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Brazil, Lula, Big Oil and the Project to Destroy BRICS
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Pepe Escobar discusses the recent programme to destablize Brazil and destroy the BRICS project

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Lula and the BRICS in a fight to the death

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Reprinted from RT
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Former Brazilian president Lula defiant after detention
(image by CCTV News, Channel: CCTVNEWSbeijing) License DMCA



"BRICS" is the dirtiest of acronyms in the Beltway/Wall Street axis, and for a solid reason: the consolidation of the BRICS is the only organic, global-reach project with the potential to derail Exceptionalistan's grip over the so-called "international community."
So it's no surprise the three key BRICS powers have been under simultaneous attack, on many fronts, for some time now. On Russia, it's all about Ukraine and Syria, the oil price war, the odd hostile raid over the ruble and the one-size-fits-all "Russian aggression" demonization. On China, it's all about "Chinese aggression" in the South China Sea and the (failed) raid over the Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchanges.
Brazil is the weakest link among these three key emerging powers. Already by the end of 2014 it was clear the usual suspects would go no holds barred to destabilize the seventh largest global economy, aiming at good old regime change via a nasty cocktail of political gridlock ("ungovernability") dragging the economy to the mud.
Myriad reasons for the attack include the consolidation of the BRICS development bank; the BRICS's concerted push for trading in their own currencies, bypassing the US dollar and aiming for a new global reserve currency to replace it; the construction of a major underwater fiber-optic telecom cable between Brazil and Europe, as well as the BRICS cable uniting South America to East Asia -- both bypassing US control.

And most of all, as usual, the holy of the holies -- connected with Exceptionalistan's burning desire to privatize Brazil's immense natural wealth. Once again, it's the oil.
Get Lula or elseWikiLeaks had already exposed how, way back in 2009, Big Oil was active in Brazil, trying to modify -- by all extortion means necessary -- a law proposed by former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, establishing profitable state-run Petrobras as the chief operator of all offshore blocks in the largest oil discovery of the young 21st century; the pre-salt deposits.
Lula not only kept Big Oil -- especially ExxonMobil and Chevron -- out of the picture but he also opened Brazilian oil exploration to China's Sinopec, as part of the Brazil-China (BRICS within BRICS) strategic partnership.
Hell hath no fury like Exceptionalistan scorned. Like the Mob, it never forgives; Lula one day would have to pay, like Putin must pay for getting rid of US-friendly oligarchs.
The ball started rolling with Edward Snowden revealing how the NSA was spying on Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and top Petrobras officials. It continued with the fact that the Brazilian Federal Police cooperate, receive training and/or are fed, closely, by both the FBI and CIA (mostly in the anti-terrorism sphere). And it went on via the two-year-old "Car Wash" investigation, which uncovered a vast corruption network involving players inside Petrobras, top Brazilian construction companies and politicians from the ruling Workers' Party.
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The corruption network is real -- with "proof," usually oral, rarely backed up by documents, obtained mostly from artful dodgers-cum-serial liars who rat on someone as part of a plea bargain.


But for the "Car Wash" prosecutors, the real deal was, from the beginning, how to ensnare Lula.
Enter the tropical Elliott NessThat brings us to the Hollywood spectacular enacted last Friday in Sao Paulo that sent shockwaves around the world. Lula "detained," interrogated, humiliated in public. This is how I analyzed it in detail.
Plan A for the Hollywood-style blitz on Lula was an ambitious double down; not only to pave the way for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff under a "guilty by association" stretch, but to "neutralize" Lula for good, preventing him from running for office again in 2018. There was no Plan B.
Predictably -- as in many an FBI sting -- the whole op backfired. Lula, in a political master class of a speech beamed live across the country, not only convincingly clad himself as the martyr of a conspiracy, but also re-energized his troops; even respectable conservatives vocally condemned the Hollywood show, from a minister in the Supreme Court to a former justice minister, as well as top economist Bresser Pereira, one of the founders of the PSDB -- the former social democrats turned Exceptionalistan-allied neoliberal enforcers and leaders of the right-wing opposition.
Bresser actually stated the Brazilian Supreme Court should intervene on Car Wash to prevent abuses. Lula, for instance, had asked for the Supreme Court to detail which jurisprudence was relevant to investigate the accusations against him. Moreover, a lawyer on center stage during the Hollywood blitz said Lula answered all questions during the almost four-hour interrogation without blinking -- questions he had already answered before.
Lawyer Celso Bandeira de Mello, for his part, went straight to the point: the Brazilian upper middle classes -- which include a largely appalling lot wallowing in arrogance, ignorance and prejudice, whose dream is a condo in Miami -- are fearful and terrified to death that Lula may run, and win again, in 2018.


And that brings us to the judge and executioner of the whole drama: Sergio Moro, Car Wash's leading actor.
Moro's academic career is hardly exciting. He's not exactly a theorist heavyweight. He graduated as a lawyer in 1995 in a mediocre university in the middle of nowhere in one of Brazil's southern states and made a few trips to the US, one of them financed by the State Department to learn about money laundering.
As I noted before, his chef-d'oeuvre is an article published way back in 2004 in an obscure magazine (in Portuguese only, titled Considerations about Mani Pulite, CEJ magazine, issue number 26, July/September 2004), where he clearly extols "authoritarian subversion of juridical order to reach specific targets" and using the media to intoxicate the political atmosphere.
In a nutshell, judge Moro literally transposed the notorious 1990s Mani Pulite ("Clean Hands") investigation from Italy to Brazil -- instrumentalizing to the hilt mainstream media and the judiciary to achieve a sort of "total delegitimization" of the political system. But not the whole political system; just the Workers' Party, as if the comprador elites permeating Brazil's rightwing spectrum were cherubic angels.
So it comes as no surprise that Moro's prime sidekick as Car Wash unrolled is the Marinho family's oligopoly, the Globo media empire -- a nest of reactionary, and not very clever, vipers who entertained very cozy relations with the Brazilian military dictatorship from the 1960s to the 1980s. Not by accident, Globo was informed about Lula's Hollywood-style "arrest" way before the fact, allowing it to invest in CNN-style blanket coverage.
Moro is viewed by legions in Brazil as an indigenous Elliot Ness. Other lawyers who have closely followed his work though hint he harbors the warped fantasy of a Workers' Party as a mob leeching and plundering the state apparatus with the aim of delivering it, in pieces, to trade unions.




According to one of these lawyers who talked to Brazilian independent media, a former president of the Lawyers' Association in Rio, Moro is surrounded by a bunch of young fanatical prosecutors, with little juridical knowledge, and posing as the Brazilian Antonio di Pietro (but without the solidity of the "Clean Hands" Milanese prosecutor). Worse, Moro is oblivious that the implosion of the Italian political system led to the rise of Berlusconi. In Brazil, it would certainly lead to the rise of a clown/village idiot supported by the Globo empire, whose oligopolistic practices are quite Berlusconian.
The digital PinochetsA case can be made that the Hollywood blitz on Lula holds a direct parallel to the first attempt at a coup d'etat in Chile in 1973, which tested the waters in terms of popular response before the real deal. In the Brazilian remix, assorted Globo media maggots pose as digital Pinochets. At least many a street in Sao Paulo now bears graffiti to the effect of "Military coup -- Never again."
Yes, because this is all about a white coup -- in the form of a Rousseff impeachment and sending Lula to the gallows. But old (military) habits die hard; Globo media maggots are now extolling the Army to take to the streets to "neutralize" popular militias. And this is just the beginning. Right-wingers are getting ready for a national mobilization on Sunday calling for -- what else -- Rousseff's impeachment.
Car Wash's merit is to investigate corruption, collusion and traffic of influence in abysmally corrupt Brazil. But everyone, every political faction, should be investigated -- including those representing Brazilian comprador elites. That's not the case. Because the political project allied with Car Wash couldn't care less about "justice"; the only thing that matters is to perpetuate a vicious political crisis as a means to drag the seventh largest economy in the world into the mud and reach the Holy Grail: a white coup, or good ol' regime change. But 2016 is not 1973, and the whole world by now knows who's a sucker for regime change.
The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort. To become conscious of it involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as present and real. This act is the essential condition for any kind of self-knowledge.
Carl Jung - Aion (1951). CW 9, Part II: P.14
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#2
[INDENT=6]Brazil Is Engulfed by Ruling Class Corruption and a Dangerous Subversion of Democracy

Glenn Greenwald Andrew Fishman David Miranda
Mar. 18 2016, 5:31 p.m.





[INDENT=6](Para ler a versão desse artigo em Português, clique aqui.)
THE MULTIPLE, REMARKABLE crises consuming Brazil are now garneringsubstantial Western media attention. That's understandable given that Brazil is the world's fifth most populous country and eighth-largest economy; its second-largest city, Rio de Janeiro, is the host of this year's Summer Olympics. But much of thisWestern media coverage mimics the propaganda coming from Brazil's homogenized, oligarch-owned, anti-democracy media outlets and, as such, is misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete, particularly when coming from those with little familiarity with the country (there are numerous Brazil-based Western reporters doing outstanding work).
It is difficult to overstate the severity of Brazil's multi-level distress. This short paragraph yesterday from the New York Times's Brazil bureau chief, Simon Romero, conveys how dire it is:
Brazil is suffering its worst economic crisis in decades. An enormousgraft scheme has hobbled the national oil company. The Zikaepidemic is causing despair across the northeast. And just before the world heads to Brazil for the Summer Olympics, the government is fighting for survival, with almost every corner of the political system under the cloud of scandal.
Brazil's extraordinary political upheaval shares some similarities with the Trump-led political chaos in the U.S.: a sui generis, out-of-control circus unleashing instability and some rather dark forces, with a positive ending almost impossible to imagine. The once-remote prospect of President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment now seems likely.
But one significant difference with the U.S. is that Brazil's turmoil is not confined to one politician. The opposite is true, as Romero notes: "almost every corner of the political system [is] under the cloud of scandal." That includes not only Rousseff's moderately left-wing Workers Party, or PT which is rife with serious corruption but also the vast majority of the centrist and right-wing political and economic factions working to destroy PT, which are drowning in at least an equal amount of criminality. In other words, PT is indeed deeply corrupt and awash in criminal scandal, but so is virtually every political faction working to undermine it and vying to seize that party's democratically obtained power.
In reporting on Brazil, Western media outlets have most prominently focused on the increasingly large street protests demanding the impeachment of Rousseff. They have typically depicted those protests in idealized, cartoon terms of adoration: as an inspiring, mass populist uprising against a corrupt regime. Last night, NBC News's Chuck Todd re-tweeted the Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer describing anti-Dilma protests as "The People vs. the President" a manufactured theme consistent with what is being peddled by Brazil's anti-government media outlets such as Globo:
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That narrative is, at best, a radical oversimplification of what is happening and, more often, crass propaganda designed to undermine a left-wing party long disliked by U.S. foreign policy elites. That depiction completely ignores the historical context of Brazil's politics and, more importantly, several critical questions: Who is behind these protests, how representative are the protesters of the Brazilian population, and what is their actual agenda?
THE CURRENT VERSION of Brazilian democracy is very young. In 1964, the country's democratically elected left-wing government was overthrown by a military coup. Both publicly and before Congress, U.S. officials vehemently denied any role, but needless to say documents and recordings subsequently emerged proving the U.S. directly supported and helped plot critical aspects of that coup.
The 21-year, right-wing, pro-U.S. military dictatorship that ensued was brutal and tyrannical, specializing in torture techniques used against dissidents that were taught to the dictatorship by the U.S. and U.K. A comprehensive 2014 Truth Commission report documented that both countries "trained Brazilian interrogators in torture techniques." Among their victims was Rousseff, who was an anti-regime, left-wing guerilla imprisoned and tortured by the military dictators in the 1970s.
The coup itself and the dictatorship that followed were supported by Brazil's oligarchs and their large media outlets, led by Globo, which notably depicted the 1964 coup as a noble defeat of a corrupt left-wing government (sound familiar?). The 1964 coup and dictatorship were also supported by the nation's extravagantly rich (and overwhelmingly white) upper class and its small middle class. As democracy opponents often do, Brazil's wealthy factions regarded dictatorship as protection against the impoverished masses comprised largely of non-whites. As The Guardian put it upon release of the Truth Commission report: "As was the case elsewhere in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, the elite and middle class aligned themselves with the military to stave off what they saw as a communist threat."


Documents proving USG involvement in the Military Coup of Brazil HERE.



"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
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#3
CounterSpy, April - May 1979, pp. 4-23.

Brazil and CIA

by Peter Gribbin

In the rush to consolidate its role as the new leader of the so-called Free World, the U.S. government saw as a major task the containment of countries which, during the Second World War, had begun to pursue an independent course of development. If and when change was to occur, it was to be of a made-to-order variety, directed from Washington. To this end, the establishment of powerful, centralized police forces in Asia, Africa, and especially Latin America became a top priority.The person the Eisenhower administration charged with organizing a task force on police training was Byron Engle.[SUP]1[/SUP] He was chosen because of his experiences training Japanese police after WW II and setting up a police advisory board in Turkey. Funding for the new police program supposedly came from the State Department, even though Engle had been with the CIA since 1947. This prompted FBI head J. Edgar Hoover to complain that the police program was just one more CIA cover.[SUP]2[/SUP]
When the Kennedy administration moved into Washington, Engle's program took on new life. The cabinet-level Counter-Intelligence (C-I) Group was headed by Maxwell Taylor, a former general who was later named U.S Ambassador to South Vietnam. The C-I Group along with the CIA was responsible for creating the Special Forces (Green Berets); new training in counter-insurgency at military schools from the National War College on down; and new courses at the Foreign Service Institute, all designed to make members of the State Department, the CIA and the military branches knowledgeable in counter-insurgency techniques. In addition, a special Committee on Police and Police Training was set up under the direction of U. Alexis Johnson, who has worked hand-in-glove with the CIA throughout his career. Johnson later became deputy ambassador to South Vietnam, but in his present capacity he appointed Engle as head of the new, expanded police program. After all, hadn't Engle once trained 100,000 Japanese police in only two months?[SUP]3[/SUP]
In the Fall of 1961, just as Joao Goulart was taking over the presidency, the United States began an expanded influx of CIA agents and AID officials into Brazil. AID Public Safety advisers like Dan Mitrione were responsible for "improving" the Brazilian police forces. Engle sent CIA officer Lauren J. (Jack) Goin to Brazil under the cover of "adviser in scientific investigations." Before coming to Brazil, Goin had set up the first police advisory team in Indonesia which was instrumental in the CIA-backed coup which culminated in the documented killing of over three-hundred thousand Indonesians. He had also served with Engle when the first police advisory team was created in Turkey.[SUP]4[/SUP]



Economic Background

The Goulart regime of 1961-1964 represented the "fundamental contradiction between a government's responsibility to the citizens who elected it, and the obedience to the demands of foreign creditors expressed in the IMF stabilization program."[SUP]5[/SUP] A government which refuses to make any gesture toward meeting their conditions frequently finds its international credit for imports cut off which, in turn, increases the likelihood of a CIA-induced, right-wing coup.
A country in the throes of a balance of payments crisis is usually unable to obtain needed credit unless "significant policy changes are made."[SUP]6[/SUP] For example, new loans may be obtained only through a change away from nationalist economic policies toward measures favoring foreign investment. As is being increasingly borne out by other Third World countries, Brazil's democratic system at the start of the 1960s proved unequal to the difficult challenge posed by the foreign exchange constraint. Since Goulart was elected by a "populist" coalition of voters spanning class lines, the party system itself discouraged strategies that might put any significant group at a disadvantage. In this atmosphere, the coup of '64 became a sine qua non for new U.S. credit.
Previously, in 1958, President Juscelino Kubitschek had been forced to come to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund on certain stabilization measures in order to secure a $300 million loan.[SUP]7[/SUP] (His predecessor, Getulio Vargas, had committed suicide in 1954. Behind him he left a document in which he blamed outside forces for helping to create the circumstances that drove him to take his life: "The foreign companies made profits of up to five hundred percent. They demonstrably deprived the state of more than a hundred million dollars by false evaluations of import goods.[SUP]8[/SUP]) But the president of the Bank of Brazil refused to go along with the government's proposed credit squeeze which would have caused a depression in the private sector. After floundering around for the greater part of 1958, instituting half-way measures unacceptable to the IMF, Kubitschek broke off negotiations and gave up hope for the American loan. He managed to obtain the needed foreign credit by means of a short-term, high-cost loan from private sources abroad. But his successor, Janio Quadros, inherited a full-scale debt repayment crisis that could no longer be postponed.
Quadros immediately came to terms with the IMF and his foreign creditors. He abolished the "exchange auctions" which the Brazilian government, by auctioning off its foreign exchange reserves to the highest bidder/importer, had previously used as a source of revenue.[SUP]9[/SUP] Certain exchange controls (subsidies) were established for "necessary" imports, effecting a devaluation of the Brazilian cruzeiro by fifty percent. The IMF was still not satisfied, however, and by July of 1961 it succeeded in forcing Quadros to abolish all exchange controls and to peg all exchange transactions at the (free) world market rate.[SUP]10[/SUP]
By meeting the IMF's demands, Quadros was able to negotiate new credits and reschedule payments due with his U.S. and European creditors. Inflation still raged, however, and when Quadros limited credit (like Kubitschek before him) he came up against strong political counterpressures. Hoping to win popular support and a new mandate to lead the country, Quadros resigned after only eight months in office.
Although some sources saw his resignation as being forced upon him by the CIA, Quadros had, in fact, been the U.S. government's last hope for bringing their brand of stability to Brazil within a democratic framework. In theNew York Times of August 26, 1961, the mood of the State Department was described as "one of fear that the departure of President Quadros from Brazil's political scene, if it is not reversed, would plunge the country into serious political difficulties threatening its stability and interfering with the financial and economic stabilization program."
Quadros' successor, Joao Goulart, whose political strength rested on the close ties he had fostered with the unions while Minister of Labor under Vargas, was to the left of the Brazilian political spectrum. The real threat -- to industrialists, the army and foreign investors -- was the likelihood that under Goulart organized labor would become the dominant political force in Brazil.[SUP]11[/SUP] If Quadros could not carry through his stabilization program, there seemed even less to hope for, in that respect, from Goulart.
During Goulart's presidency, the contradictions inherent in Brazil's post-war development reached the breaking point. Goulart had inherited the accumulated problems of fifteen years of inflation and foreign borrowing which none of his predecessors had successfully tackled. Brazil's last effort at economic stabilization within a democratic framework was made in 1963. The Three-Year plan, drawn up by Minister of Finance, Santiago Dantas, and Minister for Economic Planning, Celso Furtado, was made with one eye on the Brazilian electorate and the other on the IMF.[SUP]12[/SUP]
On the one hand, this plan promised to carry out tax and agrarian reforms while resuming a high rate of growth. Simultaneously, however, it sought to curb inflation which was a precondition for receiving new credits and/or deferral of payments due. In 1963, this crushing debt repayment burden threatened to eat up 45 percent of Brazil's export earnings.[SUP]13[/SUP] When the plan was presented to the IMF, the latter wanted more stringent conditions. These were: devaluation of the cruzeiro; exchange reform which meant abolishing subsidies on the import of wheat and petroleum; and, restrictions on the budget deficit (which translated into a cutback in government services) and on wage increases. These restrictions were designed to contract the money supply and depress the costs of goods and labor. Cheaper goods and labor (at the expense of the workers) would make Brazilian products more competitive on the world market. But the contradictory elements of the Three-Year Plan soon exploded.
Brazil was able to head off imminent disaster when the Agency for International Development (AID) agreed to release $400 million on the condition that the government stick to its austerity program.[SUP]14[/SUP] The government's program was doomed to failure, however, because of a proposed 70 percent wage increase to government employees -- the military among them -- whose support was necessary if Goulart was to stay in power. Caught between a rock and a hard place, Goulart gave in to the wage increase and held off on the proposed stabilization. The U.S. immediately suspended its aid disbursements.
Goulart further exacerbated American hostility towards him when he signed the Profit Remittance Law.[SUP]15[/SUP] This law, which infuriated foreign investors, provided that profit remittances could be calculated only on the amount of capital originally brought into the country, and not on the (much larger) unremitted past profits which had been reinvested in Brazil. U.S. distaste for Goulart was expressed in the cutting-off of aid to his government while at the same time giving aid to certain conservative state governors (Carlos Lacerda in Guanabara and Adhemar de Barros in Sao Paulo) with whom it thought it could do business.
The final act of Goulart's futile attempt to placate both foreign and domestic interests was played out in the first quarter of 1964. Early in the year, Goulart held discussions on yet another exchange reform and rescheduling of Brazil's foreign debt with a three-man team from the IMF. But this attempt to come to terms with his creditors fell through when, in a gesture towards the Left, he announced the expropriation and redistribution of privately owned land and the nationalization of private oil refineries. Unfortunately, these moves did more to mobilize the Right than they did to gain support from the Left. On April 1, 1964, the military quickly deposed Goulart and installed its own caretaker government.
The subsequent fifteen years have shown that with the overthrow of Joao Goulart, democracy in Brazil came to a screeching halt. After a shaky twenty years, basic political rights were abandoned. Provisions of the First Institutional Act drawn up after the coup created a cassacao, or political death for ten years. These emergency powers soon gave way to a Second Institutional Act. The Fifth Institutional Act shut down Congress, suspendedhabeas corpus for political activity, and gave full autocratic power to the president.[SUP]16[/SUP] Labor laws enacted after the coup rescinded virtually all job-related rights: the right to strike, to negotiate directly with the employers instead of the state, and to establish trade union representation within factories.[SUP]17[/SUP] The destruction of democracy in Brazil was evidence of the impossibility of serving two masters. Goulart was never able to reconcile the legitimate demands of domestic pressure groups with the external economic constraints of Brazil's creditors. As a final ironic twist, Goulart's refusal to succumb to foreign pressures only served to irritate undemocratic forces inside Brazil to the point where they saw it in their interest to get rid of democracy and Goulart in one fell swoop.



Imperialism's Internal Allies: Brazil's National Enemies

In the fall of 1961, just as Joao Goulart was assuming the presidency, the United States began to make contact with his right-wing opposition. At the same time, the CIA began a multifaceted penetration of Brazilian society designed to influence that country's internal politics. Lincoln Gordon, U.S. ambassador to Brazil, was appointed the same day that Goulart's predecessor, Janio Quadros resigned. Soon after his arrival in October, Gordon met with a right-wing admiral named Silvio Heck. Heck informed Gordon of a poll of the armed services which revealed that over two-thirds of the enlisted men opposed Goulart. Heck also hoped that when it came time to oust Goulart "the U.S would take an understanding view."[SUP]18[/SUP] Although Gordon later determined that Heck's figures were exaggerated, he never once warned Goulart or his advisers of this conspiracy.
The CIA, for its part, took more than a passive interest in helping right-wing military forces come to power in Brazil. The overthrow of Goulart and the destruction of democracy in Brazil was effected through the manipulation of diverse social groups. Police, the military, political parties, labor unions, student federations and housewives associations were all exploited in the interest of stirring up opposition to Goulart. Yet, while Washington's original intent may have been to replace Goulart with the strongman General Castello Branco, the guaranty of the coup's longterm success demanded an increase in U.S. material and training for the Brazilian security forces which continues to this day.
The military coup took as its first president Humberto Castello Branco, a man who had a long and close relationship with the United States military. During the Allied invasion of Italy in 1945, a number of prominent Brazilian officers participating in the campaign became exposed to American military ideas and tactics.[SUP]19[/SUP] Castello Branco's roommate in Italy was a CIA-coup engineer, then-Lieutenant Colonel Vernon (Dick) Walters. In 1964, Walters was the U.S. embassy's military attaché, and the man most closely connected with Brazil's military leadership.
Since the end of World War II, Washington had used its role as policeman of the so-called Free World to justify expanding its influence in the Brazilian forces. Military planning between the two countries was coordinated by a Joint Brazil United States Military Commission (JBUSMC). In 1949, the Pentagon helped Brazil set up and staff the Escola Superior de Guerra (Advanced War College), a carbon copy of the U.S. National War College.[SUP]20[/SUP]
The Advanced War College is responsible for national security studies, development of military strategy, and ideas on nation building -- the last being taken from the Pentagon and the U.S. Army's experience in reconstructing postwar Japan.[SUP]21[/SUP] To this day, the college has graduated over three thousand civilians and military managers indoctrinated in a right-wing military ideology and the belief that only the armed forces can lead Brazil to its proper destiny as the great power of Latin America.[SUP]22[/SUP]
Another Brazilian army general who was instrumental in the coup was Golbery do Couto e Silva. Like Castello Branco, Couto e Silva was a member of Brazil's military elite who became enamored of U.S. military thinking while a member of the Allied expeditionary force in Italy in 1945.[SUP]23[/SUP] The Brazilian army's "intellectual gray eminence," Couto e Silva was particularly influential in the formation of the Advanced War College, popularly known as the "Brazilian Sorbonne." At one point the head of Dow Chemical's Brazilian section, Couto e Silva became head of Brazil's first national intelligence service, the SNI, after the coup in 1964.[SUP]24[/SUP]
In the early 60s, the now-retired General Couto e Silva became the chief of staff at the Institute for Social Research Studies (IPES, in Portuguese). The leading inspiration at IPES was Glycon de Paiva,[SUP]25[/SUP] a mining engineer from the state of Minas Gerais. To avoid detection, IPES posed as an educational organization that donated money to reduce illiteracy among poor children. IPES' real work, however, was organizing opposition to Goulart and maintaining dossiers on anyone de Paiva considered an enemy.
Making the rounds of Brazil's major industrialists, de Paiva was able to appeal to their interests by translating his visceral hatred of communism into a simple message they could understand: Goulart wants to take away from you that which is yours. In this way, de Paiva was able to drum up close to $20,000 a month in donations.[SUP]26[/SUP]
One immediate target of IPES' anti-Goulart campaign were housewives, whom de Paiva recognized as being receptive to warnings about the threat that communism posed to the Brazilian family, and to the values of society in general. He set up women's societies in all the major cities. In Rio de Janeiro it was called the Women's Campaign for Democracy (CAMDE).[SUP]27[/SUP] During the week of the coup in March 1964, IPES organized a huge march against Goulart. In Sao Paulo 10,000 people joined a March of the Family with God for Freedom. Sao Paulo women presented a manifesto on behalf of Christian democracy, while at the same time the Archbishop of Sao Paulo forbade his bishops from participating in the march because he said it had been funded by the U.S. advertising agency, McCann Erickson.[SUP]28[/SUP]
De Paiva's major concern, however, was the threat posed by Goulart's openness towards the Left. In this respect, Couto e Silva's role in keeping files at IPES was twofold. On the one hand, he put paid agents in the Brazilian military to make sure that key men throughout the services remained loyal to the Brazilian "nation" and not to Goulart. At the same time, IPES placed paid informers in factories, schools, and government offices to report on supporters of Goulart. Petrobras, the state-owned oil company, received special attention as de Paiva was convinced that Goulart had many supporters there. Before Couto e Silva was finished, IPES had files on 400,000 "enemies" of Brazil.[SUP]29[/SUP]
Another part of the CIA's effort to create anti-Goulart sentiment in Brazil was the rigging of elections. Working through a front group called the Instituto Brasileiro de Acao Democratica (IBAD), the CIA channeled money into local political campaigns. IBAD, in turn, passed the money through its two branches, Democratic Popular Action (ADEP) and Sales Promotion, Inc.[SUP]30[/SUP] In the 1962 elections, IBAD not only funded more than one thousand candidates but recruited them so that their first allegiance would be with IBAD and the CIA. At every level, from state deputies up to governorships, the CIA stacked the ballots in favor of its candidates.
In February, 1964, the CIA was nearly "burned" by a parliamentary investigation into its violation of election laws in 1962.[SUP]31[/SUP] The CIA had spent close to $20 million, but a scandal was averted by three developments: five of the nine members of the investigating committee had themselves received CIA funds; three of banks involved -- First National City Bank, the Bank of Chicago, and the Royal Bank of Canada -- refused to reveal the foreign sources of the money deposited in the IBAD and the ADEP accounts; and lastly, Goulart, still hoping to appease Washington, saw to it that the final report was laundered.
The CIA also manipulated certain members of the student movement. The benefits of having assets in the universities, however, were not realized until after the overthrow of Goulart. Though largely ineffectual before the coup, the Grupo de Acao Patriotica (GAP) was later used to spy on members of the national student union (UNE). GAP was founded by Aristoteles Luis Drummond whose hero was the right-wing Admiral Silvio Heck.[SUP]32[/SUP]During a radio talk show he did in Rio de Janeiro, Drummond expounded on GAP's determined defense of liberty and property, which he claimed only the military could safeguard. Not surprisingly, the interview was rebroadcast by the Voice of America. Later on, the CIA supplied Drummond with 50,000 books and Cold War pamphlets on the communist menace and, more to the point, diatribes against the UNE. Still, GAP's following was small and whenever Drummond put up posters saying "GAP with Heck," he made sure it was in the dead of the night.
In the four years following the coup, however, Drummond and GAP came to play a key role in the new junta. For example, during a student demonstration in May of '68, protesting the discriminating cost of education, a military jeep was overturned and set on fire. The next morning, Drummond was asked to speak about the incident with President Costa e Silva. Boarding a military aircraft, Drummond was flown to Brasilia where he spent an hour with the president identifying leaders of the demonstration and assuring Costa e Silva that they were communists who did not represent the majority of students.[SUP]33[/SUP]



Police Operations

As opposition to the military junta increased, control of the state apparatus became synonymous with increased surveillance, arrests, and torture of those engaging in political activity. In response, Couto e Silva, the chief of staff at IPES, took his hundreds of thousands of files to Brasilia to set up the first national intelligence service, the SNI.[SUP]34[/SUP] As with the creation of DINA in Chile, Brazil's SNI was set up immediately after a CIA-backed military coup. Inevitably, the SNI turned to its more powerful counterpart in the North. In police barracks all over Brazil it was common knowledge that many officers took money from, and reported directly to, the CIA stations. In return, the CIA and the SNI began to push the police for results. Hard-pressed for incriminating evidence on subversives, the police concluded that nothing made a detainee more willing to talk than a little torture. Besides, working closely with the CIA opened one up to special stores of equipment. Everything from tear gas to field telephones (used to administer electric shocks) could be delivered immediately from the Panama branch of the CIA's Technical Services Division (TSD). Requesting such material through normal channels might take months.
Yet, the information on dissidents in Couto e Silva's files was inconclusive, and the processing of prisoners was cumbersome. An alternative resource had to be found. The sense of limitations on the part of the Brazilian police soon gave rise to vigilante groups which sought to appease the fears of Brazil's new leaders and their U.S. backers. One of the men who acted on these concerns was Henning Albert Boilesen, president of a liquid gas company. The suspicion that Boilesen was in the pay of the CIA grew when he began soliciting money from wealthy industrialists for a new organization called Operacao Bandeirantes (OBAN).[SUP]35[/SUP] OBAN united the various military police intelligence services into one paramilitary organization which knew no limits.
Esquadraos da Morte (Death Squads) were not a new phenomenon in Brazil. Before the coup they had been a source of extra income for off-duty policemen. If a thug needed a rival eliminated, he could arrange for a member of a Death Squad to get the job done. Despite salary increases from the AID, six years after the coup Death Squad executions by off-duty police personnel were still taking place. And now, a new wrinkle had been added. The "Ten for One" dictum meant that for every killing of a Death Squad member, ten people would die. When a Sao Paulo police investigator was killed in 1970, nearly twenty people were executed by the police.[SUP]36[/SUP]
U.S. AID officials knew of and supported police participation in Death Squads. In Uruguay, a CIA operations officer, William Cantrell, used the cover of an AID Public Safety Advisor to help set up the Department of Information and Intelligence (DII).[SUP]37[/SUP] Cantrell's chauffeur, Nelson Bardesio was himself a member of the Death Squad in Montevideo. Under interrogation by Tupamaros guerrillas in 1972, Bardesio testified that the DII served as a cover for the Death Squad. Bardesio's testimony further revealed that a Brazilian diplomat offered to set up radio communications between Brasilia and Montevideo. Uruguayan intelligence officials, claimed Bardesio, received Death Squad-type training in Brazil. The living link between the two countries' Death Squads is Sergio Fleury, a top officer of the political police in Brazil. A leader in the elimination of the Brazilian left, Fleury has been identified by hundreds of political prisoners as the man who supervised their torture.[SUP]38[/SUP] Through his work in the Death Squads, Fleury's infamy has spread from Sao Paulo to all of Brazil and on to Uruguay. On at least two occasions, he met with groups of Uruguayan police through CIA contacts.[SUP]39[/SUP]
The systematic use of torture was also condoned if not encouraged by U.S. AID officials. Police in Brazil once speculated on what the Public Safety Advisor Dan Mitrione would do if he were witness to the torturing of a prisoner. One said he would leave. Another asked, "Where, the country?" "No," said the first, "leave the room."[SUP]40[/SUP] To this day, the U.S. Public Safety Program in Brazil has assisted in the training of over 100,000 federal and state police personnel. Moreover, 600 high-ranking officers have received training at the now-defunct International Police Academy (IPA) on the campus of Georgetown University in Washington DC.[SUP]41[/SUP] The United States is also responsible for the construction, equipping, and development of the curriculum and faculty of Brazil's National Police Academy, its National Telecommunications Center; and the National Institute of Criminalistics and Identification.[SUP]42[/SUP]
In the actual torturing of prisoners, the military and civilian police worked hand in hand. It was a common practice for prisoners to be taken from a prison run by the civilian police to one run by a branch of the military and then back again to a facility run by the police. CENIMAR, the navy's intelligence section, had its main prison and torture center in the basement of the Ministry of the Navy, near the docks of the harbor in Rio de Janeiro. U.S. Navy officers based at the naval mission often heard screams from across the courtyard. But none of them -- not even mission commander, Rear Admiral C. Thor Hanson -- ever raised the matter with their hosts.[SUP]43[/SUP]
From the CENIMAR facility, prisoners were shipped across Guanabara Bay by motor launch to a prison on the Isle of Flowers. Inside the low white buildings were interrogators who specialized in torture. The staff there was made up of members of the Department of Political and Social Order (DOPS). The island's commander was Clemente Jose Monteiro Filho, a graduate of the School of the Americas (commonly referred to as the escuela de golpes, the school of coups) at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone.[SUP]44[/SUP] The leader of interrogation and torture was Alfredo Poeck, a navy commander who had taken a three month course at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg in 1961.[SUP]45[/SUP]
A common torture routine consisted of a preliminary beating by a flat wooden paddle with holes drilled through it called a palmatoria. This would be followed by a more concentrated application of electric wires to the genitals designed to elicit information from the victim. If this method failed, the prisoner was subjected to another round with the palmatoria -- often for six hours at a time.[SUP]46[/SUP] Today, Brazil's terror technology has advanced beyond the electric prod and the wooden paddle. Testimony from political prisoners verified by the Brazilian College of Lawyers lists among the newest inventions a refrigerated cubicle called a geladeira. Nude prisoners are boxed in the geladeira for several days at a time and frequently doused with ice-cold water. All the time, loudspeakers emit deafening sounds. One prisoner described this as a "machine to drive people crazy."[SUP]47[/SUP]
The graduates of CIA-connected police programs in the U.S. are an undeniable concern to the Brazilian people. CounterSpy, speaking to this concern, is presenting the names of these graduates during the 1961-64 periods:
Dates indicate when the person was in the U.S.
[TABLE]
[TR]
[TD]Abreu, Antonio Candido (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Ferreira, Rubens Jose (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Affonso, Leonel Archanjo (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Firmo Sereno, Joao (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Almeida, Eudes Batista (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Hostin, Jose Mario (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Almeida, Jose Tabosa (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Lage, Raimundo Valerio Dias (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Andrade, Neylor Vasconcellos (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Mafra, Heitor Martins (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Araujo, Jose Eduardo (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Nascimento, Ricardo Frazao do (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Araujo, Taltibio Delivalle y (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Nogueira, Hever da Silva (1/15/63-2/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Arnaut, Vilmar Leal (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Oliveira, Alceu Drummond (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Barbosa, Joaquim (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Pereira, Paulo Fernandes (1/15/63-4/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Boffa, Carlos Alberto (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Ribeiro, Arlindo Bento (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Brandao, Raul (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Rosa, Helio Pestana (1/15/63-4/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Costa, Jose Luiz (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Saraiva, Iaci Cruz (1/15/63-2/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Da Costa, Ismar Concalves (1/15/63-4/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Paulo Souza da (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Dantas, Walter (1/15/63-4/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Wilson Gomes da (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]De Abreu, Eudes Coutinho (1/15/63-4/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silveira Filho, Paulo Agemiro da (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]De Almada, Antonio Soares (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Sousa, Saulo Nunes (4/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]De Arruda, Firmiand Pacheco (1/15/63-4/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Souza, Dilson de Almeida (1/15/63-4/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Fernandes, Antonio (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Teixeira, Dioran (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Fernandes, Oezer Carvalho (1/15/63-2/15/63) [/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]



Labor Operations

In this final section we will examine how CIA's subversion of Brazilian labor leaders and other trade union officials helped to topple Goulart. As such, we are making available to the people of Brazil the names of those persons who participated in special training sessions in the U.S. from 1961-1964. These courses were run by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) which, according to Philip Agee, is a "CIA controlled labor center financed through AID."[SUP]48[/SUP] Before going into the names, however, it is important to trace the history of U.S. labor's cahoots with American foreign policy in Latin America.
Since the middle of the 1950s, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations -- once they had merged to become the AFL-CIO -- have taken on an increasingly active role in the implementation of American foreign policy. When the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was established as an anti-communist rival to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the "Free World" acknowledged that Latin America would become the exclusive domain of the AFL-CIO in its Cold War counter-offensive against its perceived nemesis, Soviet Expansionism.[SUP]49[/SUP]
ICFTU's affiliate in the Western hemisphere was the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT). In both ideology and practice, ORIT mirrored the AFL-CIO, which both funds and profits from its little sister to the South. ORIT's "prime goal is to fight Communism and to promote 'democratic trade-unionism.' It preaches reform within the existing capitalist system, denying the existence of class antagonism.... ORIT points to the U.S. as an example of the rewards that the system can heap upon the working class and organized labor."[SUP]50[/SUP] The principle sources of ORIT's funding have been the AFL-CIO, ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund, and other U.S. agencies. In 1961, its annual budget amounted to $125,000, excluding the grants.[SUP]51[/SUP] The CIA has exercised considerable control over ORIT. In the early 60s, Morris Paladino was ORIT's Director of Education, Director of Organization and Assistant Secretary General. At the same time, Paladino was also the CIA's principal agent in ORIT, working out of the CIA's International Organizations (IO) Division in Mexico City.[SUP]52[/SUP]
Another creature of the AFL-CIO's work in the international arena is the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Inaugurated in 1962, AIFLD's board of directors testifies to the commonality of interests shared by the CIA and America's industrial and labor elite. AIFLD's executive director until 1966 was Serafino Romualdi, former Inter-American representative for the AFL-CIO. Other board members include AFL-CIO chief George Meany; Joseph Beirne, head of the Communication Workers of America and a collaborator in CIA labor operations through the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (PTTI); J. Peter Grace, an ex-president and present chairman of the board of AIFLD, and head of the W.R. Grace Company which has extensive interests in Latin America. Other business leaders who hold or have held executive positions include Charles Brinckerhoof, chairman of the board of the Anaconda Company; William M. Hickey, president of the United Corporation; Robert C. Hill, director, Merck and Company; Juan C. Trippe, chairman of the board, Pan American World Airways; Henry S. Woodbridge, chairman of the board, Tru-Temper Copper Corporation.[SUP]53[/SUP] A new member of AIFLD's board of directors was Nelson Rockefeller who joined shortly before his death. Aside from this illustrious crew, executives rounding out AIFLD's leadership come from Gulf Oil International, Johnson and Johnson International, Owens-Illinois, and members of the Institute of International Education and the Fund for International Social and Economic Education, both recipients of funding from CIA fronts.[SUP]54[/SUP]
The extent to which AIFLD is under the aegis of the CIA is indicated by the fact that Serafino Romualdi, while at AIFLD, was still an agent of the CIA's International Organizations (IO) Division. Through the IO Division, Romualdi and William Doherty -- former Inter-American Representative of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (PTTI) and now AIFLD's Social Projects Director -- exercised day-to-day control of AIFLD for the CIA.[SUP]55[/SUP]
Unlike ORIT's out-front role in promoting pro-Western trade unionism, AIFLD is dedicated to "strengthening the democratic labor sector in terms of ... technical assistance and social projects ... primarily in the areas of education and training, manpower studies, cooperatives and housing."[SUP]56[/SUP] William Doherty is less equivocal when he points out that AIFLD is an example of the desirability of cooperation between employers and workers. He thus emphasizes AIFLD's main goal: to dispel the hostility of Latin American workers toward U.S. corporations.[SUP]57[/SUP]
A less optimistic but more realistic appraisal of AIFLD's role is given by Philip Agee in his book, Inside the Company. Speaking of its creation in 1962, he states that AIFLD is "Washington's answer to the limitations of current labor programs undertaken through AID as well as through ORIT and CIA stations." The problem, says Agee, was "how to accelerate expansion of labor organizing activities in Latin America in order to deny workers to labor unions dominated by the extreme left and to reverse communist and Castroite penetration."[SUP]58[/SUP]
"AID programs," says Agee, "are limited because of their direct dependence on the U.S. government.... ORIT programs are limited because its affiliates are weak or non-existent in some countries.... The CIA station programs are limited by personnel problems, but more so by the limits on the amount of money that can be channeled covertly through the stations and through international organizations like ORIT and ICFTU."[SUP]59[/SUP]
Under the official cover of "adult education," AIFLD sets up social projects such as workers' housing, credit unions and cooperatives. AIFLD's major task, however, is similar to ORIT's in that it seeks to organize anti-communist labor unions in Latin America. To this end, AIFLD set up training institutes which would carry on the teaching of courses presently being given by AIFLD members. And although administrate control of the training institutes in Washington would be by AIFLD, it was hoped that the institutes themselves would be headed by salaried CIA agents under operational control of the local CIA station.[SUP]60[/SUP]
A logical outcome of AIFLD's obsession with anti-communism was the direct participation of its trainees in the overthrow of Joao Goulart. Even before Goulart came to power, AFL-CIO leaders were critical of growing communist strength in both the labor movement and in Juscelino Kubitschek's government. In 1956, Romualdi, along with labor attaché Irving Salert and U.S. ambassador James C. Dunn, arranged to have Brazilian labor leaders visit the U.S. AIFLD's goal was the "development of a core of labor leaders who, by commanding the enthusiastic support of the rank and file, could turn back Communist attempts to capture the Brazilian labor movement."[SUP]61[/SUP]
The 1960 elections saw Janio Quadros elected president and Goulart vice-president. During this time, Romualdi began to court Carlos Lacerda, the right-wing governor of Guanabara, the capital of which is Rio de Janeiro. When Quadros attempted to halt Brazil's raging inflation by limiting the supply of credit, pressure against him mounted. In August of '61, after only eight months in office, Quadros unexpectedly resigned. By doing this, he hoped to rally the nation behind him and thus give himself new popular support. But Lacerda, acting on the advice of Romualdi, saw to it that the expected communist call for a general strike would be defeated. Speaking to the opening session of the ORIT convention being held in Rio, Lacerda said he would resign in order to lead "from the streets" the fight against Quadros.[SUP]62[/SUP] During the convention, Romualdi and AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer William F. Schnitzler pressured the labor leaders into boycotting the proposed strike.[SUP]63[/SUP]
When the call for a general strike was issued on August 26, the Maritime Workers, the Central Committee of the Railway Unions and the Trade Union Committee for the Defense of Democracy, representing over four million workers, prevented their members from honoring the strike, thus causing its failure.[SUP]64[/SUP]
When news of ORIT's complicity with Lacerda's anti-government plans became known, Quadros' Minister of Labor threatened to outlaw ORIT in Brazil. Only Quadros' resignation kept him from issuing the decree.[SUP]65[/SUP]
ORIT's relations with Quadros' successor were even worse. Early in 1962, an ORIT delegation headed by General Secretary Arturo Jauregui, Mexican Senator Manuel Pavon and Romualdi went to Brasilia to confer with Goulart. After waiting the whole day to speak with the president, the delegation left without even having had a chance to see Goulart. When Goulart came to New York later in the year, he innocently asked the AIFLD director, "My dear Romualdi, when are you coming to visit me in Brasilia?"[SUP]66[/SUP]
Goulart's popularity steadily declined as inflation ate away the wages of Brazilian workers. Between 1958 and 1963, the cost of living increased by over 600 percent.[SUP]67[/SUP] To counter the combined criticism of industry, commerce, the military and the Church, Goulart began to take his case to the workers and oppressed people of Brazil's countryside. But Romualdi and his allies had other plans.
To undermine Goulart's support in organized labor, ORIT, AIFLD, and the American embassy worked to break up the left-dominated CGT (General Workers Command), the nation's largest progressive labor organization. Their efforts culminated at the Third National Labor Congress of 1962. A U.S. labor specialist flown in especially for the occasion plotted strategy for the "democratic" trade union leaders. They convinced this minority bloc to pull out of the gathering, thus undermining the CGT's efforts to unify labor.
Meanwhile, the Movimento Democratico Sindical (MDS), under its motto "God, private property and free enterprise," received AIFLD aid and advice in sponsoring meetings and setting up trade-union courses. In addition, the Instituto Cultural do Trabalho (ICT) -- AIFLD's local affiliate partially financed by U.S. business concerns -- trained labor personnel and disseminated anti-communist propaganda. In response to growing radical peasant movements in the rural Northeast, AIFLD initiated a series of training and aid programs for reformist groups and leaders.[SUP]68[/SUP]
The close ties between AIFLD and the CIA went beyond the use of AIFLD trainees in CIA-sponsored coups. It is the CIA's desire to continue its penetration of labor unions as a means of silencing one of the main foci of opposition to the U.S. presence in Latin America. In Brazil, the CIA channeled $30,000 to the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW) through its conduit the Andrew Hamilton Foundation.[SUP]69[/SUP] It was AIFLD's plan to get the IFPCW to affiliate with its anti-communist IFPCW counterpart in North America.
As a measure of the success of its payoff, sixteen major petroleum unions in Brazil failed to unite in a National Federation of Petroleum Workers which the CIA opposed. AIFLD was able to get these unions to align with the conservative IFPCW by awarding financial aid to unions taking such a course. At one point, the IFPCW representative in Brazil, Alberto Ramos, wrote to one A. Noguria, "I have with me 45 million cruzeiros (almost $17,000) for you to distribute to the unions for campaigns in accordance with our plans." An itemized payoff sheet attached to the note listed the following recipients: $875.00 to Dr. Jorge Filho of the Ministry of Labor; a bonus of $312.50 to a reporter for favorable newspaper coverage; and $140.63 to two labor leaders for helping the IFPCW defeat an opposition candidate for union office. However, because of these revelations, the IFPCW was forced to end its Brazilian organizing efforts.[SUP]70[/SUP]
In the fall of '63, Romualdi and AIFLD vice-president Berent Friele -- "an old Brazilian hand belonging to the Rockefeller entourage" -- met with one of Goulart's chief opponents, Adhemar de Barros, governor of Sao Paulo.[SUP]71[/SUP]De Barros told the two men of plans already under way to mobilize police and military contingents against Goulart. When he complained that the U.S. Embassy was not listening, Romualdi wrote to the embassy's labor attaché, John Fishburn. "The Embassy's reaction," says Romualdi, "was, of course, noncommittal."[SUP]72[/SUP]
Even before his pleas to the embassy fell on deaf ears, Romualdi had decided that "a substantial sector of labor's rank and file were fed up with the Goulart regime."[SUP]73[/SUP] Starting in 1963, AIFLD "trained in Washington a special all-Brazilian class of thirty-three participants."[SUP]74[/SUP] After travelling to Western Europe and Israel with Romualdi, they returned to Brazil. Upon arrival, some went to the countryside to organize and conduct seminars. Others went to Rio, Sao Paulo and various industrial centers. Here then are the names of those persons who participated in CIA-directed labor training courses in the U.S. from 1961-1964:
Dates indicate when the person was in the U.S.
* designates participation in the AIFLD training session in Washington DC in the first three months of 1963


[TABLE]
[TR]
[TD]Abate, Hugo (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Luiz, Jose Martinho (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Abbud, Jose (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Machado Filho, Antonio Rodriguez (8/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Abrita, Antonio (8/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Magnani, Fabio (8/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Abritta, Ernane Souza (8/15/61-11/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Maluf, Edmundo Amin * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Almeida, Gilson Dias de (6/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Manzoni, Antenor (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Almeida, Jose Gomes de * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Marcassa, Joao * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Amante, Francisco Hegidio (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Marinho, Dominiciano de Sousa (6/15/62-9/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Araujo, Paulo Henrique * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Marques, Ivo Bento * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Barbosa, Jose Sebastiao (7/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Mello, Jose Gabriel de (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Barbosa, Onofre Martins (8/15/62-10/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Mello Jr., Theodore Narciso (5/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Bareta, Nelson (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Moreira, Joao Balbino Goncalves (6/15/62-9/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Barreto, Benjamin Bittencourt (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Moreira, Pedro Martins (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Barreto, Vincente de Paulo (5/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Mueller, Cezar Francisco (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Barros, Luiz Capitolino (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Nascimento, Luiz (8/15/61-3/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Bastos, Carlindo Martins (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Nascimento, Zozimo Gomes * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Bastos, Thodiano Conceigao da Silva * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Nascimerto, Djalma Paiva do * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Bayer, Wilfredo Marcos (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Neves, Jose Ferreira (8/15/61-11/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Bottega, Abilio (6/15/62-9/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Nina, Celso Afonso (8/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Braga, Nelson (5/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Nogueira, Paulo * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Branco, Aparicio de Cerqueira (7/15/62-10/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Oliveira, Deodato (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Branco, Eliseu Castelo * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Oliveira, Edward Ximenes de (8/15/61-11/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Brasiel, Wanderly Pimenta * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Oliveira, Elieser da Silva * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Busse, Ralf (8/15/62-10/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Oliveira, Jose Luiz de (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Carvalho, Antonio Nelson (10/15/62-12/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Oliveira, Solon de * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Carvalho, Aureo * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Oliveira, Vbirajara Ferreira de (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Castanheira, Bento * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Paiva, Carlos de * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Cerqueira, Jose de Arimateira (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Paiyao, Miguel Santos de (1/15/61-4/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Cesar, Jose Oliveira (8/15/61-11/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Paula, Elison Galdino de * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Contesino, Erico Antonio (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Pereira, Antenor (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Correa, Jose Benedicto (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Pereira, Vitalino Alexandre (10/15/63-12/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Costa, Fortunato Batista de (6/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Pinto, Geraldo Servulo (10/15/62-12/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Costa, Jose Alives da (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Priess, Carlos Fernando (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Crocetti, Mario Domingos * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Provensi, Mario Jose (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Cruz, Serafim Ferreira da (11/15/60-12/15/60) [/TD]
[TD]Queiroz, Martinho Martins (7/15/61-11/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Cunha, Euclides Veriato da (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Rego, Ormilo Moraes (8/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Cunha, Joao Manoel (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Reimer, Getulio (8/15/62-10/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Da Silva, Pedro Guedes (7/15/60-10/15/60) [/TD]
[TD]Reinaldo, Bernardino da Silva (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Dantas, Antonio Cavalcanti (6/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Reis, Leopoldo Miguel Dos (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]De Silva, Manoel Francisco (11/15/60-12/15/60) [/TD]
[TD]Rezende, Osvaldo Gomes (8/15/62-10/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Dias, Irineu Francisco (4/15/61-7/15/61); [/TD]
[TD]Ribeiro, Adair (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Dimbarre, Alfredo (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Rebeiro, Nelio de Carvalho (8/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Diogo, Nelson (6/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Ribeiro, Vbaldino Fontoura * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Faraco de Morias, Hermenegildo (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Rocha, Hildebrando Pinheiro (6/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Faria, Geraldo Pio de * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Roque Netto, Sebastiao Jose (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Ferreira, Alcides * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Santos, Etavaldo Dantas dos (6/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Ferreira, Jose Felix (10/15/63-12/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Santos, Reinaldo dos (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Ferreira, Sonia Apparecida (5/15/63-11/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Scoz, Elzide (10/15/63-12/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Florentino, Primo Berto (10/15/63-12/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Alvimar Macedo (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Fonseca Filho, Tristao Pereira da (6/15/62-9/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Avelino da (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Fonseca, Valdenor Flores da (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Edir Inacio da (10/15/62-12/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Francisco, Alvise * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Francisco Narciso da (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Freitas, Jose Reis (10/15/63-12/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Helio Jose Nunes da (6/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Gevaerd, Cezlos Jose * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Horacio Arantes (6/15/62-9/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Gil, Waldomiro (8/15/62-10/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Humberto Ferreira (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Giro, Guilherme (6/15/62-9/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Ivan (6/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Gomes, Silvio (10/15/62-12/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Joao Baptista Raimundo da (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Gomes, Vicente de Paula (10/15/63-12/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Julio Trajano da * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Goncalves, Darci Manoel (6/15/63-9/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Paulo da Cruz (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Goncalves, Osmar H. (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Silva, Waldomiro Luiz da (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Guimaraes, Benedicto Luiz (8/15/61-11/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Silva Sobrinho, Jose Domingues (8/15/62-10/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Hauk, Helmuth (8/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Silveira, Jose Bernardino da (8/15/61-11/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Helfenstrein, Werno (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Silveira Jr., Norberto Candido (9/15/61-12/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Leite, Antonio Pereira (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Sousa Barbosa, Onessimo de (10/15/63-12/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Leite, Floriano Gomes (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Souto, Carlos Ferreira (7/15/61-9/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Lenzi, Carlos Alberto Silveira (5/15/63-7/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Souza, Adelino Rodrigues de (6/15/62-9/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Lima, Jose Bezerra de * (1/15/63-3/15/63) [/TD]
[TD]Torreko da Costa, Carlos Coqueijo (3/15/62-5/15/62) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Lima, Manoel Barbosa (6/15/62-9/15/62) [/TD]
[TD]Vianna, Gilberto Luiz (7/15/63-10/15/63) [/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD]Lirani, Julio (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[TD]Waidt, Nilo (8/15/61-10/15/61) [/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]
The role of AIFLD's trainees in the coup was made clear by the CIA's William C. Doherty, AIFLD Director of Social Projects at the time. At an AFL-CIO Labor News Conference in July 1964, Doherty noted that the trainees "were very active in organizing workers.... As a matter of fact, some of them were so active that they became intimately involved in some of the clandestine operations of the revolution [Washington's code-word for the coup] before it took place on April 1. What happened in Brazil ... did not just happen -- it was planned -- and planned months in advance. Many of the trade union leaders -- some of whom were actually trained in our institute -- were involved in the revolution [see above], and in the overthrow of the Goulart regime."[SUP]75[/SUP]
AIFLD had succeeded in delivering the Brazilian labor movement from Communist leadership. Its supposed goal of creating an independent, democratic labor movement, however, was quickly abandoned. Two and a half years after the coup, AFL-CIO union leaders who went to Brazil under AID's exchange program returned with a devastating indictment of conditions for workers and unions in Brazil. In a New York Times dispatch from Rio de Janeiro (November 23, 1966), James Jones of the United Steel Workers of America stated that "The leaders of unions here have the greatest fear I have ever seen in my life. They are afraid to raise their voices on behalf of their workers for fear of police reprisals."[SUP]76[/SUP]
In fact, AIFLD leaders supported the authoritarian measures taken by the military junta and provided rationales for its policies. After one of Serafino Romualdi's principal contacts, Adhemar de Barros, was deprived of his political rights for ten years, Romualdi stated equivocally that "it is still too early for a final judgement on the success or failure of the Brazilian 1964 revolution [sic!]"[SUP]77[/SUP] To cement its solidarity with the new regime, William Doherty appeared on the same platform with Brazil's president, General Castello Branco, in April 1966 to help lay the foundation for an AIFLD housing project in Sao Paulo. During his speech, Doherty declared that it was "appropriate that the ceremonies were taking place on the second anniversary of Brazil's democratic Revolution [sic]."[SUP]78[/SUP]



Conclusion

The denial of all political rights and the suppression of working class efforts to gain a more equitable share of Brazil's enormous natural wealth give the lie to the country's "economic miracle" that foreign investors proclaim.[SUP]79[/SUP]Whatever gains Brazil can speak of are realized by only a small elite. Furthermore, the markets which she can boast of are those for raw materials, agricultural products and manufactured goods. These markets are all export-oriented and thus depend on the fluctuating prices of the world market. When we add to this the cheap cost of Brazilian labor, which is a prerequisite for keeping these goods competitive, is it any wonder that Brazil's per capita GNP is one of the lowest in Latin America?[SUP]80[/SUP] Clearly, the cost of fueling Brazil's "economic miracle" is more than its people can tolerate.
Since the military coup of 1964, there has been a decline in the real wages of Brazilians amounting to almost 40 percent.[SUP]81[/SUP] Brazil's gross foreign debt for 1978 is expected to reach a spectacular $40 billion, with interest and amortization payments totalling $8 billion.[SUP]82[/SUP] The reason for the seeming paradox between a country so rich in natural resources yet one whose people suffer life-long misery is quite simple, however: for capitalists, both Brazilian and foreign, the masses are looked upon as costs, not customers: the lower their real wages, the higher the profits from selling to the local upper class and the international market.[SUP]83[/SUP]
If cheap labor and an absence of political opposition have been considered Brazil's major investment advantages since 1964, events of recent years suggest that the attractiveness of Brazil to foreign investors may be on the decline. In 1978, Brazilian autoworkers paralyzed the industry with a major strike.[SUP]84[/SUP] In 1969, bank robberies by revolutionary groups in Sao Paulo alone amounted to over $1.5 million.[SUP]85[/SUP]
Brazil's rulers themselves have had to assume a "get-tough" attitude toward the U.S. in the wake of State Department reports on human rights violations. In order to gain credibility amongst their local backers, the Brazilians showed how badly they were miffed: by canceling in March, 1977 a 25-year-old military assistance treaty between Washington and Brasilia. At the same time, Brazil turned down a $50 million loan credit for the purchase of military supplies because of human rights demands attached to it by the U.S. Congress.[SUP]86[/SUP] In September, 1977, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry announced the termination of a Brazilian-American military commission and a naval commission established in 1942 to coordinate World War II efforts. Also canceled were a 1967 pact governing the use of armaments imported from the U.S. and a 1952 agreement for U.S. participation in aerial mapping of Brazil.[SUP]87[/SUP] Of the March rejection, chief of staff General Moacir Barcelos Potyguara stated that the decision would cause no problems in Brazil's military preparedness.[SUP]88[/SUP]
Unfortunately, this cavalier attitude will not effect the long-term military relations between the two countries. The March, 1977 announcement was to take place one year later. No mention was made of rejecting that which is already in the pipeline to Brazil. At the least, Brazil should benefit for years to come from its friendship with the U.S. Furthermore, U.S. opposition to Brazil's planned purchase of West German nuclear reprocessing technology seems to have subsided. In a recent visit to Brazil, Vice President Mondale backed away from criticizing the country's plans to build a uranium reprocessing plant capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.[SUP]89[/SUP]
As for Brazil's new president, Joao Baptista Figueiredo, and what lies in store for the Brazilian people, a few words must be said. For the unsuspecting, last month's appointment of Figueiredo as president appeared to usher in a new era of liberalization for that country's political situation. Pledging to continue the reforms (which included the closing of Congress for four months in 1977) initiated by his predecessor, Ernesto Geisel, Figueiredo declared that it would be his "unswerving purpose" to make Brazil a democracy. He guaranteed freedom of expression for the "many segments of Brazilian public opinion."[SUP]90[/SUP] But for those who have even the slightest familiarity with the man who is Brazil's fifth military head of state since the armed forces carried out a CIA-backed coup in 1964, Joao Baptista Figueiredo is to be watched closely.
His background speaks to the intimate role the CIA has played in making Brazil one of the most repressive and, not surprisingly, one of the "safest" investment climates in Latin America. After the '64 coup, the CIA helped Brazil set up its first national intelligence service, the SNI. Figueiredo became the director of its Rio office. Later he was named head of the military police in Sao Paulo, after which he became then-President Emilio Medici's chief of staff. Before coming to Brasilia in 1974 to direct the SNI, Figueiredo commanded the Third Army in Porto Alegre. Given the documented penetration and usurpation of the SNI and the police forces by the CIA, can there remain any doubt that with Figueiredo's ascendancy to the executive office, Langley truly has their "man in Brazil"?
In an effort to dress up the seamy history of their new president, the National Renewal Al...
"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
Reply
#4
Mar 28, 2016
The Struggle for Brazil And Against the BRICS



In August 2016, Rio de Janeiro should host South America's first-ever Olympic games, which were supposed to be its great coming out carnival, even amid campaigns against the Zika virus.
Only a few years ago, Brazil exemplified the BRIC dream of rapid growth. Now it is coping with its most severe recession in century. But there's worse ahead.
Lula's economic boom and countervailing forces
When Brazil's first working-class President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva took office in 2003, the poor nation was on the verge of an economic implosion. President Lula's center-left Workers' Party (PT) and its coalition won the markets with conservative fiscal policy and lifted millions from poverty, while living standards rose by 60%.
Timing was favorable. A year after China joined the World Trade Organization; Lula initiated Brazil's economic reforms. To modernize, Brazil needed demand for its commodities; to industrialize, China needed commodities. In the subsequent eight years, the U.S. share of Brazil's exports plunged, while China's soared. Regionally, Brazil became Latin America's growth engine. Brazil and China shunned President Bush's unipolar foreign policy; each supported a more multipolar view of the world.
So Washington's neoconservatives began to strengthen ties with Brazil's center-right opposition. Politically, this opposition comprised conservative social democrats (PSDB), Democrats, and Lula's more liberal allies, juridical authorities and military leaders. Economically, it featured the narrow elite, which reigns over an unequal economy polarized by class and race, as well as conservative and highly concentrated media conglomerates owned by a few families, including Marinho brothers' Grupo Globo. The demonstrators represent a multitude of groups, such as Free Brazil movement, neoliberal activists, Students for Liberty, Revolted Online etc. but several have cooperated with or been funded by, the Koch brothers, the John Templeton Foundation, National Endowment for Democracy and many others.
During these years, Sérgio Moro, a Harvard-trained judge, and other emerging Brazilian leaders participated in the U.S. State Department's International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), which opened doors to U.S. agencies and institutions struggling against terror and money laundering. Created amid the Cold War, IVLP has engaged 200,000 international leaders with their U.S. counterparts, including current or former chiefs of state or heads of governments. Meanwhile, Brazil's federal police began broader cooperation with the FBI and CIA in anti-terrorism.
But in the Lula years, economic boom kept the forces of the Ancien Régime at bay.
Economic erosion, political expediency
By 2015, Brazil's economy contracted 3.7%. Inflation is still at 9%, although interest rate exceeds 14%. Meanwhile, leading credit-rating agencies downgraded Brazil's debt to junk. In Congress, the speaker of the lower house Eduardo Cunha who represents Rousseff's coalition partner, the huge but fractious Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) seeks to remove President Rousseff, presumably to deter allegations that he took $5 million in bribes from the state oil company Petrobras.
The reason why the state-run oil giant attracts so much heat today goes beyond corruption. In the Lula era, Petrobras was made accountable of all offshore blocks of oil, while U.S. oil giants were kept at distance and oil exploration was started with China's Sinopec. Now that Petrobras is bleeding, a privatization fire sale would bring US players back in.
When Rousseff took office half a decade ago, she hoped to build on Lula's success. In practice, she rewarded her constituencies with higher pensions; ensured tax breaks to strategic industries and spent unwisely. Meanwhile, world trade plunged, commodity prices collapsed, China's growth decelerated and the Fed initiated rate hikes. As a result,hot money' began to flee Brazil leaving behind asset shrinkages, deflation and depreciation.
According to Wikileaks, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had been tapping some 30 Brazilian government leaders' phones (Rousseff, ministers, central bank chief, etc), and corporate giants (including Petrobras). Brazilians believe that U.S. intelligence agencies have a dark track record not just in security intelligence but economic espionage and strategic destabilization.
And the story took a new turn. The two-year long Lava Jato (car wash) investigation, Brazil's largest corruption enquiry, overturned decades of impunity as it broadened from the state-owned oil giant Petrobras across Brazil's political elite. Before last Christmas, the police raided the offices of the ruling party PT and its main coalition partner PMDB, led by Vice President Michel Terner.
Brazil has a long legacy of corruption that stems from colonialism, economic elites, race and class, the military dictatorship (1965-84) and its foreign allies, including the U.S. Yet, there have been no comparable police raids in the post-military era. In this view, the timing of the corruption inquiry and the police raids was politically expedient. They did not begin when they were legally warranted but when Rousseff became politically vulnerable.
Corruption and destabilization
Internationally, Brazil's mass demonstrations are depicted as a quest against government corruption. That is a gross simplification. In reality, current volatility is not just about corruption, which is pervasive and extends across Brazil's entire political class, including the ruling PT. Rather, it is about destabilization that is paving way to a regime change.
When Lula left office in 2010, he enjoyed 90% approval ratings. A while ago, Lula was still expected to stage a comeback in the 2018 presidential election. Then he and his wife were forced to testify in São Paulo about alleged corruption. Opposition saw it as another reason for mass demonstrations; Lula's supporters as an effort to tarnish the name of Brazil's most successful political leader. As Rousseff invited Lula to join the government as its most powerful member, conservatives argued that the invite was just another attempt to shield him from corruption investigations because in Brazil only the Supreme Court can authorize such investigations.
To neutralize Lula's return, Moro blocked his appointment relying on recordings of tapped phone calls between Lula and prominent public figures, including the incumbent president. Rousseff regarded the illegally-recorded and released calls as a political "attempt to overstep the limits of the democratic state." In this narrative, Moro expressed his ultimate goal already in 2004, when he advocated "authoritarian subversion of juridical order to reach specific targets," including the use of media to intoxicate political atmosphere.
In this scenario, the corruption case has served to discredit the government. So when Rousseff invited Lula into the government, the objective became to neutralize Lula's comeback. During his time in the U.S., Moro learned that dominant media can be used to leak stories that discredit targeted leaders in dominant media prior to the court. In the Kafkaesque new normal, you are no longer innocent until proven guilty; you are guilty until proven innocent in the name of "national security."
Struggle against the BRICS
The Brazilian judicial strategy is reminiscent of the Italian Mani Pulite investigation in the 1990s, which relied effectively on media (dominated by tycoon Silvio Berlusconi) to delegitimize the political system, which was replaced by authoritarian leadership (again, Berlusconi). Instead of violent coup d'etat or military dictatorship, judicial strategy can achieve regime change by legally acceptable means. In Brazil, Rousseff's impeachment is moving ahead and much more will follow.
In the view of Washington (and Brazil's opposition), Lula, Rousseff and the PT remain controversial because their emphasis on multipolarity (which excludes American exceptionalism); support of the BRICS (which is seen to operate against the US and G7 interests); funding for the BRICS New Development Band and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (which are seen to undermine the power of G7 international multilateral organizations); efforts to overcome income polarization (which is regarded as potentially subversive), Latin American integration (which is perceived as anti-NAFTA) and alternative global Internet regime (which would bypass U.S. control); and a multipolar currency basket (which is seen as an attempt to emasculate the global dominance of the U.S. dollar).
In this narrative, Brazil's destabilization is strategic and less about the rise of democracy than about an effort to replace it with new authoritarianism. In turn, anti-graft campaigns focus on inconvenient political parties, but exclude economic elites and foreign interests that sustain corruption. However, what happens in Brazil won't stay just in Brazil. Rather, it has potential to radicalize center-left opposition in Brazil and harden sentiments in other BRICS nations.
As global growth prospects continue to dim, what advanced and emerging economies need is cooperation that benefits both not restoration of ancient regimes that insist on privileges that were never either legitimate or democratic.

- See more at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-poli...dDrwF.dpuf
"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
Reply
#5

Brazil 1961-1964

Introducing the marvelous new world of Death Squads

excerpted from the book

Killing Hope

by William Blum

[Image: redblueline.gif]

When the leading members of the US diplomatic mission in Brazil held a meeting one-day in March 1964, they arrived at the consensus that President Joao Goulart's support of social and economic reforms was a contrived and thinly veiled vehicle to seize dictatorial power.

The American ambassador, Lincoln Gordon, informed the State Department that ' a desperate lunge [by Goulart] for totalitarian power might be made at any time."'

The Brazilian army chief of staff, General Humberto de Alencar Castelo (or Castello) Branco, provided the American Embassy with a memorandum in which he stated his fear that Goulart was seeking to close down Congress and initiate a dictatorship.

Within a week after the expression of these concerns, the Brazilian military, with Castelo Branco at its head, overthrew the constitutional government of President Goulart, the culmination of a conspiratorial process in which the American Embassy had been intimately involved. The military then proceeded to install and maintain for two decades one of the most brutal dictatorships in all of South America.

What are we to make of all this? The idea that men of rank and power lie to the public is commonplace, not worthy of debate. But do they as readily lie to each other? Is their need to rationalize their misdeeds so great that they provide each other a moral shoulder to lean on; "Men use thoughts only to justify their injustices," wrote Voltaire, "and speech only to conceal their thoughts."

The actual American motivation in supporting the coup was something rather less than preserving democracy, even mundane as such matters go. American opposition to Goulart, who became president in 1961, rested upon a familiar catalogue of complaints:
US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara questioned Brazil's neutral stand in foreign policy. The Brazilian ambassador in Washington, Roberto Campos, responded that "neutralism" was an inadequate term and explained that "what was involved was really a deep urge of the Brazilian people to assert their personality in world affairs."

American officials did not approve of some of the members of Goulart's cabinet, and said so. Ambassador Campos pointed out to them that it was "quite inappropriate" for the United States "to try to influence the composition of the cabinet."

Attorney-General Robert Kennedy met with Goulart and expressed his uneasiness about the Brazilian president allowing "communists" to hold positions in government agencies. Bobby was presumably acting on the old and very deep-seated American belief that once you welcome one or two communists into your parlor, they take over the whole house and sign the deed over to Moscow. Goulart did not see this as a danger. He replied that he was in full control of the situation, later remarking to Campos that it was as if he had been told that he had no capacity for judging the men around him.

The American Defense Attache in Brazil, Col. Vernon Walters, reported that Goulart showed favoritism towards "ultra-nationalist" military officers over "pro-U.S." officers. Goulart saw it as promoting those officers who appeared to be most loyal to his government. He was, as it happens, very concerned about American-encouraged military coups and said so explicitly to President Kennedy.

Goulart considered purchasing helicopters from Poland because Washington was delaying on his request to purchase them from the United States. Ambassador Gordon told him that he "could not expect the United States to like it".

The Goulart administration, moreover, passed a law limiting the amount of profits multinationals could transmit out of the country, and a subsidiary of ITT was nationalized. Compensation for the takeover was slow in coming because of Brazil's precarious financial position, but these were the only significant actions taken against US corporate interests.

Inextricably woven into all these complaints, yet at the same time standing apart, was Washington's dismay with Brazil's "drift to the left" ... the communist / leftist influence in the labor movement ... leftist "infiltration" wherever one looked ..."anti-Americanism" among students and others (the American Consul General in Sao Paulo suggested to the State Department that the United States "found competing student organizations") ... the general erosion of "U.S. influence and the power of people and groups friendly to the United States"... one might go so far as to suggest that Washington officials felt unloved, were it not for the fact that the coup, as they well knew from much past experience, could result only in intensified anti-Americanism all over Latin America.

Goulart's predecessor, Janio da Silva Quadros, had also irritated Washington. "Why should the United States trade with Russia and her satellites but insist that Brazil trade only with the United States?" he asked, and proceeded to negotiate with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries to (re)establish diplomatic and commercial relations. He was, in a word, independent.

Quadros was also more-or-less a conservative who clamped down hard on unions, sent federal troops to the northeast hunger dens to squash protest, and jailed disobedient students. But the American ambassador at the time, John Moors Cabot, saw fit to question Brazil's taking part in a meeting of "uncommitted" (non-aligned) nations. "Brazil has signed various obligations with the United States and American nations," he said. "I am sure Brazil is not going to forget her obligations ... It is committed. It is a fact. Brazil can uncommit itself if it wants.''

In early 1961, shortly after Quadros took office, he was visited by Adolf Berle, Jr., President Kennedy's adviser on Latin American affairs and formerly ambassador to Brazil. Berle had come as Kennedy's special envoy to solicit Quadros's backing for the impending Bay of Pigs invasion. Ambassador Cabot was present and some years later described the meeting to author Peter Bell. Bell has written:

Ambassador Cabot remembers a "stormy conversation" in which Berle stated the United States had $300 million in reserve for Brazil and in effect "offered it as a bribe" for Brazilian cooperation ... Quadros became "visibly irritated" after Berle refused to heed his third "no". No Brazilian official was at the airport the next day to see the envoy off.

Quadros, who had been elected by a record margin, was, like Goulart, accused of seeking to set up a dictatorship because he sought to put teeth into measures unpopular with the oligarchy, the military, and/or the United States, as well as pursuing a "pro-communist" foreign policy. After but seven months in office he suddenly resigned, reportedly under military pressure, if not outright threat. In his letter of resignation, he blamed his predicament on "reactionaries" and "the ambitions of groups of individuals, some of whom are foreigners ... the terrible forces that arose against me."

A few months later, Quadros reappeared, to deliver a speech in which he named Berle, Cabot, and US Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon as being among those who had contributed to his downfall. Dillon, he said, sought to mix foreign policy with Brazil's needs for foreign credits. (Both Berle and Cabot had been advocates of the 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan President Arbenz, whose sins, in Washington's eyes, were much the same as those Goulart was now guilty of.) At the same time, Quadros announced his intention to lead a "people's crusade" against the "reactionaries, the corrupt and the Communists''.

As Quadros's vice president, Goulart succeeded to the presidency in August 1961...

*****

Goulart tried to continue Quadros's independent foreign policy. His government went ahead with resumption of relations with socialist countries, and at a meeting of the organization of American States in December 1961 Brazil abstained on a vote to hold a special session aimed at discussing "the Cuban problem", and stood strongly opposed to sanctions against the Castro government. A few months later, speaking before the US Congress, Goulart affirmed Brazil's right to take its own stand on some of the cold-war issues. He declared that Brazil identified itself "with the democratic principles which unite the peoples of the West", but was "not part of any politico-military bloc".

*****

Goulart, a millionaire land-owner and a Catholic who wore a medal of the Virgin around his neck, was no more a communist than was Quadros, and he strongly supported the United States during the "Cuban Missile Crisis" of October 1962. He offered Ambassador Gordon a toast "To the Yankee Victory!", perhaps unaware that only three weeks earlier, during federal and state elections in Brazil, CIA money had been liberally expended in support of anti-Goulart candidates. Former CIA officer Philip Agee has stated that the Agency spent between 12 and 20 million dollars on behalf of hundreds of candidates. Lincoln Gordon says the funding came to no more than 5 million.

In addition to the direct campaign contributions, the CIA dipped into its bag of dirty tricks to torment the campaigns of leftist candidates. At the same time, the Agency for International Development (AID), at the express request of President Kennedy, was allocating monies to projects aimed at benefiting chosen gubernatorial candidates. (While Goulart was president, no new US economic assistance was given to the central government, while regional assistance was provided on a markedly ideological basis. When the military took power, this pattern was sharply altered.

Agee adds that the CIA carried out a consistent propaganda campaign against Goulart which dated from at least the 1962 election operation and which included the financing of mass urban demonstrations, "proving the old themes of God, country, family and liberty to be as effective as ever" in undermining a government.

CIA money also found its way to a chain of right-wing newspapers, Diarias Associades, to promote anti-communism; for the distribution of 50 thousand books of similar politics to high school and college students; and for the formation of women's groups with their special Latin mother's emphasis on the godlessness of the communist enemy. The women and other CIA operatives also went into the rumor-mongering business, spreading stories about outrages Goulart and his cronies were supposed to be planning, such as altering the constitution so as to extend his term, and gossip about Goulart being a cuckold and a wife beater.

All this to overthrow a man who, in April 1962, had received a ticker-tape parade in New York City, was warmly welcomed at the White House by President Kennedy, and had addressed a joint session of Congress.

*****

Depending on the setting, either "saving Brazil from dictatorship" or "saving Brazil from communism" was advanced as the rationale for what took place in 1964. (General Andrew O'Meara, head of the US Southern [Latin America] Command, had it both ways. He told a House committee that "The coming to power of the Castelo Branco government in Brazil last April saved that country from an immediate dictatorship which could only have been followed by Communist domination."

The rescue-from-communism position was especially difficult to support, the problem being that the communists in Brazil did not, after all, do anything which the United States could point to. Moreover, the Soviet Union was scarcely in the picture. Early in 1964, reported a Brazilian newspaper, Russian leader Khrushchev told the Brazilian Communist Party that the Soviet government did not wish either to give financial aid to the Goulart regime or to tangle with the United States over the country. In his reminiscences-albeit, as mentioned earlier, not meant to be a serious work of history-Khrushchev does not give an index reference to Brazil.

A year after the coup, trade between Brazil and the USSR was running at $120 million per year and a Brazilian mission was planning to go to Moscow to explore Soviet willingness to provide a major industrial plant. The following year, the Russians invited the new Brazilian president-to-be, General Costa e Silva, to visit the Soviet Union.

During the entire life of the military dictatorship, extending into the 1980s, Brazil and the Soviet bloc engaged in extensive trade and economic cooperation, reaching billions of dollars per year and including the building of several large hydroelectric plants in Brazil. A similar economic relationship existed between the Soviet bloc and the Argentine military dictatorship of 1976-83, so much so that in 1982, when Soviet leader Brezhnev died, the Argentine government declared a national day of mourning.

It was only by ignoring facts like these during the cold war that the anti-communist propaganda machine of the United States could preach about the International Communist Conspiracy and claim that the coup in Brazil had saved the country from communism. For a typical example of this propaganda, one must read "The Country That Saved Itself," which appeared in Reader's Digest several months after the coup. The innumerable lies about what occurred in Brazil, fed by the magazine to its millions of readers, undoubtedly played a role in preparing the American public for the great anti-communist crusade in Vietnam just picking up steam at the time. The article began:

Seldom has a major nation come closer to the brink of disaster and yet recovered than did Brazil in its recent triumph over Red subversion. The communist drive for domination-marked by propaganda, infiltration, terror-was moving in high gear. Total surrender seemed imminent- and then the people said No!

The type of independence shown by the Brazilian military government in its economic relations with the Soviet Union was something Washington could accept from a conservative government, even the occasional nationalization of American property, when it knew that the government could be relied upon to keep the left suppressed at home and to help in the vital cold war, anti-communist campaigns abroad. In 1965, Brazil sent 1,100 troops to the Dominican Republic in support of the US invasion, the only country in Latin America to send more than a token force. And in 1971 and 1973, the Brazilian military and intelligence apparatuses contributed to the American efforts in overthrowing the governments of Bolivia and Chile.

The United States did not rest on its laurels. CIA headquarters immediately began to generate hemisphere-wide propaganda, as only the Agency's far-flung press-asset network could, in support of the new Brazilian government and to discredit Goulart. Dean Rusk concerned that Goulart might be received in Uruguay as if he were still Brazil's president on the grounds that he had not resigned, cabled the American Embassy in Montevideo that "it would be useful if you could quietly bring to the attention of appropriate officials the fact that despite his allegations to the contrary Goulart has abandoned his office."

At the same time, the CIA station in Uruguay undertook a program of surveillance of Brazilian exiles who had fled from the military takeover, to prevent them from instigating any kind of insurgency movement in their homeland. It was a simple matter for the Agency to ask their (paid) friend, the head of Uruguayan intelligence, to place his officers at the residences of Goulart and other key Brazilians. The officers kept logs of visitors while posing as personal security men for the exiles, although it is unlikely that the exiles swallowed the story.

In the first few days following the coup, "several thousand" Brazilians were arrested, "communist and suspected communist" all. AIFLD graduates were promptly appointed by the new government to purge the unions. Though Ambassador Gordon had assured the State Department before the coup that the armed forces "would be quick to restore constitutional institutions and return power to civilian hands," this was not to be. Within days, General Castelo Branco assumed the presidency and over the next few years his regime instituted all the features of military dictatorship which Latin America has come to know and love:

Congress was shut down political opposition was reduced to virtual extinction, habeas corpus for "political crimes" was suspended, criticism of the president was forbidden by law, labor unions were taken over by government interveners, mounting protests were met by police and military firing into crowds, the use of systematic "disappearance" as a form of repression came upon the stage of Latin America, peasants' homes were burned down, priests were brutalized ... the government had a name for its program: the "moral rehabilitation" of Brazil ... then there was the torture and the death squads, both largely undertakings of the police and the military, both underwritten by the United States.

*****

... the US Office of Public Safety (OPS), the CIA and AID combined to provide ... technical training, ... equipment, and ... indoctrination ... in Brazil. Dan Mitrione of the OPS, ... began his career in Brazil in the 1960s. By 1969, OPS had established a national police force for Brazil and had trained over 100,000 policemen in the country, in addition to 523 receiving more advanced instruction in the United States. About one-third of the students' time at the police academies was devoted to lectures on the "communist menace" and the need to battle against it. The "bomb school" and techniques of riot control were other important aspects of their education.

"Tortures range from simple but brutal blows from a truncheon to electric shocks. Often the torture is more refined: the end of a reed is placed in the anus of a naked man hanging suspended downwards on the pau de arara [parrot's perch] and a piece of cotton soaked in petrol is lit at the other end of the reed. Pregnant women have been forced to watch their husbands being tortured. Other wives have been hung naked beside their husbands and given electric shocks on the sexual parts of their body, while subjected to the worst kind of obscenities. Children have been tortured before their parents and vice versa. At least one child, the three month old baby of Virgilio Gomes da Silva was reported to have died under police torture. The length of sessions depends upon the resistance capacity of the victims and have sometimes continued for days at a time."

Amnesty International

"Judge Agamemnon Duarte indicated that the CCC [Commandos to Hunt Communists, a death squad armed and aided by the police] and the CIA are implicated in the murder of Father Henrique Neto. He admitted that .. the American Secret Service (CIA) was behind the CCC."

Jornal do Brazil

Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Army, General Breno Borges Forte, at the Tenth conference of American Armies in 1973:

"The enemy is undefined ... it adapts to any environment and uses every means, both licit and illicit, to achieve its aims. It disguises itself as a priest, a student or a campesino, as a defender of democracy or an advanced intellectual, as a pious soul or as an extremist protester; it goes into the fields and the schools, the factories and the churches, the universities and the magistracy; if necessary, it will wear a uniform or civil garb; in sum, it will take on any role that it considers appropriate to deceive, to lie, and to take in the good faith of Western peoples."

In 1970, a US Congress study group visited Brazil. It gave this summary of statements by American military advisers there:

" Rather than dwell on the authoritarian aspects of the regime, they emphasize assertions by the Brazilian armed forces that they believe in, and support, representative democracy as an ideal and would return government to civilian control if this could be done without sacrifice to security and development. This withdrawal from the political arena is not seen as occurring in the near future. For that reason they emphasize the continued importance of the military assistance training program as a means of exerting U.S. influence and retaining the current pro-U.S. attitude of the Brazilian armed forces. Possible disadvantages to U.S. interests in being so closely identified with an authoritarian regime are not seen as particularly important. "

*****


Killing Hope - Chapter 27

"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
Reply
#6
Instances of the United States overthrowing, or attempting to overthrow, a foreign government since the Second World War. (* indicates successful ouster of a government)
  • China 1949 to early 1960s
  • Albania 1949-53
  • East Germany 1950s
  • Iran 1953 *
  • Guatemala 1954 *
  • Costa Rica mid-1950s
  • Syria 1956-7
  • Egypt 1957
  • Indonesia 1957-8
  • British Guiana 1953-64 *
  • Iraq 1963 *
  • North Vietnam 1945-73
  • Cambodia 1955-70 *
  • Laos 1958 *, 1959 *, 1960 *
  • Ecuador 1960-63 *
  • Congo 1960 *
  • France 1965
  • Brazil 1962-64 *
  • Dominican Republic 1963 *
  • Cuba 1959 to present
  • Bolivia 1964 *
  • Indonesia 1965 *
  • Ghana 1966 *
  • Chile 1964-73 *
  • Greece 1967 *
  • Costa Rica 1970-71
  • Bolivia 1971 *
  • Australia 1973-75 *
  • Angola 1975, 1980s
  • Zaire 1975
  • Portugal 1974-76 *
  • Jamaica 1976-80 *
  • Seychelles 1979-81
  • Chad 1981-82 *
  • Grenada 1983 *
  • South Yemen 1982-84
  • Suriname 1982-84
  • Fiji 1987 *
  • Libya 1980s
  • Nicaragua 1981-90 *
  • Panama 1989 *
  • Bulgaria 1990 *
  • Albania 1991 *
  • Iraq 1991
  • Afghanistan 1980s *
  • Somalia 1993
  • Yugoslavia 1999-2000 *
  • Ecuador 2000 *
  • Afghanistan 2001 *
  • Venezuela 2002 *
  • Iraq 2003 *
  • Haiti 2004 *
  • Somalia 2007 to present
  • Libya 2011*
  • Syria 2012
Q: Why will there never be a coup d'état in Washington?
A: Because there's no American embassy there.
"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
Reply


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