Thread Rating:
  • 0 Vote(s) - 0 Average
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
Area 51 - New Limited Modified Hangout In LAT
#1
After decades of denying the facility's existence, five former insiders speak out
by Annie Jacobsen
Area 51. It's the most famous military institution in the world that doesn't officially exist. If it did, it would be found about 100 miles outside Las Vegas in Nevada's high desert, tucked between an Air Force base and an abandoned nuclear testing ground. Then again, maybe not— the U.S. government refuses to say. You can't drive anywhere close to it, and until recently, the airspace overhead was restricted—all the way to outer space. Any mention of Area 51 gets redacted from official documents, even those that have been declassified for decades.

It has become the holy grail for conspiracy theorists, with UFOlogists positing that the Pentagon reverse engineers flying saucers and keeps extraterrestrial beings stored in freezers. Urban legend has it that Area 51 is connected by underground tunnels and trains to other secret facilities around the country. In 2001, Katie Couric told Today Show audiences that 7 percent of Americans doubt the moon landing happened—that it was staged in the Nevada desert. Millions of X-Files fans believe the truth may be "out there," but more likely it's concealed inside Area 51's Strangelove-esque hangars—buildings that, though confirmed by Google Earth, the government refuses to acknowledge

April 05, 2009 Issue

The problem is the myths of Area 51 are hard to dispute if no one can speak on the record about what actually happened there. Well, now, for the first time, someone is ready to talk—in fact, five men are, and their stories rival the most outrageous of rumors. Colonel Hugh "Slip" Slater, 87, was commander of the Area 51 base in the 1960s. Edward Lovick, 90, featured in "What Plane?" in LA's March issue, spent three decades radar testing some of the world's most famous aircraft (including the U-2, the A-12 OXCART and the F-117). Kenneth Collins, 80, a CIA experimental test pilot, was given the silver star. Thornton "T.D." Barnes, 72, was an Area 51 special-projects engineer. And Harry Martin, 77, was one of the men in charge of the base's half-million-gallon monthly supply of spy-plane fuels. Here are a few of their best stories—for the record:

On May 24, 1963, Collins flew out of Area 51's restricted airspace in a top-secret spy plane code-named OXCART, built by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. He was flying over Utah when the aircraft pitched, flipped and headed toward a crash. He ejected into a field of weeds.

Almost 46 years later, in late fall of 2008, sitting in a coffee shop in the San Fernando Valley, Collins remembers that day with the kind of clarity the threat of a national security breach evokes: "Three guys came driving toward me in a pickup. I saw they had the aircraft canopy in the back. They offered to take me to my plane." Until that moment, no civilian without a top-secret security clearance had ever laid eyes on the airplane Collins was flying. "I told them not to go near the aircraft. I said it had a nuclear weapon on-board." The story fit right into the Cold War backdrop of the day, as many atomic tests took place in Nevada. Spooked, the men drove Collins to the local highway patrol. The CIA disguised the accident as involving a generic Air Force plane, the F-105, which is how the event is still listed in official records.

As for the guys who picked him up, they were tracked down and told to sign national security nondisclosures. As part of Collins' own debriefing, the CIA asked the decorated pilot to take truth serum. "They wanted to see if there was anything I'd for-gotten about the events leading up to the crash." The Sodium Pento-thal experience went without a hitch—except for the reaction of his wife, Jane.

"Late Sunday, three CIA agents brought me home. One drove my car; the other two carried me inside and laid me down on the couch. I was loopy from the drugs. They handed Jane the car keys and left without saying a word." The only conclusion she could draw was that her husband had gone out and gotten drunk. "Boy, was she mad," says Collins with a chuckle.

At the time of Collins' accident, CIA pilots had been flying spy planes in and out of Area 51 for eight years, with the express mission of providing the intelligence to prevent nuclear war. Aerial reconnaissance was a major part of the CIA's preemptive efforts, while the rest of America built bomb shelters and hoped for the best.

"It wasn't always called Area 51," says Lovick, the physicist who developed stealth technology. His boss, legendary aircraft designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson, called the place Paradise Ranch to entice men to leave their families and "rough it" out in the Nevada desert in the name of science and the fight against the evil empire. "Test pilot Tony LeVier found the place by flying over it," says Lovick. "It was a lake bed called Groom Lake, selected for testing because it was flat and far from anything. It was kept secret because the CIA tested U-2s there."

When Frances Gary Powers was shot down over Sverdlovsk, Russia, in 1960, the U-2 program lost its cover. But the CIA already had Lovick and some 200 scientists, engineers and pilots working at Area 51 on the A-12 OXCART, which would outfox Soviet radar using height, stealth and speed.

Col. Slater was in the outfit of six pilots who flew OXCART missions during the Vietnam War. Over a Cuban meat and cheese sandwich at the Bahama Breeze restaurant off the Las Vegas Strip, he says, "I was recruited for the Area after working with the CIA's classified Black Cat Squadron, which flew U-2 missions over denied territory in Mainland China. After that, I was told, 'You should come out to Nevada and work on something interesting we're doing out there.' "

Even though Slater considers himself a fighter pilot at heart—he flew 84 missions in World War II—the opportunity to work at Area 51 was impossible to pass up. "When I learned about this Mach-3 aircraft called OXCART, it was completely intriguing to me—this idea of flying three times the speed of sound! No one knew a thing about the program. I asked my wife, Barbara, if she wanted to move to Las Vegas, and she said yes. And I said, 'You won't see me but on the weekends,' and she said, 'That's fine!' " At this recollection, Slater laughs heartily. Barbara, dining with us, laughs as well. The two, married for 63 years, are rarely apart today.

"We couldn't have told you any of this a year ago," Slater says. "Now we can't tell it to you fast enough." That is because in 2007, the CIA began declassifying the 50-year-old OXCART program. Today, there's a scramble for eyewitnesses to fill in the information gaps. Only a few of the original players are left. Two more of them join me and the Slaters for lunch: Barnes, formerly an Area 51 special-projects engineer, with his wife, Doris; and Martin, one of those overseeing the OXCART's specially mixed jet fuel (regular fuel explodes at extreme height, temperature and speed), with his wife, Mary. Because the men were sworn to secrecy for so many decades, their wives still get a kick out of hearing the secret tales.

Barnes was married at 17 (Doris was 16). To support his wife, he became an electronics wizard, buying broken television sets, fixing them up and reselling them for five times the original price. He went from living in bitter poverty on a Texas Panhandle ranch with no electricity to buying his new bride a dream home before he was old enough to vote. As a soldier in the Korean War, Barnes demonstrated an uncanny aptitude for radar and Nike missile systems, which made him a prime target for recruitment by the CIA—which indeed happened when he was 22. By 30, he was handling nuclear secrets.

"The agency located each guy at the top of a certain field and put us together for the programs at Area 51," says Barnes. As a security precaution, he couldn't reveal his birth name—he went by the moniker Thunder. Coworkers traveled in separate cars, helicopters and airplanes. Barnes and his group kept to themselves, even in the mess hall. "Our special-projects group was the most classified team since the Manhattan Project," he says.

Harry Martin's specialty was fuel. Handpicked by the CIA from the Air Force, he underwent rigorous psychological and physical tests to see if he was up for the job. When he passed, the CIA moved his family to Nevada. Because OXCART had to refuel frequently, the CIA kept supplies at secret facilities around the globe. Martin often traveled to these bases for quality-control checks. He tells of preparing for a top-secret mission from Area 51 to Thule, Greenland. "My wife took one look at me in these arctic boots and this big hooded coat, and she knew not to ask where I was going."

So, what of those urban legends—the UFOs studied in secret, the underground tunnels connecting clandestine facilities? For decades, the men at Area 51 thought they'd take their secrets to the grave. At the height of the Cold War, they cultivated anonymity while pursuing some of the country's most covert projects. Conspiracy theories were left to popular imagination. But in talking with Collins, Lovick, Slater, Barnes and Martin, it is clear that much of the folklore was spun from threads of fact.

As for the myths of reverse engineering of flying saucers, Barnes offers some insight: "We did reverse engineer a lot of foreign technology, including the Soviet MiG fighter jet out at the Area"—even though the MiG wasn't shaped like a flying saucer. As for the underground-tunnel talk, that, too, was born of truth. Barnes worked on a nuclear-rocket program called Project NERVA, inside underground chambers at Jackass Flats, in Area 51's backyard. "Three test-cell facilities were connected by railroad, but everything else was underground," he says.

And the quintessential Area 51 conspiracy—that the Pentagon keeps captured alien spacecraft there, which they fly around in restricted airspace? Turns out that one's pretty easy to debunk. The shape of OXCART was unprece-dented, with its wide, disk-like fuselage designed to carry vast quantities of fuel. Commercial pilots cruising over Nevada at dusk would look up and see the bottom of OXCART whiz by at 2,000-plus mph. The aircraft's tita-nium body, moving as fast as a bullet, would reflect the sun's rays in a way that could make anyone think, UFO.

In all, 2,850 OXCART test flights were flown out of Area 51 while Slater was in charge. "That's a lot of UFO sightings!" Slater adds. Commercial pilots would report them to the FAA, and "when they'd land in California, they'd be met by FBI agents who'd make them sign nondisclosure forms." But not everyone kept quiet, hence the birth of Area 51's UFO lore. The sightings incited uproar in Nevada and the surrounding areas and forced the Air Force to open Project BLUE BOOK to log each claim.

Since only a few Air Force officials were cleared for OXCART (even though it was a joint CIA/USAF project), many UFO sightings raised internal military alarms. Some generals believed the Russians might be sending stealth craft over American skies to incite paranoia and create widespread panic of alien invasion. Today, BLUE BOOK findings are housed in 37 cubic feet of case files at the National Archives—74,000 pages of reports. A keyword search brings up no mention of the top-secret OXCART or Area 51.

Project BLUE BOOK was shut down in 1969—more than a year after OXCART was retired. But what continues at America's most clandestine military facility could take another 40 years to disclose.

Two images below - one of access road and on from Google Earch

http://www.latimes.com/la-mag-april05200...6384.story


Attached Files
.jpg   Area 51 Road.jpg (Size: 44.79 KB / Downloads: 8)
.jpg   area51Googleearth.jpg (Size: 4.11 KB / Downloads: 3)
"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
Reply
#2
Peter Lemkin Wrote:Harry Martin's specialty was fuel ... Because OXCART had to refuel frequently, the CIA kept supplies at secret facilities around the globe.

The shape of OXCART was unprece-dented, with its wide, disk-like fuselage designed to carry vast quantities of fuel.

This subtle "fuel" business is the gold within the iron pyrite, and it gives away the game. It's all about protecting propulsion systems, I think.

Pure disinformation.
Reply
#3
Charles Drago Wrote:
Peter Lemkin Wrote:Harry Martin's specialty was fuel ... Because OXCART had to refuel frequently, the CIA kept supplies at secret facilities around the globe.

The shape of OXCART was unprece-dented, with its wide, disk-like fuselage designed to carry vast quantities of fuel.

This subtle "fuel" business is the gold within the iron pyrite, and it gives away the game. It's all about protecting propulsion systems, I think.

Pure disinformation.

Interesting they mentioned in an off-hand sort of way a lenticular-shaped craft.....I think they've had some of that shape since 1945 out there.

Below, more limited modified hangout on Area 51.







Web Master Note:
Credit is given to Thomas P. McIninch for compiling the story below. Considering the secrecy surrounding even the existence of black projects occurring at Groom Lake, the declassified records complied by Mr. McIninch are an invaluable documentation of an extremely "black" era of the CIA's stewardship of this dry lake facility.

THE OXCART STORY


SR-71 Movie Clip

YF-12 Movie Clip


CREDITS:
Thomas P. McIninch, available from Skunk Works Digest. Joe Baugher Lockheed Aircraft Since 1913, Rene J. Francillon, Naval Institute Press,1987. The American Fighter, Enzo Angelucci and Peter Bowers,Orion Books,1987. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Aircraft Armament,Bill Gunston,Orion Books, 1988. Lockheed Blackbirds, Anthony M. Thorborough and Peter E. Davies, Motorbooks International, 1988.

Unclassified security ratings that are for historical interest only. This page and the document it comes from, entitled OXCART History (DON: SC-86-010115), has been UNCLASSIFIED according to Senior Crown Security Class Guide dated 11/01/89, approved and dated 25 February 91.
S= Secret
C= Classified
U= Unclassified

(S) One spring day in 1962 a test pilot named Louis Schalk, employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, took off from the Nevada desert in an aircraft the like of which had never been seen before. A casual observer would have been startled by the appearance of this vehicle; he would perhaps have noticed especially its extremely long, slim, shape, its two enormous jet engines, its long sharp, projecting nose, and its swept-back wings which appeared far too short to support the fuselage in flight. He might well have realized that this was a revolutionary airplane; he could not have known that it would be able to fly at three times the speed of sound for more than 3,000 miles without refueling, or that toward the end of its flight, when fuel began to run low, it could cruise at over 90,000 feet. Still less would he have known of the equipment it was to carry, or of the formidable problems attending its design and construction.

(U) There was, of course, no casual observer present. The aircraft had been designed and built for reconnaissance; it was projected as a successor to the U-2. Its development had been carried out in profound secrecy. Despite the numerous designers, engineers, skilled and unskilled workers, administrators and others who had been involved in the affair, no authentic accounts, and indeed scarcely any accounts at all, had leaked. Many aspects have not been revealed to this day, and many are likely to remain classified for some time to come.

(S) The official designation of the aircraft was A-12. By a sort of inspired perversity, however, it came to be called OXCART, a code word also applied to the program under which it was developed. The secrecy in which it was so long shrouded has lifted a bit, and the purpose of this article is to give some account of the inception, development, operation, and untimely demise of this Remarkable airplane. The OXCART no longer flies, but it left a legacy of technological achievement which points the way to new projects. And it became the progenitor of a similar but somewhat less sophisticated reconnaissance vehicle called the SR-71, whose existence is well known to press and public.

The U-2 dated from 1954, when its development began under the direction of a group headed by Richard M. Bissell of CIA. In June 1956, the aircraft became operational, but officials predicted that its useful lifetime over the USSR could hardly be much more than 18 months or two years. Its first flight over Soviet territory revealed that the defense warning system not only detected but tracked it quite accurately. Yet, it remained a unique and (S) invaluable source of intelligence information for almost four years, until on 1 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot down near Sverdlovsk.

(U) Meanwhile, even as the U-2 commenced its active career, efforts were under way to make it less vulnerable. The hope was to reduce the vehicle's radar cross-section, so that it would become less susceptible to detection. New developments in radar-absorbing materials were tried out and achieved considerable success, though not enough to solve the problem. Various far-out designs were explored, most of them seeking to create an aircraft capable of flying at extremely high altitudes, though still at relatively slow speed. None of them proved practicable.

(S) Eventually, in the fall of 1957, Bissell arranged with a contractor for a job of operations analysis to determine how far the probability of shooting down an airplane varied respectively with the plane's speed, altitude, and radar cross-section. This analysis demonstrated that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of detection by radar. The probability of being shot down was not of course reduced to zero, but it was evident that the supersonic line of approach was worth serious consideration. Therefore, from this time on, attention focused increasingly on the possibility of building a vehicle which could fly at extremely high speeds as well as great altitudes, and which would also incorporate the best that could be attained in radar-absorbing capabilities. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and Convair Division of General Dynamics were informed of the general requirements, and their designers set to work on the problem without as yet receiving any contract or funds from the government. From the fall of 1957 to late 1958 these designers constantly refined and adapted their respective schemes.

(S) Bissell realized that development and production of such an aircraft would be exceedingly expensive, and that in the early stages at least it would be doubtful whether the project could succeed. To secure the necessary funds for such a program, high officials would have to receive the best and most authoritative presentation of whatever prospects might unfold. Accordingly, he got together a panel consisting of two distinguished authorities on aero- dynamics and one physicist, with E. M. Land of the Polaroid Corporation as chairman. Between 1957 and 1959 this panel met about six times, usually in Land's office in Cambridge. Lockheed and Convair designers attended during parts of the sessions. So also did the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy concerned with research and development, together with one or two of their technical advisors. One useful consequence of the participation of service representatives was that bureaucratic and jurisdictional feuds were reduced virtually to nil. Throughout the program both Air Force and Navy gave valuable assistance and cooperation.

(S) As the months went by, the general outlines of what might be done took shape in the minds of those concerned. Late in November 1958, the members of the panel held a crucial meeting. They agreed that it now appeared feasible to build an aircraft of such speed and altitude as to be very difficult to track by radar. They recommended that the president be asked to approve in principle a further prosecution of the project, and to make funds available for further studies and tests. The president and his Scientific Advisor, Dr. James Killian were already aware of what was going on, and when CIA officials went to them with the recommendations of the panel they received a favorable hearing. The President gave his approval. Lockheed and Convair were then asked to submit definite proposals, funds were made available to them, and the project took on the code name GUSTO.

Less than a year later the two proposals were essentially complete, and on 20 July 1959, the President was again briefed. This time he gave final approval, which signified that the program could get fully under way.

The next major step was to choose between the Lockheed and Convair designs. On 20 August 1959 specifications of the two proposals were submitted to a joint DOD/USAF/CIA selection panel:
(S) The Lockheed design was selected, Project GUSTO terminated, and the program to develop a new U-2 follow-on aircraft was names OXCART. On 3 September 1959, CIA authorized Lockheed to proceed with antiradar studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering designs, and on 30 January 1960 gave the green light to produce 12 aircraft.

(S) Pratt and Whitney Division of United Aircraft Corporation had been involved in discussions of the project, and undertook to develop the propulsion system. Their J-58 engine, which was to be used in the A-12, had been sponsored originally by the US Navy for its own purposes, and was to be capable of a speed of Mach 3.0. Navy interest in the development was diminishing, however, and the Secretary of Defense had decided to withdraw from the program at the end of 1959. CIA's requirement was that the engine and aircraft be further developed and optimized for a speed of Mach 3.2. The new contract called for initial assembly of three advanced experimental engines for durability and reliability testing, and provision of three engines for experimental flight testing in early 1961.

(S) The Primary camera manufacturer was Perkin-Elmer. Because of the extreme complexity of the design, however, a decision was soon made that a back-up system might be necessary in the event the Perkin-Elmer design ran into production problems, and Eastman Kodak was also asked to build a camera. Minneapolis-Honeywell Corporation was selected to provide both the inertial navigation and automatic flight control system. The Firewell Corporation and the David Clark Corporation became the prime sources of pilot equipment and associated life support hardware.

(U) Lockheed's designer was Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, creator of the U-2, and he called his new vehicle not A-12 but A-11. Its design exhibited many innovations. Supersonic airplanes, however, involve a multitude of extremely difficult design problems. Their payload-range performance is highly sensitive to engine weight, structural weight, fuel consumption, and aerodynamic efficiency. Small mistakes in predicting these values can lead to large errors in performance. Models of the A-11 were tested and retested, adjusted and readjusted, during thousands of hours in the wind tunnel. Johnson was confident of his design, but no one could say positively whether the bird would fly, still less whether it would fulfill the extremely demanding requirements laid down for it.

(U) To make the drawings and test the model was one thing; to build the air- craft was another. The most numerous problems arose from the simple fact that in flying through the atmosphere at its designed speed the skin of the air- craft would be subjected to a temperature of more than 550 degrees Fahrenheit. For one thing, no metal hitherto commonly used in aircraft production would stand this temperature, and those which would do so were for the most part too heavy to be suitable for the purpose in hand.

(S) During the design phase Lockheed evaluated many materials and finally chose an alloy of titanium, characterized by great strength, relatively light weight, and good resistance to high temperatures. Titanium was also scarce and very costly. Methods for milling it and controlling the quality of the product were not fully developed. Of the early deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation some 80 percent had to be rejected, and it was not until 1961, when a delegation from headquarters visited the officials of that company, informed them of the objectives and high priority of the OXCART program, and gained their full cooperation, that the supply became consistently satisfactory.

(S) But this only solved an initial problem. One of the virtues of titanium was its exceeding hardness, but this very virtue gave rise to immense difficulties in machining and shaping the material. Drills which worked well on aluminum soon broke to pieces; new ones had to be devised. Assembly-line production was impossible; each of the small OXCART fleet was, so to speak, turned out by hand. The cost of the program mounted well above original estimates, and it soon began to run behind schedule. One after another, however, the problems were solved, and their solution constituted the greatest single technological achievement of the entire enterprise. Henceforth it became practicable, if expensive, to build aircraft out of titanium. (S) Since every additional pound of weight was critical, adequate insulation was out of the question. The inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. The pilot would have to wear a kind of space suit, with its own cooling apparatus, pressure control, oxygen supply, and other necessities for survival. The fuel tanks, which constituted by far the greater part of the aircraft, would heat up to about 350 degrees, so that special fuel had to be supplied and the tanks themselves rendered inert with nitrogen. Lubricating oil was formulated for operation at 600 degrees F., and contained a diluent in order to remain fluid at operation below 40 degrees. Insulation on the plane's intricate wiring soon became brittle and useless. During the lifetime of the OXCART no better insulation was found; the wiring and related connectors had to be given special attention and handling at great cost in labor and time.

(S) Then there was the unique problem of the camera window. The OXCART was to carry a delicate and highly sophisticated camera, which would look out through a quartz glass window. The effectiveness of the whole system depended upon achieving complete freedom from optical distortion despite the great heat to which the window would be subjected. Thus the question was not simply one of providing equipment with resistance to high temperature, but of assuring that there should be no unevenness of temperature throughout the area of the window. It took three years of time and two million dollars of money to arrive at a satisfactory solution. The program scored one of its most Remarkable successes when the quartz glass was successfully fused to its metal frame by an unprecedented process involving the use of high frequency sound waves.

(S) Another major problem of different nature was to achieve the low radar cross-section desired. The airframe areas giving the greatest radar return were the vertical stabilizers, the engine inlet, and the forward side of the engine nacelles. Research in ferrites, high temperature absorbing materials and high- temperature plastic structures was undertaken to find methods to reduce the return. Eventually the vertical tail section fins were constructed from a kind of laminated "plastic" material-the first time that such a material had been used for an important part of an aircraft's structure. With such changes in structural materials, the A-11 was redesignated A-12, and as such has never been publicly disclosed.

To test the effectiveness of antiradar devices a small-scale model is inadequate; only a full-size mock-up will do. Lockheed accordingly built one of these, and as early as November 1959, transported it in a specially designed trailer truck over hundreds of miles of highway from the Burbank plant to the test area. Here it was hoisted to the top of a pylon and looked at from various angles by radar. Tests and adjustments went on for a year and a half before the results were deemed satisfactory. In the course of the process it was found desirable to attach some sizable metallic constructions on each side of the fuselage, and Kelly Johnson worried a good deal about the effect of these protuberances on his design. In flight tests, however, it later developed that they imparted a useful aerodynamic lift to the vehicle, and years afterward Lockheed's design for a supersonic transport embodied similar structures.

(S) Pilots for the OXCART would obviously have to be of quite extraordinary competence, not only because of the unprecedented performance of the aircraft itself, but also because of the particular qualities needed in men who were to fly intelligence missions. Brigadier General Don Flickinger, of the Air Force, was designated to draw up the criteria for selection, with advice from Kelly Johnson and from CIA Headquarters. Pilots had to be qualified in the latest high performance fighters, emotionally stable, and well motivated. They were to be between 25 and 40 years of age, and the size of the A-12 cockpit prescribed that they be under six feet tall and under 175 pounds in weight.

(S) Air Force files were screened for possible candidates and a list of pilots obtained. Psychological assessments, physical examinations and refinement of criteria eliminated a good many. Pre-evaluation processing resulted in sixteen potential nominees. This group underwent a further intensive security and medical scrutiny by the Agency. Those who remained were then approached to take employment with the Agency on a highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. In November 1961, commitments were obtained from five of the group. The small number recruited at this stage required that a second search be undertaken.

(S) When the final screening was complete the pilots selected from the program were William L. Skliar, Kenneth S. Collins, Walter Ray, Lon Walter, Mele Vojvodich, Jr., Jack W. Weeks, Ronald "Jack" Layton, Dennis B. Sullivan, David P. Young, Francis J. Murray, and Russell Scott. After the selection, arrangements were made with the Air Force to effect appropriate transfers and assignments to cover their training and to lay the basis for their transition from military to civilian status. Compensation and insurance arrangements were similar to those for the U-2 pilots.

(U) One thing to be decided in the earliest stages of the program was where to base and test the aircraft. Lockheed clearly could not do the business at Burbank, where the aircraft were being built, if for no other reason that its runway was too short. The ideal location ought to be remote from metropolitan areas; well away from civil and military airways to preclude observation; easily accessible by air; blessed with good weather the year round; capable of accommodating large numbers of personnel; equipped with fuel storage facilities; fairly close to an Air Force installation; and possessing at least an 8,000 foot runway. There was no such place to be found.

(S) Ten Air Force bases programmed for closure were considered, but none provided the necessary security, and annual operating costs at most of them would be unacceptable. Edwards Air Force Base in California seemed a more likely candidate, but in the end it also was passed over. Instead a secluded site in Nevada was finally picked. It was deficient in personnel accommodations and POL storage, and its long-unused runway was inadequate, but security was good, or could be made so, and a moderate construction program could provide sufficient facilities. Lockheed estimated what would be needed in such respects as monthly fuel consumption, hangars and shop space, housing for personnel, and runway specifications. Armed with the list of major requirements, Headquarters came up with a construction and engineering plan. And in case anyone became curious about what was going on at this re- mote spot, a cover story stated that the facilities were being prepared for certain radar studies, to be conducted by an engineering firm with support from the Air Force. The remote location was explained as necessary to reduce the effect of electronic interference from outside sources.

(S) Excellent as it may have been from the point of view of security, the site at first afforded few of the necessities and none of the amenities of life. It was far from any metropolitan center. Lockheed provided a C-47 shuttle service to its plant at Burbank, and a chartered D-18 (Lodestar) furnished transportation to Las Vegas.

Daily commuting was out of the question, however, and the construction workers arriving during 1960 were billeted in surplus trailers. A new water well was dug, and a few recreational facilities provided, but it was some time before accommodations became agreeable.

(** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the method I will use to indicate Marginal notes that were hand written, at the location of ** in the original document. The Marginal note states: (1955))

(S) Among the lesser snags, one existed because the laws of Nevada required the names of all contractor personnel staying in the state for more than 48 hours to be reported to state authorities. It was generally felt that to list all these names and identify the companies involved would be likely to give the whole show away. The Agency's General Counsel, however, discovered that Government employees were exempted from these requirements. Thenceforth all contractor personnel going to the site received appointments as Government consultants, and if questions were asked the reply could be that no one but government employees were at this site.

Construction began in earnest in September 1960, and continued on a double-shift schedule until mid-1964. One of the most urgent tasks was to build the runway, which according to initial estimates of A-12 requirements must be 8,500 feet long. The existing asphalt runway was 5,000 feet long and incapable of supporting the weight of the A-12. The new one was built between 7 September and 15 November and involved pouring over 25,000 yards of concrete. Another major problem was to provide some 500,000 gallons of PF-1 aircraft fuel per month. Neither storage facilities nor means of transporting fuel existed. After considering airlift, pipeline, and truck transport, it was decided that the last-named was the most economical, and could be made feasible by resurfacing no more than eighteen miles of highway leading into the base.

Three surplus Navy hangars were obtained, dismantled, and erected on the north side of the base. Over 100 surplus Navy housing buildings were transported to the base and made ready for occupancy. By early 1962 a fuel tank farm was ready, with a capacity of 1,320,000 gallons. Warehousing and shop space was begun and repairs made to older buildings. All this, together with the many other facilities that had to be provided, took a long time to complete. Meanwhile, however, the really essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery date of Aircraft No. 1 in August 1961.

(S) The facilities were ready, but the aircraft were not. Originally promised for delivery at the end of May 1961, the date first slipped to August, largely because of Lockheed's difficulties in procuring and fabricating titanium. Moreover, Pratt & Whitney found unexpectedly great trouble in bringing the J-58 engine up to OXCART requirements. In March 1961, Kelly Johnson notified Headquarters:

(U) "Schedules are in jeopardy on two fronts. One is the assembly of the wing and the other is in satisfactory development of the engine. Our evaluation shows that each of these programs is from three to four months behind the current schedule.

" (S)To this Bissell replied: (U) "I have learned of your expected additional delay in first flight from 30 August to 1 December 1961. This news is extremely shocking on top of our previous slippage from May to August and my understanding as of our meeting 19 December that the titanium extrusion problems were essentially overcome. I trust this is the last of such disappointments short of a severe earthquake in Burbank.

" (U) Realizing that delays were causing the cost of the program to soar, Headquarters decided to place a top-level aeronautical engineer in residence at Lockheed to monitor the program and submit progress reports.

Delays nevertheless persisted. On 11 September, Pratt and Whitney informed Lockheed of their continuing difficulties with the J-58 engine in terms of weight, delivery, and performance. Completion date for Aircraft No. 1 by now had slipped to 22 December 1961, and the first flight to 27 February 1962. Even on this last date the J-58 would not be ready, and it was therefore decided that a Pratt and Whitney J-75 engine, designed for the F-105 and flown in the U-2, should be used for early flights. The engine, along with other components, could be fitted to the A-12 airframe, and it could power the aircraft safely to altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6.

(S) When this decision had been made, final preparations were begun for the testing phase. In late 1961 Colonel Robert J. Holbury, USAF, was named Commander of the base, with the Agency employee as his Deputy. Support aircraft began arriving in the spring of 1962. These included eight F-101's for training, two T-33's for proficiency flying, a C-130 for cargo transport, a U-3A for administration purposes, a helicopter for search and rescue, and a Cessna- 180 for liaison use. In addition, Lockheed provided an F-104 to act as chase aircraft during the A-12 flight test period.

(S) Meanwhile in January 1962, an agreement was reached with the Federal Aviation Agency that expanded the restricted airspace in the vicinity of the test area. Certain FAA air traffic controllers were cleared for the OXCART Project; their function was to insure that aircraft did not violate the order. The North American Air Defense Command established procedures to prevent their radar stations from reporting the appearance of high performance aircraft on their radar scopes.

(S) Refueling concepts required prepositioning of vast quantities of fuel at certain points outside the United States. Special tank farms were programmed in California, Eielson AFB Alaska, Thule AB Greenland, Kadena AB Okinawa, and Adana, Turkey. Since the A-12 use specially refined fuel, these tank farms were reserved exclusively for use by the OXCART Program. Very small detachments of technicians at these locations maintained the fuel storage facility and arranged for periodic quality control fuel tests.

(S) At the Lockheed Burbank plant, Aircraft No. 1 (serially numbered 121) received its final tests and checkout during January and February 1962, and was partially disassembled for shipment to the site. It became clear very early in OXCART planning that because of security problems and the inadequate runway, the A-12 could not fly from Burbank. Movement of the full-scale (S)radar test model had been successfully accomplished in November 1959, as described above. A thorough survey of the route in June 1961, ascertained the hazards and problems of moving the actual aircraft, and showed that a package measuring 35 feet wide and 105 feet long could be transported without major difficulty. Obstructing road signs had to be removed, trees trimmed, and some roadsides leveled. Appropriate arrangements were made with police authorities and local officials to accomplish the safe transport of the aircraft. The entire fuselage, minus wings, was crated, covered, and loaded on the special-design trailer, which cost about $100,000. On 26 February 1962, it departed Burbank, and arrived at the base according to plan.

(S) First Flights (U) Upon arrival reassembly of the aircraft and installation of the J-75 engines began. Soon it was found that aircraft tank sealing compounds had failed to adhere to the metals, and when fuel was put into the tanks numerous leaks occurred. It was necessary to strip the tanks of the faulty sealing compounds and reline them with new materials. Thus occurred one more unexpected and exasperating delay in the program.

(U) Finally, on 26 April 1962, Aircraft 121 was ready. On that day in accordance with Kelly Johnson's custom, Louis Schalk took it for an unofficial, unannounced, maiden flight lasting some 40 minutes. As in all maiden flights minor problems were detected, but it took only four more days to ready the aircraft for its first official flight.

(U) On 30 April 1962, just under one year later than originally planned, the A-12 officially lifted her wheels from the runway. Piloted again by Louis Schalk, it took off at 170 knots, with a gross weight of 72,000 pounds, and climbed to 30,000 feet. Top speed was 340 knots and the flight lasted 59 minutes. The pilot reported that the aircraft responded well and was extremely stable. Kelly Johnson declared it to be the smoothest official first flight of any aircraft he had designed or tested. The aircraft broke the sound barrier on its second official flight, 4 May 1962, reaching Mach 1.1. Again only minor problems were reported.

(S) With these flights accomplished, jubilation was the order of the day. The new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John McCone, sent a telegram of congratulation to Kelly Johnson. A critical phase had been triumphantly passed, but there remained the long, difficult, and sometimes discouraging process of working the aircraft up to full operational performance.

Aircraft No. 122 arrived at base on 26 June, and spent three months in radar testing before engine installations and final assembly. Aircraft No. 123 arrived in August and flew in October. Aircraft No. 124, a two-seated version intended for use in training project pilots, was delivered in November. It was to be powered by the J-58 engines, but delivery delays and a desire to begin pilot training prompted a decision to install the smaller J-75's. The trainer flew initially in January 1963. The fifth aircraft, No. 125, arrived at the area on 17 December.

(S) Meanwhile the OXCART program received a shot in the arm from the Cuban missile crisis. U-2's had been maintaining a regular reconnaissance vigil over the island, and it was on one of these missions in October that the presence of offensive missiles was discovered. Overflights thereafter became more frequent, but on 27 October an Agency U-2, flown by a Strategic Air Force pilot on a SAC-directed mission, was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. This raised the dismaying possibility that continued manned, high- altitude surveillance of Cuba might become out of the question. The OXCART program suddenly assumed greater significance than ever, and its achievement of operational status became one of the highest national priorities.

(S) At the end of 1962 there were two A-12 aircraft engaged in flight tests. A speed of Mach 2.16 and altitude of 60,000 feet had been achieved. Progress was still slow, however, because of delays in the delivery of engines and shortcomings in the performance of those delivered. One of the two test aircraft was still flying with two J-75 engines, and the other with one J-75 and one J-58. It had long since become clear that Pratt & Whitney had been too optimistic in their forecast; the problem of developing the J-58 up to OXCART specifications had proved a good deal more recalcitrant than expected. Mr. McCone judged the situation to be truly serious, and on 3 December he wrote to the President of United Aircraft Corporation.

(U) "I have been advised that J-58 engine deliveries have been delayed again due to engine control production problems....By the end of the year it appears we will have barely enough J-58 engines to support the flight test program adequately....Furthermore, due to various engine difficulties we have not yet reached design speed and altitude. Engine thrust and fuel consumption deficiencies at present prevent sustained flight at design conditions which is so necessary to complete developments.

" (U) By the end of January 1963, ten engines were available, and the first flight with two of them installed occurred on 15 January. Thenceforth all A-12 aircraft were fitted with their intended propulsion system. Flight testing accelerated and contractor personnel went to a three-shift work day.

(U) With each succeeding step into a high Mach regime new problems presented themselves. The worst of all these difficulties-indeed one of the most formidable in the entire history of the program-was revealed when flight testing moved into speeds between Mach 2.4 and 2.8, and the aircraft experienced such severe roughness as to make its operation virtually out of the question. The trouble was diagnosed as being in the air inlet system, which with its controls admitted air to the engine. At the higher speeds the flow of air was uneven, and the engine therefore could not function properly. Only after a long period of experimentation, often highly frustrating and irritating, was a solution reached. This further postponed the day when the A-12 could be declared operationally ready.

(U) Among more mundane troubles was the discovery that various nuts, bolts, clamps, and other debris of the manufacturing process had not been cleared ** away, and upon engine run-up or take-off were sucked into the engine. The engine parts were machined to such close tolerances that they could be ruined in this fashion. Obviously the fault was due to sheer carelessness. Inspection procedures were revised, and it was also found prudent at Burbank to hoist the engine nacelles into the air, rock them back and forth, listen for loose objects, and then remove them by hand.

(** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the method I will use to indicate Marginal notes that were hand written, at the location of ** in the original document. The Marginal note states: hasn't changed)

(S) While on a routine flight, 24 May 1963, one of the detachment pilots recognized an erroneous and confusing air speed indication and decided to eject from the aircraft, which crashed 14 miles south of Wendover, Utah. The pilot Kenneth Collins, was unhurt. The wreckage was recovered in two days, and persons at the scene were identified and requested to sign secrecy agreements. A cover story for the press described the accident as occurring to a F-105, and is still listed in this way on official records.

(U) All A-12 aircraft were grounded for a week during investigation of the accident. A plugged pitot static tube in icing conditions turned out to be responsible for the faulty cockpit instrument indications-it was not some- thing which would hold things up for long. (S) Loss of this aircraft nevertheless precipitated a policy problem which had been troubling the Agency for some time. With the growing number of A-12's, how much longer could the project remain secret? The program had gone through development, construction, and a year of flight testing without attracting public attention. But the Department of Defense was having difficulty in concealing its participation because of the increasing rate of expenditures, otherwise unexplained. There was also a realization that the technological data would be extremely valuable in connection with feasibility studies for the SST. Finally, there was a growing awareness in the higher reaches of the aircraft industry that something new and Remarkable was going on. Rumors spread, and gossip flew about. Commercial airline crews sighted the OXCART in flight. The editor of Aviation Week (as might be expected) indicated his knowledge of developments at Burbank. The secrecy was thinning out.

(S) The President's Announcement

(U) In spite of all this, 1963 went by without any public revelation. President Johnson was brought up to date on the project a week after taking office, and directed that a paper be prepared for an announcement in the spring of 1964. Then at his press conference on 24 February, he read a statement of which the first paragraph was as follows:

(U) "The United States has successfully developed an advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The performance of the A-11 far exceeds that of any other aircraft in the world today. The development of this aircraft has been made possible by major advances in aircraft technology of great significance for both military and commercial applications. Several A-11 aircraft are now being flight tested at Edwards Air Force Base in California. The existence of this program is being disclosed today to permit the orderly exploitation of this advanced technology in our military and commercial program.

" (U) The president went on to mention the "mastery of the metallurgy and fabrication of titanium metal" which has been achieved, gave credit to Lockheed and to Pratt & Whitney, Remarked that appropriate members of the Senate and House had been kept fully informed, and prescribed that the detailed performance of the A-11 would be kept strictly classified. (S) The President's reference to the "A-11" was of course deliberate. "A-11" had been the original design designation for the all-metal aircraft first proposed by Lockheed; subsequently it became the design designation for the Air Force YF-12A interceptor which differed from its parent mainly in that it carried a second man for launching air-to-air missiles. To preserve the distinction between the A-11 and the A-12 Security had briefed practically all participating personnel in government and industry on the impending announcement. OXCART secrecy continued in effect. There was considerable speculation about an Agency role in the A-11 development, but it was never acknowledged by the government. News headlines ranged from "US has dozen A-11 jets already flying" to "Secret of sizzling new plane probably history's best kept.

" (U) The President also said that "the A-11 aircraft now at Edwards Air Force Base are undergoing extensive tests to determine their capabilities as long- range interceptors." It was true that the Air Force in October 1960, had contracted for three interceptor versions of the A-12, and they were by this time available. But at the moment when the President spoke, there were no A-11's at Edwards and there never had been. Project officials had known that the public announcement was about to be made, but they had not been told exactly when. Caught by surprise, they hastily flew two Air Force YF-12A's to Edwards to support the President's statement. So rushed was this operation, so speedily were the aircraft put into hangars upon arrival, that heat from them activated the hangar sprinkler system, dousing the reception team which awaited them.

(S) Thenceforth, while the OXCART continued its secret career at its own site, the A-11 performed at Edwards Air Force Base in a considerable glare of publicity. Pictures of the aircraft appeared in the press, correspondents could look at it and Marvel, stories could be written. Virtually no details were made available, but the technical journals nevertheless had a field day. The unclassified Air Force and Space Digest, for example, published a long article in its issue of April 1964, commencing: "The official pictures and statements tell very little about the A-11. But the technical literature from open sources, when carefully interpreted, tells a good deal about what it could and, more importantly, what it could not be. Here's the story ...

" (S) Going Operational

(U) Three years and seven months after first flight in April 1962 the OXCART was declared ready for operational use at design specifications. The period thus devoted to flight tests was remarkable short, considering the new fields of aircraft performance which were being explored. As each higher Mach number was reached exhaustive tests were carried out in accordance with standard procedures to ensure that the aircraft functioned properly and safely. Defects were corrected and improvements made. All concerned gained experience with the particular characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the vehicle.

(S) The air inlet and related control continued for a long time to present the most troublesome and refractory problem. Numerous attempts failed to find a remedy, even though a special task force concentrated on the task. For a time there was something approaching despair, and the solution when finally achieved was greeted with enormous relief. After all, not every experimental aircraft of advanced performance has survived its flight testing period. The possibility existed that OXCART also would fail, despite the great cost and effort expended upon it.

(S) A few dates and figures will serve to Mark the progress of events. By the end of 1963 there had been 573 flights totaling 765 hours. Nine aircraft were in the inventory. On 20 July 1963 test aircraft flew for the first time at Mach 3; in November Mach 3.2 (the design speed) was reached at 78,000 feet altitude. The longest sustained flight at design conditions occurred on 3 February 1964; it lasted to ten minutes at Mach 3.2 and 83,000 feet. By the end of 1964 there had been 1,160 flights, totaling 1,616 hours. Eleven aircraft were then available, four of them reserved for testing and seven assigned to the detachment.

The record may be put in another way. Mach 2 was reached after six months of flying; Mach 3 after 15 months. Two years after the first flight the aircraft had flown a total of 38 hours at Mach 2, three hours at Mach 2.6, and less than one hour at Mach 3. After three years, Mach 2 time had increased to 60 hours, Mach 2.6 time to 33 hours, and Mach 3 time to nine hours; all Mach 3 time, however, was by test aircraft, and detachment aircraft were still restricted to mach 2.9.

(S) As may be seen from the figures, most flights were of short duration, averaging little more than an hour each. Primarily this was because longer flights were unnecessary at this stage of testing. It was also true, however, that the less seen of OXCART the better, and short flights helped to preserve the secrecy of the proceedings. Yet it was virtually impossible for an aircraft of such dimensions and capabilities to remain inconspicuous. At its full speed OXCART had a turning radius of no less than 86 miles. There was no question of staying close to the airfield; its shortest possible flights took it over a very large expanse of territory.

(S) The first long-range, high-speed flight occurred on 27 January 1965, when one of the test aircraft flew for an hour and forty minutes, with an hour and fifteen minutes above Mach 3.1. Its total range was 2,580 nautical miles, with altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet.

(U) Two more aircraft were lost during this phase of the program. On 9 July 1964 Aircraft No. 133 was making its final approach to the runway when at altitude of 500 feet and airspeed of 200 knots it began a smooth steady roll to the left. Lockheed test pilot Bill Park could not overcome the roll. At about a 45 degree bank angle and 200 foot altitude he ejected. As he swung down to the vertical in the parachute his feet touched the ground, for what must have been one of the narrower escapes in the perilous history of test piloting. The Primary cause of the accident was that the servo for the right outboard roll and pitch control froze. No news of the accident filtered out.

(S) On 28 December 1965 Aircraft No. 126 crashed immediately after take- off and was totally destroyed. Detachment pilot Mele Vojvodich ejected safely at an altitude of 150 feet. The accident investigation board determined that a flight line electrician had improperly connected the yaw and pitch gyros-had in effect reversed the controls. This time Mr. McCone directed the Office of Security to conduct an investigation into the possibility of sabotage. While nothing of the sort was discovered, there were indications of negligence, as the manufacturer of the gyro had earlier warned of the possibility that the mechanism could be connected in reverse. No action had been taken, however, even by such an elementary precaution as painting the contacts different colors. Again there was no publicity connected with the accident.

(S) The year 1965 saw the test site reach the high point of activity. Completion of construction brought it to full physical size. All detachment pilots were Mach 3.0 qualified. Site population reached 1,835. Contractors were working three shifts a day. Lockheed Constellations made daily flights between the factory at Burbank and the site. Two C-47 flights a day were made between the site and Las Vegas. And officials were considering how and when and where to use OXCART in its appointed role.

(S) Targeting the OX

(S) After the unhappy end of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, US political authorities were understandably cautious about committing themselves to further manned reconnaissance over unfriendly territory. There was no serious intention to use the OXCART over Russia; save in some unforeseeable emergency it was indeed no longer necessary to do so. What then, should be done with this vehicle?

(S) The first interest was in Cuba. By early 1964 Project Headquarters began planning for the contingency of flights over that island under a program designated SKYLARK. Bill Park's accident in early July held this program up for a time, but on 5 August Acting DCI Marshall S. Carter directed that SKYLARK achieve emergency operational readiness by 5 November. This involved preparing a small detachment which should be able to do the job over Cuba, though at something less than the full design capability of the OXCART. The goal was to operate at Mach 2.8 and 80,000 feet altitude.

In order to meet the deadline set by General Carter, camera performance would have to be validated, pilots qualified for Mach 2.8 flight, and coordination with supporting elements arranged. Only one of several installations for electronic countermeasures (ECM) would be ready by November, and a senior intra-governmental group, including representation from the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, examined the problem of operating over Cuba without the full complement of defensive systems. This panel decided that the first few overflights could safely be conducted without them, but the ECM would be necessary thereafter. The delivery schedule of ECM equipment was compatible with this course of action.

(S) After considerable modifications to aircraft, the detachment simulated Cuban missions on training flights, and a limited emergency SKYLARK capability was announced on the date General Carter had set. With two weeks notice the OXCART detachment could accomplish a Cuban overflight, though with fewer ready aircraft and pilots than had been planned.

(S) During the following weeks the detachment concentrated on developing SKYLARK into a sustained capability, with five ready pilots and five operational aircraft. The main tasks were to determine aircraft range and fuel consumption, attain repeatable reliable operation, finish pilot training, prepare a family of SKYLARK missions, and coordinate routes with North American Air Defense, Continental Air Defense, and the Federal Aviation Authority. All this was accomplished without substantially hindering the main task of working up OXCART to full design capability. We may anticipate the story, however, by remarking that despite all this preparation the OXCART was never used over Cuba. U-2's proved adequate, and the A-12 was reserved for more critical situations.

(S) In 1965 a more critical situation did indeed emerge in Asia, and interest in using the aircraft there began to be manifest. On 18 March 1965 Mr. McCone discussed with Secretaries McNamara and Vance the increasing hazards to U-2 and drone reconnaissance of Communist China. A memorandum of this conversation stated:

(S) "It was further agreed that we should proceed immediately with all preparatory steps necessary to operate the OXCART over Communist China, flying out of Okinawa. It was agreed that we should proceed with all construction and related arrangements. However, this decision did not authorize the deployment of the OXCART to Okinawa nor the decision to fly the OXCART over Communist China. The decision would authorize all preparatory steps and the expenditure of such funds as might be involved. No decision has been taken to fly the OXCART operationally over Communist China. This decision can only be made by the President."

(S) Four days later Brigadier General Jack C. Ledford, Director of the Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T, briefed Mr. Vance on the scheme which had been drawn up for operations in the Far East. The project was called BLACK SHIELD, and it called for the OXCART to operate out of the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. In the first phase, three aircraft would stage to Okinawa for 60-day periods, twice a year, with about 225 personnel involved.

(S) After this was in good order, BLACK SHIELD would advance to the point of maintaining a permanent detachment at Kadena. Secretary Vance made $3.7 million available to be spent in providing support facilities on the island, which were to be available by early fall of 1965.

(S) Meanwhile the Communists began to deploy surface-to-air missiles around Hanoi, thereby threatening our current military reconnaissance capabilities. Secretary McNamara called this to the attention of the Under Secretary of the Air Force on 3 June 1965, and inquired about the practicability of substituting OXCART aircraft for U-2's. He was told that BLACK SHIELD could operate over Vietnam as soon as adequate aircraft performance was achieved. (S) With deployment overseas thus apparently impending in the fall, the detachment went into the final stages of its program for validating the reliability of aircraft and aircraft systems. It set out to demonstrate complete systems reliability at Mach 3.05 and at 2,300 nautical miles range, with penetration altitude of 76,000 feet. A demonstrated capability for three aerial refuelings was also part of the validation process.

(S) By this time the OXCART was well along in performance. The inlet, camera, hydraulic, navigation, and flight control systems all demonstrated acceptable reliability. Nevertheless, as longer flights were conducted at high speeds and high temperatures, new problems came to the surface, the most serious being with the electrical wiring system. Wiring connectors and components had to withstand temperatures of more than 800 degrees Fahrenheit, together with structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Continuing malfunctions in the inlet controls, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instruments were in many cases attributable to wiring failures. There was also disturbing evidence that careless handling was contributing to electrical connector failures. Difficulties persisted in the sealing of fuel tanks. What with one thing and another, officials soon began to fear that the scheduled date for BLACK SHIELD readiness would not be met. Prompt corrective action on the part of Lockheed was in order. The quality of maintenance needed drastic improvement. The responsibility for delivering an aircraft system with acceptable reliability to meet an operational commitment lay in Lockheed's hands.

(S) In this uncomfortable situation, John Paragosky, Deputy for Technology, OSA, went to the Lockheed plant to see Kelly Johnson on 3 August 1965. A frank discussion ensued on the measures necessary to insure that BLACK SHIELD commitments would be met, and Johnson concluded that he should himself spend full time at the site in order to get the job done expeditiously. Lockheed President Daniel Haughton offered the full support of the corporation, and Johnson began duty at the site next day. His firm and effective management got Project BLACK SHIELD back on schedule.

(S) Four primary BLACK SHIELD aircraft were selected and final validation flights conducted. During these tests the OXCART achieved a maximum speed of Mach 3.29, altitude of 90,000 feet, and sustained flight time above Mach 3.2 of one hour and fourteen minutes. The maximum endurance flight lasted six hours and twenty minutes. The last stage was reached on 20 November 1965, and two days later Kelly Johnson wrote General Ledford:

(S) " ... Over-all, my considered opinion is that the aircraft can be successfully deployed for the BLACK SHIELD mission with what I would consider to be at least as low a degree of risk as in the early U-2 deployment days. Actually, considering our performance level of more than four times the U-2 speed and three miles more operating altitude, it is probably much less risky than our first U-2 deployment. I think the time has come when the bird should leave its nest."

(S) Ten days later the 303 Committee received a formal proposal that OXCART be deployed to the Far East. The Committee, after examining the matter, did not approve. It did agree, however, that short of actually moving aircraft to Kadena all steps should be taken to develop and maintain a quick reaction capability, ready to deploy within a 21-day period at any time after 1 January 1966.

(S) There the matter remained, for more than a year. During 1966 there were frequent renewals of the request to the 303 Committee for authorization to deploy OXCART to Okinawa and conduct reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam, Communist China, or both. All were turned down. Among high officials there was difference of opinion; CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board favored the move, while Alexis Johnson representing State, and Defense in the persons of Messrs. McNamara and Vance, opposed it. The proponents urged the necessity of better intelligence, especially on a possible Chinese Communist build-up preparatory to intervention in Vietnam. The opponents felt that better intelligence was not so urgently needed as to justify the political risks of basing the aircraft in Okinawa and thus almost certainly disclosing to Japanese and other propagandists. They also believed it undesirable to use OXCART and reveal something of its capability until a more pressing requirement appeared. At least once, on 12 August 1966, the divergent views were brought up to the President, who confirmed the 303 Committee's majority opinion against deployment.

(S) Meanwhile, of course, flight testing and crew proficiency training continued. There was plenty of time to improve mission plans and flight tactics, as well as to prepare the forward area at Kadena. New plans shortened deployment time from the 21 days first specified. Personnel and cargo were to be airlifted to Kadena the day deployment was approved. On the fifth day the first OXCART would depart and travel the 6,673 miles in five hours and 34 minutes. The second would go on the seventh and the third on the ninth day. The first two would be ready for an emergency mission on the eleventh day, and for a normal mission on the fifteenth day.

(S) An impressive demonstration of the OXCART capability occurred on 21 December 1966 when Lockheed test pilot Bill Park flew 10,198 statute miles in six hours. The aircraft left the test area in Nevada and flew northward over Yellowstone National Park, thence eastward to Bismarck, North Dakota, and on to Duluth, Minnesota. It then turned south and passed Atlanta en route to Tampa, Florida, then northwest to Portland, Oregon, then southwest to Nevada. Again the flight turned eastward, passing Denver and St. Louis. Turning around at Knoxville, Tennessee, it passed Memphis in the home stretch back to Nevada. This flight established a record unapproachable by any other aircraft; it began at about the same time a typical government employee starts his work day and ended two hours before his quitting time. *

(S) Shortly after this exploit, tragedy befell the program. During a routine training flight on 5 January 1967, the fourth aircraft was lost, together with its pilot. The accident occurred during descent about 70 miles from the base. A fuel gauge failed to function properly, and the aircraft ran out of fuel only minutes before landing. The pilot, Walter Ray, ejected but was killed when he failed to separate from the ejection seat before impact. The aircraft was totally destroyed. Its wreckage was found on 6 January and Ray's body recovered a day later. Through Air Force channels a story was released to the effect that an Air Force SR-71, on a routine test flight out of Edwards Air Force Base, was missing and presumed down in Nevada. The pilot was identified as a civilian test pilot, and the newspapers connected him with Lockheed. Flight activity at the base was again suspended during investigation of the causes both for the crash and for the failure of the seat separation device.

(S) It is worth observing that none of the four accidents occurred in the high-Mach-number, high-temperature regime of flight. All involved traditional problems inherent in any aircraft. In fact, the OXCART was by this time performing at high speeds, with excellent reliability.
(S) BLACK SHIELD
(S) About May of 1967 prospects for deployment took a new turn. A good deal of apprehension was evident in Washington about the possibility that the Communists might introduce surface-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam, and concern was aggravated by doubts as to whether we could detect such a development if it occurred. The President asked for a proposal on the matter; CIA briefed the 303 Committee and once again suggested that the OXCART be used. Its camera was far superior to those on drones or on the U-2, its vulnerability was far less. The State and Defense members of the Committee decided to re-examine the requirements and the political risks involved. While they were engaged in their deliberations, Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, submitted to the 303 Committee another formal proposal to deploy the OXCART. In addition, he raised the matter at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch" on 16 May, and received the Presidents approval to "go." Walt Rostow later in the day formally conveyed the President's decision, and the BLACK SHIELD deployment plan was forthwith put into effect.

(S) On 17 May airlift to Kadena began. On 22 May the first A-12 (Serial No. 131) flew nonstop to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. Aircraft No. 127

(S) * Neither on this nor on other flights was there much trouble from sonic boom. To be sure, the inhabitants of a small village some 30 miles from the site were troubled as the aircraft broke through the sound barrier while gaining altitude. A change of course remedied this. At altitude OXCART produced no more than an ominous rumble on the ground and since the plane was in- visible to the naked eye no one associated this sound with its actual source.

departed on 24 May and arrived at Kadena five hours and 55 minutes later. The third, No. 129, left according to plan on 26 May 1967 and proceeded normally until in the vicinity of Wake Island where the pilot experienced difficulties with the inertial navigation and communications systems. In the circumstances, he decided to make a precautionary landing at Wake Island. The prepositioned emergency recovery team secured the aircraft without incident and the flight to Kadena resumed next day.

Arrangements were made to brief the Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station in the Philippines, Formosa, Thailand, South Vietnam, and Japan, and the High Commissioner and Chief of Station, Okinawa. The Prime Ministers of Japan and Thailand were advised, as were the President and Defense Minister of the Republic of China. The Chiefs of the Air Force of Thailand and the Republic of China were also briefed. Reactions were favorable.

(S) On 29 May 1967, the unit at Kadena was ready to fly an operational mission. Under the command of Colonel Hugh C. Slater two hundred and sixty personnel had deployed to the BLACK SHIELD facility. Except for hangars, which were a month short of completion, everything was in shape for sustained operations. Next day the detachment was alerted for a mission on 31 May, and the moment arrived which would see the culmination of ten years of effort, worry, and cost. As fate would have it, on the morning of the 31st heavy rain fell at Kadena. Since weather over the target area was clear, preparations continued in hopes that the local weather would clear. When the time for take-off approached, the OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway, and took off while the rain continued.

(S) The first BLACK SHIELD mission followed one flight line over North Vietnam and one over the Demilitarized Zone. It lasted three hours and 39 minutes, and the cruise legs were flown at Mach 3.1 and 80,000 feet. Results were satisfactory. Seventy of the 190 known SAM sites in North Vietnam were photographed, as were nine other priority targets. There were no radar signals detected, indicating that the first mission had gone completely unnoticed by both Chinese and North Vietnamese.

(S) Fifteen BLACK SHIELD missions were alerted during the period from 31 May to 15 August 1967. Seven of the fifteen were flown and of these four detected radar tracking signals, but no hostile action was taken against any of them. By mid-July they had deterred with a high degree of confidence that there were no surface-to-surface missiles in North Vietnam.

All operational missions were planned, directed, and controlled by Project Headquarters in Washington. A constant watch was maintained on the weather in the target areas. Each day at a specified hour (1600 hours local) a mission alert briefing occurred. If the forecast weather appeared favorable, the Kadena base was alerted and provided a route to be flown. The alert pre- ceded actual take-off by 28 to 30 hours. Twelve hours prior to take-off (H minus 12) a second review of target weather was made. If it continued favorable, the mission generation sequence continued. At H minus 2 hours, a "go-no-go" decision was made and communicated to the field. The final decision, it should be noted, depended not solely on weather in the target area; conditions had to be propitious also in the refueling areas and at the launch and recovery base.

(S) Operations and maintenance at Kadena began with the receipt of alert notification. Both a Primary aircraft and pilot and a back-up aircraft and pilot were selected. The aircraft were given thorough inspection and servicing, all systems were checked, and the cameras loaded into the aircraft. Pilots received a detailed route briefing in the early evening prior to the day of flight. On the morning of the flight a final briefing occurred, at which time the condition of the aircraft and its systems was reported, last-minute weather forecasts reviewed, and other relevant intelligence communicated together with any amendments or changes in the flight plan. Two hours prior to take- off the Primary pilot had a medical examination, got into his suit, and was taken to the aircraft. If any malfunctions developed on the Primary aircraft, the back-up could execute the mission one hour later.

(S) A typical route profile for a BLACK SHIELD mission over North Vietnam included a refueling shortly after take-off, south of Okinawa, the planned photographic pass or passes, withdrawal to a second aerial refueling in the Thailand area, and return to Kadena. So great was the OXCART speed that it spent only 12 1/2 minutes over North Vietnam in a typical "single pass" mission, or a total of 21 1/2 minutes on two passes. Its turning radius of 86 miles was such, however, that on some mission profiles it might be forced during its turn to intrude into Chinese airspace.

(S) Once landed back at Kadena, the camera film was removed from the aircraft, boxed, and sent by special plane to the processing facilities. Film from earlier missions was developed at the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York. By late summer an Air Force Center in Japan carried out the processing in order to place the photointelligence in the hands of American commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours of completion of a BLACK SHIELD mission.

(S) Between 16 August and 31 December 1967, twenty-six missions were alerted. Fifteen were flown. On 17 December one SAM site tracked the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful with its Fan Song guidance radar. On 28 October a North Vietnamese SAM site for the first time launched a single, alb...
"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
Reply
#4
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Area_51

This article is about the U.S. Air Force installation in Nevada. For other uses, see Area 51 (disambiguation).
Area 51


This satellite image of Area 51 shows dry Groom Lake just north of the site.
IATA: none – ICAO: KXTA
Summary
Airport type Military
Operator United States Air Force
Location Southern Nevada, United States
Elevation AMSL 4462 ft / 1360 m
Coordinates 37°14′06″N 115°48′40″W
Runways
Direction Length Surface
ft m
14L/32R 12,000 3,658 Asphalt
12/30 5,420 1,652 Asphalt
09L/27R 11,440 3,489 Salt
09R/27L 11,440 3,489 Salt
03L/21R 10,030 3,057 Salt
03R/21L 10,030 3,057 Salt
14R/32L 23,270 7,093 Closed


Area 51 is a nickname for a military base located in the southern portion of Nevada in the western United States (83 miles north-northwest of downtown Las Vegas). Situated at its center, on the southern shore of Groom Lake, is a large secretive military airfield. The base's primary purpose is to support development and testing of experimental aircraft and weapons systems.[1][2]

The base lies within the United States Air Force's vast Nevada Test and Training Range. Although the facilities at the range are managed by the 99th Air Base Wing at Nellis Air Force Base, the Groom facility appears to be run as an adjunct of the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) at Edwards Air Force Base in the Mojave Desert, around 186 miles (300 km) southwest of Groom, and as such the base is known as Air Force Flight Test Center (Detachment 3).[3][4]

Other names used for the facility include Dreamland, Paradise Ranch,[5][6] Home Base, Watertown Strip, Groom Lake,[7] and most recently Homey Airport.[8] The area is part of the Nellis Military Operations Area, and the restricted airspace around the field is referred to as (R-4808N[9]), known by the military pilots in the area as "The Box."

The intense secrecy surrounding the base, the very existence of which the U.S. government barely acknowledges, has led it to become the frequent subject of conspiracy theories and a central component to unidentified flying object (UFO) folklore.[6]Contents [hide]
1 Geography
2 Operations at Groom Lake
2.1 U-2 program
2.2 Blackbird programs
2.3 Have Blue/F-117 program
3 Runways
4 U.S. government's positions on Area 51
4.1 Environmental lawsuit
4.2 1974 Skylab photography
5 UFO and other conspiracy theories concerning Area 51
6 Portrayal in media and popular culture
7 See also
8 References
8.1 General references
8.2 Specific references
9 External links
9.1 General
9.2 Maps and photographs


Geography

Map showing Area 51, NAFR, and the NTS

Area 51 shares a border with the Yucca Flat region of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the location of 739 of the 928 nuclear tests conducted by the United States Department of Energy at NTS.[10] The Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository is approximately 40 miles (64 km) southwest of Groom Lake.

The same "Area xx" naming scheme is used for other parts of the Nevada Test Site.[11][12]

The original 6-by-10 mile rectangular base is now part of the so-called "Groom box", a 23-by-25.3 mile rectangular area of restricted airspace. The area is connected to the internal NTS road network, with paved roads leading south to Mercury and west to Yucca Flat. Leading northeast from the lake, the wide and well-maintained Groom Lake Road runs through a pass in the Jumbled Hills. The road formerly led to mines in the Groom basin, but has been improved since their closure. Its winding course runs past a security checkpoint, but the restricted area around the base extends further east. After leaving the restricted area, Groom Lake Road descends eastward to the floor of the Tikaboo Valley, passing the dirt-road entrances to several small ranches, before converging with State Route 375, the "Extraterrestrial Highway", south of Rachel.

Operations at Groom Lake

Groom Lake is not a conventional airbase, as frontline units are not normally deployed there. It instead appears to be used during the development, testing, and training phases for new aircraft. Once these aircraft have been approved by the United States Air Force or other agencies such as the CIA, operation of that aircraft is generally conducted from a normal air force base. Groom is reported, however, to be the permanent home for a small number of Soviet-designed aircraft[13] which are analyzed and used for training purposes.

Soviet spy satellites obtained photographs of the Groom Lake area during the height of the Cold War, and later civilian satellites produced detailed images of the base and its surroundings. These images support only modest conclusions about the base, depicting a nondescript base, long airstrip, hangars and the lake.

Satellite view of Area 51 from 1968.

U-2 program
Main article: Lockheed U-2

Groom Lake was used for bombing and artillery practice during World War II, but was then abandoned until April 1955, when it was selected by Lockheed's Skunk Works team as the ideal location to test the forthcoming U-2 spy plane.[14] [15] The lakebed made an ideal strip from which they could operate the troublesome test aircraft, and the Emigrant Valley's mountain ranges and the NTS perimeter protected the test site from prying eyes and outside interference.

Lockheed constructed a makeshift base at the location, then known as Site II or "The Ranch", consisting of little more than a few shelters, workshops and trailer homes in which to house its small team. In only three months a 5000-foot runway was constructed [14] and was servicable by July 1955. The Ranch received its first U-2 delivery on July 24, 1955 from Burbank on a C-124 Globemaster II cargo plane, accompanied by Lockheed technicians on a Douglas DC-3[14]. The first U-2 lifted off from at Groom on August 4, 1955. A U-2 fleet under the control of the CIA began overflights of Soviet territory by mid-1956.

During this period, the NTS continued to perform a series of atmospheric nuclear explosions. U-2 operations throughout 1957 were frequently disrupted by the Plumbbob series of atomic tests, which detonated over two-dozen devices at the NTS. The Plumbbob-Hood explosion on July 5 scattered fallout across Groom and forced a temporary evacuation.

Blackbird programs
Main articles: Lockheed A-12 and SR-71 Blackbird

Even before U-2 development was complete, Lockheed began work on its successor as part of the CIA's OXCART project, involving the A-12—a Mach-3 high altitude reconnaissance aircraft—a later variant of which became the famed USAF SR-71 Blackbird. The Blackbird's flight characteristics and maintenance requirements forced a massive expansion of facilities and runways at Groom Lake. By the time the first A-12 prototype flew at Groom in 1962, the main runway had been lengthened to 8,500 ft (2,600 m), and the base boasted a complement of over 1,000 personnel. It had fueling tanks, a control tower, and a baseball diamond. Security was greatly enhanced, the small civilian mine in the Groom basin was closed, and the area surrounding the valley was made an exclusive military preserve. Groom saw the first flight of most major Blackbird variants: A-12, the abortive YF-12 interceptor variant, and the D-21 Blackbird-based drone project. The A-12 would remain at Groom Lake until 1968. (The SR-71 first flew at Palmdale, California.)

Have Blue/F-117 program
Main article: Lockheed Have Blue

The Lockheed Have Blue prototype stealth fighter (a smaller proof-of-concept model of the F-117 Nighthawk) first flew at Groom in December 1977.[16] Testing of a series of ultra-secret prototypes continued there until mid-1981, when testing transitioned to the initial production of F-117 stealth fighters. In addition to flight-testing, Groom performed radar profiling, F-117 weapons testing, and was the location for training of the first group of frontline USAF F-117 pilots. Subsequently, the still highly classified active-service F-117 operations moved to the nearby Tonopah Test Range Airport, and finally to Holloman Air Force Base.

Area 51 border and warning sign stating that "photography is prohibited" and that "use of deadly force is authorized" under the terms of the 1950 McCarran Internal Security Act. A government vehicle is parked on the hilltop; from there, security agents observe the approach to Groom Lake.

Commuter service is provided along Groom Lake Road by a bus, catering to a small number of employees living in several small communities beyond the NTS boundary (although it is not clear whether these workers are employed at Groom or at other facilities in the NTS). The bus travels Groom Lake Road and stops at Crystal Springs, Ash Springs, and Alamo, and parks at the Alamo courthouse overnight.

Runways

The base has seven runways including one that now appears to be closed. The closed runway, 14R/32L, is also by far the longest with a total length of approximately 7,100 meters (23,300 ft), not including stopway. The other runways are two asphalt runways, the 14L/32R with a length of 3,650 meters (12,000 ft) and 12/30 with a length of 1,650 meters (5,400 ft), and four runways located on the salt lake. These four runways are 09L/27R and 09R/27L, which are both approximately 3,500 meters (11,450 ft), and 03L/21R and 03R/21L, which are both approximately 3,050 meters (10,000 ft). The base also has a helipad.[17][18]

In December 2007, airline pilots noticed that the base had appeared in their aircraft navigation systems' latest Jeppesen database revision with the ICAO airport identifier code of KXTA and listed as "Homey Airport"[19] The probably-inadvertent release of the airport data led to advice by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) that student pilots should be explicitly warned about KXTA, not to consider it as a waypoint or destination for any flight even though it now appears in public navigation databases.[19]

U.S. government's positions on Area 51

A letter from the USAF replying to a query about Area 51

On July 14, 2003 the Federal Government admitted the facility's existence, tacitly conceding that the Air Force has an "operating location" near the lake, but does not provide any further information.[citation needed]

Unlike much of the Nellis range, the area surrounding the lake is permanently off-limits both to civilian and normal military air traffic. Radar stations protect the area, and unauthorized personnel are quickly expelled. Even military pilots training in the NAFR risk disciplinary action if they accidentally stray into the exclusionary "box" surrounding Groom's airspace.[20]

A montage of available USGS satellite photography showing southern Nevada. The NTS and the surrounding lands are visible; the NAFR and neighboring land has been removed

Perimeter security is provided by uniformed private security guards working for EG&G's security subcontractor Wackenhut,[21] who patrol in desert camouflage Jeep Cherokees and Humvees, and more recently, champagne-colored Ford F-150 pickups and gray Chevy 2500 4X4 pickups. Although the guards are armed with M16s, no violent encounters with Area 51 observers have been reported; instead, the guards generally follow visitors near the perimeter and radio for the Lincoln County Sheriff. Deadly force is authorized if violators who attempt to breach the secured area fail to heed warnings to halt. Fines of around $600 seem to be the normal course of action, although some visitors and journalists report receiving follow-up visits from FBI agents. Some observers have been detained on public land for pointing camera equipment at the base. Surveillance is supplemented using buried motion sensors[22][23][24] and by HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters.

The base does not appear on public U.S. government maps;[25] the USGS topographic map for the area only shows the long-disused Groom Mine.[26] A civil aviation chart published by the Nevada Department of Transportation shows a large restricted area,[27] but defines it as part of the Nellis restricted airspace. The official aeronautical navigation charts for the area show Groom Lake but omit the airport facilities.[28] Similarly the National Atlas page showing federal lands in Nevada[29] does not distinguish between the Groom block and other parts of the Nellis range. Although officially declassified, the original film taken by U.S. Corona spy satellite in the 1960s has been altered prior to declassification; in answer to freedom of information queries, the government responds that these exposures (which map to Groom and the entire NAFR) appear to have been destroyed.[30] Terra satellite images (which were publicly available) were removed from web servers (including Microsoft's "Terraserver") in 2004,[31] and from the monochrome 1 m resolution USGS data dump made publicly available. NASA Landsat 7 images are still available (these are used in the NASA World Wind). Higher resolution (and more recent) images from other satellite imagery providers (including Russian providers and the IKONOS) are commercially available. These show, in considerable detail, the runway marking, base facilities, aircraft, and vehicles.

Nevada's state government, recognizing the folklore surrounding the base might afford the otherwise neglected area some tourism potential, officially renamed the section of State Route 375 near Area 51 "The Extraterrestrial Highway", and posted fancifully illustrated signs along its length.[32]

Although federal property within the base is exempt from state and local taxes, facilities owned by private contractors are not. Area 51 researcher Glenn Campbell claimed in 1994 that the base only declares a taxable value of $2 million to the Lincoln County tax assessor, who is unable to enter the area to perform an assessment.[33]

Environmental lawsuit

In 1994, five unnamed civilian contractors and the widows of contractors Walter Kasza and Robert Frost sued the USAF and the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Their suit, in which they were represented by George Washington University law professor Jonathan Turley, alleged they had been present when large quantities of unknown chemicals had been burned in open pits and trenches at Groom. Biopsies taken from the complainants were analyzed by Rutgers University biochemists, who found high levels of dioxin, dibenzofuran, and trichloroethylene in their body fat. The complainants alleged they had sustained skin, liver, and respiratory injuries due to their work at Groom, and that this had contributed to the deaths of Frost and Kasza. The suit sought compensation for the injuries they had sustained, claiming the USAF had illegally handled toxic materials, and that the EPA had failed in its duty to enforce the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (which governs handling of dangerous materials). They also sought detailed information about the chemicals to which they were allegedly exposed, hoping this would facilitate the medical treatment of survivors. Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, told 60 Minutes reporter Leslie Stahl, "The Air Force is classifying all information about Area 51 in order to protect themselves from a lawsuit."[34]

Citing the State Secrets Privilege, the government petitioned trial judge U.S. District Judge Philip Pro (of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada in Las Vegas) to disallow disclosure of classified documents or examination of secret witnesses, alleging this would expose classified information and threaten national security.[35] When Judge Pro rejected the government's argument, President Bill Clinton issued a Presidential Determination, exempting what it called, "The Air Force's Operating Location Near Groom Lake, Nevada" from environmental disclosure laws. Consequently, Pro dismissed the suit due to lack of evidence. Turley appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on the grounds that the government was abusing its power to classify material. Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall filed a brief that stated that disclosures of the materials present in the air and water near Groom "can reveal military operational capabilities or the nature and scope of classified operations." The Ninth Circuit rejected Turley's appeal,[36] and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear it, putting an end to the complainants' case.

The President continues to annually issue a determination continuing the Groom exception.[37][38][39] This, and similarly tacit wording used in other government communications, is the only formal recognition the U.S. Government has ever given that Groom Lake is more than simply another part of the Nellis complex.

An unclassified memo on the safe handling of F-117 Nighthawk material was posted on an Air Force website in 2005. This discussed the same materials for which the complainants had requested information (information the government had claimed was classified). The memo was removed shortly after journalists became aware of it.[40]

1974 Skylab photography

In January 2006, space historian Dwayne A. Day published an article in online aerospace magazine The Space Review titled "Astronauts and Area 51: the Skylab Incident." The article was based around a recently-declassified memo written in 1974 to CIA director William Colby by an unknown CIA official. The memo reported that astronauts on board Skylab 4 had, as part of a larger program, inadvertently photographed a location of which the memo said:“ There were specific instructions not to do this. <redacted> was the only location which had such an instruction. ”


Although the name of the location was obscured, the context led Day to believe that the subject was Groom Lake. As Day noted:“ n other words, the CIA considered no other spot on Earth to be as sensitive as Groom Lake.[41][42] ”


The memo details debate between federal agencies regarding whether the images should be classified, with Department of Defense agencies arguing that it should, and NASA and the State Department arguing against classification. The memo itself questions the legality of unclassified images to be retroactively classified.

Remarks on the memo,[43] handwritten apparently by DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) Colby himself, read:“ He did raise it - said State Dept. people felt strongly. But he inclined leave decision to me (DCI) - I confessed some question over need to protect since:
USSR has it from own sats
What really does it reveal?
If exposed, don't we just say classified USAF work is done there? ”


The declassified documents do not disclose the outcome of discussions regarding the Skylab imagery. The behind-the-scenes debate proved moot as the photograph appeared in the federal government's archive of satellite imagery along with the remaining Skylab 4 photographs, with no record of anyone noticing until Day identified it in 2007.[44]

UFO and other conspiracy theories concerning Area 51

Its secretive nature and undoubted connection to classified aircraft research, together with reports of unusual phenomena, have led Area 51 to become a focus of modern UFO and conspiracy theories. Some of the activities mentioned in such theories at Area 51 include:
The storage, examination, and reverse engineering of crashed alien spacecraft (including material supposedly recovered at Roswell), the study of their occupants (living and dead), and the manufacture of aircraft based on alien technology.
Meetings or joint undertakings with extraterrestrials.
The development of exotic energy weapons (for SDI applications or otherwise) or means of weather control.
The development of time travel and teleportation technology.
The development of unusual and exotic propulsion systems related to the Aurora Program.
Activities related to a supposed shadowy one world government and or the Majestic Twelve organization.

Many of the hypotheses concern underground facilities at Groom or at nearby Papoose Lake, and include claims of a transcontinental underground railroad system, a disappearing airstrip (nicknamed the "Cheshire Airstrip", after Lewis Carroll's Cheshire cat) which briefly appears when water is sprayed onto its camouflaged asphalt,[45] and engineering based on alien technology. Publicly-available satellite imagery, however, reveals clearly visible landing strips at Groom Dry Lake, but not at Papoose Lake.

Veterans of experimental projects such as OXCART and NERVA at Area 51 agree that their work (including 2,850 OXCART test flights alone) inadvertently prompted many of the UFO sightings and other rumors:[6]“ The shape of OXCART was unprecedented, with its wide, disk-like fuselage designed to carry vast quantities of fuel. Commercial pilots cruising over Nevada at dusk would look up and see the bottom of OXCART whiz by at 2,000-plus mph. The aircraft's titanium body, moving as fast as a bullet, would reflect the sun's rays in a way that could make anyone think, UFO.[6] ”


While they deny the existence of a vast underground railroad system, many of Area 51's operations did (and presumably still do) occur underground.[6]

In 1989, Bob Lazar came forward, claiming that he had worked at Area 51's S-4, a facility at Papoose Lake, approximately 8.5 miles south of Groom Lake. He was contracted to aid in the reverse engineering of one of several flying saucers that the U.S. government had in its possession which he nicknamed "the sport model"[46].

The 1996 documentary Dreamland directed by Bruce Burgess included an interview with a 71 year old mechanical engineer who claimed to be a former employee at Area 51 during the 1950s, working on a "flying disc simulator" built to train US Pilots, based on a disc originating from a crashed extraterrestrial craft. During his career at Area 51 he claimed to have worked with an extraterrestrial being whose name was "J-Rod", described as a telepathic translator.[47]

Dan Burisch (pseudonym of Dan Crain) claimed in 2004 to have worked on cloning alien viruses at Area 51, alongside the alien named "J-Rod". Burisch's scholarly credentials are the subject of much debate, as he was apparently working as a Las Vegas parole officer in 1989 while also earning a PhD at SUNY.[48]

Portrayal in media and popular culture

Popular culture often portrays Area 51 as a haven for extraterrestrials. The numerous conspiracy theories surrounding Area 51 have granted it a fairly high profile in popular culture, specifically in the area of science fiction. Dozens of films and television programs deal with fictionalized events at the site. The following is list of such media:
The most widely seen example is the 1996 action film Independence Day, in which the complex is shown to have been studying the crashed scout ship from the Roswell UFO incident of 1947. The heroes of the film later make their final attack from the airstrips at the base, and in a nod to established fact, Randy Quaid's character Russell Casse at one point refers to the base not being shown on a state map of Nevada.
The television series Seven Days took place largely inside the Area 51 complex itself, with the base depicted as being run by a covert National Security Agency (NSA) operation which used time travel made possible by alien technology recovered from the 1947 Roswell incident.
Lara Croft infiltrates Area 51 in Tomb Raider 3. She must find a special stone called "Element 115."
Joanna Dark infiltrates Area 51 in the multi-million selling first person shooter video game Perfect Dark. Her objectives are to meet up with a fellow secret agent, find the autopsy lab of the assumed to be dead alien named Elvis, and to get out successfully.
In the beginning of Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull, "Hangar 51" is revealed to be the location of the government warehouse where the Ark of the Covenant was stored at the end of Raiders of the Lost Ark, and where KGB agents go to recover the remains of the Roswell alien, eventually revealed to be an interdimensional being with a crystalline skeleton. Writer David Koepp acknowledged the number 51 as a reference to popular beliefs about the connection between Roswell and Area 51.[49]
In the television series Stargate SG-1, Area 51 is used as a facility for storage and research of technology brought back to Earth from other planets.
In the episode Knight to King's Pawn of the revived Knight Rider series on NBC, Michael Knight infiltrates a storage facility at Area 51, to recover KITT, after it was taken way by NSA agents.
In the Metal Gear series, Area 51 turns out to be one of the headquarters of the Illuminati group known as The Patriots, who manipulate the government, public, and economy from behind the scenes. The character Raiden is injured during an attempt to rescue Sunny.
In the comic Superman: Red Son, Abin Sur's body is stored in Area 51 by order of J. Edgar Hoover. John F. Kennedy later gives Lex Luthor access to the base to develop weapons to defeat the Soviet Union.
For the finale of the documentary television series UFO Hunters, Season Two, Area 51 was filmed in October 2008. The high definition footage aired February 25, 2009 on the History channel.

See also North America portal

Groom Range - mountain range north of the lakebed
Woomera Prohibited Area - defense and aerospace testing area in Australia
Kapustin Yar
Dugway Proving Grounds - Restricted facility in the Utah desert.

References

General references
Rich, Ben; Janos, Leo. (1996) Skunk Works. Little, Brown & Company, ISBN 0-316-74300-3
Darlington, David. (1998) Area 51: The Dreamland Chronicles. Henry Holt & Company, ISBN 0-8050-6040-5
Patton, Phil (1998) Dreamland: Travels Inside the Secret World of Roswell and Area 51. Villard Books / Random House ISBN 0-375-75385-0
Area 51 resources at the Federation of American Scientists
Leslie Stahl "Area 51 / Catch 22" 60 Minutes CBS Television March 17, 1996, a US TV news magazine's segment about the environmental lawsuit (Transcript)
Area 51 related article archive from the pages of the Las Vegas Review-Journal

Specific references
^ DREAMLAND: Fifty Years of Secret Flight Testing in Nevada By Peter W. Merlin
^ Rich, p. 57, Rich describes Groom in 1977 as being "...a sprawling facility, bigger than some municipal airports, a test range for sensitive aviation projects"
^ Area 51 researcher Glenn Campbell claims that AFFTC Detachment 3 is located at Groom, citing the title of a leaked security manual, the mailbox in Henderson, Nevada he believes formerly served Groom, and the NASA biography of astronaut Carl E. Walz who was formerly a manager at AFFTC-DET3 !: "Area 51 is Edwards DET 3", Glenn Campbell, Groom Lake Desert Rat, 6/17/96 ; "Biography of Carl E. Walz (Colonel, USAF, Ret.), NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
^ "Black Projects at Groom Lake: Into the 21st Century", Peter W. Merlin
^ Rich, p. 56 Rich writes "Kelly [Johnson, the U2's designer] had jokingly nicknamed this Godforsaken place Paradise Ranch, hoping to lure young and innocent flight crews"
^ a b c d e Jacobsen, Annie. "The Road to Area 51". Los Angeles Times, 5 April 2009.
^ Patton, p. 3, lists Paradise Ranch, Watertown, Groom Lake, and Home Base as nicknames
^ Daily Aviator - Homey Airport, article retrieved January 14, 2008.
^ FAA aviation chart for the Groom area
^ US Department of Energy. Nevada Operations Office. United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992 (December 2000)
^ NTS map showing the different areas overlaid on topographic map, State of Nevada - Division of environmental protection
^ Annotated NTS map at the Federation of American Scientists website
^ Moldovan Minister of defense jailed for sale of MiG-29 to USA
^ a b c Shadow Flights: America's Secret Air War Against the Soviet Union, Curtis Peebles, 2000, Presidio Press, ISBN 0-89141-700-1.
^ Rich, pp. 141-144, details U2 test pilot Tony LeVier scouting the remote area near Death Valley for locations, saying of Groom "I gave it a ten plus [score]... a dry lake bed around three and a half miles around", and describes LeVier showing the lake to U-2 designer Kelly Johnson and CIA official Richard Bissell, and Johnson deciding to locate the runway "at south end of lake"
^ Rich, pp. 56-60
^ Measurements, runway state and alignment information based upon Google Earth / Digital Globe images as retrieved on December 21, 2007.
^ Jeppesen-Sanderson, Inc. (August 2007). "Jeppesen Flightstar Airport Database". Retrieved on 2007-10-01.
^ a b Don’t ask, don’t tell: Area 51 gets airport identifier
^ Hall, George. Skinner, Michael. Red Flag, Motorbooks International, 1993, ISBN 0879387599, p.49: "It is an understatement to say that overflying Dreamland is forbidden..."
^ Patton, p10
^ "Area 51 hackers dig up trouble" Kevin Poulsen, Security Focus May 25, 2004
^ "Road sensors", Dreamland Resort
^ "New Area 51 road sensors", Dreamland Resort
^ USGS 1:24K/25K Topo map for location UTM 11 605181E 4124095N (NAD27) (map via TopoQuest.com)
^ USGS 1:24K/25K Topo map for geopoint GROOM MINE, NV (map via TopoQuest.com)
^ "Airports and Landing strips, 2002", Nevada Department of Transportation, cf section R-4808N
^ Las Vegas Sectional Aeronautical Chart, National Aeronautical Chart Office, Federal Aviation Administration (last checked 26 September 2008)
^ "Federal lands and Indian reservations", The National atlas of the United States of America, United States Department of the Interior, document ID: pagefed_nv7.pdf INTERIOR-GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, RESTON, VIRGINIA-2003
^ Corona image
^ Terraserver image
^ Stephen Regenold (2007-04-13). ""Lonesome Highway to Another World?"". New York Times. Retrieved on 2007-07-08.
^ Glenn Campbell (March 1994). "Secret Base Cheats Local Tax Rolls". The Groom Lake Desert Rat. Retrieved on 2007-07-08. "In the 93-94 tax year, the Air Force paid taxes of $65,517 on a property assessment (for "Buildings and Improvements" plus "Other Personal Property") of $2,517,781."
^ "Area 51 / Catch 22" segment, 60 Minutes broadcast March 17, 1996.
^ Federal judges to hear case involving Area 51 Keith Rogers, Las Vegas Review-Journal, June 4, 2002
^ US 9th Circuit ruling on Kasza V Browner and related case Frost V Perry, Lake, Widnall
^ 2000 Presidential Determination
^ 2002 Presidential Determination
^ 2003 Presidential Determination
^ 21-Sun-2006/news/7488359.html "Warnings for emergency responders kept from Area 51 workers", Keith Rogers, Las Vegas Review-Journal, May 21, 2006
^ Dwayne A. Day (January 9, 2006). "Astronauts and Area 51: the Skylab Incident". The Space Review. Retrieved on 2006-04-02.
^ Presidential Determination No. 2003-39
^ "CIA memo to DCI Colby" (PDF). hosted by The Space Review. Retrieved on 2006-04-02.
^ Dwayne A. Day (26 November 2007). "Secret Apollo". The Space Review. Retrieved on 2009-02-16.
^ Mahood, Tom (October 1996). "The Cheshire Airstrip". Retrieved on 2006-04-02.
^ http://www.zamandayolculuk.com/cetinbal/...tmodel.htm
^ Dreamland, Transmedia and Dandelion Production for Sky Television (1996).
^ Sheaffer, Robert (November/December 2004). "Tunguska 1, Roswell 0". Skeptical Inquirer (Committee for Skeptical Inquiry) 28 (6).
^ Rinzler, J.W.; Laurent Bouzereau (2008). The Complete Making of Indiana Jones. Random House. pp. 249. ISBN 9780091926618.

External links

General
Dreamland Resort - Detailed history of Area 51
Roadrunners Internationale, a project covering the history of the U2 and Blackbird projects
"How Area 51 Works", on HowStuffWorks

Maps and photographs

37.240203°N 115.818558°WCoordinates: 37.240203°N 115.818558°W
Dreamland Resort's map of Area 51 buildings
Photographs, research, and discussion about Area 51 / S4 at The Anomalies Network
Topographic Map of the Emigrant Valley / Groom area
Aerial photos from different decades, overlaid with Google Maps interface
Photographs of McCarran EG&G terminal and JANET aircraft
Official FAA aeronautical chart of Groom Lake
High resolution pictures of Area 51
"Historical pictures of Groom Lake, Groom Lake Mining District" - Department of Special Collections, Digital Image Collections, of the University of Nevada, Reno (accessed January 30, 2009)
"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
Reply
#5
Peter..that was sure a long thread to read in one setting. However, I wouldn't have done so
if I hadn't been interested in reading it. :-)

For one thing, it helps me to realize what my former husbands' uncle, was doing up in that area of Nevada,in about 1962. We wwre living in Las Vegas at that time. The uncle would go off to work during the week and come home to his family on weekends. He was a Building Contracter and I did know it had to do with some sort of Govt. contract. I also recall him mentioning, Mercury, Yucca Flats, Jack Ass Flats and also Tonapah. I don't recall him mentioning Groom Lake, althogh he might have. At the time, I had no idea what might be going on up in that area, other thmn some sort of Govt. building project going on. So, I was unaware, until reading your thread, what was going on.

In addition, a few years ago, I discovered about five near secret facilities, all relatively close to each other and in my neck of the woods. I got a lot curious and tried looking for some info on the internet. I did find out a lot mpre then I had even thought that I would. So, as I sometimes do I compiled the info from a few sources and posted it it all on another forum...just as I did about the Papa Pilgrim thread that I posted here awhile back.
Although somewhat related to your thread, if I can fill my info, I will try to post it here, in another thread. I titled my info.."What The Hell Is This Place?" This also has a whole lot of fodder for UFO believers. Many locals in these areas claim to see many things going on at night. But, I didn't get into all that much, because there is no way to know what is truth or not, in such claims. Although there were a couple of strange sightings where several local people saw it.

Hopefully, I can also still find my info in regard to a Stealth Plane crash near my area, in somewhere around 1986. This was at a time when hardly anyone was even aware of their existance and they were still even being denied.

Dixie
Reply
#6
More modified limited hangout involving Area 51 and relatating to the JFK Assassination here. and here.
"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
Reply


Forum Jump:


Users browsing this thread: 1 Guest(s)