Ur Imperialism

[Peter Lemkin]

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Ur Imperialism

By Michael Brenner [/TD]
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Imperialism is a state of mind as much as it is a structure ofdomination. That truth is central to understanding the attitude ofthose who presume to impose their will on others, to run theaffairs of alien people, to control what they may do and what theymay not do. Thinking in this way of the varied phenomena that welabel imperialism helps to clarify what they share and where theydiverge. It allows making finer grained discriminations that areespecially valuable when analyzing the recent behavior of theUnited States. For its serial interventions do not fit comfortablyinto categories borrowed from the past. America's self decreedspheres of domination do not constitute another Roman empire, aBritish Empire, a Russian Empire or in fact anything the world hasseen before. Yet it does share with imperial powers of another daycertain features. They are most pronounced in the mindset that ispermissive of actions directed at taking charge of others withouttheir approval.
1. A strong sense ofsuperiority is the bedrock of the imperial mindset.It enables and it justifies imposing oneself on others. Theingredients of superiority are physical, political and moral.Psychologically, they reinforce each other. They also are fungible-- to varying degrees.
Military prowess, in making the practical tasks of occupationand coercion easier, feeds the 'we are better" syndrome whileemboldening the nation to pursue audacious ambition. Being able todo something shifts the balance in judging whether we ought to doit. For it promises to confer success. One cannot imagine recentactions of the United States vis a vis Iraq or Afghanistan withoutassigning a crucial place to a military capacity assuring that wecould work our will insofar as defeating opposing forces isconcerned.
Political superiority manifests itself in two ways: as thefactor that makes possible the projection of military power, and inthe conviction that "we" can actually improve the life of thenatives by providing them with the order and 'enlightened'institutions which they themselves are unable to provide. Thatsupposed inability is manifest (a) in their very incapacity toresist us, and, (b) in the internal conditions that allow things tohappen that vex us, e.g. harbors for terrorists to plot attacks,drug dealers to operate, or pirates to raid.
Moral superiority is integral to the mix, especially for thosewho prize their self designated virtue -- and see themselves ashaving a selfless interest in promoting it in other lands. Thesedays that is a critical element. It has been true to a lesserextent since the Enlightenment -- thus France's 'missioncivilisatrice' and Britain's vain belief in advancing the cause ofprogress on all fronts. A keen sense of being a 'good' peopleconcerned about uplifting others salves consciences, erases doubtsand permits using dubious means to accomplish supposedly worthyends. The names Washington gives to its military actions expressthat feeling: Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom.This convenient perspective paves the way, of course, for theroutinization of hypocrisy. It legitimizes oppressive means thatwould be deemed intolerable if visited upon us, and it masksselfish aims and purposes.
2. For the imperial mind, theimmediate reason for intervention can beinsignificant relative to the response. Theincident stimulates what is a strongpredisposition. In some instances, it serves merely as anexcuse: "Remember the Maine," the Bey of Algiers' flyswatter thatbrushed the face of the French envoy; a Chinese governor'scrackdown on opium trafficking; the phantom Tonkin Gulf attack;Saddam's foot-dragging about allowing United Nations' inspectorsunimpeded access to all Iraqi facilities. At other times, there maybe a serious provocation, 9/11 triggering the 2001 invasion ofAfghanistan. In all these cases, the imperial actor is alreadyprogrammed to act aggressively and to disregard possible ensuingcomplications -- diplomatic or military.
3. The imperial mindsetis comfortable with taking charge of otherpeoples. Doing so is not felt as odd or improper.Controlling and giving direction to the 'natives' is, in fact,praiseworthy insofar as it carries the promise of their betterment,as well as for oneself. The contemporary term for that is"nation-building' -- although a pre-existing nation and/or statemay be in place but whose leadership and political coloration wedislike. Human rights abuses and poor economic conditions are takenas both evidence of the current regime's dereliction and ajustification for intervention. Imperialist thinking arrogates toitself the right to make that judgment according to its own lights.That was the logic of the American actions in Cuba, thePhilippines, multiple Caribbean countries and more recently in theIslamic world.
The decision to intervene is viewed as the competent/virtuousnation's alone. It requires no higher authority since none isrecognized or deemed qualified. Good intentions create their ownlegitimacy. These days, there is some sensitivity to legitimacy. Soit is desirable to have partners who serve as auxiliaries to theenterprise. Their presence masks the truth of it being in essence aunilateral action. The formal laying on of hands by a collectivesecurity organization has practical advantages, too, even if itcomes after the fact. But, in principle, the 'world community' inany guise has no rightful place in making key determinations. TheUnited State was not dissuaded from invading Iraq despite theSecurity Council's unwillingness to give permission. Urimperialists know best, and know that they know best.
Similarly, it is unnecessary to get the prior approval of thepeople being subjugated. After all, if they both knew what theirown enlightened interests were and were free to express them, theoccasion for the intervention would not have arisen. Dictatorships,especially hostile ones, lower the threshold for intervention sincethey are seen as preventing the latter condition from being met.Post hoc approval by the natives is inferred from theirparticipation in whatever governing mechanisms are put in place;even acquiescence is interpreted as confirming the occupier'srighteousness and as bestowing legitimacy. The extremity of thisconceit was manifest in Washington's labeling the Iraqi insurgents"Anti-Iraqi Forces." It also was implicit in Joe Biden's walkingaway from his dinner in Ahmed Karzai's presidential palacelaunching verbal barbs in a flurry of Parthian shots. Unannouncedvisits by American dignitaries reflect the same attitude.
4. An absence ofempathy for the locals and a consonant dulling ofsensibilities about the duress they experience is integral to theimperial personality. Cultural knowledge is sought only oninstrumental terms. It is extracted and processed as just anotherkind of information. To develop an understanding of the nativessufficient to allow for identification with them is to threaten theinnate feelings of superiority and perhaps to heighten theawareness of being an alien intruder. That is why, nowadays, thereis a preference for using "native" interpreters and home-grownexperts as tag-ons in performing occupation missions.
Lack of cultural preparation may also be represented as a signthat there is no intention of being a long-term occupier. A sign tothe locals, to outside parties and to whomever looks askance asdeclarations that there is no imperial intent or purpose. At thesame time, containing empathy is a way of avoiding inhibition aboutthe use of violence. For it allows a degree of depersonalization ofthe civilian casualties that are an inescapable accompaniment tomilitary action. Guilt and inhibition about committing unsavoryacts are muted when dealing with a depersonalized 'them' ratherthan actual persons whose character and individuality emerges froma known socio-cultural context. Vulgar epithets fit thispsychology: e.g. rag-heads or hajis.
Depersonalization of the locals is evident as well in thedevaluation of deaths and casualties. The fixation solely withone's own losses continues in the post-mortems. Hence, theso-called "balance-sheets" drawn of the United States' Iraqienterprise slight the devastating price paid by the Iraqi populacein general.
5. The imperial state of mind isstrengthened by being a collectivephenomenon. Emotions play a bigger role than doesdeliberate thought in justifying, sustaining and then whitewashingan intervention. This is particularly important in countries whereinvasion and occupation go against the grain of nationalself-image. A threshold of initial intensity must be crossed tofuel passions that can override habit and inhibition. 9/11 didexactly that. By providing both motivation and a blanketjustification for whatever is done, that permits the imperialmindset can grow and sustain itself whatever happens 'out there.'Emotions of this kind have the further effect of silencing and/orignoring critics who may bring to the fore uncomfortable facts. Inother words, group think and implicit group censorship gohand-in-hand. Selective perception thereby becomes a constant inthe imperial mind set.
'Imperial' behavior generates momentum that is as much mental asit is political or organizational. One gets accustomed to doingcertain things that may have seemed disagreeable if not unnaturalat the outset. The second and third times become instinctivelyeasier. This holds even where the first intervention/occupation hasbeen anything but an unalloyed success. The accommodating attitudesbecome routinized as inertia of all kinds carries the processforward. The imperial mentality feeds on itself just as oneintervention creates a military cum political dynamic that impels anation towards subsequent interventions. We saw this in round II ofthe Afghan intervention when attention diverted to Iraq returned.The same dubious methods (stress on kinetic action, unfocusedattacks producing collateral damage); the same absence of strategicdesign (when will we know success?: "we'll recognize it when we seeit"); the same lack of candor in communicating goals andacknowledging trade-offs; and the same moral compromises were madedespite the painful failures and high costs registered in Iraq.
6. A companion feature of the imperialmentality is its susceptibility to becoming prisonerof expectations. To set down the path of imposing oneselfon others is to make a bet on success. For the stake is not onlythe stated objective but all that has been invested in the project.Beyond resources - human, financial, diplomatic -there iscollective self esteem. There is the collectivity's sense of moralworth. This last figures prominently in the mentality of a liberaldemocratic society that cultivates the idea of its intrinsicgoodness. To come up short (much less fail outright) is bad enough.To make hostage to that failure something that one supposedlycherishes is to court a crisis of self doubt and plunging morale.Paradoxically, plowing ahead can put off that day of reckoning bykeeping regrets at bay- for a time. This is so even where theultimate consequences are more deleterious due to such mindlessinertia.

7. The imperial personality ishighly judgmental. It is free and easy with criticism ofthe 'natives.' The typical mode of address is to instruct, tolecture, to correct, to remonstrate, to scold and, if necessary, tocoerce. The underlying sense of superiority means that if somethinggoes badly, then 'they' have to be at fault -- for one reason oranother. To admit error, much less to apologize for it, is toundercut that image of superiority. Giving oneself license to treatthe natives as subordinates is a way of defending the core premisethat I have a right to take custody of you. Acceptance of equalityon any plane is incompatible with the imperial mindset. Hence theimportance placed on segregated, self contained residentialcompounds.
8. Rebellion againstinvasion/occupation is neither authentic nor valid tothe imperialist mind. It is be denounced and repressed.The more serious the rebellion, the stronger the impulse to castits members as evil-doers. This line of thinking/feeling flows fromthe justification for the intervention relied on in the firstplace. To acknowledge that rebels have any fair reason to turn ontheir occupiers is to call into question the legitimacy of what thedominant party is doing.
Moreover, rejection is labeled ingratitude. This reaction is indirect proportion to the extent to which the occupation isdescribed as benevolent and in the best interest of the 'natives'.That explains why the charge of ingratitude is so heavily freightedthese days. It is not an entirely novel phenomenon, as a perusal ofthe graphic portraits of diabolical Sepoy rebels drawn in Britishjournals makes stunningly clear.
9. Since the aims and methods of theenterprise are declared unimpeachable, since the advertised end isto improve life for the locals, the attempt by anyother outside party to exercise influence is by its very naturecondemned as offensive, pernicious and hostile. Thatlogic was applied to Iran's connections with leading Shi'itepoliticians in Iraq. American officials were not at all consciousof contradiction between their presence as an occupying power at adistance of 6,000 miles and their righteous denunciations ofneighboring Iran's intervention in Iraq's sovereign affairs --however indirect and/or by invitation.
Conclusion
Whatever label we choose to describe the American sense ofnational self and attitude toward others, it is instructive to takecognizance of what is shared with other powers that exercisedglobal predominance. Admittedly, that carries us only so far -- andnot only because circumstances differ in important respects.Geopolitical strategy cannot be separated from the workings of thecollective American psyche. To probe where we are as a nation, andwhat will be required of us were we to reconsider our purpose andplace in the world, the imperative need is coming to grips with ourcollective identity. To put it succinctly: is national andindividual self esteem so rooted in the belief of Americanexceptionalism and superiority that it would be fatally impaired byacknowledging our ordinariness? and, does the sense of being anonpareil people necessitate global preeminence?