Transfer of Files on Psychological Operations

[Ed Jewett]

With Magda's permission, I am going to copy over old files from my web site at E Pluribus Unum, which is slowly being phased out for a variety of reasons: 1) the recent change in employment, health and familial health issues of its resident IT maestro, and 2) the uptick on pressures on the Internet and its use as a conveyor of information that is suddenly deemed dangerous by certain agencies and people inside the US.

EPU's shade has been drawn so that only members can see its content, but I think there is material there that ought to be preserved and available to a wider audience. The collection I will now tediously transfer is chief among them.

It will take me a while to do this; I have no idea how long. You might consider refraining from comment, or making it in a parallel thread, until I am finished. On the other hand, there is no attempt on my part to control the discussion or maintain any "discrete" boundary. Indeed, it is a repository that is meant to be continued with the assistance of everyone else.

No thanks or kudos are necessary but, if you feel so obligated, send me a PM or en e-mail. Corrections, updates, insights and arguments are always welcome.

The collection deals dominantly with what might be called mind wars, or propaganda, and more specifically, the use of TV, the press, the Internet and other media to impart information, spin, etc., and to control or direct perception and discussion.

The collection, while it may refer to or include bits of historical information, reflects articles found on the Internet since early 2009. In all cases, if I remember, I would prefer to go back to the original and post it because of its embedded links but if it is no longer available, I will post the text as I posted it at EPU, with the date, and a note that the link is now "dead". In making this transfer, I will not take the time to chase "cache" items or do additional research or cross-reference.

[Ed Jewett]

PsyClops: Blitzkrieg of the Mind?



“ … interpersonal relationships must be considered to properly understand the communication process and to conduct effective PsyOp. Interpersonal relationships seem to be anchor points for individual opinions, attitudes, habits and values.”

PsyOp Operations in the 21st Century
Gary Whitley, Department of the Navy
United States Army War College, Class of 2000
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibi.../psyop.pdf


Pay special attention to the section on PsyOp and the Internet on page 17 of the paper, page 28 of the PDF, which discusses the use of the Internet as a base on which to construct a tool for coordination of psychological operations..

The paper says that “the bad guys of the world” are using the Internet and must be countered, but:

In what world can a US citizen arguing against the military-industrial-congressional complex, war and its destructions, bad governmental decisions, governmental deception and outrageous governmental expense and behavior be considered “bad”?

How and why is it that the US government and the US military (and the US business world, borrowing on Bernays) are waging “clickskrieg” on the citizens of the United States when the Constitution clearly asks and requires that the military be overseen by the civilian polity?

Why is the US military engaged in the purposeful reduction of media criticism when the American citizen clearly has a right (or at least used to have the right) in assembly, grievance, criticism, legal action, etc.?

“While the perpetrators of cyberwar (knowledge-related conflict at the military level) attacks may be formal military forces, netwar (societal struggles most often associated with low intensity conflict) attacks may not even be traditional military forces,26 but instead may “often involve non-state, paramilitary, and irregular forces.”27

War.com: The Internet and Psychological Operations
Angela Maria Lungu
Major, United States Army
February 2001
Naval War College, Newport, RI
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits...etandpsyops.pdf


Thoreau once quipped that ‘they have constructed a telegraph connecting Maine and Texas; this presumes that the two have something to say to one another’.

Is it not permissible for the citizens of the United States to have something to say to the Executive and Congressional branches about war and defense policy?

How does an argument or discussion about who perpetrated or facilitated the 9/11 attacks lend aid and comfort to an enemy when the very people arguing the “inside job” angle are or were heavily involved in the intelligence, military, law enforcement and foreign policy branches of our own government?

What argument on behalf of PsyOps as a tool in the prevention or countering of the erosion of ‘popular support for the war within the enemy’s society [the US]’ is valid when the US popular support for the war in Iraq was weak and declining even before the war began? … when residual anti-war leanings were still left over from the Vietnam era? … when questions about the casus belli and the evidence for it were raised immediately and continuously within American civilian society?

****

Isn’t it interesting that one of the early and influential papers on information warfare "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989): 23 ] was written by one of the acolytes [William Lind et al] of a fellow named Boyd, the “author” of the OODA loop?

****

Part of the role of perception management* is to deny access to information and includes deception, concealment and an effort to influence objective reasoning.

* See “Defining the Information Campaign” Lt. Col. Garry Beavers, United States Army (Retired) [a principal analyst for Electronic Warfare Associates’ Information and Infrastructure Technologies, Incorporated who received a B.S. and M.Ed. from North Georgia College and State University and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Defense Intelligence Agency] at this link:
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/m...eavers.pdf


That will certainly makes what follows of greater interest and intrigue.


Civilian Cyber Corp: Tired of waiting for the Bush Administration or The Government to mobilize you? Mobilize yourself.

The People's Information Support Team is a Civilian Irregular Information volunteer auxiliary on-line working group collaborating on electronic media engagement of oppositional, neutral and friendly blogs, forums, discussion groups and websites. Irregulars have no official Table of Organization and Equipment and are under no obligation to follow doctrine, but this particular PIST is a five-person element composed of a Team Chief, an Assistant Team Chief, two Civilian Irregular Counterpropagandists with photography, videography, journalism or editing skills; and an analyst with linguistic and area studies specialties.

Capabilities to be developed:

Disseminate selected public information to target audiences.
Counter enemy propaganda.
YouTube Smackdown
Counter enemy Morale Operations
Cheerleader
Attack anti-military arguments
Publicize heroes

Resist infantilization, victimization, marginalization and slander of American soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen

Engage Hostile Media
Relentless, destructive critique of MSM persons and publications
Expose media bias
Resurrect buried stories

The ultimate objective of PIST is to convince domestic audiences to take actions contributing to the defeat of Islamofascist terrorists and their supporters. PIST should promote resistance within the domestic civilian populace against hostile ideology or enhance the image and legitimacy of friendly ideologies.

**************************************************

From Rethinking Insurgency by Steven Metz
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army....iles/PUB790.pdf

p. 12 The most common evolutionary path for 21st century organizations—be they corporations, political organizations, or something else—is to become less rigidly hierarchical, taking the form of decentralized networks or webs of nodes (which may themselves be hierarchical). Such organizations are most effective in a rapidly changing, information saturated environment.20 Insurgent movements organized as “flat” networks or semi-networks are more flexible and adaptable than rigidly hierarchical ones. Resources, information, and decisionmaking authority are diffused. Such organizations are effective in environments where rapid adaptation is an advantage. In the contemporary era, polyglot organizations which combine a centralized, hierarchical dimension (which gives them task effectiveness) and a decentralized, networked dimension (which gives them flexibility and adaptability) can maximize mission effectiveness.

p.28-29 One other type of militia merits consideration. Some analysts contend that the Internet has made “virtual” militias (and insurgencies) possible and potentially dangerous.66 That runs counter to the definition of militias used here since “virtual” militias do not control territory or assume state functions. [But, of course, this is a false analogy coming from those who have defined the human mind as terrain to be won.] Perhaps, though, virtual militias and insurgents should be considered a separate category. Interestingly, just as the emergence of “real” insurgents sometimes spawn the creation of counterinsurgent militias the emergence of “virtual” insurgents has led to the formation of virtual counterinsurgent vigilantes. One example is the “Internet Haganah, part of a network of private anti-terrorist web monitoring services, which collects information on extremist websites, passes this on to state intelligence services, and attempts to convince Internet service providers not to host radical sites.67 The logic is that it takes a network to counter a network. As insurgents and terrorists become more networked and more “virtual,” states, with their inherently bureaucratic procedures and hierarchical organizations, will be ineffective. Vigilantes, without such constraints, may be [effective].

Quote: “We’re going to have to counter the propaganda ourselves.

Relentless, destructive critique of MSM persons and publications is among the most important tasks of bloggers, commenters, and tipsters of the Right. – Kralizec, in a comment at Hot Air.

We are going to have to blog swarm and harness the collective wisdom of Been There Done Thats … “

http://tbn0.google.com/images?q=tbn:CG1BBU.../Final%2B2A.jpg


********************************************

Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group
DISTRIBUTED, NON-HIERARCHICAL, LOOSE-CANNON CYBER ARBAKAI OF THE AMRIKI TRIBE

**************************************

The “Amazing Grim” describes Emergent Communities and show us this graphic




“…the military arc of the blogosphere has the potential to become an insurgency, by resisting the enemy propaganda disseminated by our own Main Stream Media and conducting counter propaganda for the domestic target audience. The leaders (yellow) are the bloggers with the largest readership. The TTLB Ecosystem tells us who the leaders are. Some could be IO Warlords, with a readership of contributors (red G’s), commenters (red or blue Auxiliaries), linkers and lurkers (blue or green Sympathizers) with varying degrees of committment and investment in the concept of Distributed IO by PSYOP Auxiliaries and Volunteer Counter Propagandists. Much of the blogosphere is in revolt against the Main Stream Media. It could be considered an insurgency in opposition to the traditional dead tree info monopoly. And like a real insurgency, it would benefit from the discrete advice and instruction of trained operators.

We need more blue nodes. We need counter propagandists. We need people’s time. We need people’s mental energy and communication skills.

Electronic Counter Media
http://tbn0.google.com/images?q=tbn:ivwSGo...org/new_pa4.jpg

Quote: 1-34. Joint doctrine defines the information environment as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). The environment shaped by information includes leaders, decisionmakers, individuals, and organizations. The global community’s access and use of data, media, and knowledge systems occurs in the information shaped by the operational environment. Commanders use information engagement to shape the operational environment as part of their operations. (Paragraphs 7-10 through 7-22 discuss information engagement.)

“Pictures of dead women and children, the “collateral damage” of war, carry more explosive weight than a B-52—a weight measured not in tons of explosives but in negative perception, which translates to reduced public support for government policies and initiatives.” [Aha! So our government is in favor of dead women and children!]

Ordnance = Content
Delivery Platforms = Global Media
Target = Public Opinion

Because we do not censor the Internet or transnational television, images of death and destruction from terror attacks speed unimpeded (like Germany’s tanks and aircraft) across the flat plains of the global media directly to our TV screens and computer monitors, delivering a mental blitzkrieg attack measured not in explosive weight but in the weight of perception.

*************************

Today’s conflicts are not only won on the battlefield, but through the use of websites and blogs, over the airwaves and on the front pages of our newspapers.

“Through skillful propaganda operations, the enemy successfully leverages their asymmetric attacks to encourage potential recruits to join their violent cause and to try to convince those of us in free nations to give in to hopelessness, self-doubt and despair.” [world at war, unemployment up over 10%, loss of trillions of dollars, long-term debt for decades, all brought to us by the folks at the military-industrial-Congressional-corporate/fascist complex -- hey, I'm ecstatic]

Their decentralized networks have been able to effectively employ the tools of the Information Age, while the U.S. government remains ponderous, muscle-bound and unable to respond in real time to the deceits of these enemies. To succeed in this first struggle of the 21st century, we will need fresh thinking and capabilities well beyond the Defense Department. If free people are to meet the challenges posed by what will be a long struggle against violent extremists, we will need all elements of national power, private as well as public — diplomatic, economic, as well as intelligence and military to work in concert. We will need to rethink and rearrange our domestic and global institutions designed for the Industrial Age to better suit the Information Age.

Gleaned this from Jedburgh at SWJ:

Quote: We live in a world of citizen journalists, where every action or operation is witnessed, taped and reported, individual actions are amplified, and organizations face the challenge of strategic implication. In today’s flat world, a seemingly isolated interaction in the morning becomes fodder for bloggers immediately, appears on local television news by noon, and is international news by evening.

Captain Hal Pittman, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Joint Communication)

Already in the works are initiatives on coordinated web hosting and content, video and blogging, a renewed effort to identify and find ways to empower credible Muslim voices, develop a shared image databank and strengthen the effectiveness of Military Information Support Teams (MIST) work in our overseas missions.

#####################################

The Missing Component of U.S. Strategic Communications
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/...i47/25.pdf

by Colonel William M. Darley, USA,
Director of Strategic Communications for the
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and
Editor-in-Chief of Military Review.

Read the whole thing, then go over to Swedish Meatballs and read the comments.


Some of the best:

. . . we cannot agree among ourselves as to what we view as those cultural values of our own we are willing to openly assert are superior and preferable to those championed by our enemies as a reason for engaging in war, which by definition must be promoted and internalized by targeted audiences in order for a war of ideas to be successful. Yet the assertion of superiority of values as compared to those of an adversary must be, in fact, the essence of strategic communications messages aimed at achieving wartime political objectives.

The social pressure of a seemingly intractable war is polarizing in increasingly dangerous ways an already ideologically divided society, moving it toward another virtual domestic civil war among advocates of conflicting ideologies.

. . . actual war between irreconcilable camps of ideological enemies who are increasingly gravitating to, if not openly rallying around, two inimical and antithetical sets of values as distinct as those that divide the Shia and Sunni factions in the Islamic world.

. . . the agendas of the domestic political parties have evolved to a point where they view the outcome of the war in Iraq less as an issue of homeland security than as a key factor in the success of their own parochial struggles to wrest domestic political power as a means to shape national values. To this end, domestic political opponents increasingly appear to view the war as more about controlling future nominations to the Supreme Court than about defending American citizens or improving Middle Eastern stability.

[Mom, applie pie and the girl next door?]

[Oil, SUV’s, global hegemony, forward air bases with which to attack Russia and/or secure Caspian Sea basin energy supplies, profits for the oil companies and military contractors]

*************************

The Unorganized Cyber Militia of the United States

“Kat is a blogger and a Denizen or infowarrior in Virtual Warlord John Donovan’s castle garrison who has just posted a magnum opus that may well be to Pinch Sulzberger what the Declaration of Independence was to King George III. Future students of this period will recognize this piece as a key treatise in the narrative of the pajamahadeen.

It was only those of us who disconnected from the “Matrix” of the mass media who knew the reality on the ground did not match the “reality” perpetrated by the media.

**********************

We few, we happy few, we band of blogs, having looked beyond the Matrix, discussed strategy and pointed to successes long before the media ever knew who Petraeus was or anything about the new COIN manual that incorporated ideas written by Kilcullen and discussed at length on the blogs.

… We knew deep down that what we were being told was not the whole story. And we believed that our nation was a force for good in this world, and that the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines sent forth to break militant Islamicists of their homocidal habits were the best human beings this Republic had to offer…

We almost lost the war. Not on the battle field, but right here at home. As General Lynch recently said, the reason people thought it was being lost and now appears to be miraculously won? The media, with its central editorial boards “shaping American opinion” told everyone it was so. And, at least half of the American population was unaware because they had no idea they were being sold a bill of goods. They didn’t disconnect from the “Matrix”.

We have all been the victims of a massive psychological operation. Even those of us who resisted. Our faith in our armed forces remains unshaken, but our faith in government, media, academia, elites, and many of our fellow citizens has plummeted. Many of us no longer look to government for solutions. Some of us are empowering ourselves. The reason that you are failing, the reason the stock in your companies continues to dwindle, the reason that you missed the true story of Iraq in lieu of “the narrative”, the reason that a sitting president invited bloggers to the White House, however limited in its actual journalistic moments that you claim as “real” journalism, is because you and your kind became “the Matrix”; alternate reality created by you and others like you. You are no longer independent. You are no longer individuals seeking “the truth”. … We are at war. Several wars. The outcome of all of them depends on control of the key terrain, the battle space between the ears of the American voter. And for a whole lot of reasons explained elsewhere on this blog, this key terrain has been left undefended. Will and morale are essential elements of national power that must be defended, if not by Regulars, than by us.

Also, it is clear that “good news” must come directly from the units on the ground or the Iraqis themselves. Anything coming from higher headquarters or the Pentagon is dismissed, fairly or unfairly, as propaganda. Recent reports that the Pentagon is building its public relations efforts, including “message development” teams and “surrogate” spokesmen, demonstrate an awareness of the problem. More Pentagon talking heads, however, will have less impact on broadcasting a more balanced message than authentic reporting from the troops.

… Tactical units should each have two members who are trained in public relations and equipped with high-quality cameras and laptops with video editing software, and offered incentives and rewards for effective reporting. They should record unit activities in writing and video, and share them with the American people via sites modeled on wildly successful pro-military websites, such as Blackfive.net and MoveAmericaForward.org.

… The general staff in Baghdad should measure the success of its public affairs effort by how many journos get out on the ground, in contrast to recent reports of the staff making life difficult for proven combat communicators like Michael Yon to embed with units. Yon, a former special operator, does so much to report an authoritative, balanced perspective from Iraq that the generals should instead assign him his own helicopter, and perhaps a limo.

*************************

Quote: … The military has no monopoly on information, and you don’t have to wear a uniform to be an information operator. All you need is some very basic literacy and an internet connection and you, too can be a force multiplier for the good guys. You can be a civilian irregular information group IO auxiliary.

Now doesn’t that give you more warm and fuzzies than watching Dances With the Stars?

Quote: DoD needs an element that monitors the blogosphere, getting good ideas from friendly bloggers, early warning from hostile bloggers, assessment of communications effectiveness, early identification of potential PR flaps, and establishing relationships with pro-military bloggers. The center of gravity in the Jihad is the will of the American people. Psychological Operations are being conducted which are undermining that will. The MSM is hostile. Much of the blogosphere is not hostile. The blogosphere is a virtual battlespace for the will of the American people. Pro-military bloggers could be organized to function as auxiliaries, legally permitted to target domestic audiences in ways prohibited to active duty bloggers.

####################################

Click-s-krieg on these:

http://cannoneerno4.wordpress.com/category...arriors/page/2/

http://warintel11.wetpaint.com/?t=anon

http://pist10.wetpaint.com/?t=anon

http://cannoneerno4.wordpress.com/2007/04/...-battle-spaces/

http://cannoneerno4.wordpress.com/2007/04/...-propagandists/

http://cannoneerno4.wordpress.com/2007/08/...aganda-proxies/

http://cannoneerno4.wordpress.com/2007/12/...-mind%e2%80%9d/

[Ed Jewett]

Books on covert action against dissenters:

The Cointelpro Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States, Ward Churchill and Jim VanderWall. Boston: South End Press , 1990.

War at Home: Covert Action Against US Activists and What We Can Do About It, Brian Glick. Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1989.

[Ed Jewett]

Profiling and Personality Simulation
By Dr. Norman D. Livergood
(curriculum vitae)




While serving as Head of the Artificial Intelligence Department at the U.S. Army War College for several years, and while teaching graduate courses in expert systems at several California universities, I explored and developed personality simulation systems, an advanced technology used in military war games, FBI profiling, political campaigning, and advertising.

These profiling or personality simulation systems:

· capture a person's mental components: actions, beliefs, ideas, attitudes, purchasing patterns, habits, etc.
· translate these into a computer system: a program which prioritizes and relates the various elements to an overall purpose

o example 1: a consumer profile which gives a certain weight to specific kinds of purchases the person makes and predicts what products they would buy in the future

o example 2: a criminal behavior profile based on prior indictments or convictions used to predict future criminal activity

· use the system to influence and control that person's ideas and behavior

o example 1: TV ads based on the profile developed from the consumer's purchasing patterns
o example 2: military counterintelligence activities based on a profile of the enemy's leadership

This may sound like science fiction or Frankenstein's laboratory, but it is the actual state of the technology in personality simulation and control.

Personality simulation falls within the domain of artificial intelligence. From its inception, artificial intelligence (AI) has been primarily concerned with developing systems which simulate human behavior for the purpose of controlling such behavior….

***

Strategic Personality Simulation:
A New Strategic Concept
by Norman D. Livergood
Published by the U.S. Army War College, 1995
Executive Summary

Much more here:
http://www.hermes-press.com/program1.htm


See as well the lengthy article Brainwashing America by Dr. Norman Livergood

*******

Stepford Citizen Syndrome:
Top Ten Signs Your Neighbor is Brainwashed September 5, 2002
By Maureen Farrell



http://www.democraticunderground.com/artic...5_stepford.html

[Ed Jewett]

Journalism, advertising and propaganda; 19 links

Wednesday, July 22, 2009

In 1933, the American Press Was Proud that Hitler Adopted Its Propaganda Methods. Nothing Has Changed.



In 1933, the American advertising industry proudly and publicly boasted that Hitler was copying their American propaganda techniques.
After Hitler and Goebbels gave a bad name to propaganda, Freud's nephew - psychologist Edward Bernays - simply re-branded propaganda as "public relations" and "professional journalism".
As veteran reporter John Pilger writes:

Bernays, described as the father of the media age, was the nephew of Sigmund Freud. “Propaganda,” he wrote, “got to be a bad word because of the Germans . . . so what I did was to try and find other words [such as] Public Relations.” Bernays used Freud’s theories about control of the subconscious to promote a “mass culture” designed to promote fear of official enemies and servility to consumerism. It was Bernays who, on behalf of the tobacco industry, campaigned for American women to take up smoking as an act of feminist liberation, calling cigarettes “torches of freedom”; and it was his notion of disinformation that was deployed in overthrowing governments, such as Guatemala’s democracy in 1954.

Pilger previously addressed "Professional Journalism":

Edward Bernays, the so-called father of public relations, wrote about an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. He was referring to journalism, the media. That was almost 80 years ago, not long after corporate journalism was invented. It is a history few journalist talk about or know about, and it began with the arrival of corporate advertising. As the new corporations began taking over the press, something called “professional journalism” was invented. To attract big advertisers, the new corporate press had to appear respectable, pillars of the establishment-objective, impartial, balanced. The first schools of journalism were set up, and a mythology of liberal neutrality was spun around the professional journalist. The right to freedom of expression was associated with the new media and with the great corporations, and the whole thing was, as Robert McChesney put it so well, “entirely bogus”. For what the public did not know was that in order to be professional, journalists had to ensure that news and opinion were dominated by official sources, and that has not changed. Go through the New York Times on any day, and check the sources of the main political stories-domestic and foreign-you’ll find they’re dominated by government and other established interests. That is the essence of professional journalism. I am not suggesting that independent journalism was or is excluded, but it is more likely to be an honorable exception. Think of the role Judith Miller played in the New York Times in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. Yes, her work became a scandal, but only after it played a powerful role in promoting an invasion based on lies. Yet, Miller’s parroting of official sources and vested interests was not all that different from the work of many famous Times reporters, such as the celebrated W.H. Lawrence, who helped cover up the true effects of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in August, 1945. “No Radioactivity in Hiroshima Ruin,” was the headline on his report, and it was false.
Consider how the power of this invisible government has grown. In 1983 the principle global media was owned by 50 corporations, most of them American. In 2002 this had fallen to just 9 corporations. Today it is probably about 5. Rupert Murdoch has predicted that there will be just three global media giants, and his company will be one of them. This concentration of power is not exclusive of course to the United States. The BBC has announced it is expanding its broadcasts to the United States, because it believes Americans want principled, objective, neutral journalism for which the BBC is famous. They have launched BBC America. You may have seen the advertising.
The BBC began in 1922, just before the corporate press began in America. Its founder was Lord John Reith, who believed that impartiality and objectivity were the essence of professionalism. In the same year the British establishment was under siege. The unions had called a general strike and the Tories were terrified that a revolution was on the way. The new BBC came to their rescue. In high secrecy, Lord Reith wrote anti-union speeches for the Tory Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin and broadcast them to the nation, while refusing to allow the labor leaders to put their side until the strike was over.
So, a pattern was set. Impartiality was a principle certainly: a principle to be suspended whenever the establishment was under threat. And that principle has been upheld ever since.

And see this.

Nothing has changed since:

• The corporate media are acting like virtual "escort services" for the moneyed elites, selling access - for a price - to powerful government officials, instead of actually investigating and reporting on what those officials are doing
  

• The U.S. military is instructing active duty personnel to post pro-government comments on social media websites
  

• Governments are paying civilians to write pro-government comments and to vote up or down stories favorable to their government. And see this
  

• Propaganda agents are using computer scripts on social networking sites to bury messages they don't like
  

• The government is paying off reporters to spread disinformation. Famed Watergate reporter Carl Bernstein says the CIA has already bought and paid for many successful journalists. See also this New York Times piece, this essay by the Independent, this speech by one of the premier writers on journalism, and this and this roundup. Indeed, an expert on propaganda testified under oath during trial that the CIA employs THOUSANDS of reporters and OWNS its own media organizations (the expert has an impressive background)
  

[Ed Jewett]

Saturday, June 20, 2009

The Four Reasons the Mainstream Media Is Worthless



There are four reasons that the mainstream media is worthless.

1. Self-Censorship by Journalists

Initially, there is tremendous self-censorship by journalists.
For example, several months after 9/11, famed news anchor Dan Rather told the BBC that American reporters were practicing "a form of self-censorship":

"there was a time in South Africa that people would put flaming tires around peoples' necks if they dissented. And in some ways the fear is that you will be necklaced here, you will have a flaming tire of lack of patriotism put around your neck. Now it is that fear that keeps journalists from asking the toughest of the tough questions.... And again, I am humbled to say, I do not except myself from this criticism. "What we are talking about here - whether one wants to recognise it or not, or call it by its proper name or not - is a form of self-censorship."

Keith Olbermann agreed that there is self-censorship in the American media, and that:

"You can rock the boat, but you can never say that the entire ocean is in trouble .... You cannot say: By the way, there's something wrong with our .... system".

As former Washington Post columnist Dan Froomkin wrote in 2006:

Mainstream-media political journalism is in danger of becoming increasingly irrelevant, but not because of the Internet, or even Comedy Central. The threat comes from inside. It comes from journalists being afraid to do what journalists were put on this green earth to do. . . .
There’s the intense pressure to maintain access to insider sources, even as those sources become ridiculously unrevealing and oversensitive. There’s the fear of being labeled partisan if one’s bullshit-calling isn’t meted out in precisely equal increments along the political spectrum.
If mainstream-media political journalists don’t start calling bullshit more often, then we do risk losing our primacy — if not to the comedians then to the bloggers.
I still believe that no one is fundamentally more capable of first-rate bullshit-calling than a well-informed beat reporter - whatever their beat. We just need to get the editors, or the corporate culture, or the self-censorship – or whatever it is – out of the way.

And Air Force Colonel and key Pentagon official Karen Kwiatkowski wrote:

I have been told by reporters that they will not report their own insights or contrary evaluations of the official 9/11 story, because to question the government story about 9/11 is to question the very foundations of our entire modern belief system regarding our government, our country, and our way of life. To be charged with questioning these foundations is far more serious than being labeled a disgruntled conspiracy nut or anti-government traitor, or even being sidelined or marginalized within an academic, government service, or literary career. To question the official 9/11 story is simply and fundamentally revolutionary. In this way, of course, questioning the official story is also simply and fundamentally American.

(page 26).

2. Censorship by Higher-Ups

If journalists do want to speak out about an issue, they also are subject to tremendous pressure by their editors or producers to kill the story.

The Pulitzer prize-winning reporter who uncovered the Iraq prison torture scandal and the Mai Lai massacre in Vietnam, Seymour Hersh, said:

"All of the institutions we thought would protect us -- particularly the press, but also the military, the bureaucracy, the Congress -- they have failed. The courts . . . the jury's not in yet on the courts. So all the things that we expect would normally carry us through didn't. The biggest failure, I would argue, is the press, because that's the most glaring....

Q: What can be done to fix the (media) situation?

[Long pause] You'd have to fire or execute ninety percent of the editors and executives. You'd actually have to start promoting people from the newsrooms to be editors who you didn't think you could control. And they're not going to do that."

In fact many journalists are warning that the true story is not being reported. See this announcement and this talk.
And a series of interviews with award-winning journalists also documents censorship of certain stories by media editors and owners (and see these samples).
There are many reasons for censorship by media higher-ups.

One is money.
The media has a strong monetary interest to avoid controversial topics in general. It has always been true that advertisers discourage stories which challenge corporate power. Indeed, a 2003 survey reveals that 35% of reporters and news executives themselves admitted that journalists avoid newsworthy stories if “the story would be embarrassing or damaging to the financial interests of a news organization’s owners or parent company.”

In addition, the government has allowed tremendous consolidation in ownership of the airwaves during the past decade. The large media players stand to gain billions of dollars in profits if the Obama administration continues to allow monopoly ownership of the airwaves by a handful of players. The media giants know who butters their bread. So there is a spoken or tacit agreement: if the media cover the administration in a favorable light, the MSM will continue to be the receiver of the government's goodies.

3. Drumming Up Support for War

In addition, the owners of American media companies have long actively played a part in drumming up support for war.

It is painfully obvious that the large news outlets studiously avoided any real criticism of the government's claims in the run up to the Iraq war. It is painfully obvious that the large American media companies acted as lapdogs and stenographers for the government's war agenda.
Veteran reporter Bill Moyers criticized the corporate media for parroting the obviously false link between 9/11 and Iraq (and the false claims that Iraq possessed WMDs) which the administration made in the run up to the Iraq war, and concluded that the false information was not challenged because:

"the [mainstream] media had been cheerleaders for the White House from the beginning and were simply continuing to rally the public behind the President — no questions asked."

And as NBC News' David Gregory (later promoted to host Meet the Press) said:

"I think there are a lot of critics who think that . . . . if we did not stand up [in the run-up to the war] and say 'this is bogus, and you're a liar, and why are you doing this,' that we didn't do our job. I respectfully disagree. It's not our role"

But this is nothing new. In fact, the large media companies have drummed up support for all previous wars.

For example, Hearst helped drum up support for the Spanish-American War.

And an official summary of America's overthrow of the democratically-elected president of Iran in the 1950's states, "In cooperation with the Department of State, CIA had several articles planted in major American newspapers and magazines which, when reproduced in Iran, had the desired psychological effect in Iran and contributed to the war of nerves against Mossadeq." (page x)

The mainstream media also may have played footsie with the U.S. government right before Pearl Harbor. Specifically, a highly-praised historian (Bob Stineet) argues that the Army’s Chief of Staff informed the Washington bureau chiefs of the major newspapers and magazines of the impending Pearl Harbor attack BEFORE IT OCCURRED, and swore them to an oath of secrecy, which the media honored (page 361) .

And the military-media alliance has continued without a break (as a highly-respected journalist says, "viewers may be taken aback to see the grotesque extent to which US presidents and American news media have jointly shouldered key propaganda chores for war launches during the last five decades.")

As the mainstream British paper, the Independent, writes:

There is a concerted strategy to manipulate global perception. And the mass media are operating as its compliant assistants, failing both to resist it and to expose it. The sheer ease with which this machinery has been able to do its work reflects a creeping structural weakness which now afflicts the production of our news.

The article in the Independent discusses the use of "black propaganda" by the U.S. government, which is then parroted by the media without analysis; for example, the government forged a letter from al Zarqawi to the "inner circle" of al-Qa'ida's leadership, urging them to accept that the best way to beat US forces in Iraq was effectively to start a civil war, which was then publicized without question by the media..

So why has the American press has consistenly served the elites in disseminating their false justifications for war?

One of of the reasons is because the large media companies are owned by those who support the militarist agenda or even directly profit from war and terror (for example, NBC is owned by General Electric, one of the largest defense contractors in the world -- which directly profits from war, terrorism and chaos).
Another seems to be an unspoken rule that the media will not criticize the government's imperial war agenda.
And the media support isn't just for war: it is also for various other shenanigans by the powerful. For example, a BBC documentarysdocuments:

There was "a planned coup in the USA in 1933 by a group of right-wing American businessmen . . . . The coup was aimed at toppling President Franklin D Roosevelt with the help of half-a-million war veterans. The plotters, who were alleged to involve some of the most famous families in America, (owners of Heinz, Birds Eye, Goodtea, Maxwell Hse & George Bush’s Grandfather, Prescott) believed that their country should adopt the policies of Hitler and Mussolini to beat the great depression."

Moreover, "the tycoons told the general who they asked to carry out the coup that the American people would accept the new government because they controlled all the newspapers." See also this book.

Have you ever heard of this scheme before? It was certainly a very large one. And if the conspirators controlled the newspapers then, how much worse is it today with media consolidation?
4. Censorship by the Government

Finally, as if the media's own interest in promoting war is not strong enough, the government has exerted tremendous pressure on the media to report things a certain way. Indeed, at times the government has thrown media owners and reporters in jail if they've been too critical. The media companies have felt great pressure from the government to kill any real questioning of the endless wars.

For example, Dan Rather said, regarding American media, "What you have is a miniature version of what you have in totalitarian states".
Tom Brokaw said "all wars are based on propaganda.
And the head of CNN said:

"there was 'almost a patriotism police' after 9/11 and when the network showed [things critical of the administration's policies] it would get phone calls from advertisers and the administration and "big people in corporations were calling up and saying, 'You're being anti-American here.'"

Indeed, former military analyst and famed Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg said that the government has ordered the media not to cover 9/11:

Ellsberg seemed hardly surprised that today's American mainstream broadcast media has so far failed to take [former FBI translator and 9/11 whistleblower Sibel] Edmonds up on her offer, despite the blockbuster nature of her allegations [which Ellsberg calls "far more explosive than the Pentagon Papers"]. As Edmonds has also alluded, Ellsberg pointed to the New York Times, who "sat on the NSA spying story for over a year" when they "could have put it out before the 2004 election, which might have changed the outcome."
"There will be phone calls going out to the media saying 'don't even think of touching it, you will be prosecuted for violating national security,'" he told us.
* * *
"I am confident that there is conversation inside the Government as to 'How do we deal with Sibel?'" contends Ellsberg. "The first line of defense is to ensure that she doesn't get into the media. I think any outlet that thought of using her materials would go to to the government and they would be told 'don't touch this . . . .'"

Of course, if the stick approach doesn't work, the government can always just pay off reporters to spread disinformation. Indeed, an expert on propaganda testified under oath during trial that the CIA employs THOUSANDS of reporters and OWNS its own media organizations (the expert has an impressive background).

And famed Watergate reporter Carl Bernstein says the CIA has already bought and paid for many successful journalists. See also this New York Times piece, this essay by the Independent, this speech by one of the premier writers on journalism, and this and this roundup.

Indeed, in the final analysis, the main reason today that the media giants will not cover the real stories or question the government's actions or policies in any meaningful way is that we live in a country that is not all that free (see point number 6). Mussolini said that fascism is the blending of the government and corporate interests, and the American government and mainstream media have in fact been blended together to an unprecedented degree.

See this book and the following 5-part interview for further information on 9/11 and the media: (Part 1 • Part 2 • Part 3 • Part 4 • Part 5

Can We Win the Battle Against Censorship?

We cannot just leave governance to our "leaders", as "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance" (Jefferson). Similarly, we cannot leave news to the corporate media. We need to "be the media" ourselves.

"To stand in silence when they should be protesting makes cowards out of men."
- Abraham Lincoln

"Our lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that matter."
- Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

"Powerlessness and silence go together. We...should use our privileged positions not as a shelter from the world's reality, but as a platform from which to speak. A voice is a gift. It should be cherished and used."
– Margaret Atwood

"There is no act too small, no act too bold. The history of social change is the history of millions of actions, small and large, coming together at points in history and creating a power that [nothing] cannot suppress."
- Howard Zinn (historian)

"All tyranny needs to gain a foothold is for people of good conscience to remain silent"
- Thomas Jefferson

[Ed Jewett]

How the US Government Spreads Disinformation Through the Media, via the CIA and FBI

Playlist URL:
http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=...1DC9C0AE84

Transcript: (scroll down to approx. 3/4 down page)
http://www.thekingcenter.org/news/trial/Volume9.html

In this 8-part series Dr. William F. Pepper leads the co-publisher of Covert Action Quarterly, William Schaap, through a history of US Government Approved disinformation, beginning with examples in WWI and then WWII, when things really began to take off. The techniques of disinformation that the government employed during war-time were carried over into peace-time under the aegis of the Cold War. Schaap sites specific examples of CIA and FBI disinformation, concluding with Hoover's FBI attacks on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Part 1
http://youtube.com/watch?v=bbnxsPgcsH0

Part 2
http://youtube.com/watch?v=EcH7vKVM2iE

Part 3
http://youtube.com/watch?v=C4rFXjGJ5os

Part 4
http://youtube.com/watch?v=5oMqyWns1ew

Part 5
http://youtube.com/watch?v=gd8Lqx7mazo

Part 6 (due to tape changes, some footage is lost in this section, please refer to transcript)
http://youtube.com/watch?v=DP6dTsHIlI4

Part 7
http://youtube.com/watch?v=enkxL0qquCE

Part 8
http://youtube.com/watch?v=MPZrjxD4AAo


***

Testimony of Mr. William Schaap,
attorney, military and intelligence specialization,
co-publisher Covert Action Quarterly,
on the role of the U.S. Government in
the assassination of Martin Luther King
MLK Conspiracy Trial Transcript - Volume 9
November 30, 1999

http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/MLKv9Schaap.html

****

http://www.covertaction.org/

[Ed Jewett]

Domestic Propaganda and the News Media Open-Content investigative project managed by blackmax

http://www.historycommons.org/project.jsp?project=military_analysts

is the home page for the Domestic Propaganda and the News Media investigative project, one of several grassroots investigations being hosted on the History Commons website. The data published as part of this investigation has been collected, organized, and published by members of the public who are registered users of this website.

[Ed Jewett]

Draft Policy Would OK Troops’ Tweets

* By Noah Shachtman Email Author
* September 29, 2009 |
* 5:23 pm

The Defense Department may allow troops and military employees to freely access social networks — if a draft policy circulating around the Pentagon gets approved, that is.

For years, the armed services have put in place a series of confusing, overlapping policies for using sites like Twitter and Facebook. But a draft memo, obtained by Nextgov, allows members of the military to use Defense Department networks to get on the social media sites — as well as on “e-mail, instant messaging and discussion forums.”

The new policy “addresses important changes in the way the Department of Defense communicates and shares information on the internet,” writes Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn. “This policy recognizes that emerging internet-based capabilities offer both opportunities and risks that need to be balanced in ways that provide an information advantage for our people and mission partners.”

Over the summer, it looked like access to Web 2.0 sites might be banned altogether in the military. U.S. Strategic Command told the rest of the Defense Department it was considering a near-total block on social media, because the sites have become sieves for Trojans and spam. Not long afterward, the Marine Corps banned Web 2.0 sites from its networks. The moves only added to the military’s Web 2.0 confusion. Months earlier, the Army ordered all U.S. bases to provide access to social media. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff set up a Twitter account, which today has more than 7,000 followers.

That prompted Defense Secretary Robert Gates to order the first Department-wide review of how the American military uses the sites. It’s a review that’s not yet complete, cautions Pentagon social media czar Price Floyd. “No decisions have been made,” he tells Danger Room. “The memo hasn’t gone to the leadership yet.”

But a decision is expected shortly, he added — within a matter of weeks. And if Secretary Gates and the Pentagon’s poobahs approve the draft memo, servicemembers finally be allowed to tweet and blog, with the full backing of the U.S. military.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/dr...-troops-tweets/


###

Pentagon Web 2.0 Strategy Could Give Spies, Geeks New Roles

* By Noah Shachtman Email Author
* September 30, 2009 |
* 10:52 am

Letting troops blog and Tweet is just the start. The Defense Department’s spooks, spinners, geeks, and top generals would all get new roles and responsibilities, if the Pentagon approves a draft policy on how the armed services handle Web 2.0.

The draft memo outlining that policy, first revealed yesterday by Nextgov, is designed to end years of confusion over the military’s interactions of social media. It hasn’t been okayed by the Pentagon’s leadership. But if it does, the new guidelines would allow servicemembers to use the Defense Department’s unclassified networks to hop on everything from “social networking sites” to “image and video hosting websites” to “Wikis” to “personal, corporate or subject-specific blogs” to “data mashups.” (That’s right: “mashups” are now being discussed at the Defense Department’s highest levels.)

According to the memo, troops can Facebook or YouTube or Flickr all they want — it doesn’t have to be work-related. The servicemembers just can’t claim to be officially representing the military or “have an online presence that could be viewed as representing the Department of Defense (e.g., may not use official title, military rank, military identifiers (i.e., e-mail address), or post imagery with their military uniform).” Of course, the servicememebers would also have to comply with pre-existing regulations “regarding responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities,” too.

Some in the military have called for banning or severely restricting the Web 2.0 sites, because of their potential to leak secrets or spread Trojans. It’d be up to the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence “develop and maintain threat estimates” from these “current and emerging Internet-based capabilities,” the memo states. The Pentagon’s top spook would also be responsible for making sure operational security “education, training and awareness activities” would also include blogs and the like.

The heads of the military’s various “components” — from the Secretary of the Army to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness — would get some extra work, as well. They’d have to put up “Computer Network Defense mechanisms that provide adequate security to access Internet-based capabilities” from the military’s networks.

The Defense Department’s public affairs chiefs would oversee policies for official social media sites. While the military’s Chief Information Officers would put together policies for Web 2.0’s “use, risk management and compliance oversight,” and be on the lookout for “emerging Internet-based capabilities in order to identify opportunities for use and assess risks.”

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/pe...eeks-new-roles/

UPDATE: Here’s the memo itself:


MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) - Responsible and Effective Use of Internet-based Capabilities

References. See Attachment 1

Purpose. This memorandum establishes Departmental policy on the responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities, including publicly accessible social networking services, which are not owned, operated, or controlled by the DoD. The policy addresses important changes in the way the Department of Defense communicates and shares information on the Internet. This policy recognizes that emerging Internet-based capabilities offer both opportunities and risks that need to be balanced in ways that provide an information advantage for our people and mission partners. It does not change DoD policy concerning operation and security of the DoD Information Enterprise, including the Global Information Grid (GIG), nor does it change the current procedures under which public affairs offices release information to the media or general public. This DTM is effective immediately and will be converted to a new DoD issuance or incorporated into an existing DoD issuance within 180 days.

Applicability. This DTM applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components") and authorized users of the Non Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).

Definitions. These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this DTM.

External Official Presence. Representation on the Internet external to the DoD, e.g., outside of the .MIL domain, by DoD organizations in an official public affairs capacity.

Internet-based capabilities. The full-range of publicly accessible information services resident on the Internet external to the DoD, e.g., outside of the .MIL domains, including Web 2.0 tools such as social networking services, social media, user generated content sites, social software, as well as email, instant messaging, and discussion forums. This does not include DoD-owned, DoD-operated, or DoD-controlled capabilities.

Policy. It is DoD policy that:

The Department of Defense shall permit and encourage official use of Internet-based capabilities to leverage their potential while managing risk to build an information advantage for DoD personnel and mission partners.

The establishment of External Official Presences by DoD organizations is permitted with the approval of the appropriate DoD Component Head. Approval signifies that the DoD Component Head concurs with the intended use and has determined that the Internet-based capability has an acceptable level of risk.

External Official Presences are considered public affairs activities. As such, they shall comply with Reference (a) and clearly identify that their content is provided by the Department of Defense. The DoD shall maintain a publicly accessible Internet repository of External Official Presences.

Business transformation, professional networking, education, and other official uses of Internet-based capabilities unrelated to public affairs are permitted. However, because these interactions take place in a public venue, personnel acting in their official capacity shall maintain liaison with public affairs staff to ensure organizational awareness.

Personal, unofficial use of Internet-based capabilities by DoD employees from the NIPRNET is permitted, but users shall not claim representation of the Department or its policies, or those of the U.S. government.

All use of Internet-based capabilities from the NIPRNET shall comply with all applicable policy regarding the sharing and safeguarding of information including Information Assurance (References (B) and ©), Personally Identifiable Information (Reference (d)), Public Release of Information (Reference (e)), and operations security (Reference (f)); and shall comply with the Joint Ethics Regulations (Reference (g)).

The NIPRNET shall be configured to enable access to Internet-based capabilities.

Internet-based capabilities shall not be used to transact business that generates records subject to records management policy (reference (h)) unless applicable records management requirements can be met.

All use of Internet-based capabilities shall comply with the basic guidelines set forth in Attachment 2.

Responsibilities. See Attachment 3
Releasability. UNLIMITED. This DTM is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.

Attachments:
As state


ATTACHMENT 1

REFERENCES


(a) DoD Instruction 5400.13, "Public Affairs (PA) Operations," October 15, 2008
(B) DoD Directive 8500.1, "Information Assurance (IA), " October 24, 2002
© DoD Instruction 8500.2, "Information Assurance (IA) Implementation," February 6, 2003
(d) DoD Directive 5400.11, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 8, 2007
(e) DoD Directive 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release, " August 22, 2008
(f) DoD Manual 5205.02-M, "DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual," November 3, 2008
(g) DoD Regulation 5500.7-R, "Joint Ethics Regulation," August 30, 1993 (updated March 23, 2006)
(h) DoD Directive 5015.2, "DoD Records Management Program," March 6, 2000
(i) DoD Instruction O-8530.2, "Support to Computer Network Defense (CND)," March 9, 2001

ATTACHMENT 2
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR USE OF INTERNET-BASED CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. GENERAL. This attachment applies to the use of Internet-based capabilities by DoD employees for official and personal purposes. Examples include, but are not limited to:

a. Social networking sites
b. Image and video hosting websites
c. Wikis
d. Personal, corporate or subject-specific blogs
e. Data mashups that combine similar types of media and information from multiple sources into a single representation (i.e., a web page).
f. Similar collaborative, information sharing-driven Internet-based capabilities where users are encouraged to add/generate content.

2. EXTERNAL OFFICIAL PRESENCES. External Official Presences established pursuant to this DTM shall:

a. Receive approval from the responsible DoD Component head. Approval signifies that the Component head concurs with the planned use and has determined that the Internet-based capability has an acceptable level of risk.

b. Register on an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) -managed External Official Presences list.

c. Comply with references (B) through (g).
d. Use official branding in accordance with ASD(PA) guidance.
e. Clearly indicate role and scope of the External Official Presence.
f. Provide links to the organization's official public .Mil website.
g. Actively monitor for fraudulent or objectionable use.

3. OFFICIAL USE. DoD employees officially using Internet-based capabilities that are not part of a public affairs activity may discuss their relationship to the Department of Defense and their duties but shall:

a. Comply with references (B) through (g).
b. Ensure that the information posted is relevant, accurate, and professionally portrayed.
c. Provide links to official DoD content hosted on DoD-owned, operated, or controlled sites.
d. Include a disclaimer when personal opinions are expressed. (e.g., "This statement is my own and does not constitute an endorsement or opinion of the Department of Defense").
e. Comply with applicable DoD Component policies regarding responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.


4. UNOFFICIAL USE. When acting in a personal or unofficial capacity, individuals shall:

a. Not claim representation of the Department or its policies.
b. Comply with references (B) through (g).
c Not have an online presence that could be viewed as representing the Department of Defense (e.g., may not use official title, military rank, military identifiers (i.e., e-mail address), or post imagery with their military uniform).
d. Comply with applicable DoD Component policies regarding responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.

ATTACHMENT 3

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I) shall:

a. Develop procedures and guidelines to be implemented by the DoD Components for OPSEC reviews of DoD information shared via Internet-based capabilities
b. Develop and maintain threat estimates on current and emerging Internet-based capabilities.
c. Integrate guidance regarding the proper use of Internet-based capabilities into existing OPSEC education, training and awareness activities.

2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION/ DoD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER. The ASD(NII)/DoD CIO shall:

a. Establish and maintain policy and procedures regarding Internet-based capabilities use, risk management and compliance oversight.
b. Integrate guidance regarding the proper use of Internet-based capabilities with existing IA education, training and awareness activities.
c. Establish mechanisms to monitor emerging Internet-based capabilities in order to identify opportunities for use and assess risks.

3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ASD(PA)). The ASD(PA) shall:

a. Extend the existing website registry to include registration of External Official Presences.
b. Provide policy for news, information, photographs, editorial, and other materials distributed via External Official Presences.

4. HEADS OF DOD COMPONENTS. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

a. Approve the establishment of External Official Presences.
b. Ensure the implementation, validation and maintenance of applicable IA controls and OPSEC measures.
c. Ensure Computer Network Defense mechanisms that provide adequate security to access Internet-based capabilities from the NIPRNET are in place, effective, and compliant with reference (i).
d. Educate, train and promote awareness for the responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.

5. DoD COMPONENT CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICERS (CIOs). The DoD Component CIOs shall:

a. Advise the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO and ensure that the policies and guidance issued by ASD(NII)/DoD CIO are implemented. Provide Component-specific implementation guidance on responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities.
b. Provide advice, guidance and other assistance to the Component Head and other Component senior management personnel to ensure that Internet-based capabilities are used responsibly and effectively.
c. Assist the Component Head to ensure effective implementation of Computer Network Defense mechanisms as well as the proper use of Internet-based capabilities with existing IA education, training and awareness activities.
d. Establish risk assessment procedures to evaluate and monitor emerging Internet-based capabilities in order to identify opportunities for use and assess risks.

http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerro..._draft_memo.txt

###

After Leaflet Drop Kills Afghan Girl, a Search for Safer Psyop Tech. Missiles, Anyone?

* By David Hambling Email Author
* September 30, 2009 |
* 12:01 pm

The Royal Air Force has accidentally killed a young girl in Afghanistan — by dropping a box of leaflets on her. The British Ministry of Defence is carrying out a full investigation. Meanwhile, the seemingly antiquated practice of leaflet bombing continues. In the 21st century, it remains one of the primary tools of psychological warfare; U.S. Special Operations Command is even looking to build leaflet-carrying missiles. And while top American commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal has virtually banned “kinetic” air strikes, paper bombs are in regular use.

According to the BBC, the leaflet box was supposed to open in mid-air, spreading pro-coalition propaganda over rural Helmand province. But the container failed to break apart, landing on top of the girl, who died later in the hospital.

Leaflets have been used by militaries since at least the Napoleonic wars, when the British navy dropped them over France using kites. And they continue to be employed, because leaflets have some advantages over other media. Radio and TV are fine if the audience happen to be tuned in at the time, but printed matter is durable. As the U.S. Army’s Psychological Operations Field Manual explains, a printed leaflet has the advantage that it can be passed from person to person without the message being altered. It can convey a complex message which can be reinforced with pictures if the recipient is illiterate. And a leaflet can be hidden and read in private, and shared around with others.

Delivery methods have ranged from artillery and mortar shells to loose airdrop by hand to “leaflet landmines.” The M129E1/E2 Psychological Operations Leaflet Bomb weighs 200 pounds and can disperse some 60,000 to 80,000 leaflets which are scattered by a length of detonator cord.

However, U.S. Special Operations Command is looking for a wider range of options, and their current R&D budget calls for a “Next Generation Leaflet Delivery System,” which will:

…provide forces a family of systems consisting of unmanned air vehicles, drones,
missiles, and leaflet boxes that safely and accurately disseminate variable size and weight paper and electronic leaflets to large area targets, at short (10-750 miles) and long (>750 miles) ranges. These systems can be utilized in peacetime and all threat environments across the spectrum of conflict, and are compatible with current and future U.S. aircraft.

The fact that the commandos are seriously developing missiles to deliver leaflets shows the importance given to this mission. Hopefully, improved safety measures will mean less chance of tragic accidents.But the technology does not stop there. In addition to digital broadcast capability and advanced loudspeakers, new psychological operations tech also includes development of appropriate emerging technologies including “remote controlled electronic paper.”

This sounds a lot like the video advertising inserts being pioneered by Entertainment Weekly, which includes a wafer-thin screen which plays up to 40 minutes of video. (See “video in print” in action here, featuring Tony Stark, appropriately enough.) It’s like an evolution of the musical greeting cards, with added video. But the difference with the Special Operations version is that it is remote-controlled, so presumably new messages or video can be sent as required. The applications for such a device would be endless, and as a shiny gadget it would have a much greater chance of being picked up, retained and shown around — if it can be made cheap enough to distribute in significant quantities.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/le...issiles-anyone/

[Ed Jewett]

Pentagon used psychological operation on US public, documents show

By Brad Jacobson
Wednesday, October 21st, 2009 -- 10:12 am

Figure in Bush propaganda operation remains Pentagon spokesman

In Part I of this series, Raw Story revealed that Bryan Whitman, the current deputy assistant secretary of defense for media operations, was an active senior participant in a Bush administration covert Pentagon program that used retired military analysts to generate positive wartime news coverage.

A months-long review of documents and interviews with Pentagon personnel has revealed that the Bush Administration's military analyst program -- aimed at selling the Iraq war to the American people -- operated through a secretive collaboration between the Defense Department's press and community relations offices.

Raw Story has also uncovered evidence that directly ties the activities undertaken in the military analyst program to an official US military document’s definition of psychological operations -- propaganda that is only supposed to be directed toward foreign audiences.

The investigation of Pentagon documents and interviews with Defense Department officials and experts in public relations found that the decision to fold the military analyst program into community relations and portray it as “outreach” served to obscure the intent of the project as well as that office’s partnership with the press office. It also helped shield its senior supervisor, Bryan Whitman, assistant secretary of defense for media operations, whose role was unknown when the original story of the analyst program broke.
Story continues below...

In a nearly hour-long phone interview, Whitman asserted that since the program was not run from his office, he was neither involved nor culpable. Exposure of the collaboration between the Pentagon press and community relations offices on this program, however, as well as an effort to characterize it as a mere community outreach project, belie Whitman’s claim that he bears no responsibility for the program’s activities.

rsilogo Pentagon used psychological operation on US public, documents showThese new revelations come in addition to the evidence of Whitman’s active and extensive participation in the program, as Raw Story documented in part one of this series. Whitman remains a spokesman for the Pentagon today.

Whitman said he stood by an earlier statement in which he averred “the intent and purpose of the [program] is nothing other than an earnest attempt to inform the American public.”

In the interview, Whitman sought to portray his role as peripheral, noting that his position naturally demands he speak on a number of subjects in which he isn’t necessarily directly involved.

The record, however, suggests otherwise.

In a January 2005 memorandum to active members of both offices from then-Pentagon press office director, Navy Captain Roxie Merritt, who now leads the community relations office, emphasized the necessary “synergy of outreach shop and media ops working together” on the military analyst program. [p. 18-19]

Merritt recommended that both the press and community relations offices develop a “hot list” of analysts who could dependably “carry our water” and provide them with ultra-exclusive access that would compel the networks to “weed out the less reliably friendly analysts” on their own.

“Media ops and outreach can work on a plan to maximize use of the analysts and figure out a system by which we keep our most reliably friendly analysts plugged in on everything from crisis response to future plans,” Merritt remarked. “As evidenced by this analyst trip to Iraq, the synergy of outreach shop and media ops working together on these types of projects is enormous and effective. Will continue to examine ways to improve processes.”

In response, Lawrence Di Rita, then Pentagon public affairs chief, agreed. He told Merritt and both offices in an email, “I guess I thought we already were doing a lot of this.”

Several names on the memo are redacted. Those who are visible read like a who’s who of the Pentagon press and community relations offices: Whitman, Merritt, her deputy press office director Gary Keck (both of whom reported directly to Whitman) and two Bush political appointees, Dallas Lawrence and Allison Barber, then respectively director and head of community relations.

Merritt became director of the office, and its de facto chief until the appointment of a new deputy assistant secretary of defense, after the departures of Barber and Lawrence, the ostensible leaders of the military analyst program. She remains at the Defense Department today.

When reached through email, Merritt attempted to explain the function of her office's outreach program and what distinguishes it from press office activities.

“Essentially,” Merritt summarized, “we provide another avenue of communications for citizens and organizations wanting to communicate directly with DoD.”

Asked to clarify, she said that outreach’s purpose is to educate the public in a one-to-one manner about the Defense Department and military’s structure, history and operations. She also noted her office "does not handle [the] news media unless they have a specific question about one of our programs."

Merritt eventually admitted that it is not a function of the outreach program to provide either information or talking points to individuals or a group of individuals -- such as the retired military analysts -- with the intention that those recipients use them to directly engage with traditional news media and influence news coverage.

Asked directly if her office provides talking points for this purpose, she replied, “No. The talking points are developed for use by DoD personnel.”

Experts in public relations and propaganda say Raw Story's findings reveal the program itself was "unwise" and "inherently deceptive." One expressed surprise that one of the program's senior figures was still speaking for the Pentagon.

“Running the military analyst program from a community relations office is both surprising and unwise,” said Nicholas Cull, a professor of public diplomacy at USC’s Annenberg School and an expert on propaganda. “It is surprising because this is not what that office should be doing [and] unwise because the element of subterfuge is always a lightening rod for public criticism.”

Diane Farsetta, a senior researcher at the Center for Media and Democracy, which monitors publics relations and media manipulation, said calling the program “outreach” was “very calculatedly misleading” and another example of how the project was “inherently deceptive.”

“This has been their talking point in general on the Pentagon pundit program,” Farsetta explained. “You know, ‘We’re all just making sure that we’re sharing information.’”

Farsetta also said that it’s “pretty stunning” that no one, including Whitman, has been willing to take any responsibility for the program and that the Pentagon Inspector General’s office and Congress have yet to hold anyone accountable.

“It’s hard to think of a more blatant example of propaganda than this program,” Farsetta said.

Cull said the revelations are “just one more indication that the entire apparatus of the US government’s strategic communications -- civilian and military, at home and abroad -- is in dire need of review and repair.”

A PSYOPS Program Directed at American Public

When the military analyst program was first revealed by The New York Times in 2008, retired US Army Col. Ken Allard described it as “PSYOPS on steroids.”

It turns out this was far from a casual reference. Raw Story has discovered new evidence that directly exposes this stealth media project and the activities of its participants as matching the US government’s own definition of psychological operations, or PSYOPS.

The US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command fact sheet, which states that PSYOPS should be directed “to foreign audiences” only, includes the following description:

“Used during peacetime, contingencies and declared war, these activities are not forms of force, but are force multipliers that use nonviolent means in often violent environments.”

Pentagon public affairs officials referred to the military analysts as “message force multipliers” in documented communications.

A prime example is a May 2006 memorandum from then community relations chief Allison Barber in which she proposes sending the military analysts on another trip to Iraq:

“Based on past trips, I would suggest limiting the group to 10 analysts, those with the greatest ability to serve as message force multipliers.”

Nicholas Cull, who also directs the public diplomacy master’s program at USC and has written extensively on propaganda and media history, found the Pentagon public affairs officials’ use of such terms both incriminating and reckless.

“[Their] use of psyop terminology is an ‘own goal,’” Cull explained in an email, “as it speaks directly to the American public’s underlying fear of being brainwashed by its own government.”

This new evidence provides further perspective on an incident cited by the Times.

Pentagon records show that the day after 14 marines died in Iraq on August 3, 2005, James T. Conway, then director of operations for the Joint Chiefs, instructed military analysts during a briefing to work to prevent the incident from weakening public support for the war. Conway reminded the military analysts assembled, “The strategic target remains our population.” [p. 102]

Same Strategy, Different Program

Bryan Whitman was also involved in a different Pentagon public affairs project during the lead-up to the war in Iraq: embedding reporters.

The embed and military analyst programs shared the same underlying strategy of “information dominance,” the same objective of selling Bush administration war policies by generating favorable news coverage and were directed at the same target -- the American public.

Torie Clarke, the first Pentagon public affairs chief, is often credited for conceiving both programs. But Clarke and Whitman have openly acknowledged his deep involvement in the embed project.

Clarke declined to be interviewed for this article.

Whitman said he was “heavily involved in the process” of the embed program's development, implementation and supervision.

Before embedding, reporters and media organizations were forced to sign a contract whose ground rules included allowing military officials to review articles for release, traveling with military personnel escorts at all times or remaining in designated areas, only conducting on-the-record interviews, and agreeing that the government may terminate the contract “at any time and for any reason.”

In May 2002, with planning for a possible invasion of Iraq already in progress, Clarke appointed Whitman to head all Pentagon media operations. Prior to that, he had served since 1995 in the Pentagon press office, both as deputy director for press operations and as a public affairs specialist.

The timing of Whitman’s appointment coincided with the development stages of the embed and military analyst programs. He was the ideal candidate for both projects.

Whitman had a military background, having served in combat as a Special Forces commander and as an Army public affairs officer with years of experience in messaging from the Pentagon. He also had experience in briefing and prepping civilian and military personnel.

Whitman's background provided him with a facility and familiarity in navigating military and civilian channels. With these tools in hand, he was able to create dialogue between the two and expedite action in a sprawling and sometimes contentious bureaucracy.

Buried in an obscure April 2008 online New York Times Q&A with readers, reporter David Barstow disclosed:

“As Lawrence Di Rita, a former senior Pentagon official told me, they viewed [the military analyst program] as the ‘mirror image’ of the Pentagon program for embedding reporters with units in the field. In this case, the military analysts were in effect ‘embedded’ with the senior leadership through a steady mix of private briefings, trips and talking points.”

Di Rita denied the conversation had occurred in a telephone interview.

“I don’t doubt that’s what he heard, but that’s not what I said,” Di Rita asserted.

Whitman said he'd never heard Di Rita make any such comparison between the programs.

Barstow, however, said he stood behind the veracity of the quote and the conversation he attributed to Di Rita.

Di Rita, who succeeded Clarke, also declined to answer any questions related to Whitman’s involvement in the military analyst program, including whether he had been involved in its creation.

Clarke and Whitman have both discussed information dominance and its role in the embed program.

In her 2006 book Lipstick on a Pig, Clarke revealed that “most importantly, embedding was a military strategy in addition to a public affairs one” (p. 62) and that the program’s strategy was “simple: information dominance” (p. 187). To achieve it, she explained, there was a need to circumvent the traditional news media “filter” where journalists act as “intermediaries.”

The goal, just as with the military analyst program, was not to spin a story but to control the narrative altogether.

At the 2003 Military-Media conference in Chicago, Whitman told the audience, “We wanted to take the offensive to achieve information dominance” because “information was going to play a major role in combat operations.” [pdf link p. 2] One of the other program’s objectives, he said, was “to build and maintain support for U.S. policy.” [pdf link, p. 16 – quote sourced in 2005 recap of 2003 mil-media conference]

At the March 2004 “Media at War” conference at UC Berkeley, Lt. Col. Rick Long, former head of media relations for the US Marine Corps, offered a candid view of the Pentagon’s engagement in “information warfare” during the Bush administration.

“Our job is to win, quite frankly,” said Long. “The reason why we wanted to embed so many media was we wanted to dominate the information environment. We wanted to beat any kind of propaganda or disinformation at its own game.”

“Overall,” he told the audience, “we’re happy with the outcome.”

The Appearance of Transparency

On a national radio program just before the invasion of Iraq, Whitman claimed that embedded reporters would have a firsthand perspective of “the good, the bad and the ugly.”

But veteran foreign correspondent Reese Erlich told Raw Story that the embed program was “a stroke of genius by the Bush administration” because it gave the appearance of transparency while “in reality, they were manipulating the news.”

In a phone interview, Erlich, who is currently covering the war in Afghanistan as a “unilateral” (which allows reporters to move around more freely without the restrictions of embed guidelines), also pointed out the psychological and practical influence the program has on reporters.

“You’re traveling with a particular group of soldiers,” he explained. “Your life literally depends on them. And you see only the firefights or slog that they’re involved in. So you’re not going to get anything close to balanced reporting.”

At the August 2003 Military-Media conference in Chicago, Jonathan Landay, who covered the initial stages of the war for Knight Ridder Newspapers, said that being a unilateral “gave me the flexibility to do my job.” [pdf link p. 2]

He added, “Donald Rumsfeld told the American people that what happened in northern Iraq after [the invasion] was a little ‘untidiness.’ What I saw, and what I reported, was a tsunami of murder, looting, arson and ethnic cleansing.”

Paul Workman, a journalist with over thirty years at CBC News, including foreign correspondent reporting on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, wrote of the program in April 2003, “It is a brilliant, persuasive conspiracy to control the images and the messages coming out of the battlefield and they've succeeded colossally.”

Erlich said he thought most mainstream US reporters have been unwilling to candidly discuss the program because they “weren’t interested in losing their jobs by revealing what they really thought about the embed process.”

Now embedded with troops in Afghanistan for McClatchy, Landay told Raw Story it’s not that reporters shouldn’t be embedded with troops at all, but that it should be only one facet of every news outlet’s war coverage.

Embedding, he said, offers a “soda-straw view of events.” This isn't necessarily negative “as long as a news outlet has a number of embeds and unilaterals whose pictures can be combined” with civilian perspectives available from international TV outlets such as Reuters TV, AP TV, and al Jazeera, he said.

Landay placed more blame on US network news outlets than on the embed program itself for failing to show a more balanced and accurate picture.

But when asked if the Pentagon and the designers of the embed program counted as part of their embedding strategy on the dismal track record of US network news outlets when it came to including international TV footage from civilian perspectives, he replied, “I will not second guess the Pentagon’s motives.”

Brad Jacobson is a contributing investigative reporter for Raw Story. Additional research was provided by Ron Brynaert.

Many embedded links at original (now dead):

http://rawstory.com/2009/10/bryan-whitman-2/