03-10-2008, 10:17 AM
My thoughts exactly, Magda.
Supposing there were deeper motives, what would they be? I could speculate in three easy steps if you wish :-)
1. 1990-1994, fours years of behind the scenes discussion and clandestine maneuvering to reach peace in Northern ireland.
2. The Mull helicopter crash 2nd June 1994.
3. The IRA announce ‘a complete cessation of military operations’ 31st August 1994. The loyalist paramilitaries follow suit just over a month later.
Let's never forget that cleaning the augean stables was the sixth labour of the hero Heracles, who received a great, kingly reward for his effort... and we Brits are very good when it comes to the public school education of their elite sons on matters pertaining to matters Greek.
Removing intransigent obstacles is a old and well used device of the ruling elite
***
The below is extracted from the following webpage and, critically I think, in the order they happened:
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm#move
Changes in the United States also contributed towards the start of the peace process. The emergence of a small group of Irish-Americans, with key political and corporate links, was instrumental in persuading the Clinton White House to become interested in Northern Ireland.6 They reflected background changes within the Irish-American diaspora. Traditionally sympathetic towards militant republicanism, many moderated their attitude and encouraged Irish republicans to consider the advantages offered by a ceasefire and a peace process. For Clinton, Northern Ireland would be a low-cost, low-risk foreign policy endeavour. He was pushing a door already half open.
First movements: 1990-1994
The first moves towards peace progressed along two parallel routes. Route one sought to maintain momentum between the constitutional parties, and route two saw the first tentative moves to involve republicans in talks. In 1990, the Northern Ireland Secretary of State Sir Peter Brooke authorised secret contact with the IRA in order to find the conditions under which republicans would consider calling a ceasefire and was complemented by more public overtures. In late 1992, the Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds, unaware of the back channel between the IRA and British government, authorised secret contacts between his officials and senior members of Sinn Féin. These secret talks eventually drew both governments towards the same conclusion. On 15 December 1993 the British and Irish governments published the Downing Street Declaration. In a key line, the Declaration noted that ‘the British Government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish.’ In what the British government regarded as a major coup, the Irish government reiterated its support for the principle of consent and promised, in the context of an overall settlement, to amend the Irish Constitution to enshrine the consent principle in law. In January 1994 President Clinton’s decision to grant Gerry Adams a US entry visa despite a continuing IRA campaign was a further reminder of the rewards on offer should Sinn Féin pursue the path of constitutional politics. Northern Ireland’s unionists, meanwhile, remained acutely suspicious that a secret deal was under way between the British government and republicans.
Ceasefires and after, 1994-1995
On 31 August 1994 the IRA declared ‘a complete cessation of military operations’, the main loyalist paramilitary organisations following their example in October. The British government shared the unionist suspicions of the IRA ceasefire and ruled out face-to-face talks with Sinn Féin until the permanency of the ceasefire could be established. Nevertheless the British and Irish governments moved to establish the conceptual framework for any political negotiations through the publication of the Frameworks for the Future document. The document stressed that the two governments wanted to see a ‘comprehensive settlement’ that would return greater ‘power, authority and responsibility to all the Northern Ireland people’.7 It also reaffirmed the three stranded approach and outlined, in detail, the issues that could be discussed in each strand.
Supposing there were deeper motives, what would they be? I could speculate in three easy steps if you wish :-)
1. 1990-1994, fours years of behind the scenes discussion and clandestine maneuvering to reach peace in Northern ireland.
2. The Mull helicopter crash 2nd June 1994.
3. The IRA announce ‘a complete cessation of military operations’ 31st August 1994. The loyalist paramilitaries follow suit just over a month later.
Let's never forget that cleaning the augean stables was the sixth labour of the hero Heracles, who received a great, kingly reward for his effort... and we Brits are very good when it comes to the public school education of their elite sons on matters pertaining to matters Greek.
Removing intransigent obstacles is a old and well used device of the ruling elite
***
The below is extracted from the following webpage and, critically I think, in the order they happened:
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm#move
Changes in the United States also contributed towards the start of the peace process. The emergence of a small group of Irish-Americans, with key political and corporate links, was instrumental in persuading the Clinton White House to become interested in Northern Ireland.6 They reflected background changes within the Irish-American diaspora. Traditionally sympathetic towards militant republicanism, many moderated their attitude and encouraged Irish republicans to consider the advantages offered by a ceasefire and a peace process. For Clinton, Northern Ireland would be a low-cost, low-risk foreign policy endeavour. He was pushing a door already half open.
First movements: 1990-1994
The first moves towards peace progressed along two parallel routes. Route one sought to maintain momentum between the constitutional parties, and route two saw the first tentative moves to involve republicans in talks. In 1990, the Northern Ireland Secretary of State Sir Peter Brooke authorised secret contact with the IRA in order to find the conditions under which republicans would consider calling a ceasefire and was complemented by more public overtures. In late 1992, the Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds, unaware of the back channel between the IRA and British government, authorised secret contacts between his officials and senior members of Sinn Féin. These secret talks eventually drew both governments towards the same conclusion. On 15 December 1993 the British and Irish governments published the Downing Street Declaration. In a key line, the Declaration noted that ‘the British Government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish.’ In what the British government regarded as a major coup, the Irish government reiterated its support for the principle of consent and promised, in the context of an overall settlement, to amend the Irish Constitution to enshrine the consent principle in law. In January 1994 President Clinton’s decision to grant Gerry Adams a US entry visa despite a continuing IRA campaign was a further reminder of the rewards on offer should Sinn Féin pursue the path of constitutional politics. Northern Ireland’s unionists, meanwhile, remained acutely suspicious that a secret deal was under way between the British government and republicans.
Ceasefires and after, 1994-1995
On 31 August 1994 the IRA declared ‘a complete cessation of military operations’, the main loyalist paramilitary organisations following their example in October. The British government shared the unionist suspicions of the IRA ceasefire and ruled out face-to-face talks with Sinn Féin until the permanency of the ceasefire could be established. Nevertheless the British and Irish governments moved to establish the conceptual framework for any political negotiations through the publication of the Frameworks for the Future document. The document stressed that the two governments wanted to see a ‘comprehensive settlement’ that would return greater ‘power, authority and responsibility to all the Northern Ireland people’.7 It also reaffirmed the three stranded approach and outlined, in detail, the issues that could be discussed in each strand.
The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort. To become conscious of it involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as present and real. This act is the essential condition for any kind of self-knowledge.
Carl Jung - Aion (1951). CW 9, Part II: P.14