7/7 Inquest shows official narrative falling apart at seams

[David Guyatt]

Whoops...

PII = Public Interest Immunity submission made by a minister of state arguing that disclosure of certain information would be damaging to the public interest (i.e., layered British mandarin-speak for the "state").

Security forces = military intelligence --- possibly the forerunner unit of the Special Reconnaissance Regiment, the "14 Det" or "14 Int" (14 Field Security and Intelligence Company), which are thought in some quarters to have a long and ugly history in false flag operations. All members of the force retain a right of immunity from prosecution.

http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/...2010am.htm

21 December 2010 - Morning session

1 Tuesday, 21 December 2010
2 (10.00 am)
3 Directions hearing re PII
4 (In open session)
5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr O'Connor?
6 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Good morning, my Lady.
7 My Lady, there is one main item on this morning's
8 agenda and that is for you to hear submissions on
9 a PII hearing that has been made by the Secretary
10 of State for the Home Department, Mr Garnham is
11 here to address you on that.
12 There are, I imagine, also a number of other
13 ancillary matters that the Bar may wish to raise,
14 relating to outstanding directions and so on.
15 My Lady, we think that insofar as the PII
16 claim is concerned, the logical order of things
17 would be for you to have an open hearing now, so
18 that you can hear submissions from Mr Garnham and
19 from those acting for the other interested
20 persons about the general principles that are to
21 be applied.
22 Once you have heard submissions on those, you
23 will then need to go into a closed session to
24 hear more detailed submissions. My Lady, the
25 question of whether you hear submissions on the

1

1 other ancillary matters at the same time as the
2 open submissions on the PII claim or whether you
3 think it more appropriate to hear open
4 submissions on the PII claimed, then closed
5 submissions, then come back for another open
6 hearing to hear any other matters, my Lady, is
7 really a matter for you.
8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What is the present
9 estimate for the length of time the closed
10 hearing will take, and how long will we be
11 keeping Ms Gallagher -- who I gather has had to
12 step into the breach -- and others waiting, if we
13 go open, closed, open?
14 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Mr Garnham is saying two
15 hours.
16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Well, I am not going
17 to keep them hanging around for two hours, so
18 let's do everything open that we can, whilst we
19 are in open session, and then go into closed.
20 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, yes.
21 Perhaps, then, I think really it's probably
22 for Mr Garnham to make his submissions on the PII
23 claim, and perhaps those others here can make
24 their submissions in response to the PII claim
25 and any other ancillary matters they wish.

2

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well. Yes,
2 Mr Garnham?
3 MR GARNHAM: My Lady, as you know, this is my
4 application to order from this court that the
5 material contained in what has been called
6 bundle A is protected from disclosure to both the
7 PIPs and the public, as a result of public
8 interest immunity.
9 As Mr O'Connor has indicated, it is
10 anticipated you will hear opening submissions
11 from all of us now and then there will be closed
12 submissions from me subsequently.
13 You, my Lady, and all of my learned friends
14 have seen the certificate signed by Theresa May,
15 the Secretary of State for the Home Department.
16 The certificate speaks for itself, and I don't
17 propose to read it all out, but this is a public
18 hearing and I ought, perhaps, to summarise the
19 effect of what the Home Secretary says.
20 The Secretary of State refers to documents
21 contained in what she calls bundle A. The nature
22 of those documents cannot be described in open
23 session without damaging the very interests this
24 application seeks to protect.
25 You will see that the bundle contains

3

1 information falling into three loose categories.
2 First, material you have identified as relevant
3 through your counsel; secondly, information which
4 those advising the Secretary of State believe is
5 likely to become relevant; thirdly, information
6 potentially relevant to the issue whether you can
7 properly and fairly make any ruling on particular
8 subissues.
9 I should make it clear, my Lady, that I will
10 not be inviting you in open or closed sessions
11 today to make any ruling or give any indication
12 one way or the other about that latter matter.
13 Whether that would be appropriate, in fact, will
14 be for another occasion. But information that
15 may be relevant to that issue is a part --
16 a relatively small part, but a part
17 nonetheless -- of what I propose showing you in
18 closed, and we took the view that it was right
19 that the existence of such potentially relevant
20 material -- reference to it should be made
21 openly.
22 The Secretary of State makes clear in
23 paragraph 6.1 of her certificate that attempts
24 have been made to agree a gist -- in other words,
25 a summary -- of the information contained in the

4

1 closed material that could be made public without
2 damaging national security.
3 At the time of the certificate, those
4 attempts have not been successful. I can tell
5 your Ladyship that those efforts have continued
6 and I will be able to tell you in closed where
7 they have got to. If a gist can be agreed which
8 meets with the court's approval, that, of course,
9 would then be made public and made available to
10 the PIPs.
11 The Secretary of State sets out in the
12 certificate the approach she has taken following
13 the House of Lords' decision in R v H and the
14 Divisional Court's decision in Binyam Mohamed.
15 She identifies a three-stage test. Put
16 shortly, first, relevance; secondly, does it
17 attract PII in principle; and, thirdly, the
18 balancing exercise. My Lady, largely familiar
19 stuff, save in one respect. The one, somewhat
20 novel issue is how the balance should be struck,
21 or conducted, in the case of an inquest.
22 Self-evidently, we would submit, it is not
23 precisely the same issue that arises in
24 proceedings in the usual criminal or civil
25 proceedings that most of us are more familiar

5

1 with. The Secretary of State sets out the advice
2 that we have given her, which she explains that
3 she has followed, and that is in paragraph 12.
4 In essence, she has accepted advice that the
5 balance here should be between the interests of
6 national security, on the one hand, and, on the
7 other, the public interest in this being an open
8 and effective inquiry, which inquiry pursues the
9 objectives of an inquest identified in what we
10 would submit is the most authoritative statement
11 from the House of Lords in the speech of
12 Lord Bingham in the Amin case.
13 It perhaps is right that I read the relevant
14 quotation, because it sets in context all that
15 follows. This is from paragraph 12 of the
16 certificate, from Amin:
17 "In this country, effect has been given to
18 the duty to investigate for centuries by
19 requiring such deaths to be publicly investigated
20 before an independent judicial tribunal with an
21 opportunity for the relatives of the deceased to
22 participate. The purposes of such an
23 investigation are clear: to ensure, so far as
24 possible, that the full facts are brought to
25 light, that culpable and discreditable conduct is

6

1 exposed and brought to public notice, that
2 suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing, if
3 unjustified, is allayed, that dangerous practices
4 and procedures are rectified and that those who
5 have lost their relatives may at least have the
6 satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from
7 his death may save the lives of others."
8 Our submission is that that is the correct
9 approach to the public interest in open
10 proceedings' side of the balance.
11 The Secretary of State then explains that she
12 has personally examined the documents and
13 satisfied herself that they attract PII. She
14 then sets out in general terms, deliberately
15 general terms, the reasons she says that PII
16 applies -- that's in paragraphs 13 and 17 --
17 those amount to the familiar descriptions of why
18 documents may create a risk to national security.
19 In essence, she says that their disclosure
20 would damage national security. As you will
21 appreciate, my Lady, it's not possible for me to
22 say, nor for her to say in her certificate in
23 open surroundings, which of those categories the
24 material in bundle A relates to, because doing so
25 would itself cause damage to national security.

7

1 The detail, however, is set out in a schedule to
2 the certificate, which has been disclosed to you,
3 my Lady, and to your counsel, but not to the
4 properly interested persons.
5 The Secretary of State then describes the
6 balancing exercise she has performed and gives
7 her opinion that the material ought not to be
8 disclosed. In paragraph 21 of that certificate,
9 she acknowledges that the final decision is not
10 hers, but yours and, my Lady, you will have seen
11 that she has said at paragraph 8 that she has
12 made the certificate for the purpose of assisting
13 the court in coming to this decision in PII.
14 My Lady, I think that is all I need to say in
15 open.
16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.
17 Ms Gallagher, are there any submissions you wish
18 to make at this stage?
19 MS GALLAGHER: Yes, just to ensure I'm on the
20 correct microphone?
21 Could I just begin by apologising for
22 Mr Patrick O'Connor, Queen's Counsel's, absence.
23 He was taken ill this morning, so I'm appearing
24 and making these submissions very much in
25 understudy role, although, of course, as you are

8

1 aware, there is also Mr Patterson, so there are
2 two of us representing the bereaved families
3 before you here today.
4 What I intend to do is very briefly make some
5 general observations in relation to the
6 applicable principles and then make some general
7 observations in relation to the certificate
8 itself.
9 I will be brief, as is inevitable, because
10 my Lady, of course the decision on PII, as is
11 recognised by the Home Secretary in paragraph 21
12 of the certificate, and by Mr Garnham QC in his
13 submissions just now, is in your hands and, of
14 course, post-Wiley, it is evident that striking
15 the balance is going to depend very much on the
16 specific context of bundle A. Me, myself, and
17 Mr Patterson and the other interested parties not
18 involved in the closed proceedings have seen the
19 context, so we are disabled from making effective
20 representations under the Wiley test; all we can
21 do is make these general observations.
22 Could I start firstly by just dealing with
23 what the issue of presumption is in this context?
24 We agree with Mr Garnham that, in the inquest
25 context, the balance that you need to strike is

9

1 not necessarily the same as the balance you will
2 strike in a criminal context. This relates to
3 the issue he raised at paragraph 12 of the
4 certificate, quoting from Lord Bingham. However
5 we would say that the presumption in favour of
6 disclosure in an inquest context is a strong one
7 and it's not equivalent to civil proceeding. It
8 is well known that the presumption in favour of
9 disclosure in a criminal context is more emphatic
10 than in a civil context where ultimate risk is
11 failure of a potential private claim.
12 In this particular context, there is a number
13 of reasons why we say there is a strong
14 presumption in favour of disclosure.
15 The first is a general one which simply is
16 echoing what Lord Bingham said in the context of
17 Article 2 in the Amin case, that one of the
18 principle purposes of an inquest is, of course,
19 to assuage public anxiety and hold those
20 responsible to account. That's an argument, in
21 our submission, for there to be a greater need
22 for public scrutiny than there may be in other
23 civil contexts. There are also some issues very
24 specific to this case, which we have raised, and
25 three in particular.

10

1 Firstly, my Lady, we would refer to
2 paragraph 111 of your ruling of May 2010. I
3 don't intend to go to it in any great detail, but
4 that's the paragraph, my Lady, where you make
5 clear that an inquest isn't limited to being the
6 last link in the chain, and the new events in the
7 spring of 2004 and in the wider lead-up to 2005
8 may be relevant and, quoting from you, because we
9 now know two of those to do with the police have
10 attributed responsibility for the bombings were
11 not only on MI5's radar but were seen with
12 a terrorist and a known bomb expert.
13 If that is correct, to my mind that seems far
14 from remote. I am satisfied that to embark on
15 a consideration of the bombers' backgrounds to
16 this extent, if it proves possible, would be in
17 accordance with my duty to ensure that the
18 details of the catastrophic events of 7 July 2005
19 are to adopt the term employed in Jamieson
20 "fully, fairly and fearlessly investigated" and
21 that, of course, was your current intention at
22 the time, if proved possible.
23 Secondly, we would emphasise the importance
24 of the preventability issue to the bereaved
25 families. We noted in April that, amongst those

11

1 who responded to Dr Reid's questionnaire, the top
2 three issues which were identified as requiring
3 investigation at that stage were interrelated and
4 all related to reasonable preventability by state
5 agencies.
6 They were, my Lady, number one, level of
7 intelligence or knowledge of pre-attack; number
8 two, possible prevention of an attack; number
9 three, failings and accountability of the state.
10 The importance of that issue to the families
11 has been echoed since then. As we know, at the
12 April hearing, and continuing until today, there
13 has been unanimity from the bereaved families in
14 terms of the importance of that issue, and that
15 is a very powerful factor.
16 The third factor we would highlight is the
17 wider -- again, using your phrase from the
18 judgment in May, albeit in a slightly different
19 context -- obviously, it is a judgment of public
20 interest beyond the bereaved families themselves
21 in this issue being fully and appropriately
22 investigated.
23 So for all those reasons, my Lady, we would
24 say there is a strong presumption in favour of
25 disclosure.

12

1 There's two other general matters which I
2 would note. I'm not going to, for obvious
3 reasons, go through Wiley and what the relevant
4 factors are, but we would draw your attention to
5 the decision of Silber J in the High Court in
6 June of this year. I do have copies of it. It's
7 just a small point. It's simply the reference
8 that was made to the test on public interest
9 immunity being best supplied at the end of the
10 disclosure exercise.
11 We are very conscious in this case that,
12 because of disclosure being a rolling process,
13 a decision on bundle A is potentially being made
14 now before the disclosure process has been
15 completed and that obviously makes it more
16 difficult for Mr Patterson and I and the other
17 bereaved families to make full submissions. We
18 find it difficult to make full submissions
19 anyway, given how general the information in the
20 certificate is, but in the absence of further
21 disclosure, we are also restricted somewhat. So
22 we just echo what was said by Silber J in that
23 case. I do have copies, if needed.
24 We would also draw your attention to the case
25 of Orr v Kenneth Johnson where the Court of

13

1 Appeal set out what the minimum evidential
2 requirements were for PII in an observation-type
3 case, and that was in a criminal context.
4 We, of course, don't know how much, if any,
5 of bundle A relates to observation-type issues,
6 but again we would think that may be relevant to
7 your consideration. I do have copies of the
8 judgment and also there's a brief summary at
9 Archbold paragraphs 12 and 37. Again, I can make
10 that available, if it's of relevance.
11 My Lady, could I also make just a number of
12 brief observations in respect of the certificate
13 itself. Mr Garnham said that the certificate
14 speaks for itself and, of course, to a certain
15 extent that's true, but for those of us outside
16 the closed process, it stills remains
17 a relatively impenetrable document.
18 We recognise the inevitability of that, at
19 this stage, so we are not making any criticism,
20 but we must note it, simply because it's
21 difficult for us to make meaningful submissions
22 in that context.
23 There's numerous headings of national
24 security interest which are given that are
25 described in relatively vague terms and it's

14

1 quite difficult for us to engage in any
2 meaningful way, given that context, my Lady.
3 We would note that from the certificate it
4 doesn't appear that any reference is made to
5 whether any of the material in bundle A is
6 already within the public domain. We would
7 assume it isn't, but of course, a highly relevant
8 factor will be whether any of this material was
9 touched upon in Crevice or Theseus or elsewhere
10 and it is not clear from the face of the document
11 that that is the case.
12 We do also note there is a reference at
13 page 6, paragraph 15A, the security forces -- as
14 distinct from the Security Services -- and we
15 were unclear whether that was a typographical
16 error or deliberate, but again, we were surprised
17 to see the reference to security forces in this,
18 and we simply note that.
19 My Lady, we recognise it is a matter for you
20 and we are very much in your hands. We emphasise
21 the presumption in favour of disclosure, the
22 importance to all the families of ensuring that
23 this issue is fully, fairly and fearlessly
24 investigated, and we hope that our submissions
25 can be borne fully in mind when you consider this

15

1 issue.
2 Unless I can assist you further, my Lady?
3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No. Very helpful
4 indeed. Thank you very much. Mr Patterson?
5 MR PATTERSON: My Lady, may I echo what has
6 been said by Ms Gallagher and, in summary, the
7 essential points I would make are, first, when it
8 comes to the ex parte Wiley balancing exercise
9 I know that the families that I represent, and
10 I'm confident that those represented by other
11 counsel not present today, would agree that we
12 have absolute confidence in your Ladyship,
13 assisted by your team of counsel, and we are very
14 grateful for the hard work that has been clearly
15 put into this exercise already. We've absolute
16 confidence in the striking of the balance in the
17 right place.
18 The families that I represent simply want
19 proper answers to the questions that you listed
20 in that list of factual issues some six months
21 ago and sometimes it is the case that, with the
22 passage of time, the acute desire for an answer
23 diminishes, but for many of the families, as has
24 been said, preventability is the big issue and
25 I know that they are keen to embark upon that

16

1 exercise with your Ladyship in six weeks or so.
2 The coronial process has had an impact
3 already in a whole host of respects. Your
4 Ladyship has inquired very thoroughly and very
5 robustly into issues already, such as possible
6 delays, protocols that may have hampered the
7 emergency responders on the day, and we are
8 confident that the exercise, in terms of
9 preventability, will be as thorough and robust,
10 not only in ensuring transparency and
11 accountability for those who are entrusted with
12 protecting national security and the safety of
13 the public, but also in terms of identifying
14 lessons to be learned.
15 The threat from terrorism, as we see, sadly,
16 in the papers most days, is as pressing as ever.
17 Your Ladyship plays a very important role on
18 behalf of the public, so yes, it is not
19 a criminal prosecution and, yes, the liberty of
20 the individual isn't at stake in that respect,
21 however the competing public interests are such
22 that there is a very pressing need for your
23 Ladyship to enquire thoroughly into what went on
24 and to ensure that the questions listed in the
25 factual issues are fully and fearlessly

17

1 investigated.
2 That's all I say, my Lady, in relation to the
3 certificate.
4 In terms of the timeliness of disclosure,
5 your Ladyship knows there are a lot of people
6 eager to get started on the exercise and we all
7 have competing demands in January in other
8 issues. Unless I can assist further, those are
9 my submissions.
10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much
11 indeed, Mr Patterson.
12 Right, Mr O'Connor, well I have the
13 submissions as far as the public interest
14 immunity is concerned. Are there any other
15 matters we can deal with in open court, or need
16 to deal with, which involve the other advocates?
17 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, as far as PII
18 is concerned, I think Mr Garnham may wish to
19 reply to some of the points made by my learned
20 friends. Before he does so, may I briefly make
21 some submissions on three points relating to PII.
22 We can then perhaps move to the ancillary points
23 and --
24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It seemed to me there
25 wasn't a great deal of conflict between people.

18

1 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: There wasn't. I don't
2 think there is a great deal, my Lady.
3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But there are nuances.
4 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: May I just make three
5 points?
6 The first, which is the point which has been
7 touched on by all of those that have spoken so
8 far is the question of how to approach and how to
9 formulate the considerations that you need to
10 take into account in performing the balancing
11 exercise, and in particular what goes into the
12 mix, as it were, on the open justice side of the
13 balance.
14 My Lady, we endorse the approach taken by
15 Mr Garnham and I think this is probably common
16 ground at a high level of generality that the
17 considerations are those referred to in
18 paragraph 12 of the certificate and the points
19 made by Lord Bingham in the Amin case.
20 Ms Gallagher says that those are strong
21 considerations in favour of openness and we would
22 also endorse that.
23 As far as her submission that they are
24 stronger considerations than the considerations
25 which apply in civil proceedings, we would submit

19

1 that it may be that there is little to be gained
2 from trying to establish some sort of rank here
3 as between criminal PII, civil PII and inquest
4 PII, when, as the case makes clear, the whole
5 process is fundamentally a fact-specific one and
6 different criminal cases will give rise to
7 different considerations of openness. The same
8 is true of civil proceedings and the same is
9 clearly true of inquest proceedings. So we
10 accept that they are strong considerations but we
11 would submit that really the matter needs to be
12 taken no further than that at this level of
13 principle.
14 My Lady, could I, for the second and third
15 points I want to make, ask you to turn to
16 paragraph 10 of the certificate?
17 You will see at paragraph 10 -- and
18 Mr Garnham has already taken you to this -- three
19 steps identified which are the conventional and
20 broad steps that any court needs to take when
21 considering a PII claim: first of all, relevance;
22 secondly, harm; thirdly, the balance.
23 May I add two factors for you to consider,
24 and they are factors which have been referred to
25 in the cases which Mr Garnham has referred to at

20

1 paragraph 9 -- or which are referred to at
2 paragraph 9 of the certificate. The first of
3 those two factors slots into the mix between (ii)
4 and (iii) and that is that if you are satisfied
5 that the material is relevant and, if you are
6 satisfied that disclosing it would cause harm,
7 you must then consider whether it is possible to
8 make limited disclosure of the information in
9 question without causing the harm that would be
10 caused by disclosing the material in its entirety
11 in open. There are at least two ways in which
12 that can be done.
13 The first is by gisting the material. That
14 is a process that Mr Garnham has already referred
15 to. The second is by making the material fully
16 disclosed, but by doing it in a process that is
17 less open than fully open proceedings.
18 My Lady, one matter of which we are now fully
19 informed is that under rule 17 of the
20 Coroner's Rules you have a power to conduct
21 proceedings in camera and there may be some
22 circumstances -- I put it no higher than that at
23 this stage -- whereby at least some of the harm
24 that would be caused by disclosing material that
25 has been made subject the claim of a PII would be

21

1 ameliorated simply by disclosing the material,
2 not in the full, normal way in public, but by
3 disclosing it within in camera proceedings.
4 So those are two different types of
5 procedures which would achieve the same end.
6 They are to be considered as part of this process
7 and we consider it very much part of our role to
8 have in mind the possibility of those two
9 things: first of all, attempting, as far as
10 possible, to gist the material so that the
11 interested persons can see it and, secondly,
12 always keeping in mind the consideration of
13 having proceedings that are less than fully
14 public, but which, as we now know, interested
15 persons can attend and see the material.
16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: As a last resort.
17 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Certainly a last resort
18 but one that is very much to be borne in mind
19 when these issues are in play.
20 My Lady, that was the first of the final two
21 points I wanted to make.
22 The second point, it may provide some sort of
23 answer to the issue raised by Ms Gallagher about
24 the observations of Silber J in the Al Rawi case
25 to the effect that disclosure or PII issues are

22

1 best dealt with at the end of the disclosure
2 process. My Lady, so far as Al Rawi is
3 concerned, you will know that was a case of
4 really exceptional difficulty when it came to
5 disclosure and it would be difficult to read too
6 much into an observation made in the very
7 particular factors of that case.
8 But a better answer, my Lady, may be found in
9 the case of R v H, which is one of the cases that
10 the certificate refers to at paragraph 9.
11 My Lady, I don't ask you to look at this case now
12 but, at paragraph 36 of that case, Lord Bingham
13 identified a number of steps that the court must
14 consider in analysing a PII claim, and the final
15 point he makes is that, if the answer, at the end
16 of the process, is that the PII claim is
17 essentially a good one and that the disclosure
18 cannot be made, the question the court must ask
19 itself is: does that remain the correct answer as
20 the trial unfolds, evidence is adduced and the
21 defence advanced?
22 It's important that the answer that the court
23 gives to the PII claim should not be treated as
24 final, once and for all -- should not be treated
25 as a final once and for all answer, but

23

1 a provisional answer which the court must keep
2 under view. My Lady, that applies no less in
3 these proceedings.
4 For reasons of convenience, you are asked to
5 determine the PII claim or hear submissions on it
6 today. Of course, that doesn't mean to say that
7 any answer you give will be a final answer. With
8 this claim, just as with any other, the matter
9 will be kept under review and the keeping of it
10 under review, again, is one of the functions that
11 we can perform as the process unfolds.
12 My Lady, those are the submissions I wish to
13 make, I'm grateful.
14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Garnham?
15 MR GARNHAM: There is only one matter upon
16 which I wish to make reply, my Lady and that
17 arises out of Ms Gallagher's submissions about
18 the existence of a presumption. We submit there
19 is no presumption on a PII certificate at all.
20 It's a question of properly identifying the
21 factors in the balance. Here, as Ms Gallagher
22 rightly acknowledges, the proper consideration is
23 an importance of an inquest in the Amin sense and
24 that is what you have to set against national
25 security considerations. There is no

24

1 presumption, we would submit, either in favour of
2 disclosure or in favour of national security.
3 It's a pure balancing exercise with those matters
4 in mind.
5 Lastly, we would respectfully agree with what
6 Mr Andrew O'Connor says about Al Rawi and that
7 the proper approach is not to put off the
8 decision, but to keep the result under review
9 whichever way it goes.
10 Thank you, my Lady.
11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.
12 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, may I now
13 return to the question you asked me about other
14 matters? The position -- and perhaps I can
15 explain, as everyone in court is aware, this has
16 been a long-running and not without difficulty
17 disclosure exercise. You have now conducted more
18 than one hearing. We are confident that
19 a tranche of disclosure will be made available to
20 the interested persons by way of Lextranet in the
21 next week or so -- and I apologise I can't be any
22 more precise than that, but that is the stage we
23 have reached -- but there are a number of pieces
24 of disclosure that will be being made
25 available: some redacted documents relating to

25

1 the Crevice inquiries, some further material
2 relating to Mr Gilbertson, we very much hope,
3 also, what is now a very extensive gist of the
4 minutes of the ELG meetings, and I can say that
5 the current draft of that gist runs to some 60 or
6 more pages.
7 That is to be -- there will also be further
8 disclosure from the Metropolitan Police, a lot of
9 the internal documents created during the course
10 of Operation Crevice and after. So those are the
11 matters that are very much in play. Christmas
12 has been treated as something of a deadline,
13 there are meetings that will take place later on
14 today, we are very much optimistic that
15 a quantity of that material will be made on
16 Lextranet towards the end of this week and that
17 is the position.
18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr O'Connor, I know
19 a huge amount of work has been going on behind
20 the scenes and I'm very grateful for that work,
21 which has led us to a position of being able to
22 disclose as much information as possible before
23 Christmas.
24 Right, anything else we need to deal with in
25 open session? Ms Gallagher?

26

1 MS GALLAGHER: My Lady, can I deal briefly
2 with a number of matters?
3 The first issue is there is a PII scheduled
4 for 10 January. This may be our error, but we
5 are not aware of a timetabling place in terms of,
6 if there is a certificate, when it is to come, if
7 there is a particular date in January by which we
8 will get submissions from the Secretary of State.
9 It would be helpful to have an indication, if
10 that occurs over the Christmas break and helpful,
11 not only for my legal team, but other legal teams
12 who are affected during the Christmas break and
13 so on.
14 That is the first matter.
15 The second matter just relates to disclosure
16 and, could I just say, I think my Lady is aware
17 that there has been interaction between the legal
18 teams for the five legal teams for the bereaved
19 families and we are grateful for all the work
20 that has been done and we are very conscious that
21 the team has done a huge amount and made Trojan
22 efforts to make information available to us.
23 We are grateful for the indication
24 Mr O'Connor has given you about Christmas being
25 treated as something of a deadline. As was

27

1 alluded to by Mr Patterson, January is a very
2 busy month for those of us involved in
3 Tavistock Square and, also, immediately after
4 Tavistock Square we are going to be dealing with
5 other generic issues, and we've arrangements with
6 the Legal Services Commission, we've divided
7 those issues up between us. We all have quite
8 substantial responsibilities.
9 I accept, as was said on the last occasion,
10 that Mr O'Connor, QC, does not have those
11 commitments but of course he does have other
12 commitments. We are very grateful for the
13 indication that material is going to be made
14 available in the next week or so and any
15 criticism that has been made of slippage in the
16 timetable is certainly not a criticism of your
17 inquest team, we are very conscious how much work
18 has been going on behind the scenes and the
19 documents that have been referred to will be
20 extremely helpful.
21 Reference was made to further information by
22 Mr Gilbertson. We haven't received information
23 about Mr Gilbertson, but I assume that's
24 a reference to the statements. You know there
25 was some difficulty with disclosing the

28

1 statements with redactions and that has led to
2 some further behind-the-scenes work.
3 Then could I just deal very, very briefly
4 with some matters that came up in submissions
5 from Mr O'Connor and also from Mr Garnham. It
6 seems, as you indicated, my Lady, there's very
7 little between the parties for the open session
8 in respect of the principles to be applied. That
9 is plainly a terminology distinction, but that
10 terminology distinction is evident from the case
11 law too and, in the criminal context, you quite
12 often see references to presumption or the golden
13 rule and so on, but in reality, it's all talking
14 about, as Mr O'Connor and Mr Garnham have said,
15 a simple application of the balancing exercise.
16 There's just two issues which Mr O'Connor
17 referred to with which we respectfully agree and
18 I just wanted to raise those.
19 Firstly, in making the reference earlier to
20 the distinction between inquest proceedings,
21 criminal proceedings and standard civil
22 proceedings, I certainly wasn't intending to
23 suggest a league table of sorts and I apologise
24 if that impression was given. I simply was
25 raising the fact that an inquest -- generally,

29

1 there are certain applicable principles which we
2 add into the mix and also there are particular
3 issues in this particular inquest which we add
4 into the mix and certainly they are powerful
5 factors, but we certainly weren't intending to
6 suggest there was any form of league table.
7 Secondly, we strongly agree with the
8 references made by Mr O'Connor to alternative
9 mechanisms, intermediate options, and in terms of
10 disclosure, obviously the ideal outcome from the
11 point of view of the families, if security
12 allows, is to have full disclosure, but we agree
13 with, to use your phrase, my Lady, the last
14 resort approach and, to borrow from the language
15 of the human rights world, the least restricted
16 means approach, and gisting or redaction or any
17 other more creative methods which have been used
18 in other cases, as was highlighted in the
19 materials put before the court in the judicial
20 review proceedings, my Lady, by inquest, liberty
21 and justice, we would strongly be in favour of
22 any of those alternative methods being used, if
23 at all possible, and PII being very much the last
24 resort.
25 I will just check with my solicitor if

30

1 there's any further. Nothing further, my Lady,
2 thank you.
3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you
4 Ms Gallagher, Mr Patterson, is there anything you
5 wish to raise?
6 MR PATTERSON: Nothing further, my Lady.
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Garnham, is there
8 anything you wish to raise in open submissions?
9 MR GARNHAM: Only on the question of
10 timetabling, my Lady. May I suggest that is
11 dealt with initially in the closed session at the
12 end of the PII application and then arrangements
13 are made through Mr Smith to ensure that
14 Ms Gallagher is aware of what the timetabling is?
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.
16 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady that is
17 precisely the point I was going to suggest. It
18 may be that the detail of what can or can't be
19 achieved on 10 January becomes clearer during the
20 closed hearing and Mr Smith will be able to write
21 to all persons informing them what is to take
22 place and providing material.
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Do you
24 need me to retire to go into closed session?
25 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, we would be

31

1 grateful for you to retire. I understand there
2 is a process which takes five or ten minutes to
3 alter some of the technology for us to go into a
4 closed hearing.
5 MR GARNHAM: My Lady, it would, in fact, be
6 useful for us to have five minutes, because we
7 need to speak to West Yorkshire Police on the
8 telephone. So, my Lady, if you were to say ten
9 minutes and come back at five to, that would be
10 likely to be profitable.
11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.
12 Ms Gallagher, can you send a message to
13 Mr O'Connor saying I hope he gets better soon?
14 MS GALLAGHER: Of course, my Lady. Thank
15 you.
16 (10.43 am)
17 (The open session concluded)
18

32

© Judicial Communications Office

My bolding

[Peter Presland]

Whoops...

PII = Public Interest Immunity submission made by a minister of state arguing that disclosure of certain information would be damaging to the public interest (i.e., layered British mandarin-speak for the "state").

Security forces = military intelligence --- possibly the forerunner unit of the Special Reconnaissance Regiment, the "14 Det" or "14 Int" (14 Field Security and Intelligence Company), which are thought in some quarters to have a long and ugly history in false flag operations. All members of the force retain a right of immunity from prosecution.

http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/...2010am.htm

It's all so wearyingly predictable isn't it?

The glaring anomalies and inconsistencies revealed at the inquest to date (with its crass fawning anachronisms of 'my Lady this' and 'my Lady that'), would actually have the Mandarins worried if the public weren't so damned gullible. Even so there will have been a degree of fluttering in the dovecots over in-your-face confirmations of the sheer absurdity of the established 'Official Narrative'. They are clearly determined not to let matters slip still further.

Both the J7: 7/7 Inquests and Nick Kollerstrom's 'Terror on the Tube' Blogs are worth following on all of the above.

Meanwhile poor old Anthony John Hill (aka Muad'Dib) of Ripple Effect fame, continues to rot in Wandsworth prison after extradition from Ireland for having had the temerity to send a dozen copies of his video to 'The Clerk of the Court' in the trial of the 6 alleged 7/7 accomplices who were found not-guilty anyway. The charge - Attempting to pervert the course of justice! - I kid you not. He has now served over 5 months in prison plus two years on extradition remand in Ireland.

You just couldn't bloody well make this up could you?

He's pretty well penniless - surviving on a State Pension and now stands to lose his council owned home in Ireland as well. It makes me sick and I mean SICK SICK SICK when I contemplate what this oh so superior democracy of ours is capable of. They've found somebody else to persecute and by God they're damn well going to persecute him

[David Guyatt]

Muad' Dib:

The arrest warrant (honest!):



The latest (honest!):

16.12.10 Bail hearing - Bail for Assange but no bail for Muad'Dib!
created 16.12.2010 - 15:19, updated 23.12.2010 - 21:26
This just in - Muad'Dib has today been denied bail, shortly after Julian Assange's bail was granted.
Before the bail-hearing, the courtroom was cleared of all members of the public and anyone else that was not "legally" participating in the case. This is something known as having a hearing "in chambers", though, in practice, people don't actually goto the judge's chambers. The courtroom is cleared of anyone the judge doesn't want there instead.
So, no friends of Muad'Dib were able to be in the courtroom and witness first-hand what actually occurred and they were only informed after the court-hearing by a lawyer in the hallway.

Based upon what was reported back by the lawyer present, the judge's main issue was that Muad'Dib would "re-offend" by contacting other people while on bail. The judge made specific note of the 7/7 inquest going on (which is a show "trial" where the criminals "investigate" themselves). There was apparently other things shared in court which could have been easily responded to by any of us that know what is really going on out in the world, but that is probably why the judge kicked everyone who knew anything about Muad'Dib and his situation out of the courtroom. The lone lawyer handling the case, who has never even spoken with Muad'Dib, nevermind knows anything about him, was therefore ill-equipped to handle the situation. The fact that Muad'Dib had already been out on bail for about a year and a half and had not "re-offended" made no difference to the judge. Logic and sensibility are not aspects of modern-day British "justice".

How dare a resident of Paddyland send videos to Her Majesty's Court of the Clerk. I mean, really!

The 7/7 Ripple Effect doco can be viewed HERE.

[Paul Rigby]

Latest blog from the J7 team:

http://77inquests.blogspot.com/2011/01/c...sible.html

Extract:

In the closing minutes of Friday's open hearing, after some time-wasting by Hugo Keith (whose own legal career in representing the interests of State, wealth and power is in direct contrast to O'Connor's), O'Connor made this strong argument against 'Witness G' being called as the lone 'corporate' witness for the Security Services:

"My Lady, on the question of adequacy of Witness G, I can literally do, in two or three minutes, what our thoughts are at the moment. There is, of course, no objection to Witness G being called at all. He is a well-positioned witness to talk about systems and resources.

However, he has absolutely no history of -- absolutely no involvement in any of these investigations by way of operational involvement or supervision. Secondly, he has, it seems, a complete absence of any involvement in any kind of Islamic terrorism investigations. Again, operationally or in a supervisory capacity. That is a very striking contrast, if we may say so, with the witnesses put forward by the Metropolitan Police Service -- Mr Prunty and Mr Clark -- who could not be better positioned to talk about the relevant issues, as well as Mr Parkinson from West Yorkshire Police. Slightly different, but similarly, very well qualified. We simply are puzzled by the fact that, for instance, an obvious witness would be the actual supervising manager of the desk officers concerned in 2003 to 2005, of these particular investigations, who had hands-on experience, and can actually answer real questions beyond the documents. That supervising manager will have been responsible for all the responses to the Intelligence and Security Committee. No question. So he or she will already have been deeply and profoundly involved in an accountability exercise which happened twice and lasted over some considerable time." [p77:20]

Reassuring to see MI5 has nothing to hide or fear from open hearings and the questioning of relevant personnel.

[Peter Lemkin]

Muad' Dib:

The arrest warrant (honest!):



The latest (honest!):

16.12.10 Bail hearing - Bail for Assange but no bail for Muad'Dib!
created 16.12.2010 - 15:19, updated 23.12.2010 - 21:26
This just in - Muad'Dib has today been denied bail, shortly after Julian Assange's bail was granted.
Before the bail-hearing, the courtroom was cleared of all members of the public and anyone else that was not "legally" participating in the case. This is something known as having a hearing "in chambers", though, in practice, people don't actually goto the judge's chambers. The courtroom is cleared of anyone the judge doesn't want there instead.
So, no friends of Muad'Dib were able to be in the courtroom and witness first-hand what actually occurred and they were only informed after the court-hearing by a lawyer in the hallway.

Based upon what was reported back by the lawyer present, the judge's main issue was that Muad'Dib would "re-offend" by contacting other people while on bail. The judge made specific note of the 7/7 inquest going on (which is a show "trial" where the criminals "investigate" themselves). There was apparently other things shared in court which could have been easily responded to by any of us that know what is really going on out in the world, but that is probably why the judge kicked everyone who knew anything about Muad'Dib and his situation out of the courtroom. The lone lawyer handling the case, who has never even spoken with Muad'Dib, nevermind knows anything about him, was therefore ill-equipped to handle the situation. The fact that Muad'Dib had already been out on bail for about a year and a half and had not "re-offended" made no difference to the judge. Logic and sensibility are not aspects of modern-day British "justice".

How dare a resident of Paddyland send videos to Her Majesty's Court of the Clerk. I mean, really!

The 7/7 Ripple Effect doco can be viewed HERE.

I was unaware of this horrible development and travesty of 'justice' until now! I see the UK has sunk to the same lowest level of Dante's Inferno as the USA. How could sending an attempt at investigative research put into a film be a crime?! I guess most of us on this Forum could also be convicted of similar attempts to enlighten the criminals of State. http://terroronthetube.co.uk/2010/12/08/...#more-1754 Knowledge of and speaking about the 'Unspeakable' is now officially a crime....hmmmm......

Addendum....can someone try to explain the fascist logic of his 'crime'?!

[David Guyatt]

Luvely-jubely.... send the building caretaker in to answer questions he knows nothing about.

Secret state dodge book chapter 15 - "How to Sucker an Official Inquiry".

[Paul Rigby]

Luvely-jubely.... send the building caretaker in to answer questions he knows nothing about.

Secret state dodge book chapter 15 - "How to Sucker an Official Inquiry".

My all-time favourite variant on this ancient dodge was the deployment of an incomprehensible Glaswegian historian in a BBC programme - fronted, I dimly recollect, by David "Dismal" Taylor - on the British employment of Nazis post-WWII.

In the absence of subtitles, the historian's responses amounted to a "See you, Jimmy," from British intelligence.

[David Guyatt]

Did he argue that they were "conscientious workers"?

[Paul Rigby]

Did he argue that they were "conscientious workers"?

He was in the "extraordinary powers of concentration" camp.

Least, I think he was.

[Paul Rigby]

The phrase "bang to rights" sprang to mind as I reading the following. Anyone with any doubt as to the dishonesty of the official case is vindicated:

Saturday, February 5, 2011
SIMply wrong

http://77inquests.blogspot.com/2011/02/s...l#comments

Back in October 2010, when DS Stuart first gave sworn testimony to the 7/7 Inquests (J7 analysis here) he told us that a phone belonging to MSK was found at Edgware Road:

Q. In particular, investigators found in the wreckage a phone subsequently determined to belong to Khan?
A. That's correct, sir, yes.
Q. When that phone was examined, did it have any readable data on it?
A. No, sir, it was damaged beyond --

Source: Transcripts 14th October 2010 morning page 3 lines 2 - 7

DS Stuart then discussed the calls made and received on this 'phase 4 operational phone' produced in a schedule entitled 'Draft schedule of all calls between MSK, Tanweer, Hussein and Lindsay attributed phones 270605 - 070705, and all calls in the same period to/from phones used by the four on 070705'.

The details for the phone used by Khan and described as 'a phase 4 operational phone' ends with '254'. Its recovery and connection to Khan was described to Hugo Keith QC by DS Stuart:

A. The handset for that phone was discovered at the Edgware Road scene where Mohammed Sidique Khan's body was recovered. DNA from Mohammed Sidique Khan was recovered from the handset as well. The phone was routinely cell-sited in and around his home address. It was cell-sited in Luton on the 7th where we know from CCTV Mohammed Sidique Khan was. It only ever rang the other three. It was never rung by another number attributed to Mohammed Sidique Khan.

Source: ibid page 12 lines 6 -14

DS Stuart then claims that previous operational phones contained no suspicious contacts, preferring to claim that each of the 4 phase 'operational phones' were only called by the 4 accused in connection to each other, the caveat to that being calls to car hire companies and the 3 men that were tried in the Theseus trial. Answering question from Mr Patterson QC, we gather that:

Q. Have you, Sergeant, analysed the contacts made between the earlier phones and numbers being used by the four men and other people outside that group of four?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did those enquiries lead you to any suspicions as to other contacts that might have led to suggestions that other people were involved or assisting the four men?
A. There have been prior court cases in relation to that, sir, yes.
Q. I'm aware of that, and three individuals in particular, but focusing just on the days leading up to 7/7, any suspicious contacts in any of the telephones in that period of time?
A. No, this is an accurate schedule of that, of all the contacts.
Q. Yes. That's not quite an answer to my question. One issue that arises is whether there's evidence that the four bombers were assisted in any way, either on the 7th itself or in the days leading up, and one way we can analyse that question is by focusing on telephone contact. Any suspicious contacts on the 7th or in the days leading up with others outside of the group of four?
A. No, sir, not that I'm aware of, no, sir.

Source: ibid page 21 lines 25 on

This point is further confirmed by counsel to the MPS, Max Hill, in his questioning of DS Stuart:

Q. Then just looking at the entirety of this schedule, so the period from 27 June to 7 July, are you saying that this is a complete operational picture in terms of telephones in the hands of all four bombers throughout the period 27 June to 7 July?
A. Operational, yes, sir.
Q. In answer to earlier questions from Mr Patterson, it is right that at an earlier stage there was what might be called some operational telephone use connected to those who became the subject of the Theseus trials.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The three men who stood trial in 2008 and 2009.

Source: ibid page 31 lines 13 on

To sum up what we knew in October 2010, a single phone, Khan's 'phase 4 operational phone 254', was found at the Edgware Road site, the phone had no recoverable data, the schedule released shows all calls made and received on operational phones between 27/08/05 and 07/07/05. The only suspicious calls made and/or received on operational phones were those connected to the two Theseus trials held in 2008/09.

J7 contacted the Inquests to clarify some of these details when we became aware that DS Stuart would return to give further testimony to the 7/7 Inquests on 2nd February 2011. One of the issues we asked for clarification on was: During the questioning of Detective Sergeant Mark Stuart, in sworn testimony, he stated that there was no recoverable data from a phone 'determined to belong' to Mohammad Sidique Khan:

However, news articles covering the first and second trials of the accused Waheed Ali, Sadeer Saleem and Mohammed Shakil claim that a phone recovered from Edgware Road contained phone numbers attributable to the accused and a text message sent from Waheed Ali to Khan:

Flewitt said the strength of Ali's relationship to Khan was demonstrated by a text message Ali sent to the July 7 ringleader on December 7 2003.

It read: "Gates of memories I will neva (sic) close. How much I will miss you no one knows. Tears in my eyes will wipe away but the love in my heart for you will always stay."

In the remains of Khan's mobile telephone, recovered from the debris at Edgware Road, were numbers "attributable" to Shakil, saved as "SHAXMOB",and Saleem, saved as "Sads", the jury was told.
Source: Guardian 10/04/2008

Evidence in the trial included details of the remains of Mohammad Sidique Khan's phone, found amid the wreckage of his Edgware Road blast that killed six people. His phone included a number tagged "SHAXMOB", attributable to Mohammed Shakil, and another entry, "SADS", referring to Sadeer Saleem.

Source: BBC 01/08/2008

He was so close to Khan a text message was found on the suicide bomber's mobile phone in the rubble of the Edgware Road blast. It read: "Gates of memories I will neva (sic) close. How much I miss you no one knows.Tears in my eyes will wipe away, but the love in my heart for you will always stay."

Source: This is London 28/04/2009

When DS Stuart's returned to give further evidence on Wednesday 2nd February he was asked the following by Hugo Keith:

Q. May I, before I move away from Khan's operational phones, address one particular point? An organisation that has been following this issue has expressed a certain degree of confusion as to which phones were recovered where, and perhaps I could just clear up that particular confusion, if it exists. In relation to MSK's phone, 826, the handset and SIM were found, were they not, inside the tunnel at Edgware Road?
A. That's correct.
Q. That's the third phone on the page?
A. Yes.
Q. As a result of the SIM card being found, was it possible to retrieve any of the data on that phone?
A. There was no data that could be recovered. Although it was sent off for examination, they couldn't extract any data for it.
Q. What about in relation to the last operational phone, 254, which was also, I think you told us last year, recovered from Edgware Road --
A. Yes, sir.
Q. -- or at least certainly the handset was recovered and I think you told us that it was damaged beyond repair?
A. It was, sir, and for the same reason, they couldn't extract any data from it either.
Q. Where Khan sent or received texts, therefore, particularly at the time of the use of the last operational phone, how were you able to retrieve data evidencing the sending or receipt of texts?
A. The actual sending would come from the call data. The context or the content, we would rely on downloads for whichever phone it was sent to or received from.
Q. So are there a number of routes by which data can be retrieved, even if you don't have the original SIM card?
A. Yes, sir.

Source: Transcripts 2nd February 2011 morning page 6 lines 7 on

Not only did Keith take this opportunity to claim that not only 'a phone' was found at Edgware Road, as stated by Stuart on 14th October, but in fact, two phones were found in the tunnel. Khan's phase 3 & 4 operational phones, 826 & 254 respectively. Yet it seems that only the handset and not the SIM of the 'phase 4 operational phone', the sole phone described in the schedule discussed when Stuart gave his original testimony, was recovered. No reason is given for Khan's missing SIM card.

Ms Gallagher, counsel for the bereaved, also questions DS Stuart on the question J7 posed in relation to the data extracted from Khan's phone that was referred to in the Theseus trials:

... Could I just start by dealing with this issue of confusion? Mr Keith, when questioning you, referred to an organisation having expressed confusion about your statement on 14 October about there being no readable data from the phone at Edgware Road that was recovered at Edgware Road, and you were taken to those two phones. It's [INQ11176-2]. So both the phone number ending 826 that was recovered inside the tunnel at Edgware Road --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and I think you've said the SIM card was found and sent off but there was no readable data?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And phone number 254 also recovered from Edgware Road mentioned at the bottom of that page and you said, for the same reason, no data was recoverable there?
A. The handset was recovered and it was -- no data could be --
Q. Mr Keith said, "Well, how do we have information about the exchange of text messages?", and you made reference to obtaining call data. So it's possible to obtain information about text messages without extracting it from the hardware itself, from the SIM card of the telephone?
A. Yes, there will be a record of the sending of the text on the call data that we can recover from the phone companies.
Q. But Detective Sergeant, that's just information about the sending and receipt of texts. It's not information about the content?
A. The content you would only get if the phone that either received or sent the text to the damaged phone was itself recovered and examined and we could derive data from it.
Q. So the comms data can't give you the content, that's only possible from hardware of one or other phone. So it's not possible to recover information such as contact details, so telephone numbers that are saved and so on, through comms data?
A. No, that's correct.
Q. Detective Sergeant, I think the difficulty is that your answers won't have cleared up the confusion, because the reason that the confusion has arisen is that there were a number of news articles, public at the time of the Theseus trial, which referred to the actual content of text messages recovered from one of those phones and, indeed, I think publicly there's some information with links to those news articles. But, in fact, we can go one step further because, of course, we've got the opening from counsel in the Theseus trial -- the reference is [INQ105680-12]. It's paragraph 64 and it says: "Among the debris at the scene of the Edgware Road bombing the police found part of a mobile telephone belonging to MSK. In the memory of that mobile phone was recorded a mobile telephone number attributable to Shakil ... and a ... number attributable to ...Saleem ..." Then paragraph 65, I don't think we need it on screen, but for your reference, my Lady, that includes the content of a particular text, also recovered from that.

Source: ibid page 34 lines 21 on

There is then some discussion on how the texts between Lindsay and Khan were recovered and it is established that these were accessed from Lindsay's phone, then continues:

Q. The reason it's important to do this, obviously, is, as you're aware, a number of people are following these proceedings very closely. There's been some concern expressed about this issue, so it seems sensible to just put it to bed. If there's a simple answer, let's just have it and it will be on the public record.
A. Yes, not at all. [ibid p35:5 on]
-------------
Q. Detective Sergeant, just to clarify it, if we could go back to [INQ105680-12] at paragraph 64 , when, in the opening to the Theseus trial, as was widely reported, it stated there that this information was recovered from that mobile phone found at Edgware Road, is that simply wrong?
A. Yes. [ibid p39:22 on]

Simply wrong? We can add this 'simply wrong' to the litany of errors anomalies and inconsistencies that J7 have detailed, so far, over the 15 weeks of the 7/7 Inquests. The fact that 'simply wrong' evidence can be used in an attempt to convict 3 men, all found innocent, who faced up to 40 years in prison isn't just 'simply wrong' it's 'simply appalling'.

More 'simply wrong'

The first page of a schedule detailing purchases from hydroponics shops was released, beginning on 22nd February 2005, claiming that Tanweer contacted Huddersfield Hydroponics on a phone 'atributed to him' which was cell sited within a 2km radius. Keith claims that 'operational phone usage begins around the time that hydrogen peroxide purchases are made'. [ibid p15:9 on] Yet DS Stuart gives the precise date and time for the first use of an operational phone (phase 1) for Tanweer as 25 March at 18.06, over a month after the supposed first purchase of hydrogen peroxide [ibid p11:14 on]. Simply wrong.

Pakistan calling

After claiming that no 'suspicious calls' were made to or from operational phones in DS Stuart's original testimony, the updated schedules show calls made to Khan's 'operational phones' from various phone kiosks in Pakistan, mainly from the Rawalpindi district. 'No suspicious calls' (simply wrong?) transforms into 'so many suspicious calls':

.. question of calls from Pakistan, if we just screen down, please, to page 11 [INQ11177-11] of the exhibit, we can see in the bottom half of the page there a number of calls from Pakistan?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In particular from Rawalpindi, so 9 May, 10 May. Over the page to 12 May, page 12 [INQ11177-12] of the document. Then moving forward to 14 May on page 14 [INQ11177-14] , there were a great deal many calls from Rawalpindi on that day, we can see there, all to MSK, the original schedule is in red, and I needn't go through the schedule to the later dates, but are there further calls on 19 May, 31 May and 2 June?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There appeared to be a substantial number of calls in that period from the middle of May to the beginning of June, and then, again, were there further calls from Pakistan, right at the very end, just a matter of days before the bombs are detonated on 7 July, on 2 July in fact?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you assess that these calls, therefore, were probably connected to some guidance or some means of communicating information concerned with the manufacture of the bombs and then, ultimately, their detonation?
A. Yes, I think they had to be, sir. [ibid p20:1 on]

Not just suspicious calls but apparently 'bomb-making suspicious calls' - did DS Stuart think these unworthy of mention during his first appearance at the 7/7 Inquests? Perhaps the testimony given by Clifford Todd, principal forensic investigator at the Forensic Explosives Laboratory the previous day, contains the reason:

Q. The technical expertise required to construct either the initiating device or the main explosive device, was that of a particularly high order, or could those four men -- none of whom it seems had any particular skills in chemistry -- have carried that out under a certain degree of guidance or instruction themselves?
A. Yes, they would have needed some -- certainly initial guidance or instruction, I believe. I don't think that -- my comment about them dealing with this and doing this in isolation is intended to make a distinction between four people with no experience of bomb-making, suddenly between themselves, and only between themselves, deciding to come up with a bomb plot such as this, make the devices, and go and set them off, certainly without extensive practice themselves. That's not really feasible. They would need some detailed instruction and some practice, almost certainly, at doing this. So that's what I was trying to get at in my comment about having some outside help. There must have been something more, some -- they must, at some point, have had some advice.
Q. Once the instructions or the guidance had been provided, and perhaps alongside a certain degree of training, perhaps abroad, would they have required there to have been a specialist bomb-maker or a chemist present in Alexandra Grove for bringing their plot to fruition?
A. No. I should also perhaps say that these were -- these devices were entirely unique. Certainly the hydrogen peroxide mixed with a fuel such as pepper were entirely unique within the UK for sure and, as far as I know, worldwide as well. At the time, there would have been plenty of information on the internet about how to make bombs of various descriptions, and certainly now, if you were to look, probably you will find information about devices of this particular type. But at that time, if it was the case that four people just decided to do this with no prior experience, they probably could have got enough information off the internet, but it would be extremely unlikely they would have come up with this particular design. They would have most likely come up with a design already known and spoken about on the internet, which, to the best of my knowledge, that wasn't there at that time.
Q. So this supports your overall view that the construction of these devices could only have been undertaken with guidance and instruction from elsewhere --
A. Yes, correct.
Q. -- and obviously persons unknown. The process is not, regrettably, hugely complex, but it is quite a sensitive process, is it not, in terms of getting the ratios and the mixtures right?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it your view that the paraphernalia in Alexandra Grove indicate that a great deal, unfortunately, of time and effort appears to have been dedicated to getting the ratios right and to making these devices work?
A. Yes, both the time and effort has been taken and the understanding there of what they need to do to get it right.

Source: Transcripts 1st February 2011 afternoon page 66 lines 22 on

The 'suspicious Pakistan phone calls' may go some way to answer Clifford Todd's amazement that the 4 accused were able to construct viable devices, of the like never seen before or since, without considerable expertise. What it doesn't answer is: How did they know which of the devices were viable and which were 'simply wrong'?