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On Edwin Kaiser and Related Topics
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25-08-2016, 09:35 PM
Im sorry Jim, but you really are wrong. By the way, I do have evidence, are you saying that there were no A4s to cleverly not cover the B26s? Yeah, im the first person who can prove it, like the sixth burglar, and so many other things. Don't be mad.
25-08-2016, 10:33 PM
Jim mentions the Kirkpatrick report. Googling around for it, I see the National Security Archives eventually obtained most of the Jack Pfeiffer report, linked here
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB355/ which contains Quote:lengthy and harsh critiques of two previous official investigations of the Bay of Pigs: the report of the Presidential Commission led by Gen. Maxwell Taylor; and the CIA's own Inspector General's report written in the aftermath of the failed assault. Are the Kirkpatrick and Pfeiffer reports both worth reading? Does anyone have any comments about any pros and cons I might encounter if I dig through both? Just curious, and happy to hear anyone's thoughts.
25-08-2016, 11:00 PM
Anthony Thorne Wrote:Jim mentions the Kirkpatrick report. Googling around for it, I see the National Security Archives eventually obtained most of the Jack Pfeiffer report, linked here As someone who is not bias, Robert Kennedy did make sure that his brother Jack would not be responsible for the fiasco through the Taylor report, but, he was the president that did have three months to call it off, or at the very least postponed the operation.
25-08-2016, 11:02 PM
However, Jack did not want American military involved therefore, the A4s appeared to supply air cover, but that really wasn't going to happen.
26-08-2016, 12:39 AM
Did Kirkpatrick build a fair case against the Bay of Pigs operation? If he did, what can be inferred about the rejection of his Survey by Dulles, Bissell, and other Agency principals? Historian Piero Gleijeses has noted that the White House and the CIA were like ships passing in the night during the planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion; they assumed they spoke the same language with regard to Cuba, but they actually were imprisoned by mutually exclusive misconceptions about the invasion's likely outcome. The Kennedy administration believed the assault brigade would be able to escape destruction by melting into the countryside to wage guerrilla warfare. However, the Brigade would be more than 75 miles from the mountains making it impossible for guerrilla warfare. According to Gleijeses, CIA officials, from Dulles on down to the branch chief who ran the operation, professed this same belief but tacitly assumed President Kennedy would commit US troops rather than let the Brigade be overrun.4 A close reading of the IG's Survey and the DDP's response supports Gleijeses's thesis and hints that an analogous misunderstanding within CIA itself hampered planning for the invasion and contributed to the communications breakdown with the White House.
The Bay of Pigs invasion met its ignominious end on the afternoon of 19 April 1961. Three days after the force of Cuban émigrés had hit the beach, the CIA officers who planned the assault gathered around a radio in their Washington war room while the Cuban Brigade's commander transmitted his last signal. I mentioned this regarding Osvaldo Coello who was the main radio operator on the Barbra J ship. He had been pleading all day for supplies and air cover, but nothing could be done for him and his men. Now he could see Fidel Castro's tanks approaching. "I have nothing left to fight with," he shouted. "Am taking to the woods. I can't wait for you." Then the radio went dead, however, I believe information that I have already posted is being left out here, leaving the drained and horrified CIA men holding back nausea. 1 Within days the postmortems began. President Kennedy assigned Gen. Maxwell Taylor to head the main inquiry into the government's handling of the operation. 2 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles asked the CIA's Inspector General (IG), Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., to conduct an internal audit. A humiliated President Kennedy did not wait for either report before cleaning house at CIA. He accepted resignations from both Dulles and Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell (although both stayed at their posts until their successors were selected a few months later). Lyman Kirkpatrick subsequently acknowledged that his Survey of the Cuban Operation had angered the handful of senior Agency officers permitted to read it, particularly in the Directorate for Plans (the Agency's clandestine service and covert action arm, referred to here as the DDP). 3 The IG's Survey elicited a formal rejoinder from the DDP, written by one of Bissell's aides who was closely associated with all phases of the project. These two lengthy briefs, written when the memories and documentation were fresh, were intended to be seen by only a handful of officials within the CIA. They shed light on the ways in which the CIA learned from both success and failure at a milestone in the Cold War.
26-08-2016, 01:14 AM
Anthony:
The reason there is a Pfeiffer report is because of two things: 1.) Dulles and Bissell were very angry that Kirkpatrick did such a thorough and coruscating job exposing the almost unbelievable incompetence of Operation Zapata. In some ways, Kirkpatrick goes beyond the Taylor Report. Because it traces back to the beginnings of the operation. To use one example, the CIA was so incompetent about the resistance inside of Cuba--where it was, and if there was one--that many of their resupply operations ending up being recovered by Castro. 2.) Because it was so thorough, Kirkpatrick did not think he could get it to Kennedy through normal channels. So he drove it over to the White House himself. Therefore, Dulles and Bisell filed dissents. And they then got their buddies in the Agency to put together a formal critique of Kirpatrick. You can get the Kirkpatrick Report in Peter Kornbluh's book, Bay of Pigs Declassified, which is, in my view, the best book on the subject. Kirkpatrick took almost six months to put the report together. And by all indications, it was the last straw for Kennedy. He read it right after the Taylor Report. And he then made his decision to fire the top level of the CIA. What the combination of the two reports makes clear is this: 1.) The only way the operation could have had any chance of success is if all the lies the CIA told Kennedy were actually true. That is about the defections, about the element of surprise, and finally, as a last resort, about going guerilla. But that is the whole point of what the investigations revealed: These were all lies. And the CIA lied to Kennedy to get him to OK the project. That is what he came to conclude. And that is what he told his pal, Red Fay. And Schlesinger. 2.) Kaiser misses my whole point about the air cover excuse. What Kirkpatrick was trying to demonstrate was that this was hogwash. It was irrelevant at best; at worst it created a "stab in the back" mythology. The operation was so misconceived, so mismanaged, such a hapless comedy of errors, that there was no way it was going to be successful, even with Castro's Air Force neutralized. Without the element of surprise, without the mass defections, then what you had was 1,100 men on the beach facing 35,000 army regulars, backed up with tanks, motorized companies, artillery and mortar. As any amphibious expert will tell you, that is simply ridiculous. This is why the CIA lied to Kennedy about the element of surprise. When you go through both reports, you are left with the big question: Could they really have believed this crap? I and others--Jim Douglass, Mike Morissey, Larry Hancock, Greg Burnham-- came to the conclusion that, no they did not. And thanks to Lucien Vandenbrouke, we later got the truth from Dulles and Bissell themselves.
26-08-2016, 01:34 AM
Bay of Pigs declassified: The secret report on the invasion of Cuba. New York: The New York Press, c1998. viii 339p F 1788 B29 1998. President Kennedy was dreadfully fearful of using American military and had it's military been involved in the invasion of Cuba, this would have certainly set off a chain reaction for other communist countries to engage in war with the United States due to an act of subversion on Kennedy's part. North Viet Nam was already receiving support from Fidel Castro through pints of blood sold to the Vietnamese Embassy in Cuba. Russia was also supporting North Viet Nam with Russian backed military equipment, had the United States invoked a war with Cuba, this would have certainly set off a chain reaction of events, events Kennedy wanted to desperately avoid.
Kennedy did approve (8) A4 Skyhawks to be used in air cover for the B-26's, however, (12) boarded the U.S.S. Essex, the plan was to take out Castro's air-force, however, the B-26's only partially did the damage. Kennedy was faced with two options, 1. continue the air attacks using A-4 Skyhawks for air-cover for the B-26s, or, 2. allow them to fight their own battle canceling the air-cover, but yet, make it appear the United States did all they could do in the wake of this disaster. Was it really just a fluke, a screw up in time that the A-4 Skyhawks arrived an hour late and at the moment Castro finished off the Brigade? According to the Commander, "there were no more B-26's to protect, all is a lost." At that moment the Skyhawks flew back to the Essex reporting, "the battle is over".
26-08-2016, 03:04 AM
I suppose this changes everything? Now, Howard Hunt also said, "I have a reputation for honesty." but lets face it, he also falsified cables, but, isn't everyone a liar including me? I suppose if one is going to tell the truth about something, it's up to the person to tell it. I do know that when Hunt started to spread the rumors of Kennedy calling off the air-cover for the B-26's and then they showed up an hour late meant, Kennedy really did cancel the air-cover, why the A4's did a fly by later is anyone's guess, perhaps, to assess the damage?
26-08-2016, 03:14 AM
This is where so many researchers made the mistake wanting to blame it all on the CIA and pushing the story that the CIA was forcing Kennedy into using American military, but if there is lack of communication, and misunderstanding, how then can anyone jump to conclusions? This is where Jim and so many other good researchers get confused. [URL="https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1314&dat=19630125&id=VrNWAAAAIBAJ&sjid=9egDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5936,2888109&hl=en"]
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1...8109&hl=en[/URL] |
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