US/NATO War on Russia

[Lauren Johnson]

Very interesting perspective on where the resistance against the Kiev regime is going. One word: spreading rapidly outside of the Donesk and Lugansk oblasts.

The purple assed mandrill of peace has been spotted among the sunflowers on the steppes of eastern Ukraine… or Novorossiya. There have been only fleeting glimpses so far and no one with open eyes and a clear mind thinks a breeding population will be established anytime soon.



On the plus side, the current ceasefire has seen a significant reduction of the bombardment of Donetsk and Lugansk. The people of Lugansk are starting to clean up their neighborhoods and rebuild. Electricity, water and communication services are beginning to be reestablished. Refugees are returning to their homes. However, neither side sees this truce as a prelude to peace, just a lull before the fighting resumes. The Ukies are using the truce to regroup and redeploy their battered forces. They needed this respite badly. That is what they have done in every other truce they have called. Separatist militia leaders Alexei Mozgovoi and Igor Bezler have noted this and decided to stay on the offensive. Bezler said, "Ukraine's criminal authorities resumed military operations. Now there is no way back for us. There is a long road ahead to Kiev!" That is the general opinion of the separatist fighters.


But the separatists were not, as some have claimed, on the verge of major victory before the ceasefire was agreed to in Minsk. They also needed a respite to regroup and resupply, if not at 1800 GMT on 6 September, then within a few days of that.Their forces are not strong enough to defeat the entire Ukrainian army or make the run to Odessa to create greater Novorossiya. They are spread thin. The inability to quickly reduce the many pockets of Ukie units is evidence of this. Most of the separatist units operate as small saboteur-reconnaissance groups. This is how Mozgovoi described the evolving tactics employed by his Ghost Brigade:


"Here are the outlines of a few situations in which my unit has participated. I will start with the failures the defense of Lisichansk. To suppress our forces, Ukraine threw eleven thousand men at us. Our lack of success was characterized by the fact that we were still true to the original tactics the tactics of a clean fight: creating a clear front, setting up checkpoints. That was a mistake. This war, constructed by Ukies, is built on deceit: from the news to the battlefield; and because we were expecting a clean fight, we suffered casualties. I feel the loss of my men, most severely. For me, a loss of even a few individuals is a painful blow.


"Yes, we have won fights; we pushed the enemy and they have retreated, but they always returned, in greater numbers, with more weaponry. Here is a shining example of this pattern. They set up a checkpoint at Staraya Krasnyanka, between Kremennoye and Rybezhnoye. We worked it over ten times. One day we destroy it; the next morning it is already manned with new people. Today destroy, tomorrow morning new people. Ukies load up Kamaz trucks with corpses and straight away, bring in new personnel new men destined to become corpses the following day.


"The tactics of the Ukrainian army can be summed up in this: they have placed the full weight of war upon the artillery and the rocket launchers. They commence an attack with a purge of territory, which they do using Grads and self-propelled artillery systems.


"They call it targeted attacks but the outcomes of such attacks are huge areas, whole squares swept "clean". Afterwards, the tanks arrive with means to destroy in case anyone is left alive somewhere. Finally, their armored personnel carriers follow, manned with soldiers to finish up. It seems like their tactics are unbeatable. That is the reason why we've changed our own tactics.

"Even though we have grown in numbers, I refuse to send men into the open. We prefer to work in saboteur-reconnaissance groups ("SRG"): they went, they saw, they worked, and they returned. That's all. We work on their communications; we work on their distributions and their ammunition warehouses. If they don't have ammo, they don't have the ability to fire.
"Only yesterday I was informed about the destruction of a column of 10 Urals trucks that were delivering the missiles for the Grads, which were headed toward Donetsk. What can be more effective? Even if they have the launchers, without the shells those are simply piles of scrap metal, ballast. We hit them with RPGs and "Shmels" grenade launchers. [URL="http://slavyangrad.org/2014/08/29/alexei-mozgovoi-freedom-and-conscience-this-will-be-novorossia/"](Colonel Cassad)
[/URL]

Mozgovoi, BTW, is not at all pleased with the Minsk agreement and the bogus ceasefire. Not only did he decide to remain on the offensive after Ukie forces opposing him violated the ceasefire, but he has called for the political leadership of the Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples Republics to step down.

The U.S. Marines toyed with this concept in experiments with swarm tactics and distributed operations, which culminated in the HUNTER WARRIOR advanced warfare experiment. Here's a link to download a NPGS thesis entitled "Swarm Tactics and the Doctrinal Void: Lessons from the Chechen Wars." It seems the Russians learned the lessons and passed them on to the militia of Novorossiya. Too bad we went all COIN crazy since then. (The link to this document will immediately go to a Google download page. Don't worry. It's not a virus.)


In spite of their awesome tactics, IMO the militia of Novorossiya was getting dangerously close to overextending themselves. The drive south from Donetsk began with furtive advances by small SRGs along the border. It developed into a dash to the coast before turning west to the gates of Mariupol. SRGs even pushed further west bypassing Mariupol. With Ukie reinforcements moving from throughout Ukraine to Mariupol, those separatists to the far west wisely withdrew. Without the ceasefire, those SRGs probably would have continued west towards the Crimean Isthmus. The Ukie reinforcements would still arrive and the separatists themselves could have been caught in a cauldron of their own.


The half assed ceasefire may have broken the momentum of the separatist counteroffensive, but it did not halt the Novorossiyan resistance. Partisan activity in Kharkov,Odessa and Zaporozhye oblasts is increasing. Kharkov partisans set up a fake CP, halted a convoy of conscripts, disarmed officers, told the rest to go home. Nine of 84 joined the militia. Even Kiev is not immune. One of Yarosh's Pravy Sektor units was attacked and the officers eliminated. If Novorossiya is to be more than the territory they now control, the partisans will play a key part. The partisans and the majority of the Ukrainian people turning on the junta and their extremist legions. The following is a translation of a posting of a Ukrainian junta supporter in Odessa.


To my horror I understand that that only a few patriots work in our schools. Few of those who are true patriots to the depth of their souls. Odessa universities are a separate story. Listen, what is it that we were building over all these years? What can I say to my 14-year-old nephew, who says that in his class only he and another pupil are "for Ukraine", and everybody else "loves Russia"? What can I tell to an acquaintance of mine who is a teacher, who tells me that their director read an "SBU letter" during a meeting of teacher council with a recommendation of not touching the topic of the war and not mentioning the Ukrainian army during the lesson entitled "united Ukraine"? What can I tell to a female teacher, whose colleague hissed to her face: "I'll hang you first once the Russians will arrive!" Galina Z. continues to teach in the Institute of Internal Affairs. The very same person who cried on air in Kiselyov's program (n.b. a popular Russian TV program) and told how people were eaten in the House of Unions, she saw how "nazis wiped their lips with napkins". A couple of months ago I thought that we broke out. But it turned out to be an illusion.
The junta and Nuland's nightmare are quite fragile. Outside the Pravy Sektor and Svoboda extremists and those paid by the U.S. Embassy to protest at the Maidan, IMO the Ukrainians would rather live in peace and be on good terms with the West and Russia… or at least not make enemies of either.
I have only addressed the internal situation in this post. In a day or so, I'll comment on the international aspects.


TTG

Posted at 11:56 PM in Current Affairs, Russia, The Military Art, TTG | Permalink
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Comments

confusedponderer said...
"IMO the Ukrainians would rather live in peace and be on good terms with the West and Russia… or at least not make enemies of either."
Agreed. The polls from the time before the crisis consistently suggested nothing less: Independence from Russia and no membership in NATO.
That would allow Ukraine to take from both sides what they can get, while both sides have influence but neither side has control. If not for the endemic corruption and the oligarchs, they could do as well as the Finns. What's not to like. Everybody but the nuts could be happy.
But this isn't enough! Our imperial overlords in their fathomless wisdom have passed that the Ukrainians are to choose betwen East and West, and spent 5 billion to make sure the answer ist West. As a result the country has fractured. Which is Moscow's fault for opposing it.

Reply 09 September 2014 at 05:26 AM



Dubhaltach said in reply to confusedponderer...
In reply to confusedponderer 09 September 2014 at 05:26 AM
Ah but "Finlandisation" has always been a dirty word. Didn't you get the memo? Check your inbox - It's the one written in runes on hide and dating back to ....
Dubhaltach

Reply 09 September 2014 at 09:17 AM



Dubhaltach said...
TTG:
I think you might want to check your link to "Swarm Tactics and the Doctrinal Void: Lessons from the Chechen Wars."
Which goes to another document entitled "The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and Concept Based Experimentation:
Armed To Fight in the 21st Century"
A link to the document you cite is this URI:

Given that the length of the link will probably break the site's layout could you please edit it out of this comment once you've altered the URI in your posting?
Dubhaltach

Reply 09 September 2014 at 09:03 AM



The Twisted Genius said in reply to Dubhaltach...
Dubhaltach,
Thanks for that. I fixed the link in the post and removed the long assed URL in your comment.

Reply 09 September 2014 at 09:27 AM



Dubhaltach said...
TTG: I agree with you that the momentum seems to have been lost for the Novorossiyan forces but also that they were in danger of overextending. I find myself wondering whether they came under very strong pressure to agree to a ceasefire from - let us say their backers, precisely in order to allow them to regroup and perhaps re-equip? I'm asking you to speculate I know but I'd be interested in your thoughts on that.
Dubhaltach

Reply 09 September 2014 at 09:15 AM



The Twisted Genius said in reply to Dubhaltach...
Dubhaltach,
I have no doubt there was extreme pressure by Russia. Putin is doing his level best to reduce the risk of nuclear war while still seeking his regional and global objectives. More on that later.

Reply 09 September 2014 at 09:35 AM

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[Lauren Johnson]

Just devastating. And there are those who say they don't matter because they will not be kept. The rebels are in need of time to regroup.

The Twelve Points of Betrayal

Original: [URL="http://belyaev.livejournal.com/175137.html"]Mikhail Belyayev LiveJournal
[/URL]Translation Gleb Bazov / Edited by @GBabeuf

Have you ever wondered how complete and unconditional betrayal looks? How a knife looks when it is stuck by a steady hand right between the shoulder blades during a friendly embrace? How poison looks when it is mixed into a glass of water given to a man dying of thirst? As it turns out, all this looks far more ordinary and prosaic than even the most meagre and impoverished human imagination could portray. As it turns out, betrayal is simply two sheets of paper with a row of signatures at the end of a column of dry, numbered paragraphs.

The publicized text of the ceasefire agreement that was signed in Minsk is what this very real betrayal looks like. The betrayal of everything that the Novorossiya Militiamen fought and died for. The betrayal of Novorossiya itself, because, based on the text of this agreement, there is no place envisioned for Novorossiya, nor for the Militia and nor even for any "special status" for the People's Republics.

All that this so-called ceasefire agreement provides for is a temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions. Even that is conditional on the complete elimination of the Militia and the release of all Ukrainian prisoners of war; moreover, the Militiamen are obliged not only to lay down arms, but also to leave the territory of Ukraine. In return, Ukraine promises amnesty to the parties to the conflict, a national dialogue, and certain measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in the Donbass. The LPR and the DPR are not even mentioned in the text of the agreement, and their representatives have signed it without any titles or ranks.

Independence and statehood? Novorossiya? A temporary special status in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regionshere is all you have of independent Novorossiya. Here is all your freedom and sovereignty. You can write out these words a thousand times, print them on paper, and then shove them deep down your throat. In any event, death by strangulation is better than death through shame. Ukraine does not even intend to give autonomy to the People's Republics. She did not even deign to mention these very Republics in the agreement. Temporary self-government in certain areasthat is the extent of Ukrainian generosity for the rebellious Donbass.

The Militiamen? According to this agreement they are now exiles and must leave the Donbass. Forever. Yes, the merciful Ukrainian side undertakes to pardon and not to criminally prosecute them. But only after they lay down arms and remove themselves from the territory of Ukraine. After all, according the agreement, all the unlawful military formations (meaning the Militia) must immediately be withdrawn beyond the boundaries of Ukraine.

Prisoners of war? Only the Militia is obligated to release them. The text of the agreement refers only to hostages and unlawfully detained persons, and, from the standpoint of Ukrainian law, the detention of Militiamen is perfectly legal. Like with terrorists. After all, this is the label that the Ukrainian state has applied to them.
This is not even the new Khasavyurt. At least pursuant to the Khasavyurt Accord, Russia did not promise to become part of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and did not agree to expel its own army from the country. This agreement is something incomprehensible and beyond the pale; it remains a mystery as to how the representatives of Novorossiya could have signed this masterpiece of Ukrainian arrogance and conceit.

To abide by this agreement is to spitlasciviously and with great relishin the face of every Militiaman and civilian murdered in the conflict; to spit in the face of those who were burned alive in the Odessa House of the Trade Unions; to spit in the face of the "Madonna of Gorlovka" and her murdered child; to spit in the face of all those left disabled, all those whoin their primewere left without arms, without legs, without eyes, all those who until the end of their days will now be crippled because of this war. And then, it is to spit in the face of those who lived in homes devastated by Ukrainian artillery and air power. All those who lost their livelihood, the roof above their heads and their familiar lives. All those who lost everything and through several long months buried friends, relatives and loves onesburied their husbands and their sons. Those who no longer lived, but survived, after war burst into their land.

Yes, peace is needed. It is needed both by Novorossiya and by Ukraine. This war has already claimed too many lives and brought too much suffering. But what is needed is a real peace treaty and a subsequent divorce into two separate states. And the papers that were signed in Minsk do not represent a peace treaty. They contain an act of unconditional surrender that has no analogue in the world other than an agreement of annexation of the defeated party.

So we very much hope that this agreement will simply be ignored on the front-linesthat it will be dismissed as one would with a nightmare, and that Novorossiya will continue its struggle. A fight for a real Peace, until true freedom and independence are secured. After all, by honouring this agreement Novorossiya will itself, by its own hands, commit suicide.

[Paul Rigby]

SOME POINTS CONCERNING THE CEASEFIRE
By Alexander Mercouris

Facebook, 8 September 2014

https://www.facebook.com/alexander.merco...5534289027

Since the ceasefire was announced criticism has mounted with more criticism from people like Gubarev. I understand some of this criticism but I think it would help to explain some points.

Criticism is now focusing on two specific issues:

(1) The protocol of the ceasefire agreement, which is in Russian only.
https://slavyangrad.files.wordpress.com/...ginal.pdf;
and
(2) Complaints that the ceasefire benefits the junta more than the NAF and is at the very least premature.
In my opinion (1) is simply wrong. There is much more to be said for (2). However there are points to be made even about (2).

The Protocol

Before discussing the Protocol in detail I want to say that this is in my opinion an essentially academic discussion. The wording of the Protocol does not bear the weight people are attaching to it if only because those involved in the conflict will interpret it in their own way. I merely discuss this issue because others do.

1. The first point to understand about the Protocol is that it originates from a forum, the Tripartite Contact Group, that was supposedly set up to "implement" Poroshenko's (non) peace plan. The NAF is not formally a member of the Contact Group. Its members are the OSCE, Russia and the Ukraine. The Contact Group "invited" the NAF representatives to attend and provided a venue for discussions between the junta and the NAF, which was useful for agreeing a ceasefire. However the Protocol is in no sense a final settlement agreement. That is postponed pending the "national dialogue" the Protocol refers to.

2. The Protocol is a technical document. If one ignores the language of the Protocol (deriving from the Contact Group's origins as a body to "implement" Poroshenko's (non) peace plan) and focuses instead on its content it is clear that it is the NAF that has gained most from it. Specifically

(1) It has obtained a "bilateral ceasefire" something it has been seeking since April. Please note that the key word is "bilateral". Poroshenko's previous ceasefire was unilateral which meant he could end it whenever he wanted to and that he did not recognise the NAF by declaring it. What "bilateral" means is that the Ukraine now acknowledges the NAF as a party to the conflict and is negotiating with it. As I have previously argued Poroshenko did everything he could to avoid this and tried to agree a ceasefire with Putin instead of with the NAF. Putin said no.

The word "bilateral" incidentally also means that Kuchma's status is no longer in question. The junta had previously pretended that he was not representing it. Since Kuchma negotiated the ceasefire, which is "bilateral", and since the junta is bound by what he agreed, the fiction that Kuchma does not represent the junta is over and he is confirmed as the junta's representative in negotiations with the NAF.

(2) the Protocol commits the junta to a total amnesty and an exchange of prisoners. Quite apart from the obvious human considerations by definition this again recognises the NAF as a party to the conflict since the people so amnestied can no longer be criminals or "terrorists".

(3) the Protocol reproduces language drawn from the 17th April 2014 Geneva Statement about the dissolution of "illegal groups". Note however that in light of (1) and (2) since the junta now recognises the NAF as a party to the conflict it cannot in logic any longer claim in international law that the NAF is an "illegal group". Already the NAF leadership is treating this part of the Protocol as referring to the various paramilitary groups controlled by people like Kolomoisky and Right Sector.

(4) Russia is a signatory of the Protocol. This is crucial. The US and EU by contrast are not signatories to the Protocol. They have been completely cut out of the negotiations. The fact that the Protocol is only in Russian and that there is no official translation of it into any other language (apparently not even Ukrainian) is a significant fact in itself. The long weeks of February to July when the Russians negotiated fruitlessly with the US and EU are over. Since Russia is a signatory of the Protocol it is a party to it. Since the US and EU are not signatories to the Protocol they are not parties to it. Its signature gives Russia grounds to act if the terms of the Protocol are breached. Russia has not had clear cut grounds to act up to now, As a party to the Protocol Russia is in effect its guarantor and it now does.

3. The part of the Protocol that is causing the most criticism are the sections that refer to "decentralisation" and to local elections happening under a Ukrainian law for "decentralisation".

(1) The point to understand about these sections is that the Protocol does not present itself as a final political settlement of the conflict. That in theory depends on the "inclusive national dialogue" referred to in the Protocol (wording that also ultimately originates with the 17th April 2014 Geneva Statement). Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky immediately following their signing of the Protocol made clear that the NAF's objective remains full independence. Zakharchenko has said the same today (8th September 2014).

(2) The fact that Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky issued their statement immediately after the Protocol was signed (but before it was published) refutes claims by people such as Gubarev that they did not know what they were signing when they signed the Protocol but that they merely signed whatever was put in front of them. On the contrary it is clear that they wanted to make their position unambiguously clear precisely because they did not want their intentions to be misconstrued by the language of the Protocol.

(3) The point here is that the Protocol provides for elections to local bodies of power which because they would happen in accordance with a Ukrainian law the Ukraine would be legally obliged to recognise. It is a foregone conclusion that these elections if and when they happen will be won by the NAF. If so since the Ukraine is legally obliged to recognise the elections it is also legally obliged to recognise their outcome (the "international community" would be as well).

(4) What this section of the Protocol therefore means is that the Ukraine not only now recognises the NAF as a party to a conflict but once the elections are out of the way will also be legally obliged to recognise the NAF as the political leader of the Donbas.

4. Having made these points, let me now make the key point: the Protocol is in my opinion a total red herring. The Protocol is not a contract or a treaty. There is no court or tribunal that will arbitrate on the meaning of its words. All the sides will construe it as they wish. The junta will not of course construe it as I have done and nor will its western backers even though my interpretation is undoubtedly the correct one. The junta will continue to call the NAF "terrorists" and will continue to deny they are the representatives of the Donbas whether they win an election or not. Certainly the junta will not recognise an election the NAF wins or any declaration of independence the NAF makes. For what it's worth in my opinion there is little chance of the terms of such an election being agreed upon or such an election taking place whilst the Donbas remains part of the Ukraine.

5. I have laboured the point about the meaning of the Protocol not because I attach the slightest importance to this question but because others do and because it is being suggested that Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky somehow signed away the NAF's position when they signed the Protocol. In terms of what the Protocol actually says that is simply not the case. Having said this I think the Protocol will before long be a forgotten document left to collect dust in some unvisited archive as events move beyond it.

Ceasefire benefits the Junta

This seems to me a far more powerful criticism. However I would make the following points:

(1) I will say straight away that I think this criticism has merit. The NAF would surely have been in a better position looking forward if Mariupol and Debraltsevo had been recaptured. As it is there is bound to be argument over the next few weeks and months about the status of Mariupol especially.

(2) I cannot believe the NAF leaders did not realise this when they agreed the ceasefire. However having demanded a ceasefire for months they obviously felt once the junta offered one that they had no realistic option but to agree. I would rather that they had not and that things had turned out differently but then I am not in a position to second guess their decisions or to know why they made the decision that they did. Doubtless Russian pressure played its part but one should not overlook the factor of war weariness in the Donbas itself. Possibly the NAF leaders were concerned that the population of the Donbas and possibly some of the NAF fighters might not understand or be happy if the war was prolonged further when a ceasefire was being offered. I would point out that there have been no mass protests from people in the Donbas opposing the ceasefire since it was declared and the NAF troops (apart from some commanders) seem to accept it. The one possibility I do exclude is that Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky are fools or traitors. I have watched Zakharchenko and I am sure he is neither.

(3) It is important anyway not to over dramatise the problems the arguably premature end to the fighting will cause. Just 3 weeks ago the very existence of the NAF and of the DPR/LPR was in doubt. Lugansk was suffering from a humanitarian crisis and both Lugansk and Donetsk were threatened with encirclement.

(4) That danger has gone. The junta instead of achieving a military victory has suffered a decisive defeat. NATO has refused to help the junta. Despite desperate attempts by the junta to get at least token NATO support through publicly admitted (as opposed to covert) arms supplies even that request has been refused. The US/EU has failed even to provide additional economic support. For all the brave talk at the recent EU and NATO summits the reality is NATO and the EU have cut the junta off. Meanwhile the Ukrainian economy is in freefall with Russian gas and Donbas coal no longer available, output plunging, the currency collapsing and foreign exchange reserves draining away The vice meanwhile is tightening. The very latest reports say the Russians are quietly telling European states thinking of sending gas to the Ukraine through the (bogus and illegal) "reverse flow" scheme that they may have their own gas supplies reduced if they do.

(5) Any idea that the latest redeployments are going to change the situation decisively in the junta's favour look in the light of this frankly alarmist. In truth these deployments look to me like further examples of the junta's perennial tendency to reinforce failure by sending troops to places like Mariupol and Debratselvo that are no longer defendable.

(6) The NAF made absolutely clear again today that they want all the junta's military units withdrawn from their territory. As I said previously (see below on this Page) Putin now supports this demand. If the junta does not withdraw its troops a renewed NAF offensive to drive them out looks inevitable. Indeed the NAF said as much today.

(7) I would repeat what I have said previously. In my opinion in military terms a prolonged pause will strengthen the NAF militarily more than the junta. I appreciate many others take a different view. However the NAF now has more time to consolidate its gains (some people were worrying not so long that it was overextending itself), to attract more recruits (easier to do now it is winning) and to absorb the vast quantity of heavy weapons it has captured. A renewed NAF offensive when it comes will be more powerful than the one we saw in August. In its weakened state the junta's military will struggle to resist it. Following its defeat and against the backdrop of the economic crisis and the coming of winter the junta's ability to renew the offensive on anything like the scale we saw in July is surely for the time being non existent.

Conclusion

The key lesson of the last few weeks is that the NAF can no longer be defeated, that Russia is now involved, that the US/EU are no longer involved in any meaningful way and that the junta having been defeated and facing an economic crisis is left facing the NAF and Russia by itself.

In the Ukraine it is unwise to count on anything but the balance in this conflict has now shifted decisively. I do not see how that will change. For what it's worth that is also the assessment in Britain. The mood here in the news media is one of humiliation and failure.

[Lauren Johnson]

as revealed by Wikileaks:

The basic strategy was foreseen in 2008 by all parties.

Think the deadly events in a civil-war ridden Ukraine are proceeding unscripted, and without US supervision and/or direction? Think again.
Below is an excerpt from a formerly confidential memo, leaked by Wikileaks, and authored by former US ambassador to Russia, William J. Burns, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The punchline: the memo is dated February 1, 2008.

Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine Russia's influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.

So, if Russia does "not want to face" said decision which could and has led to the violence and civil war that is now a daily staple of market-moving newsflow out of Eastern Europe, why not let the US state department force the decision upon Russia?

EDIT: But it looks like the RF didn't see it coming.

[Lauren Johnson]

Gleb Bazov's response to #393:

Gleb Bazov ‏@gbazov 9m .@DarioAlok @Novorossiyan this letter is UTTER GARBAGE. I am ashamed that Saker decided to publish it. Monstrous.

Bazov is a marxian; Saker is an Orthodox Christian. Bazov does not trust any authority that is not based on a class analysis.

[David Guyatt]

as revealed by Wikileaks:

The basic strategy was foreseen in 2008 by all parties.

Think the deadly events in a civil-war ridden Ukraine are proceeding unscripted, and without US supervision and/or direction? Think again.
Below is an excerpt from a formerly confidential memo, leaked by Wikileaks, and authored by former US ambassador to Russia, William J. Burns, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The punchline: the memo is dated February 1, 2008.

Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine Russia's influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.

So, if Russia does "not want to face" said decision which could and has led to the violence and civil war that is now a daily staple of market-moving newsflow out of Eastern Europe, why not let the US state department force the decision upon Russia?

EDIT: But it looks like the RF didn't see it coming.

Great find, Lauren.

It looks to me like a big box of fireworks just sitting there waiting for someone to throw a match into it. And someone in the USA said let's do it.

For me this is a clear case of purposefully setting out to cause war with Russia in adherence to a political and economic dogma.

If my reading of a speech given by Obama in March 2014 is correct, then this war was generated as a consequence of the USA's continuing commitment to the decades old "international order" dominated by western economic and political goals that is based on world domination (dollar hegemony).

But judge for yourself HERE and make up your own mind.

[David Guyatt]

The following, although highly significant and important, is not well reported so far as I could see. Typical.

The report does not name the countries who declined to implement the economic sanctions. They were Germany, Italy and Finland. Might one conclude that European governments got a preview of the report of the investigation of what brought down the airliner and saw, clearly, that it wasn't a missile, but a fighter, that was responsible and have responded accordingly?

EU calls new meeting over Russia sanctions split

08 September 2014, 18:41 CET
filed under: Ukraine, oil, Russia, sanctions

(BRUSSELS) - EU officials called a fresh meeting on Monday to discuss a new round of sanctions against Moscow after failing to reach unanimous agreement on the measures, diplomatic sources said.
European capitals were supposed to give formal approval on Monday to the sanctions, which include limiting access to financial markets by Russian oil giants, but had failed to do so, the sources said.
The delay comes as some of the EU's newer member states in eastern Europe -- still dependent on Russian trade and energy ties -- were uneasy at ratcheting up the sanctions, and as a tenuous Ukraine ceasefire appeared to he holding.
"There will be an extraordinary meeting of the (member state) ambassadors on the sanctions at 6:00 pm (1600 GMT)," an EU diplomat told AFP, after talks apparently did not produce the required unanimous support of all 28 nations.
The new meeting of the ambassadors will "discuss the modalities of implementation of the Russia sanctions", said the diplomat, who asked not to be named.
Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko meanwhile said there was no military solution to the conflict and announced that pro-Russian rebels backed by Moscow had released some 1,200 prisoners.
When EU officials agreed the new sanctions package Friday, EU heads Herman Van Rompuy and Jose Manuel Barroso had left open the possibility they could be lifted quickly if the ceasefire held, setting the stage for further peace efforts.
Diplomatic sources said the differences apparently revolved around this point, with some member states seeking to incorporate language in the sanctions text that would keep options open for lifting the sanctions.
"We are looking for a formula which takes developments on the ground into account," a European source said.
- Sanctions on oil giants -
European leaders ordered Brussels officials at a summit on August 30 to draw up new sanctions within a week in response to claims that Russian troops were backing rebels in eastern Ukraine.
The new EU sanctions agreed by officials Friday would limit access to financial markets by Russian oil companies such as Rosneft and Transneft plus the petroleum unit of gas giant Gazprom, diplomatic sources said Monday.
The new sanctions build on those agreed at the end of July when EU leaders, stung into action by the shooting down over Ukraine of a Malaysia Airlines plane, decided to target whole economic sectors on top of travel bans and asset freezes against individuals.
Crucially, the July sanctions meant Russian entities would no longer be able to raise fresh funds on EU financial markets with a maturity of more than 90 days.
It is widely expected this could now be cut to as little as 30 days in the new measures, tightening the screws on state-owned Russian banks at a time when the economy is already struggling.
That could force the Russian government "to put its hand in its pocket", to make up the funding shortfall, another diplomatic source said.
The EU ambassadors were originally expected to formally approve the sanctions package Monday at 1300 GMT after instructions from their governments, but that deadline was put back to 1600 GMT, and then the new meeting was called.
The negotiations over the sanctions have already taken more than a week, with the Czech Republic and Slovakia having openly lobbied Brussels to soften the new measures.
The new measures target more people linked to the rebel leadership in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, the government of Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in March, and Russian "decision-makers and oligarchs", Van Rompuy and Barroso said on Friday.
They cover the same four areas as the previous set in July -- capital markets, defence, dual-use goods with both military and civilian capabilities, and oil technology, they added.
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned Moscow could retaliate against any new sanctions, including blocking western commercial flights through its airspace.

From EU Business.

[Magda Hassan]

EU may fully or partially lift sanctions against Russia European Commission

World
September 12, 14:42 UTC+4
The EU may analyse possible suspension or lifting of the anti-Russian sanctions in late September



© AP Photo/Yves Logghe


New EU sanctions unlikely to affect Russian arms exports Rostec


BRUSSELS, September 12. /ITAR-TASS/. The European Union may fully or partially lift the sanctions against Russia depending on the situation in Ukraine's eastern regions, the European Commission's press service said on Friday. "The EU's measures are scalable and reversible: in light of the review and if the situation on the ground so warrants, the Commission and the EEAS will put forward proposals to amend, suspend or repeal the set of sanctions in force, in all or in part."
The EU may analyse possible suspension or lifting of the anti-Russian sanctions in late September.

http://en.itar-tass.com/world/749251

[Magda Hassan]

The only person more odious and unwelcome than Bernard-Henri Levy has turned up like the grim reaper.

Barroso, Blair and Yatseniuk join global leaders at 11th Yalta European Strategy Annual Meeting

President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, former Prime Minister of Britain (1997-2007) Tony Blair and Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk will participate in the 11th Yalta European Strategy (YES) Annual Meeting.
President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, President of the Republic of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves and President of European Parliament Martin Schulz will officially open the 11th YES Annual Meeting on September 12.
Barroso will be a special invited guest of the meeting, which this year will bear the title "New Ukraine, New Europe, New World Building and Defending."
President Barroso will deliver his remarks "Working Together for a United Ukraine in a United Continent" during an evening reception held on Friday, September 12.
Earlier on September 12, businessman and philanthropist Sir Richard Branson, Founder of the Virgin Group, will deliver his perspectives on "How Can Business Contribute to Finding Peace for Ukraine?"
Arseniy Yatseniuk, Prime Minister of Ukraine, will open the second official day of the YES Annual Meeting on September 13.
Tony Blair, Patron of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1997-2007) will deliver special remarks entitled "Toward Reconciliation" also on Saturday.
In addition, on Saturday, leaders of Ukrainian political parties will discuss the issue of "Parliamentary Elections: Breakthrough or Entrenchment of the Old?" featuring a panel including Anatoliy Hrytsenko, MP of Ukraine and head of the Civil Position Party; Oleh Liashko, MP of Ukraine and head of the Radical Party of Ukraine; Yuriy Lutsenko, advisor to the President of Ukraine and head of the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko Party and Sergiy Tigipko, MP of Ukraine and head of the Strong Ukraine Party.
The 11th YES Forum will be moderated by Chrystia Freeland, Member of the Parliament of Canada and Stephen Sackur, presenter of BBC HARDtalk.
"More than 350 leaders in politics, business, society and media representing 20 countries will discuss the impact of the historical events since last November in Ukraine on Europe and the world, how to address Ukraine's internal and external challenges and the risks that come with them for Europe and beyond? How can Ukraine's international partners effectively support the country's further development?," reads a press release from the meeting's organizers.
For the first time in its history, the YES Annual Meeting will take place in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. In past years, the forum was held at its traditional venue, the Livadia Palace in Yalta in Crimea, which was annexed by Russia from Ukraine in March.

[Magda Hassan]

Strong words indeed.

Russian Foreign Ministry on the statement by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy on further EU restrictive measures against Russia

2111-11-09-2014

We have the following to say regarding a statement by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy on 11 September this year on the adoption of a new package of anti-Russian sanctions.
By taking this step, the European Union has made its choice against a peaceful settlement of the internal crisis in Ukraine, which all responsible forces in Europe should have supported instead.
Brussels and the leaders of the EU member-countries now need to give a clear answer to their citizens as to why they are putting them under the risk of confrontation, economic stagnation and unemployment.

Give the people a chance for peace.