17-05-2012, 12:01 AM
Conspiracy Theories
CASS R. SUNSTEIN
University of Chicago - Law School
(Is it not precious: an apparatchik of the regime which counseled, "They bring a knife, you bring a gun"
or, in the alternative, you bring reasoned research, they bring the boy band In Cinque)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a...id=1084585
Abstract:
Many millions of people hold conspiracy theories; they believe that powerful people have
worked together in order to withhold the truth about some important practice or some terrible
event. A recent example is the belief, widespread in some parts of the world, that the attacks
of 9/11 were carried out not by Al Qaeda, but by Israel or the United States. Those who
subscribe to conspiracy theories may create serious risks, including risks of violence, and
the existence of such theories raises significant challenges for policy and law. The first challenge
is to understand the mechanisms by which conspiracy theories prosper; the second challenge
is to understand how such theories might be undermined. Such theories typically spread as a
result of identifiable cognitive blunders, operating in conjunction with informational and reputational
influences. A distinctive feature of conspiracy theories is their self-sealing quality. Conspiracy
theorists are not likely to be persuaded by an attempt to dispel their theories; they may even
characterize that very attempt as further proof of the conspiracy. Because those who hold
conspiracy theories typically suffer from a crippled epistemology, in accordance with which it
is rational to hold such theories, the best response consists in cognitive infiltration of extremist
groups. Various policy dilemmas, such as the question whether it is better for government to
rebut conspiracy theories or to ignore them, are explored in this light.
3. Cognitive infiltration
Rather than taking the continued existence of the hard core as a constraint, and
addressing itself solely to the third-party mass audience, government might undertake
(legal) tactics for breaking up the tight cognitive clusters of extremist theories,
arguments and rhetoric that are produced by the hard core and reinforce it in turn.
One promising tactic is cognitive infiltration of extremist groups. By this we do not mean
1960s-style infiltration with a view to surveillance and collecting information, possibly for
use in future prosecutions. Rather, we mean that government efforts might succeed in
weakening or even breaking up the ideological and epistemological complexes that
constitute these networks and groups.
How might this tactic work? Recall that extremist networks and groups,
including the groups that purvey conspiracy theories, typically suffer from a kind of
crippled epistemology. Hearing only conspiratorial accounts of government behavior,
their members become ever more prone to believe and generate such accounts.
Informational and reputational cascades, group polarization, and selection effects suggest
that the generation of ever-more-extreme views within these groups can be dampened or
reversed by the introduction of cognitive diversity. We suggest a role for government
efforts, and agents, in introducing such diversity. Government agents (and their allies)
might enter chat rooms, online social networks, or even real-space groups and attempt to
undermine percolating conspiracy theories by raising doubts about their factual premises,
causal logic or implications for political action.
In one variant, government agents would openly proclaim, or at least make no
effort to conceal, their institutional affiliations. A recent newspaper story recounts that
Arabic-speaking Muslim officials from the State Department have participated in
dialogues at radical Islamist chat rooms and websites in order to ventilate arguments not
usually heard among the groups that cluster around those sites, with some success.68 In
another variant, government officials would participate anonymously or even with false
identities. Each approach has distinct costs and benefits; the second is riskier but
potentially brings higher returns. In the former case, where government officials
participate openly as such, hard-core members of the relevant networks, communities and
conspiracy-minded organizations may entirely discount what the officials say, right from
the beginning. The risk with tactics of anonymous participation, conversely, is that if the
tactic becomes known, any true member of the relevant groups who raises doubts may be
suspected of government connections. Despite these difficulties, the two forms of
cognitive infiltration offer different risk-reward mixes and are both potentially useful
instruments.
There is a similar tradeoff along another dimension: whether the infiltration
should occur in the real world, through physical penetration of conspiracist groups by
undercover agents, or instead should occur strictly in cyberspace. The latter is safer, but
potentially less productive. The former will sometimes be indispensable, where the
groups that purvey conspiracy theories (and perhaps themselves formulate conspiracies)
formulate their views through real-space informational networks rather than virtual
networks. Infiltration of any kind poses well-known risks: perhaps agents will be asked
to perform criminal acts to prove their bona fides, or (less plausibly) will themselves
become persuaded by the conspiratorial views they are supposed to be undermining;
perhaps agents will be unmasked and harmed by the infiltrated group. But the risks are
generally greater for real-world infiltration, where the agent is exposed to more serious harms.
All these risk-reward tradeoffs deserve careful consideration. Particular tactics
may or may not be cost-justified under particular circumstances. Our main suggestion is
just that, whatever the tactical details, there would seem to be ample reason for
government efforts to introduce some cognitive diversity into the groups that generate
conspiracy theories. Social cascades are sometimes quite fragile, precisely because they
are based on small slivers of information. Once corrective information is introduced,
large numbers of people can be shifted to different views. If government is able to have
credibility, or to act through credible agents, it might well be successful in dislodging
beliefs that are held only because no one contradicts them. Likewise, polarization tends
to decrease when divergent views are voiced within the group.69 Introducing a measure
of cognitive diversity can break up the epistemological networks and clusters that supply
conspiracy theories.
Government agents (and their allies) might enter chat rooms, online social networks,
or even real-space groups and attempt to undermine percolating conspiracy theories
by raising doubts about their factual premises, causal logic or implications for political action.
Those who subscribe to conspiracy theories may create serious risks
CASS R. SUNSTEIN
University of Chicago - Law School
(Is it not precious: an apparatchik of the regime which counseled, "They bring a knife, you bring a gun"
or, in the alternative, you bring reasoned research, they bring the boy band In Cinque)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a...id=1084585
Abstract:
Many millions of people hold conspiracy theories; they believe that powerful people have
worked together in order to withhold the truth about some important practice or some terrible
event. A recent example is the belief, widespread in some parts of the world, that the attacks
of 9/11 were carried out not by Al Qaeda, but by Israel or the United States. Those who
subscribe to conspiracy theories may create serious risks, including risks of violence, and
the existence of such theories raises significant challenges for policy and law. The first challenge
is to understand the mechanisms by which conspiracy theories prosper; the second challenge
is to understand how such theories might be undermined. Such theories typically spread as a
result of identifiable cognitive blunders, operating in conjunction with informational and reputational
influences. A distinctive feature of conspiracy theories is their self-sealing quality. Conspiracy
theorists are not likely to be persuaded by an attempt to dispel their theories; they may even
characterize that very attempt as further proof of the conspiracy. Because those who hold
conspiracy theories typically suffer from a crippled epistemology, in accordance with which it
is rational to hold such theories, the best response consists in cognitive infiltration of extremist
groups. Various policy dilemmas, such as the question whether it is better for government to
rebut conspiracy theories or to ignore them, are explored in this light.
3. Cognitive infiltration
Rather than taking the continued existence of the hard core as a constraint, and
addressing itself solely to the third-party mass audience, government might undertake
(legal) tactics for breaking up the tight cognitive clusters of extremist theories,
arguments and rhetoric that are produced by the hard core and reinforce it in turn.
One promising tactic is cognitive infiltration of extremist groups. By this we do not mean
1960s-style infiltration with a view to surveillance and collecting information, possibly for
use in future prosecutions. Rather, we mean that government efforts might succeed in
weakening or even breaking up the ideological and epistemological complexes that
constitute these networks and groups.
How might this tactic work? Recall that extremist networks and groups,
including the groups that purvey conspiracy theories, typically suffer from a kind of
crippled epistemology. Hearing only conspiratorial accounts of government behavior,
their members become ever more prone to believe and generate such accounts.
Informational and reputational cascades, group polarization, and selection effects suggest
that the generation of ever-more-extreme views within these groups can be dampened or
reversed by the introduction of cognitive diversity. We suggest a role for government
efforts, and agents, in introducing such diversity. Government agents (and their allies)
might enter chat rooms, online social networks, or even real-space groups and attempt to
undermine percolating conspiracy theories by raising doubts about their factual premises,
causal logic or implications for political action.
In one variant, government agents would openly proclaim, or at least make no
effort to conceal, their institutional affiliations. A recent newspaper story recounts that
Arabic-speaking Muslim officials from the State Department have participated in
dialogues at radical Islamist chat rooms and websites in order to ventilate arguments not
usually heard among the groups that cluster around those sites, with some success.68 In
another variant, government officials would participate anonymously or even with false
identities. Each approach has distinct costs and benefits; the second is riskier but
potentially brings higher returns. In the former case, where government officials
participate openly as such, hard-core members of the relevant networks, communities and
conspiracy-minded organizations may entirely discount what the officials say, right from
the beginning. The risk with tactics of anonymous participation, conversely, is that if the
tactic becomes known, any true member of the relevant groups who raises doubts may be
suspected of government connections. Despite these difficulties, the two forms of
cognitive infiltration offer different risk-reward mixes and are both potentially useful
instruments.
There is a similar tradeoff along another dimension: whether the infiltration
should occur in the real world, through physical penetration of conspiracist groups by
undercover agents, or instead should occur strictly in cyberspace. The latter is safer, but
potentially less productive. The former will sometimes be indispensable, where the
groups that purvey conspiracy theories (and perhaps themselves formulate conspiracies)
formulate their views through real-space informational networks rather than virtual
networks. Infiltration of any kind poses well-known risks: perhaps agents will be asked
to perform criminal acts to prove their bona fides, or (less plausibly) will themselves
become persuaded by the conspiratorial views they are supposed to be undermining;
perhaps agents will be unmasked and harmed by the infiltrated group. But the risks are
generally greater for real-world infiltration, where the agent is exposed to more serious harms.
All these risk-reward tradeoffs deserve careful consideration. Particular tactics
may or may not be cost-justified under particular circumstances. Our main suggestion is
just that, whatever the tactical details, there would seem to be ample reason for
government efforts to introduce some cognitive diversity into the groups that generate
conspiracy theories. Social cascades are sometimes quite fragile, precisely because they
are based on small slivers of information. Once corrective information is introduced,
large numbers of people can be shifted to different views. If government is able to have
credibility, or to act through credible agents, it might well be successful in dislodging
beliefs that are held only because no one contradicts them. Likewise, polarization tends
to decrease when divergent views are voiced within the group.69 Introducing a measure
of cognitive diversity can break up the epistemological networks and clusters that supply
conspiracy theories.
Government agents (and their allies) might enter chat rooms, online social networks,
or even real-space groups and attempt to undermine percolating conspiracy theories
by raising doubts about their factual premises, causal logic or implications for political action.
Those who subscribe to conspiracy theories may create serious risks
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