On Edwin Kaiser and Related Topics

[Cliff Varnell]

When your notion of "truth" conflicts with multiple sources from the declassified record--some of them from the CIA itself--then yes, you risk your credibility.

But you are the same person who said I made up quotes from Allen Dulles about his snookering of Kennedy. When in fact, Dulles had himself admitted he suckered JFK and put it in his own writing! And an historian discovered it at the Princeton Library.

You were apparently unaware of this fact. Which was in the Douglass book.

This indicates a very dubious methodology of sourcing by you.

Dulles snookered Kennedy?

More like Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy snookered them both.

What you studiously fail to grasp, Jim, is that the Bay of Pigs planning was usurped by Bundy and Rusk in the month leading up to the operation.

Whose bright idea was it to stage the D-Day-2 "false flag" attacks on Castro's air force?

McGeorge Bundy.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu...-63v10/d64

Emphasis added in text

64. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy


Washington, March 15, 1961.
SUBJECT

• Meeting on Cuba, 4:00 PM, March 15, 1961
  
  

CIA will present a revised plan for the Cuban operation.1 They have done a remarkable job of reframing the landing plan so as to make it unspectacular and quiet, and plausibly Cuban in its essentials.

The one major problem which remains is the air battle. I think there is unanimous agreement that at some stage the Castro Air Force must be removed. It is a very sketchy force, in very poor shape at the present, and Colonel Hawkins (Bissell's military brain) thinks it can be removed by six to eight simultaneous sorties of B-26s. These will be undertaken by Cuban pilots in planes with Cuban Air Force markings. This is the only really noisy enterprise that remains.

My own belief is that this air battle has to come sooner or later, and that the longer we put it off, the harder it will be. Castro's Air Force is currently his Achilles' heel, but he is making drastic efforts to strengthen it with Russian planes and Russian-trained pilots.

Even the revised landing plan depends strongly upon prompt action against Castro's air. The question in my mind is whether we cannot solve this problem by having the air strike come some little time before the invasion. A group of patriotic airplanes flying from Nicaraguan bases might knock out Castro's Air Force in a single day without anyone knowing (for some time) where they came from, and with nothing to prove that it was not an interior rebellion by the Cuban Air Force, which has been of very doubtful loyalty in the past; the pilots will in fact be members of the Cuban Air Force who went into the opposition some time ago. Then the invasion could come as a separate enterprise, and neither the air strike nor the quiet landing of patriots would in itself give Castro anything to take to the United Nations.

I have been a skeptic about Bissell's operation, but now I think we are on the edge of a good answer. I also think that Bissell and Hawkins have done an honorable job of meeting the proper criticisms and cautions of the Department of State.

That was the plan.

Knock out Castro's air force in one day, and have some time pass between the operations.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu...-63v10/d65

Emphasis added in text

65. Editorial Note

According to summary notes prepared by General Gray, CIA officials returned to the White House on March 15, 1961, to present a revised plan for the operation against Cuba; see Document 64. The President's appointment book indicates that the meeting took place from 4:30 to 5:45 p.m. The meeting was attended by Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Mann, Berle, Dulles, Bissell, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, and Gray. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, it is likely that at least one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, probably General Lemnitzer or Admiral Burke, also attended. According to Gray's notes on the meeting:

"At this meeting the Zapata plan was presented to the President and a full-length discussion of it followed. The President expressed the belief that uprisings all along the island would be better than to concentrate and strike. The President asked how soon it was intended to break out from this area and Mr. Bissell stated that not before about D+10. The President was also concerned about ability to extricate the forces. The President did not like the idea of the dawn landing and felt that in order to make this appear as an inside guerrilla-type operation, the ships should be clear of the area by dawn. He directed that this planning be reviewed and another meeting be held the following morning." (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961; Kennedy Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

Without knocking out Castro's air force how could the ships be clear of the beach by dawn?[URL="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d66"]

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu...-63v10/d66[/URL]

Emphasis added in the text

66. Editorial Note


On March 16, 1961, CIA officials outlined for President Kennedy the revisions to the Zapata plan that the President had called for on the previous day. The President's appointment book indicates that the meeting took place in the White House from 4:15 to 5:23 p.m. The meeting was attended by Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Mann, Berle, Dulles, Bissell, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, and Gray. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, it is clear from his subsequent debriefing on the meeting that Admiral Burke also attended. According to Gray's notes on the meeting:

"At meeting with the President, CIA presented revised concepts for the landing at Zapata wherein there would be air drops at first light with [Page 160]the landing at night and all of the ships away from the objective area by dawn. The President decided to go ahead with the Zapata planning; to see what we could do about increasing support to the guerrillas inside the country; to interrogate one member of the force to determine what he knows; and he reserved the right to call off the plan even up to 24 hours prior to the landing." (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961, by General Gray; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

On March 17 Admiral Burke provided the JCS with additional details about the discussion of the revised Zapata plan. According to Burke, the President wanted to know what the consequences would be if the operation failed. He asked Burke how he viewed the operation's chance of success. Burke indicated that he had given the President a probability figure of about 50 percent. President Kennedy also inquired what would happen if it developed after the invasion that the Cuban exile force were pinned down and being slaughtered on the beach. If they were to be re-embarked, the President wanted to know where they could be taken. According to Burke's account of the meeting: "It was decided they would not be re-embarked because there was no place to go. Once they were landed they were there." In the course of the discussion, it was emphasized that the plan was dependent on a general uprising in Cuba, and that the entire operation would fail without such an uprising. (Review of Record of Proceedings Related to Cuban Situation, May 5; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

"It was decided" -- the decision not to commit US forces was a group decision.

Dulles attended that meeting; so did Burke.

Both of these men -- and JFK himself -- knew that no group decision was going to be rescinded on D-Day.

Bundy's original plan was to deploy 16 B-26s; Rusk complained and the force was cut to 8.

This guaranteed the failure of the D-Day-2 operation, much of Castro's air force was left intact.

It should have been clear to everyone involved that this failure to take out all of Castro's Sea Furies, B-26s and T-33s doomed the BOP.

That was Saturday night, D-Day-2.

The principals should have known better than to have let the invasion go forward.

The top level of the CIA took the fall, but Rusk, Bundy and Kennedy himself should have known better than to proceed.

The claim Jim DiEugenio and many others make that the CIA and the military tried to pressure JFK into saving the operation with US military force on D-Day is bullshit.

So what if Dulles claimed otherwise well after the fact?

The guy was a professional liar.

So what if JFK made the same claim?

The guy was a professional politician, and the claim is self-serving.

The historical record indicates otherwise.

What form did this CIA pressure take, Jim?

Cabell pleading with JFK at 4am on D-Day?

Wow. Some pressure...

Burke said he'd make an air craft carrier available...big deal!

Facing saving measure, strictly.

Either the BOP failure was the result of a five-way clusterfuck involving incompetence at the CIA, Pentagon, State Department, National Security Council,
and POTUS -- or Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy sabotaged the invasion for the express purpose of blaming it all on Dulles and getting rid of him.

To whom did Rusk and Bundy owe their jobs?

http://akrockefeller.com/news/west-papua...-freeport/

Robert Lovett and Joe Kennedy.

Who were Dulles' biggest enemies in the US ruling elite?

Robert Lovett and Joe Kennedy.

https://cryptome.org/0001/bruce-lovett.htm