Operation Phoenix

[Magda Hassan]

[size=12]The Phoenix Project and Its Creator, Nelson Brickham[/SIZE]

by Douglas Valentine

Nelson Brickham joined the CIA in 1949, serving first in the sedate Directorate of Intelligence, then transferring in 1955 to the Operations Division, where he served in the high-profile Soviet-Russia Division. Brickham gained a wide range of experience, from running black propaganda and false-flag recruitments, to gathering information on Soviet missile silos. Over the years he developed his own "systems approach" to spookery that he later employed when developing the Phoenix Program.
Brickham volunteered for duty in Vietnam in 1965. In the spring of 1966 he became chief of Field Operations in the Saigon station's Foreign Intelligence "liaison" branch. He had an office in the U.S. Embassy Annex but also spent time with his senior Vietnamese Police Special Branch counterparts in their office at the National Interrogation Center.
Brickham managed the veteran CIA liaison officers who were working with Police Special Branch officers in South Vietnam's 44 provinces. These Vietnamese Special Branch officers functioned like detectives in the intelligence branch of a big-city police department. They also managed the CIA's gulag archipelago of secret interrogation centers. The Special Branch mounted both positive intelligence and counterintelligence operations. In some respects the Vietnamese Police Special Branch is the model for the covert action branch of the Department of Homeland Security.
Upon assuming the job as Chief of Field operations, Brickham inherited and sharpened three existing programs:
1) The Hamlet Informant Program (HIP), in which principal agents working for the CIA and Special Branch recruited informants in the hamlets. This was dangerous work, because no one likes a snitch, and because the snitches often lied and set-up innocent people. Informants know they are unliked, and they need to be motivated. Some of them were blackmailed into becoming informants; others did it for revenge. Money was the most common motivating factor used in recruiting people for the HIP Program. (The eerie resemblance to Ashcroft's short-lived TIPS program need not be emphasized.)
2) The Province Interrogation (PIC) Program. The CIA began building a secret torture chamber in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces in 1964. Try to file an FOIA for information on them and see what happens. The CIA hired Pacific Architects and Engineers to build these facilities. Information from defectors and captured documents was put into the PIC Program reporting system, to which the CIA had total access.
3) Penetrations into the Viet Cong Infrastructure (usually by blackmailing or terrorizing a member of a targetted individual's family) were the most sought-after means of gathering information. Brickham conducted penetrations unilaterally and in liaison with the Special Branch. CIA province officers trained their counterpart Special Branch officers on how to mount penetrations, how to interrogate suspects, and how to recruit informants.
As Chief of Field Operations, Brickham established six regional offices and put a CIA liaison officer in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces. CIA Station Chief John Hart liked this organizational scheme so much that he decided to put a CIA Covert Action paramilitary officer in each province, too. The CIA's Covert Action program under Tom Donohue had a $28-million budget, while Brickham's liaison budget amounted to a paltry $1 million a year. Many Covert Action officers were refugees from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. They ran the CIA's Armed Propaganda Teams (versions of which will soon be deployed by the Department of Homeland Security), Census Grievance Program, Montagnard program, and most importantly, the Counter-Terror (CT) Teams. According to Brickham, the purpose of the CT Teams (versions of which will also soon be deployed in America through the Homeland Security covert action apparatus) was to do to the terrorists what they were doing to us. In Vietnam that meant leaving severed heads on fence posts.
Brickham would eventually bring the liaison and covert action people together in the Phoenix Program. The process began in July 1966 with the Roles and Missions Study, which concluded that military operations alone would not win the Vietnam War, and that a second "Pacification" war was needed 1) to destroy the Viet Cong Infrastructure and 2) win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese through political propaganda and psychological warfare. The Special Branch was assigned the task of attacking the Viet Cong Infrastructure, and Brickham focused on articulating the problem.
President Johnson sent CIA officer Robert Komer to Vietnam in August 1966 to organize this second Pacification war, through the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), formed in October 1966. (OCO is an early model of the current Office of Homeland Security.) OCO "coordinated" field units from the State Department, the Information Service, and the CIA, and had branches for psyops, political action, defectors, public safety, and economic development. At this point Brickham's boss, Howard Stone, the chief of Foreign Intelligence in the CIA's Saigon station, transferred Brickham and his field operations people out of the CIA station and put them in the Revolutionary Development Cadre Program, which was managed by CIA officer Lou Lapham. Considered the CIA's "second" station, the Rev Dev Cadre program taught the CIA's Vietnamese assets how to "pacify" the Vietnamese people.


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http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/attack-against.pdf
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
On 22 November 1966, Brickham presented Robert Komer with his original think piece, titled "Attack Against VC Infrastructure."
"Attack Against VC Infrastructure" was written during the Roles and Missions reorganization in preparation for fighting the pacification war. The Roles and Missions Study and Combined Campaign Plan stressed that increased emphasis should be given to identifying and eliminating the VC Infrastructure (as defined within the document) and to small unit operations designed specifically to destroy guerrilla forces. According to Bickham, "People wanted to know what was meant by the term 'Viet Cong Infrastructure.'" Even the military had no idea, so Howard Stone arranged for Brickham to brief General William Westmoreland.
Brickham wrote "Attack" as the basis for his hour-long Westmoreland briefing. "Attack" was the first time the CIA revealed to the military that it had Province Interrogation Programs (PICs) and that it kept "political order of battle" files.
"Attack" is important because it defines the VCI in its first sentence: "The VC organizational hierarchy, the mangement structure, as opposed to guerrialls for example, VC troops, and even, in many cases, VC terrorists." It adds to this definition all communist party members, front officers, and suicide bombers (sappers). Brickham likened the "attack on the VCI" to going after the Mafia, because the Mafia attracts bad people and uses selective terror and extortion to achieve its goals.
"Attack" is also significant in that it defines the attack as a function of the Police Special Branch, with its HIP, PIC, and penetration operations. Notably, the means of attack were ambushes, counterterror teams, popular and regional forces (like our National Guard and Reserves), Special Forces elements, plus regular Army Search and Destroy, Hamlet Search, and Country Fair operations. One can include the My Lai Massacre in the attack on the VCI, as a Phoenix "concept" operation. Although the attack on the VCI was essentially a secret police operation that relied on blacklists and assassination squads, B-52s and artillery bombardments were also frequently used to neutralize members of the VCI, along with their families and everyone else in their villages and hamlets.
"Attack" mentions the Cong Tac IV program, in which US Army intelligence officers were sent to 20 districts and precincts in and around Saigon. Cong Tac IV organized the initial Phoenix database of VCI on 3-by-5 cards. The CT IV units used regular Army units as a shield to sweep into villages to try to identify VCI from Special Branch blacklists, with the help of the National Police Field Forces. (The Department of Homeland Security is likewise militarizing secret units with police departments across America.)
"Attack" also mentions the Dien Ban DIOCC (mini-PIC) pilot program in Quang Ngai Province. The DIOCCs (District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers) were created by the CIA and Marines in IV Corps.
"Attack" suggested incorporating the Special Branch operations already in place, with the Cong Tac IV and DIOCC programs, and combining them in a national program that coordinated the 22 some-odd intelligence agencies in each province, in the attack on the VCI.

22 November 1966

ATTACK AGAINST VC INFRASTRUCTURE

1. When we speak of the VC infrastructure, we are
speaking of the VC organizational hierarchy, the man-
agement structure, as opposed to guerrillas, for example,
VC ttoops and even, in many cases, VC terrorists. Many
if not most of these latter categories, guerrillas, troops,
and even terrorists, are young people who have been either
impressed or seduced into the VC, and cannot in any way
be considered "hard core" Communists.
2. We do include in "infrastructure" all PRP mem-
bers, and all front organization officers (as opposed
to the rank and file of these front organizations).
Thus all members of a village chapter, all District
Committee and all Province Committee cadre are included
as of course the higher echelons. Region (or Zone) and
COSVN. We would also include members of the so-called
sapper units--these people are harderned <sic> Communist troops,
organized in military formations, to carry out sabotage
and terrorism of the larger and more dramatic nature--
hotel bombings in Saigon, Long Binh ammunition dump,
General Walt's residence. These latter are not casual
acts of terrorism, but carefully planned and fully or-
ganized military operations--Commando type operations.
3. Effective attack on VC infrastructure depends
on precise identification, location, and pattern of move-
ments and activities of these Viet Cong cadre and their
organizational units.
4. To the end of developing intelligence infor-
mation on the infrastructure, we have three operational
collection programs: informant operations; interrogations
of captured (or arrested) and defected VC; and agent
penetrations of VC organizations.
5. Informant operations, as they affect the infra-
structure per se, produce information mainly on hamlet
and village cadre and guerrillas, and to a much lesser
extent on District level cadre. These latter, the Dis-
trict cadre, will be mainly tax-collectors, propagandists,
and so on, those VC elements exposed to the "general
public". Informants can quite often give information
regarding locations of District and higher headquarters,
bases, meetings and so on, without however, providing
useful identification of the persons.

[page 2]

Page Two

6. The interrogation of prisoners and defectors
is by far the most important source of infrastructure
information, in terms of identifications, job decrip-
tion, physical description, activities, base areas, hid-
ing places, and so on. Very rarely, however, can pri-
prisoners or defectors give advance information on locations
and movements, meetings, conferences, et cetera.
7. The third program, agent penetrations, can
produce substantional bodies of infrastructure infor-
mation--identifications of cadre, movements and act-
ivities, and at times advance information of meetings
and conferences. Our handicap here is that agent com-
munications are characteristically slow; so that fre-
uqently, even though an agent has learned in advance of
a cadre conference, we or a military element able to
react, receive the information too late.
8. We have, as of last complete reporting date,
30 September, 137 penetrations of District committees
throughout the country, of which 93 are Police Special
Branch penetrations, and 44 are CIO. We had under
development as of that date 153 additional District
level penetration cases, 92 PSB and 61 CIO. We had,
as of 30 September, 15 Province Committee penetrations,
with an additional 20 under development.
9. An additional source of information not regarded
as a separate operational program, is the exploitation
of captured documents.
10. It is important to realize that, due to VC
use of aliases, VC security compartmentation, and geo-
graphical dispersal of the various sections of, for
example a VC Province Committee the full and complete
true name identificntion of these cadre is very dif-
ficult. Many VC are known only alias.
11. Information from the above four sources is
assembled and collated in Province Police Special Branches.
Once a year, each Province PSB will publish a VC Pol-
itical Order of Battle, which will contain all that
the police know of the VC organization, and a fill-in,
to the extent possible, of the true names of identified
VC cadre. Vietnamese reporting channels are not very
effic1ent however. It turns out that a great deal of

[page 3]

Page Three

information on VC identifications will exist in Police
files at District level, and also in Sub-Sector files.
In order to prepare complete political OB's, for mili-
tary operations, for example, not only will Province
and Sub-Sector will be collected and added. This is a
slow laborious process.
12. Attack against the infrastructure involves a
variety of action "tools". Arrest of terrorists and
saboteurs often lead immediately to the arrest of
underground cells in GVN cities. VC cadre may be
arrested in GVN controlled areas, based on informant
tips or on reports of penetration agents. It is quite
rare, however, to catch high-level cadre in this fashion--
what we get will be city cadre and occasionnlly a Dis-
trict Committee officer. Danang, Qui Nhon, Phan Thiet,
Tuy Hoa, Han Me Thuot, Saigon, Can Tho, are all cities
where (extensive) underground networks have been rounded
up onne or more occasions in 1966.
13. In the country side <sic> several different action
"processes" are employed. First will be the precisely
targetted raid of ambush, based upon intelligence in-
formation regarding the residence or future movements
of one or more cadre. We try, by these and other means,
to capture meetings or conferences of VC Village chapters
and District Committees. These raids or ambushes may be
carried out by the Police, by PRU's by RF, or in some
areas by Special Forces elements. Such raids have been
quite successful, or partially successful - when they
result in one or more VC Village or District Cadre being
killed. Unfortunately, they are more often killed than
captured.
14. A second action method is the military search
and destroy, hamlet search or "County Fair" type op-
operation. For these operations, the Police prepare
search lists from their files; to an increasing extent
as a result of encouragement and pressure, they also
collect VC defectors and other sources to use as
"identifiers" of VC caught in these cordon and sweep
operations. A modest number of Viet Cong village and
district cadre will be caught and identified in these

[page 4]

Page Four

operations, and at times one or more Province level or
higher cadre may be caught and identified. Thus in Phuoc
Tuy Province, a recent sweep operation caught a Province
Committee security cadre. In operation Irving, a Zone 5
(VC Region level) economic cadre was captured. Those are
just the most recent such catches.
15. A final and not insignificant aspect of the
attack on infrastructure are the direct military op-
eration targetted on the VC District, Province, or
Region base areas. Whereas it is possible to reach
District Committee bases, meetings, and conferences with
small ground units, and it is possible to capture the
District Cadre, catching Province and higher cadre has
so far, largely been a matter of luck. Province and higher
level cadre very rarely are exposed to capture. However,
almosy all reasonably reliable information on District
Committee meetings, Province Committee and higher base
areas, meeting, and conferences are increasingly result-
ing in air or artillery strikes. Sometimes military
operations are directed against a VC gathering rather
than a <sic> installation. For example, a Marine Battalion
attacked a Quang Nam Province Committee conference last
spring, and more recently, 175mm artillery fire was
directed on the reported site of a combined conference of
MR-4, MR-l and COSVN representatives. We have on occasion
been fortunate enought <sic> to receive after-action information
on such strikes, and we are confident that the damage to
the infrastructure, intterms <sic> of key personnel killed, is
significant.
16. The overrunning by Australian troops in January
1966 of the Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee
(now VC Region 4) headquarters in the Ho Bo woods is a <sic>
example of military operational activity. While not cap-
turing "infrastructure", the operation destroyed and dis-
rupted the headquarters, and the documents loss suffered
by the VC unquestionably seriously degraded the Special
Zone Committee capability, at least temporarily.
17. A special Task force has been organized to
launch a combined intelligence/police/military assault
against the MR-4 (Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh Special Zone
Committee) headquarters and base area.
_____________________________________________________________________________


http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/con...zation.pdf

>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
Brickham's second three-page document, "A Concept for Organization for Attack on VC Infrastructure," was written at the behest of CIA station chief John Hart as a plan for a "general staff for pacification." The idea was to present this concept paper to Robert Komer, Lyndon Johnson's personal representative in Vietnam and the CIA officer in overall charge of pacification.
Brickham wrote "Concept" with CIA officer John Hansen, an expert in counter-espionage and computers. Brickham was the organizational man, and used Rensis Likert's three-part "Management By Objective" theory:
1) The "strategy" or "objective" of the organization was better intelligence.
2) The organization was to be structured so that it would have adequate funding without trespassing on any other agency's mandate. Much like the Department of Homeland Security, member agencies provided their own money and personnel, etc.
3) Management of CIA officers in the field was achieved through monthly reporting formats that were plugged into Hansen's computer. To oversee policy-making and operations, Brickham proposed a board of directors with Komer as the Chairman, on the Ford Motor Company "command post" model.
Station Chief John Hart called this concept "ICEX -- Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation." It was much like the current Office of Homeland Security in the White House. The ICEX Saigon staff consisted of three operations officers, a reports management group, and an intelligence group. In the "Concept" paper we first hear of ROICs and POICs -- Regional Operations and Intelligence Coordinators, and Province Operations and Intelligence Coordinators. These ROICs and POICs would play a central role in the Phoenix Program
Brickham identified three problem areas: 1) collection, coordination, and reaction; 2) screening, detention, and judicial processing; and 3) interrogation exploitation. These are all integral elements of the current "war on terror." Notably, the Homeland Security lexicon was emerging in these early plans for the Phoenix Program.
Brickham's "Concept" was approved by the CIA but not adopted by Komer. Komer did not want a general staff, but an "executive action organization that focused on getting the job done."

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http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/per...ations.pdf
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
On 26 May 1967, after Komer rejected the "Concept" paper, Brickham went back to the drawing board and, with Komer's ideas in mind, wrote and submitted "Personal Observations." As Brickham states, it "reflects a management philosophy" and contains "more detailed development of thoughts behind the organization proposals recently submitted to you [ie, Komer]."
"Personal Observations" emphasizes the management system required for the "decentralized" command system Komer wanted. It recites the basic goals and strategy of pacfication, and emphasizes the importance of the military, as well as the CIA, in the attack on the VC Infrastructure. It stresses the importance of "coordination" between the military, the police, and the CIA, and cites examples of coordination problems. Brickham highlights the "war lord complex" as one of the main problems. (One can see George W. Bush descending into this "war lord complex.")
On page 4, Brickham refers to the importance of "modern corporate experience" in developing the decentralized command structure Komer wanted. This includes using computer systems and reporting formats to improve the performance of people in the field. In "Personal Observations," Brickham again refers to the Ford Motor Company model. "In industry and commerce," he writes on page 10, "[Phoenix] officers are known as 'Product Managers' and in appropriate circumstances this approach has proved to be highly effective and valuable."
In "Personal Observations" Brickham turns the attack against the VCI into a business venture. This mindset eventually resulted in Phoenix Coordinators being responsible for neutralizing 1,800 VCI per month. This is a most illuminating document.

[cover page]

26 May 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador R. W. Komer
VIA: AD/RDW
FROM: Nelson H. Brickham
SUBJECT: Personal Observations

Attached herewith is an informal memorandum summarizing
my personal observations, after twenty months in country,
concerning the requirements of our situation in Vietnam. It
reflects a management philosophy as well as a discussion of
our main problems, and is significant only as it contains
the analysis, rat1onale, and more detailed development of
thoughts behind the organization proposals recently submitted
to you.

[page one]
REQUIREMENTS OF A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. The management system must provide for development
and review of basIc strategy (of pacification) and for review
and/or modification of strategy and programs corresponding to
fundamental changes in the situation or to new opportunities
and requirements.
B. The system must address itself to the radical improve-
ment of basic performance in a number of programs, and it must
address itself to achievement and preservation of coordination
and integration of programs and efforts.
C. The management system must be designed around a highly
decentralized command system, which focal command point (Sector/
Province) must coordinate and manage highly diverse and techni-
cally specialized programs. However, this is done in a series
(44) of largely repetitIve situations.
D. The system must therefore provide clear definition
and communication of goals; it must be sensitive to progress
towards those goals and to deviations from programs and required
levels of performance, and it must be responsive to control,
redirection and corrective action for correction of inadequate
performance and coordination, and corresponding to changing
situations and to problems.
A. Basic National Goals and Strategy of Pacification
Basic goals and pacification strategy, as well as pro-
gram requirements in terms of this strategy, are amply and ade-
quately set forth in a series of documents, notably the Klein
Report, the Roles and Missions Study Group Report, planning
documents issued in November 1966 for the RD 1967 Planning
Conferences, and the 1967 Campaign Plan.
Programs of the several agencIes are responsive to and
in accordance with the basic strategy. A number of these
programs were developed and in existence prior to the drafting
of the above basic documents, and as a matter of fact, were
contributive to their preparation.
The basic programs, especially in the intelligence and
action areas, have all demonstrated their usefulness and
soundness and do not require modification. They do require
coordination, integration, improvement and intensification.
These are management and operating problems (as opposed to
planning and strategy problems).

[page two]
-2
That basic strategy and programs are both comprehensive
and sound does not argue against the fact that modification
can and should be made, as we learn new facts, or as new
problems emerge.
For example, there is too little realization of the impact
of conventional military operations on the "infrastructure"
and on the guerrilla war. Documents captured earlier this
year permitted the first real insight in this facet of the war,
and demonstrated significant degradation of the VC infrastruc-
ture, the VC guerrilla capability, the loss of support from
the villages and hamlets, an increasingly difficult food situ-
ation, etc. There have been only two comprehensive analyses
of these trends (one MACV and one OSA), and their obvious
lessons in terms of militnry operations, military/civil opera-
tions, new requiremerits for attack on infrastructure, have not
been drawn, or incorporated into pncification strategy, except
in a piecemeal fashion.
Likewise, new problems have been recognized or, while
foreseen, have mushroomed to such an extent as to outstrip all
capabilities for handling them. An outstanding example of
such problems is that of disposal of VC after they are captured
The war is a run on a treadmill as long as existing and totally
inadequate process and facilities for detention and neutrali-
zation of captured VC remain unchanged. This is an example of
a problem area requiring very highest level attention and
solution.
New opportunities, new insights and new problems must be
incorporated into basic strategy and basic programs, and any
"general staff for pacification" must be ennabled to recognize
and respond to such opportunities, insights and problems.

B. Coordination and Performance
The main problem in Vietnam is one of implementation and
coordination of the various programs, civilian and military. Few
if any of the programs are new. If each program is implemented
with full effectiveness, and if all of them pull together, in
concert, then we could expect quite striking advances in rela-
tively brief time periods.
The first necessity is coordination and integration. in
Province, on the American side; until we achieve that, it is
difficult to talk cooperation and integration on the Victnamese
side. This need for American coordination and improved effec-
tiveness of all elements of the American Province Team has
been constant refrain, in various reports and memoranda, going
back to 1963 (and earlier) Various experiments have been
made in the effort to create coordinated Province Team Appro-
aches, but they have, by and large, not succeeded, or have

[page three]
-3-
succeeded in only one or a few Provinces. The OCO structure
has made some progress in certain areas, but it has been
disappointingly slow.
There has been highly varying performance, or program
effectiveness, of the various agencies. This could be
illustrated a dozen different ways. The Provinces have not
been adequately staffed, nor in many cases can it be said that
the people involved have been doing thier <sic> jobs. A Refugee
officer arrives at a District town, kicks bags of rice off of
his helicopter and then disappears. A PFF Company is given
an occasional visit by a so-called advisor. A Public Safety
man is supposed to set up a detention camp: he arrives at
District headquarters in the company of a regionnl OCO staff
officer. looks around for fifteen minutes and disappears,
never to be seen again, and the U.S. Division has to set up
and man the camp for him. ARVN and Sector will have nothing
but contempt for Police intelligence. Certain officers of
some agencies spend as much time in Saigon, or at least out
of Province, as possible; many of them don't budge out of
their Province capitals into the Districts nnd villages. A
MACV Senior Advisor will censor reports so as to present a
rosy picture (if ARVN was as good as he says it is, we should-
n't have a war). One element of OCO will produce a major
staff study without coordination or reference to the line unit
concerned, which study may be radically incorrect. Too many
officers, of all agencies, betray an abysmal ignorance of
programs of their colleagues, programs which they are supposed
to be supporting, or from which they could gain support for
their own operations.
There are the numerous "private wars" going on. One
person pushes one program, which may be in radical conflict
with programs pushed by others, either in his own agency or
in another agency. A combat unit may ignore "infrastructure"
and go around looking for big main force enemy which they
never or rarely find. (This is the "IV Corps Syndrome", but
American units have been known to do the same.) Province
Chiefs, and Sector will force police to ignore infrastructure
and concentrate exclusively on military OB sightings. Combat
units both ARVN and American, will operate in Provinces with no
reference to Sector, and therefore with no reference to or
exploitntion of locally held tactical intelligence, and of
course, without taking advantage of potential local assistance.
Higher command levels will evacuate important prisoners before
local exploitation, especially of "infrastructure" information,
can be done. Each Corps (Region) and each Province develops
its own "war lord" psychology, going off in its owm direction,
not necessarily in accordance with basic program and mission.

[page four]
-4 -
There are numerous grave weaknesses. Province and Sector
will misuse PRU units, committing them to static defense or to
conventional military use in a conventionnl fashion. The Police,
and Police Special Branch will not, except in a few situations,
be incorporated into RD planning, so that they are unable to
program against requirements. OCO Province Reps and Sector
Advisors will "forget" to get inputs from Special Branch Advisors
for the Special Joint Reports.
C. Decentralized Decision Making.
It is totally unfeasible to exercise tactical control of
Province and pacification operations, even with a complete
real time communications systems. This implies tactical control
decentralization to Corps (Region) and Sector (Province) in
accordance with orthodox military and civil organizational
command lines.
This places a high premium on the individual orientation,
initiative and aggressiveness, in the first instance, of Sector
(Province) personnel.
With such far-flung decentralizntion, however, and recog-
nizing (a) the traditional weaknesses of traditional information
systems, (b) the diverse and centripetal tendencies and pressures,
© the necessity for blending together a wide range of diverse
technical specialties, (d) the necessities to monitor progress,
identify problems and initiate corrective action, and (e) the
need in its own right for large amounts of various types of
information, the necessity for detailed central knowledge and
a high degree of program control at Saigon level becomes
evident.
D. Reports and Information Systems.
"Modern corporate experience has demonstrated that manage-
ment of large and diverse enterprises requires a wide range of
facts to arrive at good decisions. Accordingly, the benefits
of a comprehensive reporting system are many. It aids decen-
tralization without loss of control and saves executives' time
by locating and anticipating problems, thus enabling them to
concentrate more on finding solutions and preventing adverse
effects. It also spreads scarce executive talent over a larger
number of critical areas."
Centrally designed and controlled reporting and information
systems are therefore becoming more and more prominent in
management literature. This trend towards centralized design
and processing has been given enormous impetus by the advent
of various automated data processing systems, which have a

[page five]
-5-
greatly expanded capacity for storing, manipulating and repro-
ducing information, at a greatly incrensed processing speed.
Automatic data processing potential greatly modifies
(increases) substantive raw information requirements at a
central processing point. This process is underway in both
substantive traditional military intelligence collation func-
tions and also in the infrasturcture area, at the CICV automa-
tic data processing center. Therefore, while previously there
was no substantive requirement for raw information transmitted
to Saigon (for other than management spot checking purposes),
now there is.
Proper design of the management reporting and information
system is crucial. This is true not only in terms of information
flow upwards, but also in terms of the feedback to echelons of
the system and to the Provine operations.
<indented>
The reporting system should be:
-Designed to elicit the kind of performance desired,
by identifying areas that top command believes are of
priority importance and that are subject to continuing
scrutiny. So designed as to focus responsibilities
and induce self-initiated corrective action.
-Designed to serve multiple purposes--i.e., service
requirements of several management echelons simul-
taneously, so as to reduce the number of disparate
excessive and probably uncoordinated requirements
originating in various echelons. Reports system
design must be realistic and not overburdensome,
violation of which destroys either the reporting
system or the officers' effectiveness or both. A
rapidly rising marginal cost of information must be
kept in mind.
-Designed so as to surface, directly or indirectly,
key problem areas requiring top management attention--
misunderstandings, malcoordination, et cetera.
-Designed so as to elicit certain key facts relative
to and reflective of an officer's performance, which
may prove grounds for either corrective or possibly
later disciplinary action.

[page six]
-6 -
The OSA field reporting system was designed expressly with
the above considerations in mind. The following decisions were
made:
<indentation>
a. Its monthly periodic report. This keys the report
in with Liaison Service reporting cycles. A month is
short enough time to permit meaningful feedback and
corrective action, is long enough time to have suffi-
cient activity and accomplishments to include, and is
not so long a period of time as to have too much to
report.
b. The report combines narrative and statistical
reporting. This report is a comprehensive one,
reflecting recurring requirements from Washington,
from Saigon and from Regions. It combines both
objective and factual, and subjective reporting.
c. The report reflects activities, understanding,
and thinking and writing ability. It is designed as
a "projective test", so to speak. The relatively
few officers who (a) perform poorly but write well,
or (b) perform well but write poorly are rather
easily and rapidly discovered and identified.
d. The report focusses on basic program performance
and on key areas of management importance and interest.
e. The report includes items and statistical reporting,
which, correlated with other factors, yield good clues
as to program progress, as to officers <sic> performance as
well as to performance and functioning of related
systems--first-echelon supervision, for example, and
American team cooperation.
f. The report provides a factual and subjective basis
for evaluation and investigation.
<end indentaion>
In addition to the (OSA monthly management report, there
are a variety of other reports required, (most of which
however are prepared by the Liaison Service) and are submitted
as attachments to the basic monthly report. Of special
importance are the so-called spot reports which form the
basis for bi-weekly reports to Washington and for feedback
dissemination to Province. This latter feature--publication
and feedback to Region and Province, is exceptionally impor-
tant, because it reflects and recognizes the Province Officer's

[page seven]
-7-
own activities, it tells him what other people are doing,
identifies to him important (and reportable) activities, and
induces a competitive and emulative spirit.
There are of course many more facets to the overall
Province reporting problem than are encompassed by the OSA
reporting system. Sector has its reports, daily, weekly
and otherwise; AID and JUSPAO have theirs, which have been
partially integrated in the OCO modification of the Special
Joint Report (monthly).
The modifications made by OCO in the Special Joint
Report were not too helpful. and as a matter of fact, were
a step backwnrds. The previous SJR was a report requiring
input from all agencies, and carried signatures of all
agencies, reducing opportunity for slanted and distorted
reporting. OCO reduced the signatories to two, the OCO
Province Representative and the Senior Sector Advisor. The
net effect has been that in a number of instances, an input
is no longer requested of the PSB advisor, nor perhaps may
he even see the report. This means that his programs are
reported and commented upon by someone who known relatively
little about them, nor does our officer know what is being
said. The second fault of the new OCO report is its pre-
occupation, in numerous statistical appendices, with trivia.
This is a carryover of the USAID planning and programming
system.
One grave problem which a management reporting system
must address is that of distortion and cover-up. This
has been described by one officer as follows: "... The
whole current system of reporting statistics that prove
either to Congress or to the American public or the
President that successive generations of American officials
in Vietnam are more successful than their predecessors--
these things are just getting in the way of solving the
problem.... Then you have a group of Americans in the
field, the majority of whom serve a one-year tour. They
go through the honeymoon phase in which they try to see
everything good about their counterpart and about the
situation and report it thus. Then they go through a per-
iod of disillusionment, in which they realize that nothing
has been accomplished, but by this time they have become
the victims of their own past reports and they have to
maintain the fiction. Ultimately they go out of there
very discouraged and probably very unhappy with their own
performance because about the time they become knowledge-
able to really do something they are on their way
home and have no desire to hurt their own professional
career."

[page eight]
-8-
In addition to management information systems (handled
differently by different agencies), there are numerous sub-
stantive sub-systems now in existence in Vietnam. Police
Special Branch collection and processing of information is
one such sub-system. The PIC system is a separate but
related sub-system. There are various military intelli-
gence sub-systems. The militnry and OSA infrastructure
sub-systems are gradually being brought together, but
tactical intelligence sub-systems are poorly integrated.
Prisoner exploitation sub-systems have been poorly integra-
ted (hopefully now resolved). No effective attack has yet
been devised for measuring impact on and degradation of VC
infrastructure. The Chieu Hoi exploitation and reporting
sub-system leaves much to be desired. Information feedback
to Province of captured documents and prisoner exploitation
by OSA is well established, but is a problem which has only
recently been addressed by MACV.
Some of these sub-systems are clearly and obviously
autonomous and integral. Others however, should just as
clearly and obviously be closely related and integrated,
which they are not. Others yet should exist and don't.
Complementary to a management information system,
there must be a top management investigative or inspection
function. This function must be empowered to conduct or
direct routine and special investigations and reviews, both
announced and unannounced. It must be empowered to impound
files for special investigations, and conduct private as
well as joint interviews. This is not nor should it be
allowed to gain the color of hostile or necessarily cri-
tical investigation. One major purpose is to give the
necessary human and intuitive feel and content, which puts
flesh and blood around the statistical and narrative reports.
The investigative function, in its routine visitation
aspect, can be instructional and "orientational", in terms
of coordination and program functioning (but necessarily
must avoid command direction)

E. Management System Design.
There are several different organizational solutions
at the Mission level responsive to the specifications and
discussion above. These different solutions are not neces-
sarily alternative; they can be regarded as transitional,
one being a step in evolution to the next.

[page nine]
-9-
A minimal solution would be similar to that in operation
in the Ford Motor Company. In this, Ford formed an "operating
committee" consisting of all functional Division chiefs,
which meets once a week. A comprehensive statistical report--
between 50 to 60 pages in length--is presented, going into all
factors of production, market, costs, inventories, and
trends. The statistical and narrative presentation is designed
to highlight and focus attention on operating conditions, on
changes, and on indicators, of problem areas. Only three full
time officers are required for the presentation and presentation
of this report (after the system was installed). It required
complete systems design for the reports <sic> content, information
system and computer back-up.
Our problem is substantially different, but is amenable
to the same approach (without its totally statistical content).
Under this concept a working committee would be formed, under
the chairmanship of Mr. Komer, composed of Chief, OSA; J-2;
J-3; Chief, OCO; AD/RDW; Chief RDSD; AD/PSD; Chief, OSA/ID.
The committee probably should meet bi-weekly. This would
constitute the "board of directors" for pacification.
A small and select reports group, working with raw Pro-
vince (Sector) input direct from the various agencies but
also special reports obtained from the agencies, would
systematically cover a series of selected topics, identified
as reflective of key management problem areas. Province staff-
ing by the various agencies would be one such topic. Prisoner
and Chieu Hoi accession and disposition would be another. RD
Team locations, actions and casualties would be another, as
would quantitative and qualitative description of intelligence
reports accessions, PRU operations, et cetera. Province
inspection reports would be presented.
Such a system could be inaugurated almost immediately,
based on input of existing information flow from the various
agencies (raw traffic). A reports group of an estimated four
officers. drawn from MACV, OSA and Mr. Komer's staff could
be formed with little difficulty. One of them should be a
professional information system analyst as well as a statis-
tical expert (from either MACV or USAID MID).
This group, under guidance of the "board of directors"
would begin immediately a review of reporting from all agen-
cies, and undertake immediately an information system design,

[page ten]
-10-
per the discussion above. Or, alternatively, the Reports
Group could begin immediately functioning in the staff capa-
city, and two professional consultants in information analysis
could be brought from Washington, for a comprehensive study.
Such a study should in no circumstances require more than
three months time.
A second solution would use the first as a core, or
nucleus, but would add the Program Manager concept. The Pro-
gram Manager concept has been developed in both industry and
government as a method for coordinating, stimulating and
focussing diverse elements and activities of different organi-
zational components, from top-management level. It provides
centralized planning, direction and supervision of the specific
programs, while at the same time preserving the line of command
integrity of each separate organizational component. While
operating with and through regular line of command, the con-
cept permits direct contact with the various action elements,
within the context of the program, this short-circuiting
numerous reporting and managerial "filters".
In industry and commerce, these officers are known as
"Product Managers" and in appropriate circumstances this
approach has proved to be highly effective and valuable.
In Government (e.g., as in the new Department of State
reorganization, and as in the military) they are known as
either Program Managers or Project Officers, depending upon
the echelon or level at which they are functioning. (Additional
information on Product Manager concept is available if desired).


___________________________________________________________________


http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/coordination.pdf
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
"A Proposal" was presented to Komer in early June 1967. This is the most important "enabling" document in the development of the Phoenix Program. It has annexes on interrogation, data processing, and screening and detention of VCI.
"A Proposal" was accepted by Komer. The idea was to integrate all US and Vietnamese intelligence and counter-insurgency forces. The result was the formation of ICEX, which would later be renamed the Phoenix Program.
In "A Proposal" the CIA is identified as OSA (the Office of the Special Assistant). The document describes the joint combined staff mechanism that Komer favored, operating at the national, corps, and province levels, down to the DIOCs at the district level. ICEX coordinated everyone in an attack on the VCI, under Komer as Deputy Ambassador for Pacification. "A Proposal" presents ICEX as a joint civilian (CIA) and military staff. It reviews all the integral elements of ICEX-Phoenix, but it stresses that the CIA was in charge at every level. Indeed, the CIA would run Phoenix until 1969 when the program became public and the military took over.
_________________________________________________________________


http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/macv-381-41.pdf
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
Dated 9 July 1967, MACV Dir. 381-41 was written by CIA officers James Ward and Evan Parker, and MACV Counter-Intelligence chief Colonel Junichi Buhto. Parker became the first director of ICEX/Phoenix. Ward had his finger on the pulse of field operations, and Buhto was the military's liaison to CIA.
MACV 381-41 officially authorized the ICEX Program. It stated the purpose, scope, concept, and organization of ICEX, while describing its committee system and its principle "rifle shot" (meaning assassination) method of operation. It told where ICEX coordinators would come from (including the Central Registry Detachment) and scheduled the establishment of ICEX committees by 15 July 1967 at corps, province, and district levels.
MACV 381-41 is clearly a unilateral American document, and ICEX is clearly a unilateral American program with no mention of the Vietnamese. This is why it is so important. It is six pages long with an organizational chart at the end.


__________________________________________________________________


http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/action-program.pdf
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
The three-page cover sheet is a MACCORDS Memorandum from L. Wade Lathram, ACOS, CORDS, referencing a 21 July memo from Evan Parker (MACJOIR-ICEX), titled "Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure 1967-1968."
"Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure" refers to a 16 June 1967 COMUSMACV-approved proposal for the joint civilian (CIA)-military attack on VCI. It notes that MACV 381-41 was distributed on 17 July, and it tells Corps Senior Advisors exactly how to comply with MACV 381-41, by 31 July 1967. It refers to briefings given by Evan Parker, in which Parker told the Corps commanders how to set up ICEX committees. By 19 July there were ten DIOCCs operating, half in I Corps.
According to "Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure," by July the Saigon ICEX headquarters staff included Parker and four part-time CIA staffers, two full-time MACV officers, and one part-time MACV officer. Six more MACV officers were coming, and four more officers were coming from the CIA. The ICEX HQ staff was expected to include 50 people. 126 people were being assigned to the field. This documents notes a plan to brief General Nguyen Ngoc Loan again on 7 August, and notes that he objected to the ICEX Program. An "interrogation study" (Tab 11) was to be completed in November.
"Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure" is a lengthy document. Tab A discusses Program Status and Summary. Tab B lists the twelve Action programs. In many ways Tab B (with its separate tabs) is the guts of the ICEX program. Absolutely essential reading. Tab 10, "Improve Civilian Detention Systems," is in many ways a prelude for Homeland Security.

__________________________________________________________________


http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/car...7aug67.pdf
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
Dated 4 August 1967, this memo is authored by senior CIA officer George Carver, then serving as senior advisor on Vietnamese affairs to the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA's Vietnam Committee.
The memo explains what the Attack on Viet Cong Infrastructure is, and how it is effected by "the Infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Structure (ICEX)." The document was written by Brickham. It refers to the PICs, and the Roles and Missions Study, and problems between the Vietnamese Army and Police which were preventing the Vietnamese from getting with the program. It identified the people who staffed the ICEX Committee, including Komer at DEPCORDS, the CIA chief of station in Saigon, the MACV J2 and J3, and the CIA's RDC Division chief at CORDS. It is seven pages long, with a cover sheet, and was summarily approved.
_________________________________________________________________


http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/pro...idance.pdf
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
This is a three-page, self-explanatory document which discusses the 12 Action Programs, ICEX organization and staffing, etc. It refers to ICEX/SIDE. SIDE stands for the Screening Interrogation and Detention Program. This is discussed at length in Don Bordenkircher's book Tiger Cage: An Untold Story.
____________________________________________________________________


http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/icex-briefing.pdf
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
Dated August 1967, this is a SACSA (Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities) ICEX Briefing document. When ICEX was created, General William DuPuy was the SACSA. A former CIA deputy division chief, DuPuy allowed the CIA to handle ICEX/Phoenix as it saw fit, and he readily committed Special Forces to the program. This document is crucial for that reason--it is the document that officially brings the Special Forces into Phoenix.
_____________________________________________________________________


http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/mac...-0910z.pdf
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
This November 1967 MACV Joint Message form "DTG 06 0910Z" is a progress report from Komer to everyone involved in ICEX/Phoenix. See the first page for a recipient list, one of the document's most important features. Another important feature (see page 2) is that the GVN had not yet signed on to the Phoenix program or concept. Komer notes the new government under Nixon's hand-picked candidate, President Nguyen Van Thieu, would soon sign on.
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