06-09-2013, 08:00 AM
Michael Morissey
http://educate-yourself.org/cn/morrissey...2000.shtml
Morissey cites Marcus and Salandria's interactions with Chomsky.
Describes Chomsky's pattern of studying the critics (JFK assassination, AIDS/CIA, JFK vis-a-vis Vietnam) then feigning surprise before simply dummying up.
Chomsky uses weasel words to justify "no change in Vietnam policy"
The article's author describes Chomsky's rhetorical gymnastics:
Article excerpt:
Chomsky and Vietnam
Chomsky's argument is that
1. Vietnam policy did not change after the assassination (until 1968, of course)
2. Only tactics changed, quite coincidentally, at the same time as the assassination, in response to the changed military situation.
3. The change in tactics was first made by JFK, not LBJ.
1 is justified by Chomsky's definition of the word policy to mean "withdrawal if and only if victory is assured." This is his interpretation, from which he refuses to budge an inch, of one sentence in the McNamara-Taylor recommendations approved by NSAM 263:
This action [troop withdrawals] should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.
Chomsky insists that the last six words constitute an "explicit condition" of victory before any withdrawal would take place, and that this was the policy of both JFK and LBJ.
This is pure linguistics. Now, Chomsky is the greatest linguist in the world, but look at the linguistic facts he ignores in his interpretation:
First, the sentence can easily be understood to mean "This is the way we should explain it, but not necessarily the whole truth." Obviously, McNamara and Taylor (and JFK) would not have wanted it to look like they were simply abandoning the South Vietnamese.
More importantly, the phrase "without impairment of the war effort" is not an explicit condition, even if the most famous linguist in the world says it is.
Consider:
My plan is to wash the windows without hurting the plants.
Does this mean (Chomsky's interpretation)
My plan is to wash the windows if and only if I can do so without hurting the plants.
or does it mean, as I am quite certain it does,
My plan is to wash the windows and not hurt the plants (and I think I can do so).
This is what the sentence means, and it is what McNamara and Taylor meant:
"The plan--at least the way we should explain the plan--is to withdraw and do so without impairment of the war effort (which as we have said should be taken over completely by the Vietnamese by the end of 1965)."
But Chomsky wants us to understand it as: "The plan is to withdraw if, and only if, victory is assured."
Who is right? You be the judge.
The second argument is meant to back up the first. If the policy never changed, it does not matter when the tactics changed, whether under JFK or LBJ, but we would still be left with the troublesome coincidence that the change in tactics (in fact a reversal, from withdrawal to escalation, from not fighting the war to fighting the war) took place immediately after the assassination.
But lo and behold, on Jan. 31, 1991, right out of the blue, apparently, a draft of NSAM 273 appears from the black box that houses "national security" secrets, with no explanation as to why it was being released 13 years after the final document was released (NSAM 273 was declassified in 1978), or who or what was causing it to be released (an interesting question in itself, as is the question of its authenticity).
This is all Chomsky needs for his third argument: If anyone should insist that even a reversal of tactics, if not of policy, so close on the heels of the murder of the head of state in charge of both the policy and the tactics, could be suspicious, thanks to the Bundy draft we now know that the person behind the change in tactics was not Johnson, but Kennedy.
Why? Because Bundy wrote the draft on Nov. 21, one day before the assassination! Therefore, Chomsky concludes, JFK would have signed it (although he never saw it or discussed it with Bundy or anyone else). Therefore, Chomsky further concludes, the people who say NSAM 273 shows a change in policy (Peter Dale Scott, John Newman, Arthur Schlesinger) are right, but wrong about who was responsible for it.
Chomsky's third argument actually contradicts the first. It's like saying, "I don't care what flavor it is, but make sure it's vanilla." If "tactical" changes don't matter, they don't matter. If they don't matter, there is no reason to make the further point--dubious in itself--that JFK made the change. By adding this third argument, Chomsky allows for the possibility that the "tactical" change was indeed significant, which destroys the premise expressed in the first argument.
http://educate-yourself.org/cn/morrissey...2000.shtml
Morissey cites Marcus and Salandria's interactions with Chomsky.
Describes Chomsky's pattern of studying the critics (JFK assassination, AIDS/CIA, JFK vis-a-vis Vietnam) then feigning surprise before simply dummying up.
Chomsky uses weasel words to justify "no change in Vietnam policy"
The article's author describes Chomsky's rhetorical gymnastics:
Article excerpt:
Chomsky and Vietnam
Chomsky's argument is that
1. Vietnam policy did not change after the assassination (until 1968, of course)
2. Only tactics changed, quite coincidentally, at the same time as the assassination, in response to the changed military situation.
3. The change in tactics was first made by JFK, not LBJ.
1 is justified by Chomsky's definition of the word policy to mean "withdrawal if and only if victory is assured." This is his interpretation, from which he refuses to budge an inch, of one sentence in the McNamara-Taylor recommendations approved by NSAM 263:
This action [troop withdrawals] should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.
Chomsky insists that the last six words constitute an "explicit condition" of victory before any withdrawal would take place, and that this was the policy of both JFK and LBJ.
This is pure linguistics. Now, Chomsky is the greatest linguist in the world, but look at the linguistic facts he ignores in his interpretation:
First, the sentence can easily be understood to mean "This is the way we should explain it, but not necessarily the whole truth." Obviously, McNamara and Taylor (and JFK) would not have wanted it to look like they were simply abandoning the South Vietnamese.
More importantly, the phrase "without impairment of the war effort" is not an explicit condition, even if the most famous linguist in the world says it is.
Consider:
My plan is to wash the windows without hurting the plants.
Does this mean (Chomsky's interpretation)
My plan is to wash the windows if and only if I can do so without hurting the plants.
or does it mean, as I am quite certain it does,
My plan is to wash the windows and not hurt the plants (and I think I can do so).
This is what the sentence means, and it is what McNamara and Taylor meant:
"The plan--at least the way we should explain the plan--is to withdraw and do so without impairment of the war effort (which as we have said should be taken over completely by the Vietnamese by the end of 1965)."
But Chomsky wants us to understand it as: "The plan is to withdraw if, and only if, victory is assured."
Who is right? You be the judge.
The second argument is meant to back up the first. If the policy never changed, it does not matter when the tactics changed, whether under JFK or LBJ, but we would still be left with the troublesome coincidence that the change in tactics (in fact a reversal, from withdrawal to escalation, from not fighting the war to fighting the war) took place immediately after the assassination.
But lo and behold, on Jan. 31, 1991, right out of the blue, apparently, a draft of NSAM 273 appears from the black box that houses "national security" secrets, with no explanation as to why it was being released 13 years after the final document was released (NSAM 273 was declassified in 1978), or who or what was causing it to be released (an interesting question in itself, as is the question of its authenticity).
This is all Chomsky needs for his third argument: If anyone should insist that even a reversal of tactics, if not of policy, so close on the heels of the murder of the head of state in charge of both the policy and the tactics, could be suspicious, thanks to the Bundy draft we now know that the person behind the change in tactics was not Johnson, but Kennedy.
Why? Because Bundy wrote the draft on Nov. 21, one day before the assassination! Therefore, Chomsky concludes, JFK would have signed it (although he never saw it or discussed it with Bundy or anyone else). Therefore, Chomsky further concludes, the people who say NSAM 273 shows a change in policy (Peter Dale Scott, John Newman, Arthur Schlesinger) are right, but wrong about who was responsible for it.
Chomsky's third argument actually contradicts the first. It's like saying, "I don't care what flavor it is, but make sure it's vanilla." If "tactical" changes don't matter, they don't matter. If they don't matter, there is no reason to make the further point--dubious in itself--that JFK made the change. By adding this third argument, Chomsky allows for the possibility that the "tactical" change was indeed significant, which destroys the premise expressed in the first argument.