The Iraq Inquiry - Chilcott's Circus Clowns Come to Town

[David Guyatt]

Additiona extract:

3.33pm: Boyce says that he does not think the Americans would have been able to invade on 19 March 2003 without the British.

[David Guyatt]

Additiona extract:

3.33pm: Boyce says that he does not think the Americans would have been able to invade on 19 March 2003 without the British.

See the Question Time footage linked below for further insight into this very important aspect of the Iraq war.

The US couldn't have invaded Iraq without British military involvement.

https://deeppoliticsforum.com/forums/sho...#post34548

[Carsten Wiethoff]

From http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/pol...69610.html

Plans to exploit Iraq's oil reserves were discussed by government ministers and the world's largest oil companies the year before Britain took a leading role in invading Iraq, government documents show.
[URL="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/graphic-iraq-oil-2269811.html"]
[/URL]
The papers, revealed here for the first time, raise new questions over Britain's involvement in the war, which had divided Tony Blair's cabinet and was voted through only after his claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.


The minutes of a series of meetings between ministers and senior oil executives are at odds with the public denials of self-interest from oil companies and Western governments at the time.
The documents were not offered as evidence in the ongoing Chilcot Inquiry into the UK's involvement in the Iraq war. In March 2003, just before Britain went to war, Shell denounced reports that it had held talks with Downing Street about Iraqi oil as "highly inaccurate". BP denied that it had any "strategic interest" in Iraq, while Tony Blair described "the oil conspiracy theory" as "the most absurd".

Yeah, absurd is the right word. mileymad:

[Peter Lemkin]

From http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/pol...69610.html

Plans to exploit Iraq's oil reserves were discussed by government ministers and the world's largest oil companies the year before Britain took a leading role in invading Iraq, government documents show.
[URL="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/graphic-iraq-oil-2269811.html"]
[/URL]
The papers, revealed here for the first time, raise new questions over Britain's involvement in the war, which had divided Tony Blair's cabinet and was voted through only after his claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.


The minutes of a series of meetings between ministers and senior oil executives are at odds with the public denials of self-interest from oil companies and Western governments at the time.
The documents were not offered as evidence in the ongoing Chilcot Inquiry into the UK's involvement in the Iraq war. In March 2003, just before Britain went to war, Shell denounced reports that it had held talks with Downing Street about Iraqi oil as "highly inaccurate". BP denied that it had any "strategic interest" in Iraq, while Tony Blair described "the oil conspiracy theory" as "the most absurd".

Yeah, absurd is the right word. mileymad:

Any child could figure out that because they have oil - and don't grow cotton or broccoli in Iraq it is on 'target' for being taken over by ANY means necessary - with any lies and deceits being done/said to accomplish this fact. Further, since the oil/Carbon-lobby is about the strongest in holding the puppet strings of politicians and in control of the Secret Government, This would rank near or at the 'top' of resources the ultra-rich will steal [not buy or rent or lease or share]. :mexican:

[Jan Klimkowski]

Quotes are from the Independent article linked by Carsten.

This bears further deconstruction.

The documents were not offered as evidence in the ongoing Chilcot Inquiry into the UK's involvement in the Iraq war.

Indeed. Will Chilcot now demand that they are entered as evidence?

I'm not holding my breath.

In March 2003, just before Britain went to war, Shell denounced reports that it had held talks with Downing Street about Iraqi oil as "highly inaccurate". BP denied that it had any "strategic interest" in Iraq, while Tony Blair described "the oil conspiracy theory" as "the most absurd".

I wrote about this extensively at the time.

The nub of it is that by declaring war for oil as a "conspiracy theory", PM Blair shut down meaningful debate about one of the primary motivations for the Iraq invasion.

From then on, every time an MSM journalist raised oil as a rationale for the invasion , the hack would preface his words, or - to use the journalistic phrase, weasel them - by saying the conspiracy theorists claim this is a war for oil, Mr Minister....., and thus undermine the point and make the politician's inevitable rebuttal easy. Hack and politician would then chuckle at the ludicrousness of such an idea.

Phrases such as "conspiracy theory" or "truther" are psyop creations, emanating from intelligence shrinks and propagandists.

The fundamental purpose of such phrases is to narrow the boundaries of "reasonable" debate and to ridicule anyone whose opinion is outsde the spooks' carefully constructed safe, and fictional, Zone.

[Jan Klimkowski]

Devastating evidence from Major General Michael Laurie confirming what anyone who followed this, from duplicitious beginning to tragic end, already knows.

But at least one man in uniform had the cojones to stand up and tell it how it is.

Iraq dossier drawn up to make case for war intelligence officer

Newly released evidence to Chilcot inquiry directly contradicts Blair government's claims about dossier

Richard Norton-Taylor guardian.co.uk, Thursday 12 May 2011 15.41 BST

A top military intelligence official has said the discredited dossier on Iraq's weapons programme was drawn up "to make the case for war", flatly contradicting persistent claims to the contrary by the Blair government, and in particular by Alastair Campbell, the former prime minister's chief spin doctor.

In hitherto secret evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, Major General Michael Laurie said: "We knew at the time that the purpose of the dossier was precisely to make a case for war, rather than setting out the available intelligence, and that to make the best out of sparse and inconclusive intelligence the wording was developed with care."

His evidence is devastating, as it is the first time such a senior intelligence officer has directly contradicted the then government's claims about the dossier and, perhaps more significantly, what Tony Blair and Campbell said when it was released seven months before the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Laurie, who was director general in the Defence Intelligence Staff, responsible for commanding and delivering raw and analysed intelligence, said: "I am writing to comment on the position taken by Alastair Campbell during his evidence to you … when he stated that the purpose of the dossier was not to make a case for war; I and those involved in its production saw it exactly as that, and that was the direction we were given."

He continued: "Alastair Campbell said to the inquiry that the purpose of the dossier was not 'to make a case for war'. I had no doubt at that time this was exactly its purpose and these very words were used."

Laurie said he recalled that the chief of defence intelligence, Air Marshal Sir Joe French, was "frequently inquiring whether we were missing something" and was under pressure. "We could find no evidence of planes, missiles or equipment that related to WMD [weapons of mass destruction], generally concluding that they must have been dismantled, buried or taken abroad. There has probably never been a greater detailed scrutiny of every piece of ground in any country."

The document is one of a number released by the Chilcot inquiry. They include top secret MI6 reports warning of the damage to British interests and the likelihood of terrorist attacks in the UK if it joined the US-led invasion of Iraq.

However, a newly declassified document reveals that Sir Kevin Tebbit, then a top official at the Ministry of Defence, warned the defence secretary, Geoff Hoon, in January 2003 that the US would "feel betrayed by their partner of choice" if Britain did not go along with the invasion.

Despite its concerns, MI6 told ministers before the invasion that toppling Saddam Hussein "remains a prize because it could give new security to oil supplies".

Laurie's memo raises questions about the role of Sir John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, who later became head of MI6.

[Peter Lemkin]

Devastating evidence from Major General Michael Laurie confirming what anyone who followed this, from duplicitious beginning to tragic end, already knows.

But at least one man in uniform had the cojones to stand up and tell it how it is.

[SIZE="3"][B]
However, a newly declassified document reveals that Sir Kevin Tebbit, then a top official at the Ministry of Defence, warned the defence secretary, Geoff Hoon, in January 2003 that the US would "feel betrayed by their partner of choice" if Britain did not go along with the invasion.

Despite its concerns, MI6 told ministers before the invasion that toppling Saddam Hussein "remains a prize because it could give new security to oil supplies".

Laurie's memo raises questions about the role of Sir John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, who later became head of MI6.

Really says it all......sad how the world is 'run' by criminals and liars - only interested in money; and caring nothing of the democracy and rule of law that they mouth to calm the Sheeple.

[Jan Klimkowski]

Hmmmm - is the British establishment about to unroll a limited hangout, blaming it all on Tony "I'm a pretty straight sort of guy" Blair?

Chilcot to 'heavily criticise' Tony Blair over Iraq war

Official inquiry into Iraq war expected to focus on former prime minister's failure to consult the cabinet fully in run-up to invasion

Nicholas Watt, chief political correspondent guardian.co.uk, Sunday 31 July 2011 12.12 BST

Tony Blair is likely to be criticised heavily by the official inquiry into the Iraq war, which is expected to focus on his failure to consult the cabinet fully in the run-up to the 2003 invasion.

The Mail on Sunday reports today that Sir John Chilcot, the former permanent secretary at the Northern Ireland Office who is chairing the inquiry, has identified a series of concerns. These include:

failing to keep cabinet ministers fully informed of Blair's plans in the run-up to the invasion in March 2003. The committee is understood to have been impressed by the criticism voiced by Lord Butler of Brockwell, the former cabinet secretary, that Blair ran a sofa government.

failing to make proper preparations for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq.

failing to present intelligence in a proper way. In his inquiry into the use of intelligence, published in July 2004, Butler said the usual MI6 caveats were stripped out of the famous Downing Street arms dossier of September 2002.

failing to be open with ministers about understandings Blair reached with George Bush in the year running up to the invasion.

Blair today hit out at the Mail on Sunday. A source close to the former prime minister said: "This is a deliberate attempt to pre-judge a report that hasn't even been written yet."

Angus Robertson, the SNP's leader at Westminster, said: "The tapestry of deceit woven by Tony Blair over the past decade has finally unravelled. Despite his best attempts to fudge the issue when he was called to give evidence, the Chilcot inquiry have recognised the former prime minister's central role in leading the UK into worst foreign policy disaster in recent history.

"While no inquiry will ever bring back those lost in Iraq, this comprehensive review by Sir John Chilcot will at least provide some explanation of the decisions which led to the disastrous invasion."

There has been speculation at senior levels of Whitehall that Chilcot and the members of his inquiry are planning to criticise Blair when they publish their report in the autumn. Some members of the inquiry, including the former British ambassador to Moscow Sir Rod Lyne, put Blair under pressure in his two appearances before them.

Members of the inquiry have said in private to former colleagues in Whitehall that the best way to gauge the inquiry's findings is to identify areas that have been raised repeatedly by Chilcot and his team. Three key areas which fall into this category are the lack of proper cabinet consultation, the use of intelligence, and the failure to make preparations for the post-war reconstruction.

It is expected that the inquiry will take a dim view of the Downing Street dossier on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, published on 24 September 2002. This included the notorious claim that Iraq could launch a WMD attack in 45 minutes.

In launching the report, Blair told an emergency session of the Commons: "His [Saddam Hussein's] weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down; it is up and running now."

Blair later stated he was wrong to have been so categorical about Iraq's WMD programme.

The inquiry is likely to criticise Alastair Campbell, Blair's former director of communications, who was instrumental in drawing up the dossier.

Campbell has always maintained that Sir John Scarlett, then chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, was in charge of the dossier.

But Major General Michael Laurie told the inquiry in a letter in May that the dossier was designed to "make the case for war".

Campbell wrote back to the inquiry to say: "Witnesses who were directly involved in the drafting of the dossier have made clear to several inquiries that at no time did I put anyone in the intelligence community under pressure, or say to them or anyone else that the then prime minister's purpose in publishing the dossier was to make the case for war."

The inquiry is also expected to focus on Blair's assurances to Bush in the run-up to the Iraq war. Blair rejects criticism that he told the former president in a meeting at his Texas ranch in April 2002 that he would support an invasion as long as the US agreed to try to secure agreement from the United Nations.

In addition, the inquiry will address the failure to make adequate preparations for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. Major General Tim Cross, who was attached to the US post-war Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, told the inquiry of a meeting he had with Blair on 18 March 2003, two days before the invasion.

In written evidence, he said: "I told him that there was no clarity on what was going to be needed after the military phase of the operation, nor who would provide it. Although I was confident that we would secure a military victory, I offered my view that we should not begin that campaign until we had a much more coherent postwar plan."

Cross told the inquiry in person in December 2009: "He nodded and didn't say anything particular. I didn't expect him to look me in the eye and say, 'This is terrible, we are going to pull the whole thing off.' I was just one of a number of people briefing him."

[Magda Hassan]

Chilcot report into Iraq delayed by Whitehall refusal to release evidence

Sir John Chilcot reveals frustration at inability to see key papers, including records of talks between Tony Blair and George Bush

• Richard Norton-Taylor
  
• guardian.co.uk, Monday 16 July 2012 15.56 BST
  

Tony Blair (left) and George Bush enter Downing Street. Refusal to release records of talks between the two on Iraq has delayed the Chilcot inquiry report for more than a year. Photograph: Dan Chung for the Guardian

Fierce opposition in Whitehall to the disclosure of key documents relating to the invasion of Iraq, notably records of discussions between Tony Blairand George Bush, has meant the Chilcot inquiry will not now be able to publish its report for well over a year.
Sir John Chilcot has made it clear in a letter to David Cameron that he and his fellow panel members are deeply frustrated by Whitehall's refusal to release papers, including those that reveal which ministers, legal advisers and officials were excluded from discussions on military action. The papers still kept secret include those relating to MI6 and the government's electronic eavesdropping centre, GCHQ.
The inquiry panel has seen the classified documents in dispute but is being prevented from publishing them.
In a letter to the prime minister released on Monday, Chilcot says there are unresolved disputes over "a number of particularly important categories of evidence" relating to "the discussions between the prime minister and heads of state or government of other nations" and "the treatment of discussions in the cabinet and cabinet committees".
Chilcot says Martin Gilbert, a historian and member of the inquiry panel, has been seriously ill since April, and has not been able to contribute to its work.
Chilcot refers to sharp exchanges he has had with the former cabinet secretary Lord O'Donnell over the refusal to disclose details of correspondence and conversations between Blair and Bush in the period leading up to the invasion. Their disclosure would serve to "illuminate Mr Blair's position at critical points" in the runup to war, Chilcot told O'Donnell last year.
He referred to passages in memoirs, including Blair's autobiography, A Journey; disclosures by Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff; and the diaries of Alastair Campbell, his former head of communications. Those publications, and the refusal to disclose Blair's notes, Chilcot told O'Donnell last year, "leads to the position that individuals may disclose privileged information (without sanction) whilst a committee of privy counsellors established by a former prime minister to review the issues, cannot".
Campbell revealed his version of Blair's discussions with Bush in the latest volume of his diaries published last month.
O'Donnell told Chilcot that releasing Blair's notes would damage Britain's relations with the US and would not be in the public interest. "We have attached particular importance to protecting the privacy of the channel between the prime minister and president," he said.
Chilcot has emphasised that the protocols were "put in place to protect national security, international relations and the personal security of individuals. They are not there to prevent embarrassment."
O'Donnell, who consulted Blair about the documents, retired at the end of last year when he became a peer. He was succeeded by Sir Jeremy Heywood, who clearly shares O'Donnell's approach to the release of the documents.
Chilcot says in his letter that it is essential for the inquiry to establish "as accurately and reliably" as possible what happened and that some of the significant lessons to learn apply not only to Iraq. "Most have more general application to the conduct of government."
The final report, he adds, is likely to be more than 1m words. But the Chilcot panel will not be in a position to even complete the draft for a year. It will be in a position to "begin the 'Maxwellisation' process by the middle of next year", Chilcot told Cameron. Under this process, those whom the inquiry intends to criticise are given a copy of passages of the draft report to enable them to respond. The process derives from Companies Act investigations.
The inquiry initially suggested it would be completed in May 2011. It then said it could finish by autumn last year. It subsequently said it would not be published until this summer "at the earliest".
The inquiry held 18 months of public hearings between the end of 2009 and early 2011. A succession of witnesses, ranging from former cabinet secretaries to military commanders, sharply criticised the way Blair and his close advisers took key decisions without consulting senior ministers and the then attorney general, Lord Goldsmith.
Chilcot has said Blair's claim that MI6 established "beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction was "not possible to make on the basis of intelligence".
Sir Michael Wood, the former senior legal adviser at the Foreign Office, said he considered resigning in protest against the war. Goldsmith said Blair's suggestion in January 2003 that Britain could attack Iraq without further UN backing had not been compatible with his legal advice.
Despite his refusal to release the Blair-Bush paper, O'Donnell said in evidence to the inquiry that the cabinet should have been told of Goldsmith's doubts about the legality of invading Iraq before Blair went to war.
"The ministerial code is very clear about the need, when the attorney general gives written advice, the full text of that advice should be attached [to cabinet papers]," O'Donnell said.
He said Blair did not believe cabinet was "a safe space" in which to debate going to war. That was one of the reasons why the then prime minister preferred informal meetings with no record taken.

[Magda Hassan]

Iraq Inquiry ~ Chilcot ~ Report delayed perhaps 2 years

Posted by ObiterJ | 17 July, 2012

The Iraq Inquiry - under the chairmanship of Sir John Chilcot - was expected to report during 2012 but publication of a report is to be delayed and may not appear until 2014. What has brought about this state of affairs?

The delay seems to arise for three reasons - (a) the amount of material to be analysed; (b) the process known as "Maxwellisation" and © problems in getting government to agree to certain material being published either in the eventual report or alongside that report.

Statement on the Inquiry website:

The Inquiry website states that the Inquiry has concluded its public hearings and is currently analysing the written and oral evidence it has received and drafting its report.

Pulling together and analysing the evidence and identifying the lessons, for a report that covers so wide and complex a range of issues and a time period of some nine years, is a significant task. Very considerable progress has already been made, but there is still much to be done.


As well as drafting the report, [B]the Inquiry is negotiating with the Government the declassification of a significant volume of currently classified material, in order that it may be quoted in, or published alongside, the Inquiry's report. Work on this substantial task, which involves the detailed scrutiny of many thousands of documents, is already under way. Significant progress has been made, but there will continue to be a series of further requests as drafting progresses.

The Inquiry has previously indicated that it intends to undertake a process of Maxwellisation whereby individuals who may be criticised in the report will be informed of the proposed criticism (and provided with relevant parts of the draft report in which the criticism is made) in order that they may make representations to the Inquiry Committee before the report is finalised.

The Inquiry has advised the Prime Minister that it will be in a position to begin the process of writing to any individuals that may be criticised by the middle of 2013.

The Inquiry's report will be submitted to the Prime Minister as soon as possible after that process is complete. The Inquiry understands that it will then be published in Parliament. A copy will also be available on [the Inquiry] website.

Sir John Chilcot, the Inquiry Chairman, wrote to the Prime Minister on Friday 13 July 2012 to provide an update on the Inquiry's progress and an outline of the scope of the Inquiry's report. The Inquiry published this letter on Monday 16 July.

Sir John's earlier letter to Sir Gus O'Donnell, the then Cabinet Secretary, sent on 21 October 2011 and Sir Gus's reply on 2 December were published on 14 December 2011.

[B]Maxwellisation:

this process is described well in this link.

[B]Publication of material:

Just what is this material which the inquiry says it requires and which the government is reluctant to allow to be published?

The letter of 13 July 2012 from Sir John Chilcot to Prime Minister David Cameron offers an indication.

"There are, however, a number of particularly important categories of evidence, including the treatment of discussions in Cabinet and Cabinet committees and the UK position in discussions between the Prime Minister and the heads of State or Government of other nations, to be addressed....."


The Guardian 16th July 2012 reports:

"Fierce opposition in Whitehall to the disclosure of key documents relating to the invasion ofIraq, notably records of discussions between Tony Blair and George Bush, has meant the Chilcot inquiry will not now be able to publish its report for well over a year.

Sir John Chilcot has made it clear in a letter to David Cameron that he and his fellow panel members are deeply frustrated by Whitehall's refusal to release papers, including those that reveal which ministers, legal advisers and officials were excluded from discussions on military action. The papers still kept secret include those relating to MI6 and the government's electronic eavesdropping centre, GCHQ.

The inquiry panel has seen the classified documents in dispute but is being prevented from publishing them."

[B]Comment:

Little of this is actually surprising even though it does nothing to allay public concerns such as those expressed by World Socialist Web Site on 16th March 2010.

It seems highly unlikely that government will ever sanction [B]publication of some of this material. Furthermore, there will be some Blair-Bush discussions for which no record was ever maintained. The end result will be that the report will contain certain crucial gaps. This will be a very unsatisfactory state of affairs.


[B]Freedom of Information:

A Freedom of Information Act request for disclosure of the record a telephone conversation between Prime Minister Blair and President G W Bush on 12th March 2003 was the subject of a ruling in May 2012 by the First-Tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber which "largely upheld" a decision of the Information Commissioner of 13th September 2011 - read the decision- to the effect that certain parts of the record were to be disclosed to the applicant - a Mr Plowden.

See Telegraph 21st May 2012 - "Blair-Bush Iraq conversation must be released"

http://watchingthelaw.blogspot.com.au/20...layed.html[/B][/B][/B][/B][/B][/B]