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Moshe Regev/Regenstreich
#1
By Justin Arenstein

The Israeli mastermind behind Mpumalanga's R1,3-billion promissory note scandal was arrested by a joint FBI-Interpol task force at his Las Vegas hideout in Nevada, United States, this week after a two-year manhunt.

Moshe Regenstreich, who has claimed to be everything from an Israeli war hero to an international spy, will be extradited to Switzerland for trial after allegedly fleecing European businessmen of $10-million (about R720-million) in a series of illicit diamond deals.

Regenstreich left Switzerland as "Moshe Regev" on Israeli passport number 5366439 in March 1995, but entered South Africa as Regenstreich on Israeli passport number 6650678 late in 1997 and eventually left on Lesotho passport number N006588 in August 1998.
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After he had been linked to the illegal trade in chemical weapons, including deadly mustard and sarin nerve gas, he was blacklisted by the United States congress and the state department in 1995 when his import-export company, Mainway, was linked to the sale of equipment, material, know-how and technology to Iran for the manufacture of chemical weapons.

Swiss courts eventually placed a cash bounty on his head and issued an international warrant in January 1998.

But Regenstreich had entered South Africa, where he cut deals with National Intelligence Agency (NIA) operatives, Mpumalanga's provincial government and even the justice department.

He was also able to flee to New York at the height of the promissory note scandal in August 1998, after helping Alan Gray, the former Mpumalanga parks board chief, to secretly use 19 game parks as collateral for a series of illegal offshore loans.

Faizel Abdul-Kader, South Africa's Interpol director, confirmed that Regenstreich had been on his international wanted list since early 1998, but said Interpol was not informed that he had entered South Africa.

Regenstreich set up a financial brokerage, Fenetic Investments, in Sandton shortly after arriving in the country and rapidly bought a number of other shady foreign exchange brokerages.

He hired two NIA operatives, Ian Langworthy and Pieter Louw, and according to their official reports used the companies as a front for money laundering and dealing in stolen share certificates.

Regenstreich also used Fenetic to set up the R1,3-billion promissory note deal with Gray in 1998, promising massive offshore loans of up to R500-million each in return for a contract granting 19 game parks to Fenetic as "unequivocal" collateral.

On a roll, Regenstreich set up a $115-million 12-ton gold deal and signed an offer to purchase one of Marino Chiavelli's former 30-room palaces in Hyde Park for $2,4-million. Media exposes of the illegal promissory note deal shattered his affluent lifestyle, however, leading to his eviction from the mansion, his arrest with Langworthy and Louw in a stolen share certificate scam, Reserve Bank raids on his Fenetic offices and a flurry of law suits.

Regenstriech and Gregory Mbokomo, his Zambian financial director, were initially charged along with the NIA operatives after they were caught trying to convince Johannesburg-based BFS Capital to accept share certificates worth $14,3-million as surety in return for a $1,5-million loan.

All charges were dropped in January, however, after the state said Regenstreich had co-operated and that the police had been unable to prove that he or Mbokomo were aware that the certificates were stolen.

Langworthy insisted in NIA reports at the time of his arrest that Regenstreich was the key to the criminal underworld and had used Fenetic to illegally channel crime-syndicate money out of the country.

The Reserve Bank eventually closed down Fenetic after confirming that it was engaging in international currency speculation without a forex licence. It declined to prosecute, despite being briefed on Regenstreich's role in the promissory note scam, the stolen share certificates and concerns by the International Banks of Southern Africa that he was the front for an Israeli crime syndicate that had cost local commercial banks millions.

Regenstreich fled to the US, apparently using a Lesotho passport.

Langworthy and Louw are meanwhile threatening to implicate their NIA handlers, as well as Bushie Engelbrecht, the head of crime intelligence when the share certificate scam goes to trial next month.

Langworthy reported directly to Thabo Kubu, the head of the NIA's shadowy strategic projects unit, and tried to intimidate police into dropping charges by organising meetings between Kubu and investigating officers.

The scheme backfired when Kubu eventually made a sworn statement to police insisting Langworthy had "gone overboard".

Kubu was suspended from the NIA on unrelated charges shortly after the arrests and his unit dismantled following allegations of massive fraud, misuse of state resources and death threats against NIA operatives who complained about the unit's conduct. - African Eye News Service
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&...964F253822
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
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#2
Updated October 2003
Chemical Chronology
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1998-1999

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
1998
German intelligence reports that Iran is making efforts toacquire production equipment for tabun and sarin, using three separate Indian companies as fronts: "With the aid of Indian companies, Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory." The following Indian companies were implicated: Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India. The Iranian companies involved in the building of the CW complex are Defense Industries, Shahid, Bagheri Industrial Group, and Shahid Hemat Industrial group.
— Arms Control Reporter, 707.E-2.175, 10-98; Jamie Dettmer, "Teheran Building Deadly Gas Plant," Washington Times, 30 January 1998, p. A1.
Early 1998
Iran is capable of producing several CW agents, including nerve, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide.
— Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare, A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Copernicus Books, 2002), p. 166.
January 1998
An internal Israeli defense ministry report allegedly claims that Israel has maintained military-industrial ties with Iran. The report mentions three suspected business deals: (1) the supply of 58,000 gas masks by Shalon Chemical Industries after the Iran-Iraq War; (2) the supply of gas detectors by Elbit for the identification of chemical warfare agents; and (3) the installation of fire control systems on East European Tanks sold to Iran.
— "Defense Ministry Report Confirms Weapon Deals with Iran," Ha'aretz; 20 July 1998; FBIS, Document FTS19980720001094, p. A4.
13 January 1998
Minister Mohsen Rafiqdust of the IRGC states in Tehran, "If the Iraqi regime deploys chemical weapons either against the Muslim combatants or Iranian civilians, the Islamic Republic would be forced to resort to chemical warfare against enemy forces...Iran has a high capability for producing these arms."
— IRNA, 14 January 1998, FBIS,15 January 1998.
July 1998
General Wafiq Al-Sammarai, former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, claims that Iraq used VX against Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war.
— Patrick Cockburn, "Iraq Used Deadly Gas on Iranians," Independent, 3 July 1998; "Iraq Reportedly Used VX Gas in Iran-Iraq War," CNN, 3 July 1998, http://www.cnn.com.
24 August 1998
The secretary of Iran's Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezai, says that if any country fires even one missile at Iran, Iran would definitely respond by firing ten. He also states, "We [Iran] do not ask for anyone's permission to equip our armed forces and we will produce all types of advanced weapons except nuclear and chemical weapons."
— "Reza'i: Iran Will Respond to Any Missile Attack," IRNA, 25 August 1998; FBIS, Document FTS19980825000384, Joan Mower, "Soviets, Persian Gulf, Afghanistan Toughest for US Spies," Associated Press, 25 October 1988.
November 1998
Iran submits its CWC declarations.
— "Iran: Chemical Weapons," Federation of American Scientists, 6 November 1998, http://www.fas.org/ nuke/ guide/ iran/ cw/ index.htm.
6 November 1998
The Federation of American Scientists claims that Iran began production of chemical weapons early on in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran "manufactures weapons for blister, blood, and choking agents; it is also believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. Iran's stockpile of chemical weapons is believed to include nerve and blister agents. Iran is estimated to have an inventory of several thousand tons of various agents, including sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents. Its production capacity is estimated at as much as 1,000 tons a year, with major production facilities located at Damghan, 300km east of Tehran. Iran is working on developing a self-sufficient CW production capacity that includes more effective nerve agents. Along with shell and bomb delivery systems, Iran may also be producing CW warheads for its Scud missile systems. With extensive foreign assistance, Tehran is obtaining technology, chemical agent precursors, production equipment, and entire production plants. Although Iran is making a concerted effort to attain an independent production capability for all aspects of its chemical weapons program, it remains dependent on foreign sources for chemical warfare-related technologies. China is an important supplier of technologies and equipment for Iran's chemical warfare program."
— "Iran: Chemical Weapons," Federation of American Scientists, 6 November 1998, http://www.fas.org/ nuke/ guide/ iran/ cw/ index.htm.
18 November 1998
Ambassador Mohammad R. Alborzi, director general of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, delivers Iran's CW declaration during a session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the CWC in The Hague, Netherlands. In his statement, he admits for the first time that Iran had once possessed CW, in the waning years of the Iran-Iraq War. But he claims that, "...following the establishment of cease fire, the decision to develop chemical weapons capabilities was reversed and the process was terminated." During the speech, Alborzi repeated that Iran would continue a policy that shuns CW production.
— Itamar Eichner, "Iran Admits to Possessing Chemical Weapons," Yedi'ot Aharonot, 20 November 1998; FBIS Document FTS19981120000618, 20 November 1998; "Iran Pledges No Chemical Weapons Production," Agence France Presse, 17 November 1998; Mohammad R. Alborzi, "Statement to the Third Session of the Conference of the States Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention," 16-20 November 2000.
20 January 1999
It is reported that Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai provided secret documents to the United States alleging that at least 10,000 Russian scientists are helping Iran develop missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The report allegedly states that the Russian scientists are helping Iran develop its Shehab-3 and Shehab-4 missiles, as well as a 3,600km-range S.S.-400 missile. Israel believes the missiles will be completed in 2002 and capable of carrying nuclear warheads by 2007. Details are supposedly to be revealed in the next issue of The Foreign Report.
— "Mordekhay Said to Give US Data on Russia-Iran Cooperation," Maariv (Tel Aviv), 20 January 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990120000938, 20 January 1999; "Israeli Official Says Iran Missile Program 'On Schedule'," Jerusalem Post, 21 January 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990121000290, 21 January 1999.
20 January 1999
A FBIS translated excerpt states, "Nahum Manbar was not the only Israeli involved with Iran's chemical weapons programs. At the same time Manbar and his accomplices were selling materials, equipment, and technology for Iran's chemical weapons program, there was another Israeli involved in contacts with Iranian agents. Between 1992 and 1994, Moshe Regev's company was involved in selling Iran equipment, materials, know-how, and technology to manufacture mustard gas and sarin gas...Manbar and Regev did not work together...both worked with the same contacts...and both claimed to have contact with the Israeli intelligence community and defense establishment...The various branches of the defense establishment, headed by MOSAD [Mossad], spared no effort in accumulating evidence against Manbar. Against Regev, however, no action has been taken...[During a conversation with a Ha'aretz correspondent] Regev denied having any link whatever to the sale of chemical equipment and substances to Iran. Later, however, he did admit that he had been involved in such transactions, though he attempted to minimize his role..." [Note: There is nothing in the remainder of the article mentions anything about a confession having to do with the sale of chemical weapons technology to Iran.]
— "Israel Admits Selling Iran Chemical Weapons Technology," Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), 20 January 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990120001469, 20 January 1999.

23 January 1999
The Director General of the OPCW, Jose M. Bustani, says in a visit to Tehran that "Iran is an exemplary state in the campaign against chemical weapons."
— "Iran: Daily Assails Double Standards on Chemical Weapons," Kayhan International, 26 January 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990206000399, 26 January 1999; "Iran 'Exemplary State' in Anti-Chemical Weapons Campaign," IRNA, 23 January 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990123000517, 23 January 1999.
26 January 1999
The National Council of Resistance of Iran states that VX nerve agent is produced in the Construction Crusade's War Engineering Research Center.
— Soona Samsami, "Clerical Regime's Quest for Biological Weapons & Germ Arsenal," National Council of Resistance of Iran, 26 January 1999, p. 3.
February 1999
Iran's opposition in exile accuses Tehran of researching and developing VX nerve gas, toxic molds, and soil-contaminating agents.
— "Iran Opposition Says Teheran in Deadly Weapons Drive," CNN, 4 February 1999. http://www.cnn.com.
February 1999
International CW inspectors from the OPCW visit Iran's chemical sites.
— "Iran Reports Inspection of Chemical Sites," Reuters, 21 February 1999; "Inspectors Visit Iranian Chemical Installations," IRNA, 21 February 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990221000402, 21 February 1999.
8 February 1999
The OPCW sends out invitations for a course on medical defense against chemical weapons to be hosted between 15-20 May at the Center for Treatment of Chemical Weapons Victims in Tehran. The course will cover nerve agents, vesicants, cyanide poisoning, phosgene poisoning, toxins, and various incapacitating agents, as well as the general medical defense against CW.
— International Cooperation and Assistance Division of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, "An Invitation to Propose Candidates for a Course on Medical Defense against Chemical Weapons," 8 February 1999.
13 February 1999
The MKO reports that Iran has accelerated its CBW production program since President Khatami came to office: "Under the supervision of around 25 of their Russian counterparts, Iranian scientists have hastened their efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons..." According to MKO sources, Iran is awaiting sophisticated computers to accelerate its CBW production and has already managed to produce the CW nerve agent VX, as well as anthrax and aflatoxins (biological agents/toxins). In addition to Russian scientists that are assisting Iran's program, the MKO claimed that Chinese and North Korean scientists are also "helping to further Iran's WMD capabilities..."
— Greg Seigle, "Iran is Accelerating WMD, Claims Opposition," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 10, 1999, p. 63; "Iran Daily: 'What's Up' Column," Iran News, 13 February 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990220000113, 13 February 1999.
10 March 1999
A seminar is held for the officials and experts of the Iranian Customs and Department of Quality Control and Chemical Analysis of the National Standard Institute.
— Statement by an Iranian Official at Columbia University, 4 October 1999, p. 4.
12 April 1999
During a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers to increase military technology cooperation with Russia in exchange for tightened control of technology transfer to Iran. At the same time, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens states to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, "We know today that Russian technological information regarding nuclear capability and ballistic missiles has for months been passed from Russia to Iran. I believe that we must do what we can, in addition to the efforts by the US, to prevent this transfer of technology to Iran." According to a senior defense official, Iran is set on developing long-range surface-to-surface missiles, as well as acquiring biological and chemical weapons and achieving nuclear capability. He said that Iran would be unable to achieve these goals without Russian assistance, and that there are no indications this aid is stopping.
— "Further on Sharon's Russia Talks, Iranian Procurement," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 13 April 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990413001053, 13 April 1999.
13 April 1999
Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers additional military technology cooperation to Russia on the condition that it ceases its weapons technology exports to Iran. A senior intelligence officer states that Iran is developing a long-range, surface-to-surface missile equipped with biological and chemical warheads, and that Iran is set on developing nuclear weapons. He adds that Russian assistance is imperative to these endeavors.
— Danna Harman and Liat Collins, "Sharon Offers Russia Increased Technological Cooperation," Jerusalem Post, 13 April 1999.
15 May 1999
A center named the International Centre for Training and Treatment of the Victims of Chemical Warfare (ICTTVCW) is inaugurated in Tehran.
— "Chemical Warfare Treatment Center Opens in Teheran," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 May 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990515000532, 15 May 1999.
15-20 May 1999
The first international seminar for specialized medical training arranged by the OPCW is convened in Tehran.
— "Chemical Warfare Treatment Center Opens in Teheran," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 May 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990515000532, 15 May 1999.
July-December 1999
According to a report by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), during the second half of 1999, "...Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from entities in Russia and China. It also acquired or attempted to acquire indirectly through intermediaries in other countries equipment and material that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure."
— Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 1999, http://www.cia.gov/ cia/ publications/ bian/ bian_aug2000.htm.
2 July 1999
It is reported that "the US intelligence community recently completed an inter-agency assessment of Iran's growing chemical weapons capabilities," and that a special White House National Security Council task force was created to monitor developments related to Iran's CW program.
— Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring, Iranian Gas," Washington Times, 2 July 1999, p. 7.
25 August 1999
Iran's Defense Ministry opens a new colour [sic] and chemical manufacturing plant located at the Parchin Chemical Complex. The reported daily production capacity is two tons.
— "Shamkhani: Iran Can Produce All Military Hardware," IRNA, 25 August 1999; in "Iran to Manufacture Previously-Imported Explosive," Tehran IRIB Television Fourth Program Network, 25 August 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990825001643, 25 August 1999.
23 September 1999
The Organization for Defense Industries commenced operation of a production line for uniforms resistant to chemical agents (protective suits). [Note: Not necessarily protective suits, but something like a battle dress overgarment that resists chemical exposures.]
— "Iran Produces Chemical-Resistant Military Uniforms," IRNA; FBIS, Document FTS19990925000608, 23 September 1999; "Iran Commissions NBC Suit Production Plant," IRIB Television First Program Network; FBIS, Document FTS19990923000658, 23 September 1999.
November 1999
The OPCW certifies the Iranian declarations submitted under the CWC.
— Jean Pascal Zanders, "Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons: A Critical Analysis of Past Allegations," Lecture, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Washington, DC, 7 March 2001, cns.miis.edu/ cns/ dc/ 030701.htm.
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/I..._1999.html
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
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#3
My emphasis in bold.

Regev "was arrested by a joint FBI-Interpol task force at his Las Vegas hideout in Nevada, United States".

Hmmm. FBI and Interpol, eh?

I wonder if Regev's spooky handlers were aware that this "FBI-Interpol task force" was so close to Their boy?

Judging by the background, Mossad will not be happy.
"It means this War was never political at all, the politics was all theatre, all just to keep the people distracted...."
"Proverbs for Paranoids 4: You hide, They seek."
"They are in Love. Fuck the War."

Gravity's Rainbow, Thomas Pynchon

"Ccollanan Pachacamac ricuy auccacunac yahuarniy hichascancuta."
The last words of the last Inka, Tupac Amaru, led to the gallows by men of god & dogs of war
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