26-08-2016, 01:14 AM
Anthony:
The reason there is a Pfeiffer report is because of two things:
1.) Dulles and Bissell were very angry that Kirkpatrick did such a thorough and coruscating job exposing the almost unbelievable incompetence of Operation Zapata. In some ways, Kirkpatrick goes beyond the Taylor Report. Because it traces back to the beginnings of the operation. To use one example, the CIA was so incompetent about the resistance inside of Cuba--where it was, and if there was one--that many of their resupply operations ending up being recovered by Castro.
2.) Because it was so thorough, Kirkpatrick did not think he could get it to Kennedy through normal channels. So he drove it over to the White House himself.
Therefore, Dulles and Bisell filed dissents. And they then got their buddies in the Agency to put together a formal critique of Kirpatrick. You can get the Kirkpatrick Report in Peter Kornbluh's book, Bay of Pigs Declassified, which is, in my view, the best book on the subject.
Kirkpatrick took almost six months to put the report together. And by all indications, it was the last straw for Kennedy. He read it right after the Taylor Report. And he then made his decision to fire the top level of the CIA.
What the combination of the two reports makes clear is this:
1.) The only way the operation could have had any chance of success is if all the lies the CIA told Kennedy were actually true. That is about the defections, about the element of surprise, and finally, as a last resort, about going guerilla. But that is the whole point of what the investigations revealed: These were all lies. And the CIA lied to Kennedy to get him to OK the project. That is what he came to conclude. And that is what he told his pal, Red Fay. And Schlesinger.
2.) Kaiser misses my whole point about the air cover excuse. What Kirkpatrick was trying to demonstrate was that this was hogwash. It was irrelevant at best; at worst it created a "stab in the back" mythology. The operation was so misconceived, so mismanaged, such a hapless comedy of errors, that there was no way it was going to be successful, even with Castro's Air Force neutralized. Without the element of surprise, without the mass defections, then what you had was 1,100 men on the beach facing 35,000 army regulars, backed up with tanks, motorized companies, artillery and mortar. As any amphibious expert will tell you, that is simply ridiculous. This is why the CIA lied to Kennedy about the element of surprise.
When you go through both reports, you are left with the big question: Could they really have believed this crap? I and others--Jim Douglass, Mike Morissey, Larry Hancock, Greg Burnham-- came to the conclusion that, no they did not. And thanks to Lucien Vandenbrouke, we later got the truth from Dulles and Bissell themselves.
The reason there is a Pfeiffer report is because of two things:
1.) Dulles and Bissell were very angry that Kirkpatrick did such a thorough and coruscating job exposing the almost unbelievable incompetence of Operation Zapata. In some ways, Kirkpatrick goes beyond the Taylor Report. Because it traces back to the beginnings of the operation. To use one example, the CIA was so incompetent about the resistance inside of Cuba--where it was, and if there was one--that many of their resupply operations ending up being recovered by Castro.
2.) Because it was so thorough, Kirkpatrick did not think he could get it to Kennedy through normal channels. So he drove it over to the White House himself.
Therefore, Dulles and Bisell filed dissents. And they then got their buddies in the Agency to put together a formal critique of Kirpatrick. You can get the Kirkpatrick Report in Peter Kornbluh's book, Bay of Pigs Declassified, which is, in my view, the best book on the subject.
Kirkpatrick took almost six months to put the report together. And by all indications, it was the last straw for Kennedy. He read it right after the Taylor Report. And he then made his decision to fire the top level of the CIA.
What the combination of the two reports makes clear is this:
1.) The only way the operation could have had any chance of success is if all the lies the CIA told Kennedy were actually true. That is about the defections, about the element of surprise, and finally, as a last resort, about going guerilla. But that is the whole point of what the investigations revealed: These were all lies. And the CIA lied to Kennedy to get him to OK the project. That is what he came to conclude. And that is what he told his pal, Red Fay. And Schlesinger.
2.) Kaiser misses my whole point about the air cover excuse. What Kirkpatrick was trying to demonstrate was that this was hogwash. It was irrelevant at best; at worst it created a "stab in the back" mythology. The operation was so misconceived, so mismanaged, such a hapless comedy of errors, that there was no way it was going to be successful, even with Castro's Air Force neutralized. Without the element of surprise, without the mass defections, then what you had was 1,100 men on the beach facing 35,000 army regulars, backed up with tanks, motorized companies, artillery and mortar. As any amphibious expert will tell you, that is simply ridiculous. This is why the CIA lied to Kennedy about the element of surprise.
When you go through both reports, you are left with the big question: Could they really have believed this crap? I and others--Jim Douglass, Mike Morissey, Larry Hancock, Greg Burnham-- came to the conclusion that, no they did not. And thanks to Lucien Vandenbrouke, we later got the truth from Dulles and Bissell themselves.