pfizer, Inc.
Philip Morris International
PhRMA
Plastics Industry
Proctor & Gamble Company
Qualcomm
Retail Industry Leaders Association
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International
Software and Information Industry Association
Target
Tech America
Telecommunications Industry Association
The Chubb Corporation
The Coca-Cola Company
The Entertainment Software Association
The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
The Software Alliance
The Walt Disney Company
The Washington Council on International Trade
The American Council of Life Insurers
Time Warner, Inc.
TUMI
U.S. Apple Association
U.S. Grains Council
United Parcel Service (UPS)
United States Council for International Business (USCIB)
United Technologies
US-ASEAN Business Council
US-New Zealand Council
Viacom
Visa
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Wasserman & Associates
WBC Global
World Trade Center San Diego
Xerox Corporation

The recent leak by Wikileaks shows how the original 8 pages is now 70+ pages.

Here is possibly the best analysis of the TPP so far at least.

KEI analysis of Wikileaks leak of TPP IPR text, from August 30, 2013

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Submitted by James Love on 13. November 2013 - 4:32KEI Comments on the August 30, 2013 version of the TPP IP Chapter
For more information, contact James Love, mailto:james.love@keionline.org, mobile +1.202.361.3040.
Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) has obtained from Wikileaks a complete copy of the consolidated negotiating text for the IP Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). (Copy here, and on the Wikileaks site here: https://wikileaks.org/tpp/) The leaked text was distributed among the Chief Negotiators by the USTR after the 19th Round of Negotiations at Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, in August 27th, 2013.
There have been two rounds since Brunei, and the latest version of the text, from October, will be discussed in Salt Lake City next week.
The text released by Wikileaks is 95 pages long, with 296 footnotes and 941 brackets in the text, and includes details on the positions taken by individual countries.
The document confirms fears that the negotiating parties are prepared to expand the reach of intellectual property rights, and shrink consumer rights and safeguards.
Compared to existing multilateral agreements, the TPP IPR chapter proposes the granting of more patents, the creation of intellectual property rights on data, the extension of the terms of protection for patents and copyrights, expansions of right holder privileges, and increases in the penalties for infringement. The TPP text shrinks the space for exceptions in all types of intellectual property rights. Negotiated in secret, the proposed text is bad for access to knowledge, bad for access to medicine, and profoundly bad for innovation.
The text reveals that the most anti-consumer and anti-freedom country in the negotiations is the United States, taking the most extreme and hard-line positions on most issues. But the text also reveals that several other countries in the negotiation are willing to compromise the public's rights, in a quest for a new trade deal with the United States.
The United States and other countries have defended the secrecy of the negotiations in part on the grounds that the government negotiators receive all the advice they need from 700 corporate advisors cleared to see the text. The U.S. negotiators claim that the proposals need not be subject to public scrutiny because they are merely promoting U.S. legal traditions. Other governments claim that they will resist corporate right holder lobbying pressures. But the version released by Wikileaks reminds us why government officials supervised only by well-connected corporate advisors can't be trusted.
An enduring mystery is the appalling acceptance of the secrecy by the working news media.
With an agreement this complex, the decision to negotiate in secret has all sorts of risks. There is the risk that the negotiations will become hijacked by corporate insiders, but also the risk that negotiators will make unwitting mistakes. There is also the risk that opportunities to do something useful for the public will be overlooked or abandoned, because the parties are not hearing from the less well-connected members of the public.
The U.S. proposals are sometimes more restrictive than U.S. laws, and when consistent, are designed to lock-in the most anti-consumer features. On top of everything else, the U.S. proposals would create new global legal norms that would allow foreign governments and private investors to bring legal actions and win huge damages, if TPP member countries does not embrace anti-consumer practices.
General provisions, and dispute resolution
The existing multilateral copyright and trade treaties, negotiated in the light of day, generally provide better balance between right holders and users. The WTO TRIPS Agreement is the only multilateral agreement with impressive enforcement mechanisms. The TRIPS agreement is defined not only by the specific provisions setting out rights and exceptions, but general provisions, such as Articles 1, 6, 7,8, 40 and 44, that provide a variety of safeguards and protections for users and the public interest. The US is proposing that the new TPP IPR provisions be implemented with few if any of the safeguards found in the TRIPS, or weaker versions of them.
The dispute resolution provisions in the TPP permit both governments and private investors to bring actions and obtain monetary damages if arbitrators find that the implementation of the agreement is not favorable enough to right holders. This effectively gives right holders three bites at the apple -- one at the WTO and two at the TPP. They can lobby governments to advance their positions before a WTO panel, and/or, the separate dispute mechanisms available to governments and investors in the TPP. There are no opportunities for consumers to bring such disputes.
The addition of the investor state dispute resolution provisions in the TPP greatly increases the risks that certain issues will be tested in the TPP, particularly when the TPP provisions are modified to be more favorable to right holders, or lack the moderating influence of the TRIPS type safeguards which the US is blocking in the TPP.
Access to Medicines
The trade agreement includes proposals for more than a dozen measures that would limit competition and raise prices in markets for drugs. These include (but are not limited to) provisions that would lower global standards for obtaining patents, make it easier to file patents in developing countries, extend the term of patents beyond 20 years, and create exclusive rights to rely upon test data as evidence that drugs are safe and effective. Most of these issues have brackets in the text, and one of the most contentious has yet to be tabled -- the term of the monopoly in the test data used to register biologic drugs. The United States is consistently backing the measures that will make drugs more expensive, and less accessible.
Some of the issues are fairly obvious, such as those requiring the granting of more patents with longer effective terms, or monopolies in test data. Others are more technical or subtle in nature, such as the unbracketed wording of Article QQ.A.5, which is designed to narrow the application of a 2001 WTO Doha Agreement TRIPS and Public Health, and its obligations to provide for "access to medicine for all." By changing the language, the TPP makes it seem as if the provision is primarily about "HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, [US oppose: chagas] and other epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency," instead of all medicines and all diseases, including cancer.
Patents on Surgical Methods
An interesting example of how the US seeks to change national and global norms are the provisions in the TPP over patents on surgical methods. The WTO permits countries to exclude "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals." The US wants to flip this provision, so that "may also exclude from patentability" becomes "shall make patents available." However, when a version of the IP Chapter was leaked in 2011, the US trade negotiators were criticized for ignoring the provisions in 28 USC 287 that eliminated remedies for infringement involving the "medical activity" of a "medical practitioner." The exception in US law covered "the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body." The US trade negotiators then proposed adding language that would permit an exception for surgery, but only "if they cover a method of using a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." The US proposal, crafted in consultation with the medical devices lobby, but secret from the general public, was similar, but different from the U.S. statute, which narrowed the exception in cases involving "the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent." How different? As Public Citizen's Burcu Kilic puts it, under the US proposal in the TPP, the exception would only apply to "surgical methods you can perform with your bare hands."
Why is the United States putting so much effort into narrowing if not eliminating the flexibility in the WTO agreement to provide exceptions for patents on "diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals"? It did not hurt that AdvaMed, the trade association for the medical device manufacturers, hired Ralph F. Ives as Executive Vice President for Global Strategy & Analysis. Before becoming a lobbyist for the medical device industry, Ives was the head of pharmaceutical policy for USTR. And Ives is just one of an army of lobbyists (including former Senator Evan Bayh) representing the medical devices industry. ITAC3, the USTR advisory board for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Health/Science Products And Services, includes not only Ralph Ives, but also representatives from Medronic, Abbott, Johnson and Johnson, DemeTech, North Coast Medical and Airmed Biotech -- all companies involved in the medical device business. All are considered "cleared advisors" to USTR and have access to the TPP text.
Uncertainty over compulsory licenses on patents
At present, exceptions to exclusive rights of patents may be implemented under a general exceptions clause (Article 30 of the TRIPS), a rules based system (Article 31), or under other provisions, including limitations to remedies, the first sale doctrine, or the control of anticompetitive practices. The option to use the TRIPS Article 31 mechanisms has been proposed by New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, Chile and Malaysia, but is not currently supported by the US, Japan or other countries. This presents significant uncertainty over the freedom to use compulsory licenses. If QQ.E5quater is not accepted, the rules based WTO approach will not be possible, and governments will have to satisfy a restrictive three step test, and run the risk of litigation under investor state dispute resolution provisions of the TPP.

Article QQ.E.5quater: {Other Use Without Authorisation of the Right Holder}
[NZ/CA/SG/CL/MY propose: Nothing in this Chapter shall limit a Party's rights and obligations under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement or any amendment thereto.]

Copyright
There is little reason for any language on copyright in the TPP. All of the TPP member countries are already members of the WTO, which has its own extensive obligations as regards copyright, including obligations to implement Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention. The TRIPS has already expanded copyright coverage to software, and provides extensive protections to performers, producers of phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting organizations. Moreover, the United States and Australia have proposed that all TPP member countries "ratify or accede" to two 1996 treaties (the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty), as well as the 1974 Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite. Despite this, the TPP provides its own nuanced and often detailed lists of obligations. Collectively, the copyright provisions are designed to extend copyright terms beyond the life plus 50 years found in the Berne Convention, create new exclusive rights, and provide fairly specific instructions as to how copyright is to be managed in the digital environment.
Copyright terms
There are significant differences in the positions of the parties on the term of protection. Some countries are opposing any expansion of the term found in the Berne Convention, the TRIPS or the WCT, which is generally life plus 50 years, or 50 years for corporate owned works.
For the TPP copyright terms, the basics are as follows. The US, Australia, Peru, Singapore and Chile propose a term of life plus 70 years for natural persons. For corporate owned works, the US proposes 95 years exclusive rights, while Australia, Peru, Singapore and Chile propose 70 years for corporate owned works. Mexico wants life plus 100 years for natural persons and 75 years for corporate owned works. For unpublished works, the US wants a term of 120 years.
While the US negotiators are indeed promoting US legal norms, they are promoting norms that most experts and consumers see as a mistake, that should be corrected. There is no justification for 95 year copyright terms for corporations, or 70 years of protection after an author is dead, or 120 years for unpublished works.
3-Step Test
One set of technically complex but profoundly important provisions are those that define the overall space that governments have to create exceptions to exclusive rights. The Berne Convention established a system combining "particular" exceptions for the most common and important topics such as quotations, news of the day, public affairs, speeches, uses of musical compositions, and education, and a general purpose exception to the reproduction right that could be implemented in any other case not covered by the particular exception. Any exception not spelled out as a particular exception was subject to a very restrictive three step test. When the WTO incorporated the bulk of the Berne Convention articles, it retained this system, and added additional areas of flexibility, including very broad freedom to apply the first sale doctrine (Article 6 of the TRIPS), to control anti-competitive practices (Articles 8 and 40), and to implement a liability rule approach through Article 44.2 of the TRIPS.
In recent years, the publisher lobby has sought to elevate the 3-step test to a high level filter to limit all copyright exceptions, including the so called "particular" Berne exceptions, as well as anything else that limits exclusive rights. In the TPP, the copyright lobby has succeeded in obtaining a formulation based in part upon the 1996 WIPO WCT treaty, which can be read to provide some recognition of the Berne particular exceptions, but (unlike the 2012 Beijing treaty) does not specifically reference the important agreed upon statements in the 1996 WCT, which support more robust exceptions.
In its current form, the TPP space for exceptions is less robust than the space provided in the 2012 WIPO Beijing treaty or the 2013 WIPO Marrakesh treaty, and far worse than the TRIPS Agreement. While this involves complex legal issues, the policy ramifications are fairly straightforward. Should governments have a restrictive standard to judge the space available to fashion exceptions for education, quotations, public affairs, news of the day and the several other "particular" exceptions in the Berne Convention, and more generally, why would any government want to give up its general authority to consider fashioning new exceptions, or to control abuses by right holders?
Formalities
The TPP goes beyond the TRIPS agreement in terms of prohibiting the use of formalities for copyright. While the issue of formalities may seem like a settled issue, there is a fair amount of flexibility that will be eliminated by the TPP. At present, it is possible to have requirements for formalities for domestically owned works, and to impose formalities on many types of related rights, including those protected under the Rome Convention. In recent years, copyright policy makers and scholars have begun to reconsider the benefits of the registration of works and other formalities, particularly in light of the extended terms of copyright and the massive orphan works problems.
In April 2013 a major workshop on this topic took place in Berkeley, titled: "Reform(aliz)ing Copyright for the Internet Age?" (http://www.law.berkeley.edu/formalities.htm), where the benefits and challenges of reintroducing formalities was discussed.
On the issue of formalities, the TPP language is an unnecessary and unwelcome barrier to introducing reforms.
TPM/DRM
The copyright section also includes extensive language on technical protection measures, and in particular, the creation of a separate cause of action for breaking technical protection measures. The US wants this separate cause of action to extend even to cases where there is no copyrighted works, such as in cases of public domain materials, or data not protected by copyright. It is worth noting that the restrictions on breaking technical protection measures include several exceptions, including, for example:

"lawfully authorized activities carried out by government employees, agents, or contractors for the purpose of law enforcement, intelligence, essential security, or similar governmental purposes"

In the United States the problem of TPMs and the complicated rulemaking process for exceptions and limitations to anticircumvention measures was part of a recent controversy when the Librarian of Congress refused to renew an exemption to allow the unlocking of cell-phones. After a petition by over 100,000 to the White House, the Obama Administration responded, agreeing that an exemption should exist to permit unlocking of cell-phones. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) introduced a bill, co-sponsored with bipartisan support, called the "Unlocking Technology Act" which would make clear that there is no liability for circumvention of a TPM where circumvention is done to engage in a use that is not an infringement of copyright. Such a bill is potentially threatened by the aggressive proposals on TPMs in the TPP.
The TPP provisions on technological protection measures and copyright and related rights management information are highly contentious and complex, and as a practical matter, impossible to evaluate without access to the negotiating text. Given the enormous public interest in this issue and other issues, it is very unfortunate that governments have insisted on secret negotiations.
Damages
One of the largest disappointments in the ACTA negotiations was the failure to sufficiently moderate the aggressive new norms for damages associated with infringements. The TPP negotiation has been far more secretive than the ACTA negotiation, and what is now clear is that as far as the issue damages is concerned, the TPP text is now much worse than the ACTA text. Particularly objectionable is the unbracketed Article QQ.H.4: 2ter, which reads as follows:

2ter. In determining the amount of damages under paragraph 2, its judicial authorities shall have the authority to consider, inter alia, any legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may include lost profits, the value of the infringed goods or services measured by the market price, or the suggested retail price.

Aside from the obvious overreaching of requiring consideration of "the suggested retail price," the US is ignoring all sorts of national laws for copyright, patents and trademarks, and TRIPS rules as regards layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, that set different standards for damages in cases of infringements. The following are just a few examples:
Under the Article 36 of TRIPS, damages for certain infringement are limited, by the WTO, to "a sum equivalent to a reasonable royalty such as would be payable under a freely negotiated licence in respect of such a layout-design."
Under the Affordable Care Act, a company infringing on undisclosed patents for biologic drugs is only liable for a reasonable royalty, or no royalty, depending upon the nature of the disclosure.
The US DOJ and the USPTO recently took the position that certain patents infringements related to standards setting activities, should be limited to a reasonable royalty.
The US proposal in the TPP will also prevent the United States from using limitations on remedies for infringement as part of a larger effort to expand access to orphaned copyright works -- an approach that has been endorsed by the US Copyright Office, and by Senator Patrick Leahy.
For several other examples, see: " Two areas where ACTA is inconsistent with US law, injunctions and damages, KEI Policy Brief, 2011:2, as well as: Access to Orphan Works, and ACTA provisions on damages KEI Policy Brief 2010: 1.
Concluding comments


Although there are some areas of agreed to text, the leaked text from August 30, 2013 also highlights the numerous areas where parties have yet to finalize the agreement. That there are over 900 brackets means that there is still plenty of opportunity for countries to take positions that will promote the public interest and preserve consumer rights. These areas include substantive sections of the most controversial provisions on patents, medicines, copyright and digital rights where there are often competing proposals. The publication of the text by Wikileaks has created a rare and valuable opportunity to have a public debate on the merits of the agreement, and actions to fix, change or stop the agreement. http://www.keionline.org/node/1825

[Magda Hassan]

[Magda Hassan]

The TPP, if Passed, Spells the End of Popular Sovereignty for The United States

By Lambert Strether of Corrente.
You've heard of popular sovereignty, right? It's embodied in the Preamble of the United States Constitution.[1] I'll quote it for the sheer majesty of the language, archaic though it may seem in these "innovative" days:

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

A popular website ("We Speak Student") explains in its Constitution FAQ:

What is the principle of popular sovereignty?
The principle of popular sovereignty is the idea that a government's power derives only from the consent of the people being governed. The Constitution's first three words"We the People…"establish from the very start that the United States government draws its authority and legitimacy directly from the people. The concept of popular sovereignty differs from the old monarchical belief in the divine right of kings (in which the monarch was said to draw his right to rule directly from God) and also from the British principle of parliamentary sovereignty (in which ultimate authority rested with Parliament rather than with the people directly).

Making it all the more remarkable, or not, that our political class Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Max Baucus and Orrin Hatch, a bipartisan caucus, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Editorial Board of The New York Times, to name a few of the usual suspects would pursue an agreement, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) that sells out popular sovereignty to transnational investors, and allows them to rule us. I know your friends think this sounds like nutty black helicopter stuff, but it's true! It's true! (Tell them to watch Yves on Bill Moyers, in a really sharp transcript.) So bear with me, please, as I work through the thesis. First, I'll look at how TPP replaces popular sovereignty with transnational investor rule, in two ways. Next, I'll take a very quick look at the state of play. Finally, I'll suggest that all is not lost, and in fact the TPP can be defeated.
First, TPP undermines popular sovereignty because it's being written in secret. I'll give a few quotes here, mostly to illustrate that the farther away you get from K Street, the more precise the language becomes. First, Campaign for America's Future:

The next "trade" treaty will be the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This is a huge treaty with only a small part covering trade. Most of the agreement (according to leaks) sets down a new kind of regulatory structure [what does that mean?] for the giant corporations that would supersede the ability of any country to rein them in. The treaty is being negotiated in secret with only business interests "at the table." Representatives of others with a stake in the outcome are not part of the process. Groups representing the interests of consumers, labor, human rights, the environment, democracy or even smaller and innovative companies that might want to compete with the giant multinationals are not part of the negotiations.

To bad about the verticals, not to mention the American people, or their elected representatives. CEPR:

Of course the TPP is not about free trade, in most cases the formal trade barriers between the countries negotiating the pact are relatively low. The main thrust of the negotiations is to impose a regulator[y] structure in a wide range of areas health, safety, environmental which will override national and sub-national rules. This has little to do with trade and in some cases, such as the increased patent protection for prescription drugs being pushed as part of the deal (which is noted in the article), will actually involve increased barriers to trade.

And now Expose the TPP, which makes "regulatory structure" just a wee bit more precise while, again, agreeing on the secrecy:

The Trans-Pacific Partnership n. 1. A "free trade" agreement that would set rules on non-trade matters such as food safety, internet freedom, medicine costs, financial regulation, and the environment. 2. A binding international governance system that would require the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and any other country that signs on to conform their domestic policies to its rules. 3. A secret trade negotiation that has included over 600 official corporate "trade advisors" while hiding the text from Members of Congress, governors, state legislators, the press, civil society, and the public.

Fortunately, and bringing me to the second and more important reason the TPP undermines popular sovereignty, the investment chapter for the TPP was leaked, and the excellent Public Citizen[2] published it (link to the PDF). Their summary in relevant part describes the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions:

These provisions are so extreme that many people unfamiliar with them tend to dismiss description of them or their implications…
Procedural rights that are not available to domestic investors to sue governments outside of national court systems, unconstrained by the rights and obligations of countries' constitutions, laws and domestic court procedures (Section B). There is simply no reason for foreign investors to pursue claims against a nation outside of that nation's judicial system, unless it is in an attempt to obtain greater rights than those provided under national law. Moreover, many of the TPP partners have strong domestic legal systems . For example, TPP partners New Zealand, Australia and Singapore are all ranked by the World Bank as performing at least as well as the United States with regard to control of corruption and adherence to rule of law. Yet in a manner that would enrage right and left alike, the private "investor-state" enforcement system included in the leaked TPP text would empower foreign investors and corporations to skirt domestic courts and laws and sue governments in foreign tribunals. There, they can demand cash compensation from domestic treasuries over domestic policies that they claim undermine their new investor rights and expected future profits. This establishes an alarming two-track system of justice that privileges foreign corporations in myriad ways relative to governments or domestic businesses. It also exposes signatory countries to vast liabilities, as foreign firms use foreign tribunals to raid public treasuries.

So that explains the "new kind of" "regulatory structure," the "binding international governance system" a lot better than I can. Because this new "governance system" is literally, and not metaphorically, revolutionary[3], I took a look at the actual text of the Investment Chapter, made some screen shots, and added some (really sloppy) yellow magic marker highlighting. I should say that I am by no stretch of the imagination a subject matter expert in the language of international trade treaties, though I do know a "shall" when I see it; my purpose in highlighting the text is simply to show passages that the cynical would characterize as "weasel wording," or subject to "lawyerly parsing," or containing, in the vulgate, "loopholes that you could drive a truck through." Also, you may wish to contrast the majesty of the language of the U.S. Constitution with the fluorescent-lit, Orwellian bureaucratese of the Investment Chapter. Also too, you've really got to read this stuff to believe it. So herewith, all from Section 12 and following:

The goal: Equal treatment for investment capital, globally. Does anybody think that's going to be a race to the top for anybody but the global investor class?

Note that the expectation of profit is one of the characteristics of an investment. And what better judge of those expectations could there be than the investor?

Can "expropriation" include state actions that damage an investors expectation of profit? You betcha! Here's how that "direct or indirect" wording gets teased out:

Get a load of those loopholes! "Intangible property rights" and "indirect expropriation" are to be determined on a "case-by-case, fact-based inquiry" as to whether "distinct" (sez who) and "reasonable" (sez who) "expectations" (sea who) were "interfered with." But don't worry, little governments! Only in "rare circumstances" will your "legitimate" (sez who) "public welfare objectives" be considered expropriations. And never mind that one "rare circumstance," if the "expectations" were large enough say, the expectations of the health insurance companies that ObamaCare would never be repealed? could sink a sovereign state entirely.

I really like the part where the writ of your government runs "where applicable."

So the proceedings of the tribunal are "open," unless one of the parties decides it should be closed.

This is the part where, after its open except when randomly closed hearing, the tribunal can order your government to pay an investor for damages to their investment which may, as we saw in the definition of investment, include expectations of a return. (And just in case you think it can't happen here, here's one example, and here's another of the same sort of tribunal, though not yet the TPP.)
Second, and briefly, the state of play. Via AEI:

[T]he potential impact of the president's no-show at TPP negotiations [a positive result of the government shutdown] is a likewise negative development but not necessarily a fatal one to the successful conclusion of the agreement. With or without Obama's presence, the situation with regards to the negotiations stands as follows. Since 2010, when serious bargaining began, there have been 19 negotiating sessions. At this point, most if not all of the technical underbrush has been cleared away by the trade bureaucrats from the 12 member states. What is left is a group of at least a dozen highly sensitive political questions and judgments that must be settled by political leaders. Among the issues outstanding are rules and commitments related to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the environment, labor, market access and rules of origin, intellectual property (IP), government procurement, services and investment, regulatory coherence and coordination, and data flows and protection, among others. (The list will vary from observer to observer and cannot be conclusive since no actual potential text has been made public).

No potential for conflict there! But to get the TPP passed, Obama needs "fast track" trade promotion authority (TPA) that he doesn't have. Can he get it? Politico:

As the administration is trying to wrap up talks on the Trans-Pacific Partnership by the end of the year, "they have handicapped themselves by not having trade promotion authority," said a former U.S. trade official who asked not to be identified. "You cannot strike the right balance of ambition in the agreement [whatever that means] if you have one hand tied behind your back."
Leaders of the 12 TPP countries wound up announcing the goal of finishing the talks by the end of the year, but some think if Obama had been there, they would have declared the deal virtually complete, creating the impetus for key committees in Congress to take up the trade promotion authority bill. Instead, it waits in the wings, assembly required, with no agreement yet on how to put it together.

Good. Let's hope it rots there.
Finally, all is not lost, for at least four reasons:
1.) Obama is a lame duck. A guy who can't launch a website for his signature domestic initiative shouldn't be let anywhere near an international agreement that creates a "binding international governance system." Yikes! Bad idea!
2.) Fast track is on the rocks because of yet another "strange bedfellows" alliance.FT:

The Obama administration's efforts to secure "fast track" authority deemed vital to seal trade deals with Europe and Asia have run into resistance from "an unholy alliance" of Democrats and conservative Republicans on Capitol Hill.

3.) Lots of resistance back in the district. Here's a handy map that states and localities can look at if they want to see who can sue them; and here's a letter state legislators wrote.
4.) Other democracies don't like the TPP any better than we do. Here's one view from Japan.
So get it together, talk it up, write that letter to the editor, and do whatever else you can! The Constitution we've got will do 'til another one comes along, and the TPP isn't that. Did you vote for this, or anything remotely like it?
NOTES
[1] In connection with putative trade deals, there is also this language in Article I, Section 8:

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes…

[2] I sure wish Public Citizen weren't so PDF heavy. It's really hard to deep link into their stuff, or quote from it, and their work deserves the widest possible circulation.
[3] I know that the approach of TPP is similar to NAFTA, but TPP covers ~40% of the world's GDP.
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/11/t...tates.html