Christopher Simpson Interview on his book Blowback

[Peter Lemkin]

Despite bad filming and lackluster questions, Simpson really shines - as does his book. If you haven't read it, I highly suggest it!

[Peter Lemkin]

[Peter Lemkin]

[Ralf Anders]

"Despite bad filming and lackluster questions, Simpson really shines - as does his book. If you haven't read it, I highly suggest it!"

Seconded.

Also of interest:

https://www.thenation.com/article/seven-...ne-secret/

Bellant's book Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party to which Simpson wrote the preface seems to be available here:

https://archive.org/details/pdfy-yPZYxkxdFvpHCYOo

[Lauren Johnson]

Peter, thanks for putting this thread up. I just watched the Science of Coercion. Outstanding. Looking forward to the others.

[Peter Lemkin]

Peter, thanks for putting this thread up. I just watched the Science of Coercion. Outstanding. Looking forward to the others.

You're welcome. He's one of the best and clearest thinkers on a variety of topics of control and secret government that most have never heard of. He teaches still at American University in D.C. and lectures to small audiences. The MSM and the Mighty Wurlitzer obviously don't want his voice and ideas heard. However, try to get his book on the Science of Coercion, currently out of print and it will cost you almost $400 used - so someone appreciates him. He was part of a small group called the IWG who were allowed into NARA for a few years to find all the files on the CIA-Nazi collaboration. All were fairly progressive academics with the right backgrounds to do that, but in their final report he wrote a minority dissenting opinion which was never published, as the CIA and NARA were too upset at the truth in it...I'll try to find it and post it here.

Can't upload it...so here it is:

[FONT=AAAAAA+LiberationSansNarrow-Bold, serif]ChristopherSimpson[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAA+LiberationSansNarrow-Bold, serif]Member,IWG Historical Advisory Panel[/FONT]"[FONT=AAAAAA+LiberationSansNarrow-Bold, serif]TheCIA's ongoing campaign against accountability for its activitiesrequires that every[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAA+LiberationSansNarrow-Bold, serif]responsiblehistorian and journalist treat the CIA claims with great skepticism."[/FONT]
[FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]You'llrecall that the fundamental reason for the passage of the Nazi WarCrimes Disclosure Act (NWCDA) and the Japanese Imperial GovernmentDisclosure Act (JIGDA) was to open classified records concerning U.S.intelligence agencies' and corporate collusion with Nazi andJapanese war criminals. Significant progress has been made on thatscore, not least of which is that no educated person can ignore thereality of this collaboration and the substantial role it played inCold War intelligence operations.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Muchmore remains to be done. The Interagency Working Group (IWG) facedinsider footdragging,constant double-talk, and occasional outrightdeceit from some federal agencies that were opposed to its legallymandated work. The problems intensified in the wake of the 911 crisisand subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Insiderresistance to the IWG reached its logical consummation when the WhiteHouse appointed John Yoo as a public member of the IWG in May 2004.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]1[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Yoo,of course, is the official directly responsible for the legalrational used by the White House to approve use of torture andtorture-like practices during protracted interrogations ofprisoners.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]2[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Manypeople have noted the[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]overlapbetween Yoo's recommendations and the techniques used in Nazi andAxis concentration camps, as well as in Stalin-era Gulag prisons.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Yoo'sappointment sparked a battle led by the public members of the IWGthat eventually led Yoo to quietly withdraw from the projectby anystandard, this was an important IWG accomplishment in Bush-eraWashington. Yoo's appointment to the IWG, and even the NationalArchives/IWG press release that once announced it, has since thattime quietly disappeared from the National Archives' and IWG'sWebsite, and from other public documents.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]3[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Throughoutthe IWG's existence, the actual implementation of the NWCDA andJIGDA disclosure laws was carried out by, and to a large extentfinanced by, the same federal agencies whose records were beingdeclassified. While the public members of the IWG attempted to workby consensusand up to a point succeeded at itthe realities ofoperating a no-budget honor system involving a dozen federal agenciessignificantly restricted what could be accomplished, particularlywhen dealing with agencies that set out to restrict the IWG's work[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]fromthe outset.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Thereis only space here to present a handful of examples of the power ofintelligence bureaucracies to obstruct declassification in such asituation. [/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Substantialevidence indicates that the Army's central repository forintelligence records has intentionally destroyed its files onprominent Nazis closely associated with U.S. intelligence[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]during the early Cold War when their names surfaced in the media.Known instances include a failed effort to destroy all filesconcerning Klaus Barbie, and the successful elimination of almost allrecords concerning the Gehlen Organization's Heinz-Danko Herre, andabout Walter Rauff, an SS executioner who cooperated with AllenDulles in Operation Sunrise and eventually escaped to South America.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif](Theofficial story is that the Army intelligence records were routinelydestroyed.)[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]TheDepartment of State, for its part, provided false documentationconcerning its performance under the NWCDA and JIGDA when it feltopportune to do so. From 2002 through at least 2004, the IWG'spublic members and the Historical Advisory Panel (on which I served)repeatedly requested federal agencies to document what they wereactually doing under the acts, rather than to simply provide periodicstatements that all was well. As part of its response, the Departmentof State historian's office created after-the-fact memos thatclaimed it had completed its agency-wide search for records of warcrimes in the Asian Theater in less than 24 hoursa transparentlymisleading claim. Other searches required under the laws were said tohave been completed in less than a week.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]4[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Whenquestioned about these strange memos, the[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Department'srepresentative asserted that a verbal order' had beendistributed three months prior to the concocted memos, which heregarded as only a formality. The Historians' Advisory Panel thenrequested copies of the paperwork and related records documenting theactual search. At this writing, there has been no substantiveresponse from the Department.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]5[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Itwas the CIA, however, that more than any other agency systematicallyexploited the IWG's structural weaknesses. At early IWG meetingsthe CIA's representative, Larry Holmes, succeeded in pushingthrough several measures that had a long-term impact. To the best ofmy knowledge, neither of these measures has been acknowledged in theIWG's report to Congress. Perhaps most damaging was the IWG'searly acceptance of what was known behind[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]closeddoors as the CIA's "Waldheim Rule," after the case of former UNSecretary General Kurt Waldheim. Put briefly, Holmes agreed that theCIA would review for release Agency records that included informationon the war crimes of a particular person. (More on this in a moment.)[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Butany other intelligence records the Agency might have about thatindividual, such as his or her postwar role in politics, business orthe military, or his associations with U.S. officials or with Axiswar criminals, were to be automatically off limits, unless theindividual was personally employed by a U.S. agency.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Acceptingthis stricture eventually led to absurd consequences, such as what ispresently called the "CIA's file on Hermann Abs" in theNational Archives. Abs was a major German banker deeply involved inNazi-era looting of Jewish property, but who later won favor with thepostwar West German government and the United States. In the end, theU.S. Justice Department banned Abs' entry into this country underlaws that prohibit suspected Nazi and Japanese war criminals fromtraveling here.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Onemight reasonably expect the CIA to have a substantial dossier on Abs.Yet what the National Archives now calls the "CIA file on HermannAbs" includes none of that, because the Agency has withheld itunder the Waldheim Rule. The present dossier is made up of a handfulof pages, almost all of which are an informant's report quoting Abssaying he was not responsible for Nazi crimes.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Thescope of the Waldheim Rule was dramatically expanded by the CIA's"relevancy standards," the existence of which was concealed fromthe IWG for most of that group's existence. At the time the IWG wasestablished, its members (including the CIA) voted unanimously that"an individual's membership in a Nazi criminal unit such as theSS is prima facie evidence of the relevance [under the NWCDA] of thefiles maintained on that individual."[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]6[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Thisagreement meant, in effect, each agency was to check its recordsagainst a computerized list of about 60,000 persons who are known tohave been senior Nazi Party officials, members of the SS, identifiedas war crimes suspects during 19451947, or part ofcollaborationist murder squads the Nazis operated on the EasternFront. If a match was found, that person's records were to beconsidered "relevant" for review under the NWCDA and later underthe JIGDA.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Itwas not until IWG work had been underway for almost five years thatthe CIA informed the IWG that it was not using the standard forrelevancy it had voted to endorse. It was using a different standard,which the CIA itself estimated had eliminated the "relevancy" of95.5 percent of the Nazis and other Axis criminals on thecomputerized list before the search for records had even begun.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]7[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Thus,the only records the CIA considered "relevant" for potentialdeclassification under the law were those that concerned anindividual who had been "actually convicted of war crimes" orrelated persecution, or if the CIA itself had collected informationabout that individual's World War II crimes (a rare occurrence,particularly during the 1950s), or if another government[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]agencyhad independently completed the research necessary to prove to theCIA's satisfaction that the individual was a war criminal. If therewas no information about an actual conviction for World War IIcrimes, "any documents on that person are deemed outside thescope of the Act,'" wrote the CIA's representative to the IWG,Larry Holmes.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]8[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Oncethe policy was discovered, IWG Chair Steven Garfinkel and the IWGpublic members strongly protested. These "highly restrictivehandicaps" called into question whether the IWG could ever performthe task that Congress had assigned to it, Garfinkel said.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]9[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Holmesdemurred, and shortly after retired.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Duringthe winter of 200304, Garfinkel led a demarche to DCI GeorgeTenet's office to argue for greater agency cooperation indeclassifying records, in part because it was in Tenet's owninterest to avoid the appearance of hiding information about Nazi warcriminals. Tenet agreed to use his discretionary power as CIAdirector to conduct limited new searches and to release[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]additionalinformation on certain Nazi cases identified by the IWG and itshistorians.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Mostof the material subsequently released by Tenet concerned the GehlenOrganization, the predecessor of the West German state intelligenceservice. While Garfinkel and the IWG deserve considerable credit forpressuring Tenet, it is nevertheless true that the release of theGehlen-related records was actually compelled by a federal judge inresponse to a Freedom of Information Act suit brought by a privatecitizen.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]10[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Themajority of the other materials released[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]byTenet consisted of little more than a form indicating that someone inthe U.S. government had once requested a file trace on the subject.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Forthe IWG, the important thing was that the records were released atall. But for the CIA, the director's "discretionary" releasehas meant that today the Agency maintains a [/FONT][FONT=AAAAAC+LiberationSansNarrow-Italic, serif]defacto [/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]WaldheimRule and the abusive "relevancy" restrictions on records itcontrols concerning Cold Warera activities of Axis criminals. Thisis an especially serious problem when it comes to[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]recordson Japanese and Asian collaborationist criminals whose crimes againsthumanity remain largely unrecognized or unknown in the West.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]TheCIA today continues to treat with disdain and often with outrightdeceit those individuals and institutional researchers who lack theresources to bring a great deal of pressure on the Agency,notwithstanding the passage of two laws designed specifically tocompel disclosure of records on perpetrators of crimes againsthumanity. The CIA's ongoing campaign against accountability for itsactivities requires that every responsible historian and journalisttreat the[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]CIAclaims with great skepticism.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]1[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].IWG Press Release, "President Appoints John Choon Yoo to the NaziWar Crimes and[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]JapaneseImperial Government Records Interagency Working Group," May 13,2004.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]2[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel (eds.) The Torture Papers,Cambridge University Press,[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]2005.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]3[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]http://www.archives.gov/iwg/about/press-releases/index.html[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif],viewed most recently on Jan.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]21,2007.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]4[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].For the Department's memo, see "Search for Records ConcerningJapanese War Crimes[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif](Pursuantto P.L. 105-246) (IPS No. S200100002)" (unclassified) January 23,2001, and the[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]attached4-page tab titled "Tab 6 Document Search Action Office Checklist."[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]5[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].Similarly, a Freedom of Information Act request for these recordsfiled almost four years ago[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]hasyet to be processed.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]6[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].IWG Chair Steven Garfinkel to David Holmes, DCI representative to theIWG, April 30, 2002;[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]seealso (n.a.) "IWG Decisions As of February 22, 2000," copy inauthor's collection.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]7[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].Percentage has been calculated from numbers reported in David Holmes(CIA) to Steven[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Garfinkel(IWG Director) September 20, 2002, "CIA Response to IWG ReportQuestions,[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]September2002," see "CIA Relevancy Guidelines," pp. 12-13. The CIA laterreported that it had[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]runcomputerized searches on the names on the Justice Department list.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]8[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].Ibid, p.12. At that stage, work had not even begun on recordsconcerning Japanese and[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]Asianwar criminals. The CIA's relevancy standard reduced their entirePacific Theater search[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]toa few dozen names.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]9[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].NARA/IWG press release, "CIA Intends to Release Records on Cold WarSpymaster,"[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]October5, 2000.[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]http://www.archives.gov/iwg/about/press-releases/cold-war-spymasterrecords[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].[/FONT]

[FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif]10[/FONT][FONT=AAAAAB+LiberationSansNarrow, serif].Garfinkel to Holmes, April 30, 2002.[/FONT]