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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000924

NOFORN

SIPDIS



DEPT FOR NEA/MAG



E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, LY

SUBJECT: LIBYAN SUCCESSION: QADHAFI ORCHESTRATING THE BOYS´ HIGH WIRE

ACT?



REF: A) TRIPOLI 883; B) TRIPOLI 685; C) TRIPOLI 212; D) 08 TRIPOLI 699; E) TRIP

OLI 487; F) 08 TRIPOLI 870; G) STATE 43049; H) TRIPOLI 661; I) TRIPOLI 208; J)



TRIPOLI 899



CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,

Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: Muammar al-Qadhafi´s recent appointment of

his son Saif al-Islam as "General Coordinator" and attendant

indications of a succession plan have stirred up old rumors of

rivalry between seeming frontrunners for the throne, Saif

al-Islam and his brother, National Security Advisor, Mutassim

al-Qadhafi. Saif al-Islam´s return from a 12-month self-imposed

absence from Libyan politics and his recent new appointment

clearly indicate that his star is on the rise in the

constellation of Libyan succession contenders. Qadhafi pere was

reportedly disappointed in Mutassim´s management of September 1

Revolution Day anniversary events and his late September travel

to UNGA. Nevertheless, Mutassim´s continued engagement on the

U.S. file and continuing efforts to coordinate a meeting

between his father and POTUS -- demonstrate that he may see this

portfolio as his ticket to continue playing in the succession

game (Ref A). Contacts assert that Saif al-Islam may be the

"face of reform," due to his high-profile, public status, and

the current favorite to succeed his father, but that Mutassim

should not be counted out of the succession game, particularly

given his backing by conservatives in the regime, such as

PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, and his rumored ability

as National Security Advisor to access significant military and

security elements, including brother Khamis´s elite 32nd Brigade

force. End Summary.



SAIF´S RETURN FROM THE COLD



2. (S/NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi´s October 6 speech to Revolutionary

Committee members in Sebha marked the peak of a remarkably

resurgent six weeks for Saif al-Islam, which began with the

latter´s high-profile return to Libya on August 20 with

convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi (Ref B).

Saif has also recently begun to re-engage international media,

with profiles in two CNN feature reports on his efforts to

"rehabilitate" former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members

(septel). He has also been involved in attempting to settle the

ongoing contretemps between the GOL and Canada (septel). Saif´s

reentry onto the public scene signaled the end of his August

2008 self-announced retreat from politics, and comes after some

significant setbacks for him over the past year at the hands of

regime conservatives. In March, the draft constitution (a

Saif-initiative that was to include a position for him as head

of a 100-member council of deputies) was dropped from the agenda

of the annual General People´s Congress (Ref C). During the

same meeting, the Congress installed or kept ministers

historically opposed to Saif´s reform agenda, such as

PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (who kept his position

after Muammar al-Qadhafi publicly called him a corrupt thief

just six months earlier) (Ref D). Late April witnessed the

sudden nationalization of Saif´s quasi-independent media

company, which included the take over of his al-Libia satellite

channel mid-broadcast by the state-run Jamahiriya News Agency

(Ref E) on reported grounds that Saif was overreaching in

expanding media freedom.



3. (S/NF) Saif´s slide was juxtaposed with younger brother

Mutassim´s rise, with the latter completing a state visit to

Russia in October 2008 (Ref F), meeting the Secretary of State

in Washington in March 2009 (Ref G), accompanying Qadhafi on the

historic visit to Italy in June, welcoming CODEL McCain in

August (Ref H) , and accompanying his father to New York for the

UN General Assembly. Mutassim was very visible at his father´s

side throughout these high level visits. Additionally,

Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi´s ability to maintain the PM-equivalent

position proved to be positive for Mutassim, who is reportedly

close to the conservative PM and, in the past, has orchestrated

reactions against Saif´s interests through the PM´s office (Ref

I). Regime insiders also tell us that Mutassim remains the only

one who can actually challenge his father.



WHAT SAIF´S RETURN MEANS FOR MUTASSIM



4. (S/NF) As Saif´s star rises again, local observers are

turning their eyes toward Mutassim for a reaction. Mutassim has

time and time again evinced his aversion to the spotlight via

media encounters or public events. Evidence of the elder

Qadhafi´s disappointment in Mutassim´s management of September 1

Revolution Day anniversary events, as well as specific missteps

in New York (i.e., Mutassim´s inability to get necessary

permissions for a tent to be pitched for the Libyan leader) have

surfaced (Ref A). Saif is rumored to have trumped Mutassim

during a recent order for all expatriate residents of the

National Oil Company housing compound to vacate their houses.

The residents report that while Mutassim originally gave the



TRIPOLI 00000924 002 OF 002



order for everyone to move immediately, Saif intervened to block

the demand in order to give the occupants more time to pack up

and move. [Note: The reason for the demolition of the housing

compound is rumored to be to clear a way for Aisha al-Qadhafi

(known to have disagreements with Saif) to build a home adjacent

to a park near the location. End note.]



5. (S/NF) Simultaneous with Saif´s apparent ascendancy, Mutassim

has moved in an uncharacteristically quick manner to reengage on

the U.S. file. On November 8, he approved the 505 agreement,

which had previously languished in his office for nearly six

months (Ref J). A few days before, on November 5, he personally

engaged the Ambassador on the treatment of Libyan ships at U.S.

ports and Libyan diplomtas by U.S. border authorities.

Additionally, Mutassim renewed his desire to coordinate a

meeting between the Libyan leader and POTUS (Ref A). According

to the Egyptian Embassy here, Mutassim was also expected to meet

Egypt´s Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman during a November visit

to Tripoli (septel), and his staff advised us that he will meet

the Turkish PM during the latter´s historic upcoming visit.



THE SUCCESSION QUESTION - WILL IT BE SAIF OR MUTASSIM?



6. (S/NF) Contacts suggest that although Mutassim is not as

skilled in public relations as his older brother Saif, he wields

significant power from behind the scenes. As National Security

Advisor (NSA), Mutassim directs at least some of Libya´s

national security policy decisions, including purchases of

equipment, and he reportedly plays on issues regarding the

military purse. Contacts also report that younger brother

Khamis al-Qadhafi, Commander of the 32nd "Khamis" Brigade

(widely known to be the most well-trained and well-equipped

force in the Libyan military), is closer to Mutassim than to

Saif. [Note: At least one contact has commented that Khamis

could come out as a dark horse in the succession race. End

note.] Mutassim´s role as NSA and his reported closeness to

Khamis would give Mutassim access to some of the most important

military and security elements of the regime. Nevertheless, the

ultimate authority over the regime´s security apparatus remains

in question. Independent website Libya al-Youm reported

November 4 that the Minister-equivalent of Defense, Major

General Abu Baker Younis Jaber, recently called on his officers

to swear allegiance to Saif in his new post, making it unclear

whether the military establishment will report to Mutassim or

Saif -- or both -- in the future. [Note: Muammar al-Qadhafi

reportedly mediated a conflict between Mutassim and Younis Jaber

earlier this year involving their respective roles in military

procurement. (Ref I). End Note.]



COMMENT



7. (S/NF) As Libya undergoes this latest round of Qadhafi´s

political restructuring, without a constitution or clarified

succession plan, burgeoning sibling rivalry among Qadhafi´s

progeny is near inevitable. Qadhafi has placed his sons

(daughter Aisha is considered by some shrewder and smarter than

her brothers but does not seem to be playing a visible role in

the succession struggle) on a succession high wire act,

perpetually thrown off balance, in what might be a calculated

effort by the aging leader to prevent any one of them from

authoritatively gaining the prize. It is also difficult to

precisely gauge Mutassim´s depth of ambition for the leadership

role since those around him do not freely engage on the topic.

The rivalry is likely to play out publicly over the next few

months in a continued realignment of political and business

interests, as reformists ("Saif backers") and conservatives

("Mutassim backers") continue to vie for the elder Qadhafi´s

attention. Mutassim appears to believe that progress in the

U.S. relationship could prove key to keeping him in the game if

he does indeed aspire to play a crucial role in the post-Leader

era. Whichever of the Qadhafi children wins the "prize," there

is a high level of anxiety among our Libyan contacts, given the

potential for chaos in the absence of the traditionally "guiding

hand" of the Leader and given the absence of viable state

institutions to insure stability. They see a best possible

outcome as a division of the spoils, with Saif handling the

domestic side of the house and Mutassim handling the security

and possible foreign relations part. A second possibility is a

"trinity," whereby Saif would be the political face of the

regime, Mutassim the national security face, and Khamis the

military/security face. End Comm.

CRETZ