08-02-2014, 02:24 AM
Talk about a myth....
This was a done deal. JFK's policies were spelled out in this letter and in NSAM263... The Taylor recommendation referred to are at the right from the report
Below are the specific changes to NSAM263 - by BUNDY - prior to the assassination, knowing full well that JFK would NEVER agree to NSAM273 given what he had already ordered...
[ATTACH=CONFIG]5712[/ATTACH][ATTACH=CONFIG]5713[/ATTACH]
273
4. The President expects that all senior officers of the Government will move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it is essential that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that express or implied criticism of officers of other branches be scrupulously avoided in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting, of November 20. The offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned are indicated in each case.
263: (The change to "established US policy in South Vietnam" had nothing at all to do with established policy but a POLICY CHANGE with the new pres.... yet BUNDY jumped the gun)
4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field. More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting of November 20. The office or offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned is indicated in each case.
273:
7. Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:
A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;
B. The plausibility of denial;
C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;
D. Other international reaction.
Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.
(Action: State, DOD, and CIA. )
263: (removed entirely and replace with text above)
7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action.
(Action: DOD, and CIA. )
273 simply removes the lined out text:
9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In particular, measures should be undertaken to satisfy ourselves completely that recent charges from Cambodia are groundless, and we should put ourselves in a position to offer to the Cambodian a full opportunity to satisfy themselves on this same point
This was a done deal. JFK's policies were spelled out in this letter and in NSAM263... The Taylor recommendation referred to are at the right from the report
Below are the specific changes to NSAM263 - by BUNDY - prior to the assassination, knowing full well that JFK would NEVER agree to NSAM273 given what he had already ordered...
[ATTACH=CONFIG]5712[/ATTACH][ATTACH=CONFIG]5713[/ATTACH]
273
4. The President expects that all senior officers of the Government will move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it is essential that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that express or implied criticism of officers of other branches be scrupulously avoided in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting, of November 20. The offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned are indicated in each case.
263: (The change to "established US policy in South Vietnam" had nothing at all to do with established policy but a POLICY CHANGE with the new pres.... yet BUNDY jumped the gun)
4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field. More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting of November 20. The office or offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned is indicated in each case.
273:
7. Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:
A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;
B. The plausibility of denial;
C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;
D. Other international reaction.
Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.
(Action: State, DOD, and CIA. )
263: (removed entirely and replace with text above)
7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action.
(Action: DOD, and CIA. )
273 simply removes the lined out text:
9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In particular, measures should be undertaken to satisfy ourselves completely that recent charges from Cambodia are groundless, and we should put ourselves in a position to offer to the Cambodian a full opportunity to satisfy themselves on this same point
Once in a while you get shown the light
in the strangest of places if you look at it right..... R. Hunter
in the strangest of places if you look at it right..... R. Hunter