Breaking News: Confirmed Identity of the CIA Official behind 9/11 Rendition & Torture Cases Revealed

[Magda Hassan]

Alfreda Frances Bikowsky: The Current Director of the CIA Global Jihad Unit

Boiling Frogs Post has now confirmed the identity of the CIA analyst at the heart of a notorious failure in the run-up to the September 11th tragedy. Her name is Alfreda Frances Bikowsky and she is the current director of the CIA Jihad Unit. Through three credible sources and documents we have confirmed Ms. Bikowsky's former titles and positions, including her start at the CIA as an analyst for the Soviet Desk, her position as one of the case officers at the CIA's Bin Laden Unit-Alec Station, her central role and direct participation in the CIA's rendition-torture and black sites operations, and her current position as director of the CIA's Global Jihad Unit.The producers Nowosielski and Duffy have now made both names available at their website. They also identify the second CIA culprit as Michael Anne Casey. We have not been able to obtain confirmation by other sources on this person yet, but we are still working on it.Alfreda Frances Bikowsky is the person described in New Yorker journalist Jane Mayer's book The Dark Side as having flown in to watch the waterboarding of terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammad without being assigned to do so. "Its not supposed to be entertainment," superiors were said to have told her. She was also at the center of "the el-Masri incident," in which an innocent German citizen was kidnapped by the CIA in 2003 and held under terrible conditions without charges for five months in a secret Afghan prison. The AP characterized it as "one of the biggest diplomatic embarrassments of the U.S. war on terrorism."Both the previous and current administrations appear to have deemed Alfreda Frances Bikowsky's direct involvement in intentional obstruction of justice, intentional cover up, lying to Congress, and overseeing rendition-kidnapping-torture practices as qualifying factors to have kept promoting her. She now leads the CIA's Global Jihad Unit and is a close advisor to the President.# # # # *For more background check out the following links:Boiling Frogs Breaking News: CIA Goes After Producers Nowosielski & DuffyThe Still Developing Story of the Recently Issued CIA Threats to Producers Nowosielski & DuffyPodcast: The Boiling Frogs Presents Ray Nowosielski & John Duffy
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[Magda Hassan]

Profile: 'Frances'
Related Entities:
Employee of Central Intelligence Agency
Employee of Alec Station
Employee of Counterterrorist Center
Possibly the same as 'Michael'
Acquaintance of George W. Bush
Acquaintance of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
'Frances' was a participant or observer in the following events:
After March 7, 2003: CIA Officer Takes Sightseeing Trip to See KSM Waterboarded
A CIA officer takes an unauthorized trip to see alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) being waterboarded in Poland (see After March 7, 2003). The officer's name is not known, but she will be described by author Jane Mayer as a redhead who will be involved in the wrongful rendition of German citizen Khalid el-Masri in early 2004 (see Before January 23, 2004). Based on information from "two well-informed agency sources," Mayer will write that the officer is "so excited" by KSM's capture that she flies "at government expense to the black site where Mohammed was held so that she could personally watch him being waterboarded." However, according to Mayer, she is not an interrogator and has "no legitimate reason to be present during Mohammed's interrogation." A former colleague will say she went because, "She thought it would be cool to be in the room." Her presence during KSM's torture seems "to anger and strengthen his resolve, helping him to hold out longer against the harsh tactics used against him." The officer will later be reprimanded for this, and, in Mayer's words, "superiors at the CIA scold […] her for treating the painful interrogation as a show." A former colleague will say: "She got in some trouble. They told her, It's not supposed to be entertainment.'" [MAYER, 2008, PP. 273] This officer may be interviewed by the CIA inspector general's probe into torture (see July 16, 2003) and will later be considered for the position of deputy station chief in Baghdad (see (March 23, 2007)).
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, 'Frances', Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Alec Station
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

July 16, 2003: CIA Inspector General Interviews Counterterrorist Center Officer about Usefulness of Detainee Reporting
The CIA's inspector general interviews a female CIA officer about the efficacy of the agency's custody and interrogation practices for high value detainees. The officer is not identified, but as the topic discussed is the involvement of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) in the practices, and the highest known female officer at the CTC at this time is the one referred to as "Frances" in this timeline, it may be her. (Note: this manager is involved in renditionsee Before January 23, 2004and torturesee After March 7, 2003). The officer says that the value of the program is taking terrorists off the streets, and if the CIA gets unique valuable information from a detainee then an operation is judged a success. The officer also makes a number of statements about information provided by detainees:
Training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida provided information about al-Qaeda's modus operandi and that led to the arrest of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, an associate of the 9/11 hijackers;
Alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) provided information that led to the arrest of a truck driver in Ohio named Iyman Faris, a smuggler named Uzair Paracha, a sleeper operative in New York named Saleh Almari, an operative named Majid Khan, and Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, KSM's nephew, who was involved in financing 9/11;
Detainees have also provided a wealth of information about al-Qaeda plots, including potential attacks on the US consulate in Karachi, a plan to fly planes into Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in London, a plot where spikes in track would be loosened in an attempt to derail a train, a plot to blow up some gas stations, a plot to fly planes into the Library Tower in California, and a plot to collapse a suspension bridge by cutting lines.
The manager adds that as some operatives potentially involved in these plots have been arrested and the plans have not come to fruition, then the operations must have been thwarted by the CIA. [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 7/17/2003 ]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), 'Frances', Counterterrorist Center
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Before January 23, 2004: Internal Dispute Breaks Out at CIA over Handling of Detainee
Following the arrest of German national Khalid el-Masri in Macedonia (see December 31, 2003-January 23, 2004), a dispute breaks out at CIA headquarters over what to do with him. A female officer who is a manager at Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, argues that el-Masri should be rendered to Afghanistan. Author Jane Mayer will describe the officer as a "tall, pale-skinned, spiky-haired redhead who wore bright red lipstick" and indicate she was a former Soviet analyst who had been at Alec Station during the pre-9/11 failures. Mayer will add that she "was particularly controversial among many of her male colleagues for her ferociousness," and, that she was "reviled by some male colleagues for what they regarded as her aggression." Lacking proof against el-Masri, this officer argues that the man in custody is probably a terrorist and should be taken to a black site. [MAYER, 2008, PP. 35, 273, 282-283] A former CIA officer will say: "She didn't really know. She just had a hunch." [WASHINGTON POST, 12/4/2005] Mayer will attribute her determination to having been part of the unit when it failed before 9/11. Other officers suggest they should wait to see whether el-Masri's passport, suspected of being a forgery, is genuine or not, and point out there is no evidence he was anything but a tourist on holiday when he was arrested. However, the female officer does not trust the Germans, apparently thinking them soft on terrorism, and does not want to wait. Another problem is that these discussions occur during the holiday period and, by the time the CIA's station in Germany looks at the paperwork, el-Masri is already on his way to Afghanistan (see January 23 - March 2004). [MAYER, 2008, PP. 282-283] The female officer will also make a sight-seeing trip to see alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed waterboarded (see After March 7, 2003), will be considered for the position of deputy station chief in Baghdad (see (March 23, 2007)), and may be interviewed by the CIA's inspector general during its investigation into torture (see July 16, 2003).
Entity Tags: Khalid el-Masri, 'Frances', Alec Station, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

(February 2004): CIA Determines Passport of Wrongly Held German Citizen Is Not Forged; Detainee Still Held in Afghanistan
A CIA review of the passport of Khalid el-Masri determines that it is genuine, not a forgery. El-Masri had been arrested in Macedonia (see December 31, 2003-January 23, 2004) and rendered to Afghanistan, where he is being tortured (see January 23 - March 2004), partly because the CIA thought he was traveling on a false German passport. However, the news that the passport is legitimate does not inspire the CIA to release him, as a manager at Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, still wants him held. A former colleague will say that this is because of a "gut feeling" the manager, known only as "Frances," has and because she "can't admit a mistake." Another former colleague will say, "She just looked into her crystal ball and it said that he was bad." Although it is clear by now that there was no problem with el-Masri's passport and that he is not an associate of the 9/11 hijackers (note: the hijackers knew a different man with the same name), Frances insists el-Masri "had phone calls to people who were bad. Or to people who knew people who were bad." Some other CIA officers are unhappy with this state of affairs. One CIA official comes in every morning and asks, "Is that guy still locked up in the Salt Pit?" [MAYER, 2008, PP. 284-285]
Entity Tags: Khalid el-Masri, Alec Station, 'Frances', Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Late March 2004: CIA Manager Agrees to Release Innocent German, Only on Impractical Condition Germans Follow Him
A manager at Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, agrees that the agency can release an innocent German citizen named Khalid el-Masri who has been imprisoned in one of the CIA's black sites for about two months (see December 31, 2003-January 23, 2004 and January 23 - March 2004). The CIA has known el-Masri is innocent for some time, but has not yet got around to releasing him (see (February 2004)). However, the manager, a redheaded woman known only as "Frances," makes his release conditional on the German intelligence services promising to follow him once he is free. She is told that as el-Masri is not a terrorist, but innocent, he cannot be put on a watch list, followed, or monitored when making phone calls. Therefore, she is reluctant to let him go and he remains in prison in Afghanistan. [MAYER, 2008, PP. 285]
Entity Tags: Khalid el-Masri, Alec Station, 'Frances', Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

(April 2004): CIA Hatches Reverse Rendition' Plan for Innocent German, Alec Station Manager Still against Releasing Him
Two officers in the CIA's European division hatch a plan to free an innocent German named Khalid el-Masri who has been held at an agency black site since January (see January 23 - March 2004). The plan, which is termed a "reverse rendition," is basically to take el-Masri out of prison, fly him somewhere, drive him round in circles for a few hours, and then let him go. However, a manager at Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, is opposed to this plan. The manager, known only as "Frances," had been the driving force behind el-Masri's rendition to Afghanistan in the first place and had previously put obstacles in the way of his release (see Late March 2004). Now, she still argues that el-Masri is a terrorist. Author Jane Mayer will comment on why her opposition carries weight: "She had an unusual amount of clout in the agency. She was smart and tough. And her trump card was that she sometimes personally briefed President Bush." [MAYER, 2008, PP. 285-286] Despite her opposition, a version of the "reverse rendition" plan will be implemented at the end of May (see May 29, 2004).
Entity Tags: Alec Station, Khalid el-Masri, 'Frances', Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

(May 2004): CIA Director Informed Agency Is Holding Innocent Man at Afghan Black Site
CIA Director George Tenet is informed that the agency has wrongly rendered an innocent German named Khalid el-Masri to a black site in Afghanistan and has been holding him there for several months (see January 23 - March 2004). Tenet receives this information at a meeting with all the main participants in the case: a redheaded bin Laden unit manager who pushed the rendition in the first place who is known only as "Frances"; Counterterrorist Center head Jose Rodriguez and Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt, who have known of the case for some time but done nothing about it (see (April 2004)); and two European Division officers who have a plan to free el-Masri (see (April 2004)). After they all say their piece, Tenet is, according to author Jane Mayer, "stunned." He says: "Are you telling me we've got an innocent guy stuck in prison in Afghanistan? Oh sh_t! Just tell mepleasewe haven't used enhanced' interrogation techniques on him, have we?" The group then discusses what to do, and one suggestion is to let him go with a large quantity of cash. According to two of Mayer's sources, Pavitt chuckles, "At least the guy will earn more money in five months than he ever could have any other way!" [MAYER, 2008, PP. 286] No definitive decision about what to do is taken, and Tenet goes to see National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see (May 2004)).
Entity Tags: Khalid el-Masri, Jose Rodriguez, Jr., Counterterrorist Center, George J. Tenet, Alec Station, 'Frances', Central Intelligence Agency, James Pavitt
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

After May 29, 2004: CIA Officer Responsible for Wrongful Rendition Promoted to Top Post'
The CIA officer responsible for the wrongful rendition and torture of the innocent German Khalid el-Masri (see Before January 23, 2004 and January 23 - March 2004) is promoted at some point after el-Masri is released from prison (see May 29, 2004). Writing in 2008, author Jane Mayer will say the female officer, known only as "Frances," is appointed to "a top post handling sensitive matters in the Middle East." [NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 8/14/2008]
Entity Tags: 'Frances', Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

(March 23, 2007): CIA Officer Involved in Botched Rendition Considered for Baghdad Position, but Not Appointed
A CIA officer known only as "Frances" who ordered the wrongful rendition of a German citizen (see Before January 23, 2004) and made an unauthorized trip to view the waterboarding of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see After March 7, 2003) is considered for the position of deputy chief at the CIA's station in Baghdad. Harper's journalist Ken Silverstein learns of her candidacy from two sources, who describe her as "a person who inspires little confidence, and who is highly adept at working her way through the bureaucracy, but has no leadership ability." Apparently, she is being considered because "no one wants to take high-profile positions at Baghdad station, so the CIA is stuck taking whoever is willing to go." However, in the end she does not get the job. [HARPER'S, 3/23/2007] Several weeks later, CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano will write to Silverstein to defend Frances. Gimigliano says that at this time Frances "is neither considering, nor being considered for, service in Iraq." He adds: "I can tell you that she has been central over the years to the efforts of our government, and other governments, to discover and disrupt al-Qaeda operations worldwide. Her work, and the work she has led, has stopped terrorist attacks and saved innocent lives. The counterterrorist expertise she has built and applied on behalf of our country is the product of great effort and exceptional commitment." [HARPER'S, 4/16/2007]
Entity Tags: Paul Gimigliano, Central Intelligence Agency, 'Frances'
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp..._manager_1

[Magda Hassan]

Profile: 'Michael'

a.k.a. "Michelle"

Related Entities:

• Employee of Central Intelligence Agency
  
• Employee of Alec Station
  
• Acquaintance of Tom Wilshire
  
• Acquaintance of Doug Miller
  
• Employee of Counterterrorist Center
  
• Possibly the same as 'Frances'
  
• Acquaintance of Mark Rossini
  
• Acquaintance of Margaret Gillespie
  

'Michael' was a participant or observer in the following events:

9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Bin Laden Unit Blocks Notification to FBI about Hijacker Almihdhar's US Visa

Victims' family members Lorie Van Auken (right) and Kristen Breitweiser (left) are shocked to learn Tom Wilshire blocked a cable to the FBI about Khalid Almihdhar's visa. [Source: Banded Artists]Doug Miller, an FBI agent assigned to Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, reads CIA cables reporting that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa and drafts a cable to the FBI to inform it of this. The CIA obtained the information through a tap on Almihdhar's phone in Yemen (seeDecember 29, 1999) and by monitoring him as he passed through Dubai (seeJanuary 2-5, 2000) on his way to an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000).
Draft Cable - Miller writes that Almihdhar has a US visa (see April 3-7, 1999) and that the visa application states his destination is New York and he intends to stay for three months. The draft cable mentions the tap on Almihdhar's phone, his planned travel to Malaysia, and the links between his phone and the 1998 East African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998 and October 4, 2001). It also says that the CIA has obtained photographs of Almihdhar and these will be sent separately. Miller asks the FBI for feedback resulting from an FBI investigation.
Blocked - A female CIA officer known as "Michael" accesses Miller's draft about an hour after he writes it. The cable is then blocked on the orders of the station's deputy chief, Tom Wilshire, as a few hours after Miller drafts the cable Michael attaches a message to it saying, "pls hold off on [cable] for now per [Tom Wilshire]." [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 240 ] Miller is also told, "This is not a matter for the FBI." [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 311]
'No Reason to Kill the Message' - Author James Bamford will later comment: "A potential terrorist and member of al-Qaeda was heading for the US, the FBI's jurisdictionits turfand he [Miller] was putting the FBI on notice so it could take action. There was no reason to kill the message." [BAMFORD, 2008, PP. 19] Miller will later say he has no "rational answer" as to why the cable was blocked, but will speculate that Alec Station officers were annoyed he had encroached on their territory. [CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 10/1/2008] Michael drafts a cable falsely saying that the information about Almihdhar's visa has been shared with the FBI (seeAround 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000) and there will be a discussion the next day about whether the cable should be sent (see January 6, 2000). The Justice Department's Office of Inspector General will later call the failure to pass the information to the FBI a "significant failure" but will be unable to determine why the information was not passed on. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 250 ] The 9/11 Commission will know of the incident, but will relegate it to an endnote in its final report, omitting Wilshire's role entirely. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502]The CIA inspector general will falsely claim that the cable is not sent, "[a]pparently because it was in the wrong format or needed editing." [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 6/2005, PP. XV ]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Doug Miller, Central Intelligence Agency,'Michael', 9/11 Commission, Alec Station, Tom Wilshire, Khalid Almihdhar, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
[B]Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline[/B]



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Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Officer Sends out Cable with False Claim FBI Has Been Told of Hijacker Almihdhar's US Visa

A female CIA officer known only as "Michael" sends out a cable saying the information that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa has been sent to the FBI "for further investigation." The cable does not state how the visa information was passed or by whom. Michael is with Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit. The cable, which is lengthy and summarizes information about Almihdhar and three other operatives planning an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia, is sent to some overseas CIA stations, but not the FBI. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 243 ] The CIA, which will be criticized for its apparent failure to tell the FBI of Almihdhar's visa after 9/11, will repeatedly tout this cable as evidence that it had actually informed the FBI of Almihdhar's visa, or at least thought it had done so. [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/17/2002; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 146 ; TENET, 2007, PP. 195] However, this appears not to be true, as after 9/11 the FBI will be unable to find any record of receiving such information and the CIA will be unable to find any record of having sent it. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 249-252 ] In addition, as Michael blocked the relevant notification to the FBI on this day (see9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000) and insists it not be passed the next day (see January 6, 2000), she must know the claim the information about Almihdhar's visa had been passed is false. Michael will apparently lie about this cable to the Justice Department's inspector general (see February 2004) and CIA Director George Tenet (see Before October 17, 2002 and Shortly Before April 30, 2007).
[B]Entity Tags: Alec Station, Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency, 'Michael'
[B]Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline[/B]

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January 6, 2000: CIA Officer Says Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Cannot Be Shared with FBI Because Next Al-Qaeda Attack Will Be in Southeast Asia

Mark Rossini. [Source: Fox News]Mark Rossini, an FBI agent on loan to Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, protests in vain against a decision to deliberately withhold information about one of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, from the FBI (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). One of his colleagues, Doug Miller, had tried to inform the FBI that Almihdhar had a US visa the day before, but had been blocked by a 29-year-old female CIA officer known as "Michael" and the unit's deputy chief, Tom Wilshire. According to author James Bamford, Rossini was "perplexed and outraged that the CIA would forbid the bureau's notification on a matter so important." Rossini will later say: "So the next day I went to her and said, What's with Doug's cable? You've got to tell the bureau about this.' She put her hand on her hip and said, Look, the next attack is going to happen in Southeast Asiait's not the bureau's jurisdiction. When we want the FBI to know about it, we'll let them know. But the next bin Laden attack's going to happen in Southeast Asia."[BAMFORD, 2008, PP. 19-20] Rossini protests, saying, "They're here!" and, "It is FBI business," but to no avail. Even though he is an FBI agent, he cannot pass on notification to the bureau without permission from his superiors at Alec Station.[CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 10/1/2008] Michael will be promoted after 9/11. [MAYER, 2008, PP. 16] In the run-up to the 9/11 attacks, Wilshire will write an e-mail expressing his fear of an al-Qaeda attack in Southeast Asia, specifically Malaysia (see July 5, 2001), and will give this as a reason he does not communicate information about Almihdhar and his partner Nawaf Alhazmi to the FBI in May 2001 (see May 15, 2001). It will be alleged after 9/11 that the notification may be withheld to stop the FBI interfering with an illegal CIA-linked operation to monitor the hijackers in the US (see 2006 and After).
[B]Entity Tags: Mark Rossini, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Tom Wilshire, 'Michael', Doug Miller, Alec Station
[B]Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline[/B]


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Before October 17, 2002: CIA Officer Apparently Lies to Director about Withholding of Hijacker Information before 9/11

A CIA officer who served with Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, before 9/11 is interviewed by CIA Director George Tenet about a failure to pass on information to the FBI about one of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar. Although information about Almihdhar's US visa was not passed to the FBI, the officer, a woman known only as "Michael," drafted a cable falsely stating that it had been passed (see Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). According to Tenet's testimony to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry (see October 17, 2002), the officer "believes she never would have written this cable unless she believes this had happened." Tenet will be impressed with her, calling her a "terrific officer" at an open hearing of the inquiry. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/17/2002] However, it was Michael herself who blocked the cable, on the orders of her boss, Tom Wilshire (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). In addition, the day after she sent the cable falsely stating the information had been passed, she again insisted that the information not be provided to the FBI (see January 6, 2000). Michael will later repeat the same lie to the Justice Department's inspector general (see February 2004).
[B]Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, 'Michael', George J. Tenet
[B]Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline[/B]

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February 2004: CIA Officer Lies to Justice Department Inspector General about Passage of Information about Almihdhar's US Visa

A CIA officer who blocked notification to the FBI that Khalid Almihdhar had a US visa makes a number of false statements about the blocking in an interview with the Justice's Department's office of inspector general. The officer, a woman known only as "Michael," was working at Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, in 2000. She blocked a cable drafted by an FBI agent on loan to Alec Station named Doug Miller telling the FBI about Almihdhar (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000), but then drafted a cable falsely stating the information had been passed (see Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000) and insisted to Miller's colleague Mark Rossini that the FBI not be informed the next day (see January 6, 2000). Instead of telling the inspector general why she blocked the initial cable and then drafted the cable with the false statement, Michael claims that she has no recollection of Miller's cable, any discussions about putting it on hold, or why it was not sent. She also claims the language of the cable suggests somebody else told her the information about Almihdhar's visa had been passed to the FBI, but cannot recall who this was. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 242-243 ; BAMFORD, 2008, PP. 19-20] The exact date of this interview is not known, although the inspector general discovered Miller's cable in early February (see Early February 2004) and Miller and Rossini are interviewed around this time. Both men also falsely claim not to recall anything about the cable (see (February 12, 2004)).
[B]Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Office of the Inspector General (DOJ), 'Michael',Central Intelligence Agency, Alec Station
[B]Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline[/B]

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Shortly Before April 30, 2007: CIA Officer Reportedly Makes False Claims to Former Agency Director about Failure to Pass Information to FBI

According to former CIA Director George Tenet, he speaks to a "senior CIA officer" with knowledge of pre-9/11 intelligence failures, apparently in preparation for a book he is writing. They discuss the failure to inform the FBI that one of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, had a US visa (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). The officer tells Tenet: "Once Almihdhar's picture and visa information were received, everyone agreed that the information should immediately be sent to the FBI. Instructions were given to do so. There was a contemporaneous e-mail in CIA staff traffic, which CIA and FBI employees had access to, indicating that the data had in fact been sent to the FBI. Everyone believed it had been done." [TENET, 2007, PP. 195] The claim that "everyone agreed" the information should be sent to the FBI is false, because two officers, deputy unit chief Tom Wilshire and "Michael," specifically instructed two other people working at Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, not to send it (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000 and January 6, 2000). The "contemporaneous e-mail" was then written by Michael, who must have known the claim the information had been passed was incorrect (see Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). Michael later appears to have lied about this matter to Tenet (see Before October 17, 2002) and the Justice Department's inspector general (see February 2004).
[B]Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Alec Station, 'Michael', Central Intelligence Agency
[B]Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline[/B]
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http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp...michelle_1[/B]
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[Peter Lemkin]

Sadly, the whistleblowers will soon pay a high price for this truth!.....and I fear the real villian[s] will have little to nothing done.....at most, they will disappear from sight. mileymad:

[Peter Lemkin]

Meet Alfreda Bikowsky, the Senior Officer at the Center of the CIA's Torture Scandals

By Glenn Greenwald and Peter Maass @ggreenwald @maassp
Friday at 6:28 PM

NBC News yesterday called her a "key apologist" for the CIA's torture program. A follow-up New Yorker article dubbed her "The Unidentified Queen of Torture" and in part "the model for the lead character in Zero Dark Thirty.'" Yet in both articles she was anonymous.
The person described by both NBC and The New Yorker is senior CIA officer Alfreda Frances Bikowsky. Multiple news outlets have reported that as the result of a long string of significant errors and malfeasance, her competence and integrity are doubted even by some within the agency.
The Intercept is naming Bikowsky over CIA objections because of her key role in misleading Congress about the agency's use of torture, and her active participation in the torture program (including playing a direct part in the torture of at least one innocent detainee). Moreover, Bikowsky has already been publicly identified by news organizations as the CIA officer responsible for many of these acts.
The executive summary of the torture report released by the Senate last week provides abundant documentation that the CIA repeatedly and deliberately misled Congress about multiple aspects of its interrogation program. Yesterday, NBC News reported that one senior CIA officer in particular was responsible for many of those false claims, describing her as "a top al Qaeda expert who remains in a senior position at the CIA."
NBC, while withholding her identity, noted that the same unnamed officer "also participated in enhanced interrogations' of self-professed 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, witnessed the waterboarding of terror suspect Abu Zubaydah and ordered the detention of a suspected terrorist who turned out to be unconnected to al Qaeda, according to the report."
The New Yorkers Jane Mayer, writing yesterday about the NBC article, added that the officer "is still in a position of high authority over counterterrorism at the C.I.A." This officer, Mayer noted, is the same one who "dropped the ball when the C.I.A. was given information that might very well have prevented the 9/11 attacks; she gleefully participated in torture sessions afterward; she misinterpreted intelligence in such a way that it sent the C.I.A. on an absurd chase for Al Qaeda sleeper cells in Montana. And then she falsely told congressional overseers that the torture worked." Mayer also wrote that the officer is "the same woman" identified in the Senate report who oversaw "the months-long rendition and gruesome interrogation of another detainee whose detention was a case of mistaken identity."
Both news outlets withheld the name of this CIA officer even though her identity is widely known among journalists, and her name has been used by various media outlets in connection with her work at the CIA. Both articles cited requests by the CIA not to identify her, even though they provided details making her identity clear.
In fact, earlier this year, The Washington Post identified Bikowsky by name, describing her as a CIA analyst "who was tied to a critical intelligence-sharing failure before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and the botched 2003 rendition' of an innocent German citizen thought to be an al-Qaeda operative." That Post report led to both McClatchy and independent journalist Marcy Wheeler raising questions about the propriety of Bikowsky's former personal lawyer, Robert Litt, playing a key role in his current capacity as a top government lawyer in deciding which parts of the torture report should be released.
The McClatchy article identified Bikowsky by name as the officer who "played a central role in the bungled rendition of Khaled el-Masri. El-Masri, who was revealed to be innocent, claimed to have been tortured by the agency." El-Masri, a German citizen who was kidnapped from Macedonia and tortured by the CIA in Afghanistan, was released in 2003 after it was revealed he was not involved in al Qaeda.
Back in 2011, John Cook, the outgoing editor of The Intercept, wrote an article at Gawker, based on the reporting of Ray Nowosielski and John Duffy, naming Bikowsky and pointing to extensive evidence showing that she "has a long (if pseudonymous) history of being associated with some of the agency's most disastrous boondoggles," including a key role in the CIA's pre-9/11 failure to notify the FBI that two known al Qaeda operatives had entered the country.
Earlier that year, the Associated Press reported that a "hard-charging CIA analyst [who] had pushed the agency into one of the biggest diplomatic embarrassments of the U.S. war on terrorism" (the rendering for torture of the innocent El-Masri) was repeatedly promoted. Despite internal recommendations that she be punished, the AP reported that she instead "has risen to one of the premier jobs in the CIA's Counterterrorism Center."
The article named her as "Frances," explaining that the AP "agreed to the CIA's request to refer to Frances by her middle name because her first is unusual."
Bikowsky's name, and her long string of controversial actions, have become such an open secret that she even has her own lengthy, detailed Wikipedia page. The entry describes her as a "career Central Intelligence Agency officer who has headed . . . the Global Jihad unit."
In the months leading up to the release of the torture report, the CIA and the White House fought to prevent the Senate even from assigning pseudonyms to the CIA officers whose actions are chronicled in the report. The Senate ultimately capitulated, making it difficult to follow any coherent narrative about what these officers did.
As Mayer wrote in yesterday's article:

Readers can speculate on how the pieces fit together, and who the personalities behind this program are. But without even pseudonyms, it is exceedingly hard to connect the dots. . . . [W]ithout names, or even pseudonyms, it is almost impossible to piece together the puzzle, or hold anyone in the American government accountable. Evidently, that is exactly what the C.I.A. was fighting for during its eight-month-long redaction process, behind all those closed doors.

Naming Bikowsky allows people to piece together these puzzles and hold American officials accountable. The CIA's arguments for suppression of her name are vague and unpersuasive, alluding generally to the possibility that she could be the target of retaliation.
The CIA's arguments focus on an undefined threat to her safety. "We would strongly object to attaching anyone's name given the current environment," a CIA spokesperson, Ryan Trapani, told The Intercept in an email. In a follow-up voicemail he added: "There are crazy people in this world and we are trying to mitigate those threats."
However, beyond Bikowsky, a number of CIA officials who oversaw and implemented the program have already been publicly identifiedindeed, many of the key architects of the program, such as Jose Rodriguez, are frequent guests on news programs.
Trapani also argued that the Senate report is "based only upon one side's perspective on this story" and that an article about Bikowsky "doesn't require naming a person who's never had a chance to rebut what's been said about them." When The Intercept asked for the CIA's rebuttalor Bikowsky'sto the critical portrayal of her in the Senate report, Trapani declined to offer one. He noted that CIA Director John Brennan had disputed the report's contention that the agency had misrepresented the value of the interrogation program.