A Simple Question as We Prepare for the 50th

[Charles Drago]

The issue of killing Custer in a political context would fit the pattern of the Empire "robber-barons".

I do not know enough about the machinations of the Elite in this circumstance. The concept most definitely is borne out by events. Timing can be so revealing in covert ops. Circumstantial Evidence but none the less evidence in the timing of some events.

Akin to JFK openly (in his cabinet and beyond - NSAM 263 signed by JFK not signed in his name) defining his SE Asia game refusal and within weeks he dies, timing.
Or Someone buying WTC and within weeks making a killing on murder by state, timing.

Hyperbolas? Maybe. Timing.
End result? An area I will check out. A good thing.
Thank You Charles

You're very welcome.

I direct your attention to the DPF thread Custer at Little Bighorn: A Deep Political Hypothesis. It is located at

https://deeppoliticsforum.com/forums/sho...ght=Custer

My minimally edited opening post there from 2010:

The Battle of the Little Bighorn (a/k/a Custer's Last Stand and the Battle of the Greasy Grass) stands with Gettysburg and the Alamo in the holy trinity of American military engagements fought on the home continent. The events of Sunday, June 25, 1876 leading to the annihilation of Brevet Major General George Armstrong Custer's command nucleus of five troops of the 7th U.S. Cavalry along the banks of a narrow, twisting river in the high plains country of what is now eastern Montana remain the subjects of intense scrutiny by an international cadre of scholars, amateur historians, and "buffs."

Literally thousands of books focusing on that engagement and its principal combatants have been published in the intervening 134 years. Yet mysteries and impassioned arguments regarding everything from the development of the battle itself to the motives and even mental states of Custer and at least two of his junior officers are ongoing.

For the purposes of this forum, I'll put forward the following hypothesis:

Deep political forces within the military/industrial complex of the time conspired to embarrass Custer -- and thus neutralize him as a political force viewed as a serious impediment to the fulfillment of Manifest Destiny -- by sabotaging his actions during the Montana campaign.

ITEM -- Custer had incurred the undying enmity of President Ulysses Grant. Earlier in 1876, the House Committee on Military Expenditures had conducted an investigation of various acts of Secretary of War William W. Belknap. Custer was called to testify in the proceedings. He all but confirmed the accusations not only against Belknap, but also against President Grant's brother, Orville Grant.

ITEM -- Custer had incurred the undying enmity of mining and railroad interests. In 1875, Custer had made a solemn, spiritual commitment to the Sioux (hereinafter Lakota) that he would not fight Native Americans again. Custer's promise coincided with a U.S. Senate commission meeting with Lakota leaders to purchase access to the gold mining fields in the Black Hills (which Custer had discovered a year earlier). The Lakota eventually turned down the government offer in favor of an 1868 treaty that promised U.S. military protection of their lands.

ITEM -- Custer, writing under the nom de plume Nomad in "Turf, Field and Farm," had reached a wide audience with his idealized depictions of "noble savages" and a way of life and wilderness worth preserving. At its core, the conflict between the indigenous peoples of the North American continent and Americans was and remains a spiritual conflict (ask Leonard Peltier).

How was the aforementioned "sabotage" carried out?

To reduce a long and complex story to its essence: Custer's attack on the huge village encountered at Little Bighorn was doomed to failure due to the actions and non-actions (including the refusal to obey at least one direct order) of the subordinate officers to whom he had entrusted command of combat battalions.

Historians continue to try -- in vain -- to explain why Captain Frederick Benteen refused to obey Custer's direct, written order, issued in the heat of battle, to ride to his commander's relief. As Custer's battalion came under fire, and as Major Marcus Reno senselessly ended his all-important charge against the village and retreated in panic across the river to take up a defensive position some five miles distant from Custer's final stand, Benteen casually watered his horses miles from the action and finally came up at a trot.

Benteen, an avowed Custer hater, found Reno's whipped troops and, rather than rallying them in a march toward Custer, sat impassively within the sound of Custer's vollying rifle fire (an established signal to indicate position and predicament) and allowed his commander's battalion to be destroyed.

I submit that the confusion of historians is the product of the absence of deep political analysis of Little Bighorn.

You should not read the absurdly condensed narrative offered above as an argument for George Armstrong Custer's highly developed moral conscience. The Boy General was an opportunist of the highest order. And he was America's first modern public relations creation. (In violation of a direct order, he brought Mark Kellogg, a reporter for the Bismarck Tribune, with him on the final campaign. They died less than a mile apart.)

There is much more to tell. My hypothesis is the basis for a motion picture treatment that I've written. The story of Little Bighorn is a bonanza for sub-plots. The best: The only officer at the Reno-Benteen position who attempted to ride to Custer's aid was Captain Thomas Weir -- the man who Custer suspected of having had an affair with Elizabeth Bacon Custer. Weir survived the Custer fight only to die -- allegedly of acute alcoholism -- less than six months later. Shortly before his demise, he wrote to Libby Custer to note that he knew the "real" story of why her husband perished.

In any event, I hope this little exercise in deep political thinking helps us along as we pursue more contemporary -- but hardly more relevant -- inquiries.