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Operation Phoenix
Phoenix Program

The Phoenix Program (Vietnamese: Chiến dịch Phượng Hoàng, a word related to fenghuang, the Chinese phoenix) was a military, intelligence, and internal security program designed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and coordinated and executed by Republic of Vietnam's (South Vietnam) security apparatus and US Special Operations Forces such as the Navy SEALs, United States Army Special Forces and MACV-SOG during the Vietnam War. It was in operation between 1967 and 1972, but similar efforts existed both before and after this. The program was designed to identify and "neutralize" (via infiltration, capture, terrorism, or assassination) the civilian infrastructure supporting the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF or Viet Cong) insurgency.


In South Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s there was a secret network, which the U.S. intelligence services called the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI). This network provided the political direction and control of the Front's (and North Vietnam's) war within the villages and hamlets of the south.
By 1967 this network numbered somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 members throughout South Vietnam. Almost every village had a cell made up of a Communist Party secretary; a finance and supply unit; and information and culture, social welfare, and proselytizing sections to gain recruits from among the civilian population. The members reported up the chain of command, which, in turn, took orders from the Lao Dong Party Central Committee in North Vietnam. A preferred NLF tactic was to kill carefully selected government officials in order to drive the Saigon regime out of the region.[1]
The VCI laid down caches of food and equipment for regular force troops coming from border sanctuaries; it provided guides and intelligence for the People's Army of Vietnam; it conscripted personnel to serve in local force (militias) and main force mobile combat units of the NLF, and levied taxes to facilitate the administration of a rudimentary civil government.
In areas loyal to the Saigon government, protection against the North Vietnamese forces, or even NLF guerrillas, was often compromised because village chiefs were assassinated, terrorist bombings took place, or supporters of the government would be executed. During 1969, for example, over 6,000 South Vietnamese citizens were killed (over 1,200 in selective assassinations) and 15,000 wounded. Among the dead were some 90 village chiefs, 240 hamlet chiefs and officials.

History of the program

In 1967 all pacification efforts by the United States had come under the authority of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. CORDS had many different programs within it, including the creation of a peasant militia which by 1971 had a strength of about 500,000.[1]
As early as 1964 the CIA used counter terror teams to seek out and destroy NLF cadre hiding in the villages. In 1967, as part of CORDS, the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was created. The purpose of the organization centered on gathering information on the VCI. It was renamed Phoenix later in the same year. The South Vietnamese program was called Phụng Hoàng (or Phượng Hoàng), after a mythical bird that appeared as a sign of prosperity and luck. The 1968 Tet offensive showed the importance of the Viet Cong infrastructure, and the Communist-led military setback made it easier for the new program to be implemented. By 1970 there were 704 U.S. Phoenix advisers throughout South Vietnam.[1]
Officially, Phoenix operations continued until December 1972, although certain aspects continued until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.[2]


The chief aspect of the program was the collection of intelligence information. VCI members would then be neutralized (captured, converted, or killed). Emphasis for the enforcement of the operation was placed on local government militia and police forces, rather than the military, as the main operational arm of the program.[1]
Neutralization was not arbitrary but took place under special laws that allowed the arrest and prosecution of suspected communists, but only within the legal system. Moreover, to avoid abuses such as phony accusations for personal reasons, or to rein in overzealous officials who might not be diligent enough in pursuing evidence before making arrests, the laws required three separate sources of evidence to convict any individual targeted for neutralization. If a suspected VCI was found guilty, he or she could be held in prison for two years, with renewable two-year sentences totaling up to six years.[1]
According to MACV Directive 381-41, the intent of Phoenix was to attack the VCI with a "rifle shot rather than a shotgun approach to target key political leaders, command/control elements and activists in the VCI."
Heavy-handed operations—such as random cordons and searches, large-scale and lengthy detentions of innocent civilians, and excessive use of firepower—had a negative effect on the civilian population. It was also acknowledged that capturing VCI was more important than killing them.[2]

Measures of success and failure

According to one view, Phoenix was a clear success. Between 1968 and 1972, Phoenix neutralized 81,740 NLF members, of whom 26,369 were killed. This was a large section taken out of the VCI and, between 1969 and 1971, the program was quite successful in destroying the infrastructure in many important areas. By 1970, Communist plans repeatedly emphasized attacking the government’s pacification program and specifically targeted Phoenix officials. The NLF also imposed quotas. In 1970, for example, Communist officials near Da Nang in northern South Vietnam instructed their assassins to “kill 400 persons” deemed to be government “tyrant[s]” and to “annihilate” anyone involved with the pacification program. Several North Vietnamese officials have made statements about the effectiveness of Phoenix. In the end, it was a direct conventional North Vietnamese military invasion, not the guerrilla insurgents, that defeated the South Vietnamese.[1]
Others view the program less favorably, arguing that ultimately, the entire counterinsurgency in Vietnam was a failure for a variety of reasons: clearly, one critical factor was that the communists had established a large and effective support cadre throughout South Vietnam before a coordinated effort was undertaken to eradicate it. While indications are that Phoenix achieved considerable success in damaging that infrastructure, it was too little and too late to change the war’s overall course.[2]
The Phoenix Program is sometimes seen as an "assassination campaign," and has been criticized as an example of human-rights atrocities alleged to have been committed by the CIA or other allied organizations, including U.S. Military Intelligence. There was eventually a series of U.S. Congressional hearings. Consequently, the military command in Vietnam issued a directive that reiterated that it had based the anti-VCI campaign on South Vietnamese law, that the program was in compliance with the laws of land warfare, and that U.S. personnel had the responsibility to report breaches of the law. Supporters argue that the primary intent was to capture, not to kill, in order to gain further information. However, decentralized operations in an uncertain, ambiguous environment did lead to abuses.[2] In many instances, rival Vietnamese would report their enemies as "VC" in order to get U.S. troops to kill them (Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing, New York: Signet, 1984, p. 625.) In many cases, Phung Hoang chiefs were incompetent bureaucrats who used their positions to enrich themselves. Phoenix tried to address this problem by establishing monthly neutralization quotas, but these often led to fabrications or, worse, false arrests. In some cases, district officials accepted bribes from the NLF to release certain suspects.[1]


Quote from Lieutenant Vincent Okamoto, intelligence-liaison officer for the Phoenix Program for 2 months in 1968 and a recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross. Wounded 3 times, he is the highest-decorated Japanese-American veteran of the Vietnam War. He has served as president of the Japanese American Vietnam Veterans Memorial Committee and as a Los Angeles Superior Court judge.[3][4]
“ The problem was, how do you find the people on the blacklist? It's not like you had their address and telephone number. The normal procedure would be to go into a village and just grab someone and say, 'Where's Nguyen so-and-so?' Half the time the people were so afraid they would say anything. Then a Phoenix team would take the informant, put a sandbag over his head, poke out two holes so he could see, put commo wire around his neck like a long leash, and walk him through the village and say, 'When we go by Nguyen's house scratch your head.' Then that night Phoenix would come back, knock on the door, and say, 'April Fool, motherfucker.' Whoever answered the door would get wasted. As far as they were concerned whoever answered was a Communist, including family members. Sometimes they'd come back to camp with ears to prove that they killed people. ”
See also


  1. ^ a b c d e f g
  2. ^ a b c d
  3. ^ "Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides" by Christian G. Appy, Penguin Books, 2003, page 361. [1]
  4. ^ "County’s Newest Judge Sworn In, Promises to Protect Rights" By Kenneth Ofgang. April 30, 2002. Metropolitan News-Enterprise.

Further reading

  • Andrade, Dale, Ashes to Ashes.
  • Cook, John L. The Advisor.
  • Herrington, Stuart, Stalking the Viet Cong.
  • Moyar, Mark, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey.
  • Douglas Valentine, The Phoenix Program, 1990. [2]. Chapter 24 "Transgressions" online: [3]. Author permission further explained: [4]
  • Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism., Newsweek, 19 June, 1972. [5]
  • Don Luce, Hostages of War (Indochina Resource Center, 1973). [6]
  • Seymour Hersh, Cover-Up, Random House, 1972. [7]
  • Long Time Passing, by Myra MacPherson, Signet, 1984. [8]
  • Then the Americans Came, by Martha Hess, Four Walls Eight Windows Press, 1996. [9]
  • Deadly Deceits: My 25 years in the CIA, by Ralph McGehee, 1999. [10]
  • Patriots: the Vietnam War remembered from all sides, by Christian G. Appy, Penguin, 2003. [11]

External links

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
Until outlawed in mid 70s CIA directly involved in assassination attempts against Castro of Cuba, and Congolese leader Lumumba. CIA also encouraged plots that resulted in assassination of Dominican Republic President Trujillo, South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem in 63 and Chilean Rene Schneider in 73. Most extensive assassination op was Operation Phoenix conducted during latter part of VN war. Twentieth Century Fund. (1992). The Need to Know: Covert Action and American Democracy, 83. Vietnam, 65-70 details re Vietnam. From 65-68 U.S. and Saigon intel services maintained an active list of VC cadre marked for assassination. Phoenix Program for 69 called for "neutralizing" 1800 a month. About one third of VC targeted for arrest had been summarily killed. Security committees established in provincial interrogation centers to determine fate of VC suspects, outside of judicial controls. Green Berets and navy SEALs most common recruits for Phoenix Program. Green Beret detachment B-57 provided admin cover for other intel units. One was project cherry, tasked to assassinate Cambodian officials suspected of collaborating with NVNese, and kgb. Another was project oak targeted against svnese suspected collaborators. They controlled by special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities, which worked with CIA outside of general abrams control. Stein. J. (1992), A Murder in Wartime, 360-1.
Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix op from 1/68 thru 5/71, CORDS reported 20,857 VCI killed. Gvt of VN reported 40,994 from 8/68 thru mid 71. Per cord statistics 12.4% Deaths could be attributed to Phoenix ops. Kenneth osborn of program said Phoenix became a depersonalized murder program. A dept of defense analyst thayer, found that 616 suspected VCI targeted by Phoenix from 1/70 thru 3/71 were killed by Phoenix forces. After war NVNese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach said CIA's assassination program slaughtered far more than the 21,000 officially listed by the U.S. In some parts of south 95% of communist cadre assassinated or compromised by Phoenix. Manning, R., (ed), (1988), War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, 72.
Vietnam, 68-72 Under Phoenix "security committees" in provincial "interrogation centers" would determine fate suspected NLF. Counterspy spring/summer 78, 8.
Vietnam, 69 Under Phoenix in July 69 "Vietnam information notes," a state dept publication said target for 69 elimination of 1,800 VCI per month. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978), Uncloaking the CIA, 97.
Vietnam, 73 According to Defense Dept official 26,369 South Vietnamese civilians killed under Phoenix while op under direct U.S. control (Jan 68 thru Aug 72 ). By same source, another 33,358 detained without trial. Colby in 73 admitted 20,587 deaths thru end 71 , 28,978 captured, and 17,717 "rallied" to Saigon gvt. Thus approx 30% targeted individuals killed. All Phoenix stats fail to reflect U.S. Activity after "official" U.S. Control of op abandoned. Counterspy spring/summer 75 8.
Vietnam, 75 Counter-spy magazine describes Phoenix Program as "the most indiscriminate and massive program of political murder since the nazi death camps of world war two." Counterspy spring/summer 75 6.
Vietnam, in 82 Ex-Phoenix operative reveals that sometimes orders were given to kill U.S. military personnel who were considered security risks. He suspects the orders came not from "division", but from a higher authority such as the CIA or the ONI. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) summer 82 52.
Vietnam. Phoenix Program to neutralize VCI (tax collectors, supply officers, political cadre, local military officials, etc). Plan to send pru or police teams to get in practice, death the frequent result of such ops, some times through assassinations pure and simple. Powers, T. (1979), The Man Who Kept the Secret, 181.
Vietnam. Phoenix Program took over 20,000 lives, 65-72 U.S. Congress,Church Committee Report. (1976) B 1 27.
Vietnam, July 71 Colby inserted chart to Representative Reid showing that some 67,282 persons had been neutralized by Phoenix ops against VC between 68-71 Of these 31 percent had been killed, 26% rallied, and 43% captured or sentenced. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978). Uncloaking the CI, 18.
Vietnam, 67-73 The Phoenix Program used the CIA's assassination squads, the former counter terror teams later called the provincial reconnaissance units (PRU). Technically they did not mark cadres for assassinations but in practice the pru's anticipated resistance in disputed areas and shot first. People taken prisoner were denounced in Saigon-held areas, picked up at checkpoints or captured in combat and later identified as VC. Sheehan, N. (1988), A Bright Shining Lie, 732.
Vietnam, Phoenix Program, late 60 early 70 took over 20,000 lives in Vietnam. U.S. Congress,Church Committee Report. (1976) B 1 27.
Vietnam. Phung Hoang aka Phoenix Program quotas for units set by komer for all 242 districts. One result indiscriminate killing with every body labeled VCI. Powers, T. (1979), The Man Who Kept the Secrets, 181-2.
Conflict, li.
Law professor at University of Washington, Seattle, Roy L. Prosterman, designed the land reform program the U.S. Government promoted in the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador. In each place the program was accompanied by a rural terror. In Vietnam the Phoenix Program killed 40,000 civilian between August 68 and mid-71; in Philippines, martial law; in El Salvador, a state of siege. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) Winter 90 69
Vietnam, 67-70 Phoenix a fiasco, it unmanageable and encouraged outrageous abuses. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 323.
Vietnam, 75 according to Frank Snepp's Decent Interval up to thirty thousand special police, CIA and Phoenix related Vietnamese employees were left behind. Saigon CIA station managed to pull out only 537 of its 1900 Vietnamese including close to 1000 high-level Vietnamese who had built close relationships with the agency over the years. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) 6-7/79 4.
Vietnam, 68-72 CI Phoenix project run jointly CIA and U.S. Army military intel. Counterspy 5/73 21.
Vietnam, 75 U.S. military provided approx 600 case officers to supplement 40-50 CIA case officers for Phoenix ops. Counterspy spring/summer 75 8.
Vietnam. The Phoenix and the identity card programs. Volkman, E., & Baggett, B. (1989), Secret Intelligence, 150.
Vietnam, 65-69 CI/pacification efforts initiated by French culminate in Phoenix Program designed to eliminate Viet Cong infrastructure. Made official June 68, Phoenix was intensification of ci ops and involved "mass imprisonment, torture and assassination." For thorough Phoenix description seeCountersp 5/73 20.
Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix Program synthesis police and pm programs. CIA managing census grievance, rd cadre, counterterror teams and pics. Military intel working with mss, ARVN intel and regional and popular forces. Aid managing chieu hoi and public safety, including field police. Needed to bring altogether under special police. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 99.
Vietnam, 66 beginning of Phoenix Program. Lv 218. Phoenix to increase identification VC infrastructure and passing info to military, police, and other elements who were to induce defections, capture them, or attack them in their strongholds. Colby, W. (1989). Lost Victory, 266.
Vietnam, 67-73 In 67 CIA proposed all U.S. Intel agencies pool info on VC at district, province and Saigon levels for exploitation. Program first called intel coor and exploitation program (icex). Phoenix the name of program. Assigned quotas for VC to be neutralized. To focus police and intel orgs. Against communist apparatus. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977), The Counterinsurgency Era, 243-8.
Vietnam, 67-73 District intel ops coor center (diooc). Dien ban center a model for all of Phoenix. Bldg 10' x 40'. Manned by two U.S. soldiers, 2 census grievance, one rd cadre, and one special branch. Diooc intel clearinghouse to review, collate, and disseminate info. Immediate local reaction. Americans kept files of sources, VCI and order battle. Reaction forces 100 police, 1 PRU unit, guides from census grievance. Marines screened civilian detainees using informants and diooc's blacklist. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 126.
Vietnam, 67 12/20/67 Prime Minister signed directive 89-th. T/vp/m legalizing Phung Hoang, VN clone of Phoenix. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 148.
Vietnam, 67 Phoenix Program in fledgling stage conceived and implemented by CIA. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 147.
Vietnam, 68 Phoenix Program statistics were phony a bust and a fake. DeForest, O., & Chanoff, D. (1990), Slow Burn, 54-55.
Vietnam, 69 Program of 69 campaign called for elimination of VCI. Program became known as Phung Hoang or Phoenix. In each province the chief established a province security committee (PSC). PSC controlled the npff and sp who maintained province interrogation centers (pics). Counterspy 5/73 20.
Vietnam, 71 CIA had no intention handling over attack on VCI to national police command. CIA advisers to special police advised to begin forming special intel force units (sifu). 8-Man teams composed of 4 volunteers each from special police and field police. Sifu targeted at high-level VCI, as substitutes for pru. They sign CIA planned manage attack on VCI thru sb, while keeping Phoenix intact as a way of deflecting attention. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 391.
Vietnam, 71 In revising Phoenix Program (because of all communist penetrations in gvt) first steps to hire southeast asia computer associates (managed by a CIA officer) to advise 200-odd VNese techs to take over MACV and CORDS computers. VNese were folded into big mack and Phung Hoang management info system (phmis). Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 363.
Vietnam, 72 In report on Phoenix effectiveness in 9/72 Phung Hoang crossed out and anti-terrorist inserted. The end of Phoenix? Some Phoenix ops in 73. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program 403, 406.
Vietnam, 75 U.S. Still involved in Phoenix in 75. Program renamed special police investigative service (spis). U.S. provides data processing facilities for spis thru, Computer Science Services, inc. Which runs intel thru machines to classify and collate them and then turns info over to spis. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 415.
Vietnam. Phoenix Program, resources control program, checkpoints, identification card program, paramilitary police called the police field force a 100 man mobile company at least one assigned to each province. Aid helped upgrade police and developed national police academy, improved communications and files, established one two-way radio in every village. Chieu hoi program. Refugee generation programs. Province coordinating committees supervised civic action on bridges, roads, public buildings, agricultural extension work, medical technicians and more. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, 217-8.
Vietnam, 67-73 The Phoenix Program used the CIA's assassination squads, the former counter terror teams later called the provincial reconnaissance units (PRU). Technically they did not mark cadres for assassinations but in practice the PRU's anticipated resistance in disputed areas and shot first. People taken prisoner were denounced in Saigon-held areas, picked up at checkpoints or captured in combat and later identified as VC. Sheehan, N. (1988), A Bright Shining Lie, 732.
Vietnam, Phoenix. Ranelagh, J. (1986), The Agency 437-441.
Vietnam, police. Public safety included Michigan State University program. Resources control, effort to regulate movement resources both human and material. Includes set up checkpoints roads and waterways, mobile checkpoints. Resulted in 560,000 arrests by 1969. National identity registration program. Every VNese 15 or older must register and carry identification card. Fingerprints obtained. Once completed program to include fingerprints, photos and bio data. Surveillance of suspects role of special police branch. Sp agents penetrate subversive organizations and use intel collection, political data and files from census data to separate good from bad. Pacification or Phoenix Program. Systematic effort at intel collection and exploitation. All intel services and America's CIA and military intel orgs. Pool data from informers and prisoners. With this info police and provincial reconnaissance units make raids in contested areas to seize or eliminate VCI agents. See Klare, M.T. (1972), War Without End, 265 for more death squads.
Vietnam, 66-71 Phoenix op designed to help U.S. Military reach crossover point, where dead and wounded exceeded VC's ability to field replacements. In 4/67 Pres Johnson announced formation of civil ops and revolutionary development support (CORDS) for pacification. R. Komer as deputy commander of MACV-CORDS. CORDS budget about $4 billion from 68-71. CORDS the management structure for pacification programs. Personnel both military and civilian. By 71, 3000 servicemen, advisers to ARVN, placed under CORDS. 1200 Civilians by 71. Usaid responsible for material aid. State and USIA also provided personnel. But CIA played the crucial role. CORDS reinstated civic action teams under name revolutionary development cadre. Rd program formed teams of 59 SVNese, divided into 3 11-man security squads and 25 civic action cadres. Teams to spend 6 months in a village to fulfill "eleven criteria and 98 works for pacification." 1. Annihilation of ...Cadre; 2. Annihilation of wicked village dignitaries; etc. System placed 40,000 two-way radios in villages. Land reform failed. (Photos of Phoenix propaganda material). Teams helped create regional and popular forces (rf/pfs). Ruff-puffs, suffered high casualties. They represented half of SVN gvt forces, they had 55-66% of casualties. They inflicted 30% of communist casualties. Underground pm effort called Phoenix which included a "census grievance," stay-behind. He actually a spy. All info fed into intel coordination and exploitation program. VNese at Komer's request set up staff that with CIA was responsible for coordinating intel reports on VC infrastructure. Info from census grievance, military, police reports. PM units - including CIA's provincial reconnaissance units and ruff-puffs. Arrestees - those not killed when captured - taken to provincial interrogation centers (pic). Also regional prisons and a national center all financed by CIA. Problems of coordination and jealousy. Numerical quotas created saying how many VCI to be eliminated each month. Torture used in questioning. Manning, R., (ed), (1988), War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, 55-65.
Vietnam, 71 William E. Colby on july 19, 1971, before Senate subcommittee testified CIA op Phoenix had killed 21,587 Vietnamese citizens between 1/68 and 5/71. In response to a question from mr. Reid "do you state categorically that Phoenix has never perpetrated the premeditated killing of a civilian in a non-combat situation?" Colby replied: "No, I could not say that...I certainly would not say never." Counterspy 12/78 6.
Vietnam, 67 First MACV alloted Phoenix 126 officers and ncos. By end 67 one nco assigned to each of 103 dioccs then in existence. All military officers and enlisted men assigned to Phoenix Program took orders from CIA. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 145.
Vietnam, 68-73 Phoenix ci/terror op funded and covered by U.S. Aid, CORDS pacification survey, public employment projects, and other benign agencies. Counterspy may 73 22.
Vietnam, 71 1.7 Billion dollars go to CORDS in Phoenix Project. Colby refuses congressional audit Phoenix funds before committee. Counterspy 5/73 24.
Vietnam, 71 When questioned concerning unaccounted-for 1.7 Billion dollars which had financed much of covert aspect of Phoenix Program, Ambassador Colby assured house subcommittee on foreign ops and govt info, all main problems has been resolved and Congress could rest assured aberrations of brutality would remain at a minimum. He did not know how many innocent victims the program had killed, maybe 5,000, maybe more. He did not have authority to discuss reasons why Congress could not audit 1.7 billions worth of taxpayers funds which went to CORDS. Counterspy 5/73 24.
Vietnam, 69 Colby rendered due process obsolete. VCI target broken into three classes a, for leaders and party members; b, for holders of responsible jobs; c, for rank-and file. Decision c category to be ignored since Phoenix directed at VCI command and control structure. Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) explained. Hes guesstimate of VCI in 1/69 was 75,000. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 260.
Vietnam, 71 House subcommittee on foreign operations and gvt. Info. investigates Phoenix. Colby insists project "respectable", brutality minimized. Estimates 5000 killed. Congress denied audit of Phoenix funds. Counterspy may 73 24.
Vietnam, 67-73 CIA developed Phoenix Program in 67 to neutralize: kill, capture or make defect VCI. VCI means civilians suspected of supporting communists. Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called Phung Hoang by VNese. Due process totally nonexistent. SVNese who appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 13.
Vietnam, 68 Phoenix ci/terror program established by Thieu's presidential decree, literally written by CIA man William Colby. Decree and future authorizations indicated that suspects could be arrested without a warrant or copy of charges and detained on basis of police dossier heresay evidence. Once arrested, suspect could not confront accusers or see dossier, was denied bail legal counsel, and was denied a trial or even a hearing. At best one's case was reviewed by province security committee composed of milt and intel officers. Under Phoenix all rights of due process stripped. Counterspy Winter 78 28.
Covert Action Information Bulletin 13:3, 16-17:6-10; 17:48-49; 22:2,4,6,10-24; "from Phoenix associates to civilian-military assistance," 22:18-19; "from the hessians to the contras: mercenaries in the service of imperialism," 22:10-11.
89 An article by Rob Rosenbaum from interviews with General Secord and Ted "Blond Ghost" Shackley. They give their answers to questions about Iran-Contra, secret war in Laos, Phoenix Program in Vietnam, CIA-Mafia plots of the sixties. Shackley discusses charges of opium smuggling in Laos by elements supported by CIA. Photos of Secord and Shackley. Shackley interview in his risk-assessment consulting firm, Rosslyn-based Research Associates International. Vanity fair, 1/90 72-77, 126-8,130-1 Vietnam 68-73 Evan Parker, Jr., John Mason, and John Tilton all from CIA were men who headed Phoenix Program when it supposedly transferred to military and CORDS. Roger McCarthy said CIA very much involved with Phoenix. Corn, D. (1994), Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, 193.
Vietnam. John Murray, of WHD, and his wife Delores, former CIA ops officer, sending letters of disclosures re Shackley. He covertly contacted William Miller, staff director of Church Committee, and told how Shackley and Helms in 70 arranged to keep CIA from being implicated in My Lai massacres. (Some evidence suggested massacre related to CIA's Phoenix Program.) Corn, D. (1994), Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, 302.
Vietnam, 67 50 officers and enlisted men invited to join counter insurgency program. Those who accepted by CIA joined as junior officer trainees. Most assigned to provinces as rdc/p or rdc/o advisers and many as Phoenix coordinators. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 198.
Vietnam, 68-69 Robert K. Brown (later editor of Soldier of Fortune magazine) worked with James K. Damron, CIA's project coordinator for the Phoenix Program in Gia Dinh province. Pigeon, R. (1986). The Soldier of Fortune, 44.
Vietnam, Orrin DeForest, with U.S. Air Force special investigations early on. Joined CIA in 68 as chief interrogator Hau Nghia province in bien hoa under cover of Office of Special Assistance (OSA). Duties included inspection of pics, training VNese in interrogation. Monitoring intel production. He discovered pics poorly run, Phoenix Program slipshod, and CIA had been unable generate single agent. Using methods learned while working with Japanese national police in identifying, communist agents, disregarding CIA methods, DeForest's efforts produced 80% hard intel in VN. Minnick, W. (1992). Spies and Provacateurs, 50-1.
training, 55 Eisenhower establishes public safety program whose goal is to train foreign police units in, among other things, counterinsurgency. 62 Program becomes Office of Public Safety which eventually procures 400 officers in 45 countries and yearly budget 50 million. Much of Phoenix funding and training was thru Office of Public Safety. By 75 ops had distributed 200 million in equipment foreign police, trained 7000+ senior police officials, and trained over 1 million rank and file police officers worldwide. Counterspy Winter 78 29-30.
Vietnam, 75 Counter-spy magazine describes Phoenix Program as "the most indiscriminate and massive program of political murder since the nazi death camps of world war two." Counterspy Spring/Summer 75 6.
Vietnam. Former Phoenix advisor Wayne Cooper said "Operation Phoenix was a unilateral American program", and Klare confirmed by saying "although most of the dirty work was performed by indigenous operatives, Phoenix was designed, organized, financed, and administered by U.S. authorities." Counterspy Winter 78 27.
Vietnam. "Phoenix demonstrated that the U.S. Government through the CIA will create, impose, and conduct an operation in another country without a semblance of a mandate from a given people or their representatives as long as the operation is considered in interest of U.S. governmental objectives." Counterspy Winter 78 27-8.
Vietnam, 59-69 the SEALs and the Phoenix Program. The Intel Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was a joint MACV/CIA op - forerunner of Phoenix. SEALs helped train VNese personnel. SEALs assigned ops detachments. SEALs worked with PRUs. By 68, with prisoner snatches, ambushes, and increasing VC defections, ICEX program neutralizing 800 VCI every month. Phoenix began 7/1/68. Description of the province intel ops coordinating center (piocc) and the district (diocc). Combatting VCI in urban areas responsibility of national police force and police field force. SEALs taught PRUsin mekong delta. Description of prus. They the most effective native troops. By end of 68, the iv corps PRUswere almost entirely advised by seal personnel. Seal advisors accompanied PRUson average of 15 missions a month. Description of ops. Dockery, K. (1991). SEALs in Action, 167-176.
Vietnam, 68-73 ttwo small groups wreaked havoc on the VCI. The Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and the Navy's SEALs. PRUs and SEALs often worked together and both killed many VCI and guerrillas -- the enemy had wrapped itself in the population. Together they were fewer than 6000 men. They had access to the best intel often coming directly from CIA. Pru had roots in the counterterror teams of the early 60s. In 66 the ct became prus. Details of the makeup and recruiting source of the prus. PRUsoften killed targets. Military participation in the pru program was to end in 10/70. Pru was the most effective action arm of the Phoenix Program. Details of the SEALs larger-than-life reputation earned in VN. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 171-199.
Vietnam, 65-72 During Nixon's first 2 1/2 years, state department officially admits that the CIA-run Phoenix Program murdered or abducted 35,708 VNese civilians, 4,836 more than the pentagon claimed the NLF had assassinated or kidnapped during the same period, and a monthly increase over the 200 killed by the CIA every month under johnson. Senator Gravel edition, (1971), Pentagon Papers v 300.
Vietnam, 65-73 Phoenix Program torture tactics include rape, electric shock, water torture, hanging from ceiling, beatings, incarceration and execution. Counterspy 5/73 16. Vietnam, 69-71 K. Barton Osborn, Phoenix agent, testified to Congress "I never knew an individual to be detained as a VC suspect who ever lived through an interrogation in a year and a half. Uc 114. Note says this testimony given before U.S. Congress,Heari. 315-321.
Vietnam, 73 "The prime difference between the types of intelligence provided to the military units and the Phoenix coordinator was that all information going to Phoenix was of a political nature ... I was following through on a reported (VC) suspect that one of my agents had identified. The man was interrogated at the marine counter-intelligence complex and I was invited to witness it. As I entered the hooch the man was being taken out, dead. He died from a six inch dowel pushed through his ear and into his brain." Barton Osborn, former Phoenix case officer before Armed Services Committee, 1973. Counterspy Spring/Summer 75 7.
Vietnam. Colby supervised est of pics in each of SVN's 44 provinces. Each center constructed with CIA funds. Agency personnel directed each centers op much of which consisted of torture carried out by VN nationals. Coi 207. Colby admitted serious abuses committed under Phoenix. Former intel officers came before Congressional cmttees to describe repeated examples torture. Marchetti, V., & Marks, J.D. (1974), The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 207 see fn.
Vietnam, 66-74 CIA analyst, Nelson H. Brickman, on 11/66 produced basic guidelines for [the Phoenix Program] in a memorandum that described the VCI and suggested which parts of it should be targeted. His memo said rank-and-file members were not legitimate targets "because they were most often unwilling participants in the revolution." Brickman called for using all available intelligence services to neutralize the VCI. Robert Komer was so impressed he assigned Brickman to the revolutionary development office. He adopted brickman's suggestion that there was no need to begin a new anti-vci program, only that the existing programs be brought together and managed by a single bureau. He recommended the U.S. Agencies get their houses in order before bringing in the gvn. Brickman "deserved the credit" for the Phoenix Program. A program called intel coordination and exploitation (icex) was the first structure. Evan parker named director of icex but komer had full control. U.S. Military reluctantly participated initially. Icex officially created on 7/9/67, although basic structure had been in place a year. Building of district ops and coordinating centers (doicc) which by late 67 were called district intel and ops coordinating centers (dioccs). MACV directive 381-41 stated: "to coordinate and give impetus to U.S. and gvn operations...Directed toward elimination of the VC infrastructure." Icex placed under cords. South Vietnamese were unwilling to take program seriously. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 58-70.
Vietnam, 67-72 K. Barton Osborn's testimony re the Phoenix Program before the house committee on government ops, 8/71. Osborn characterized program as a "sterile, depersonalized murder program." Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, xv-xvi.
Vietnam, 67 The Phoenix (Phung Hoang) program was officially born on 12/20/67 when the SVNese premier issued a decree. This differed from ICEX only in official SVNese support for the program. Seal-and-search op in Bui Cui village. LRRP ambush parties. People's self-defense forces (psdf) started after Tet, it was a nationwide system of local militias. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 72-81.
Vietnam, 68-70 PIOCCC had extensive dossiers on VCI and the chieu hoi program was the largest producer of Phoenix intel. 132. A criticism of Phoenix was the covert control by CIA. Despite influx of military advisers, CIA controlled chain of command and purse strings. Colby, top man of CORDS in 69 had been with CIA. American directors of Phoenix at national level were all CIA. In 7/69 the system changed. "Management and support facilities for Phoenix were officially transferred from the office of the special assistant to the ambassador (osa) (cia) to MACV, who assumed full responsibility for providing for or arranging monetary and logistical support through American channels." From July 69 on, CIA made up only a small part of the program. Details of numbers neutralized and differences between CIA and military estimates. The use of diocc VCI target folders, a simple prepared set of biographical, operational, and administrative questions. By the end of 1970 one hundred thousand copies had been distributed. A sophisticated computerized collation program called the Phung Hoang Management Info System (PHMIS) was implemented. The program combined the national police tracking system with VCI info to gear up police for handling both. PHMIS was manned by Vietnamese, using American advisers as trainers. 135-6. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 134.
Vietnam, 68 President Thieu with the help of William Colby, Komer's deputy for CORDS, drafted a decree that officially sanctioned Phoenix/Phung Hoang on 7/1/68. Article 3 was of paramount importance -- it defined who was or was not a member of the VCI. Article 3 -- definitions: the Viet Cong infrastructure is all Viet cong, political and administrative organizations established by the communist party which goes under the name people's revolutionary party, from the cities to the countryside. The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) is the highest level steering organization...And the front for the liberation of South Vietnam (NLFSVN)....Viet Cong military units, members of mass organizations established by the Viet Cong, citizens forced to perform as laborers, or civilians in areas temporarily controlled by the Viet cong, are not classified as belonging to the Viet Cong infrastructure. Definition adjusted over time. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 84.
Vietnam, 94 VN rejects visit of ex-CIA chief Colby, now a Washington lawyer, who had planned to visit as a director of a U.S.-based investment fund. Fund directors had planned to hold a reception Monday. Event canceled, and directors will meet in Bangkok. Colby was CIA's chief in Saigon during war and was associated with Phoenix, an op to root out rural support for communist guerrillas via sweeping arrests, torture and execution of suspects. Critics said most of those killed were innocent peasants. Chicago Tribune 12/3/94 21.
Vietnam, accelerated pacification campaign, July 68 Thieu with Colby's help issued decree est Phoenix committees at national, regional and provincial and even district level, "to which all the agencies involved had to furnish representation." Colby, W. (1978). Honorable Men, 267.
Vietnam, Australia, Vietnam, 62-73 Australian AATTV teams operated in VN often in CIA Phoenix op. `Black team' commanded by American of australian usually given target figure. He pinpointed and black team would go out, usually dressed in enemy's gear and the assassination then blamed on VC. Toohey, B., & Pinwill, W. (1990), Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service 87-88.
Vietnam, icex intel coor and exploitation MACV/cia program to work on VCI with Vietnamese cooperation. Colby helped devise program which became Phoenix. Colby, W. (1978), Honorable Men 267.
Vietnam, National Security study memo, 67-69 said although Phoenix launched in Dec 67, Vietnamese cooperation minimal and only after American prodding, Thieu issued a decree in July 68 directing network to be set up. Program forced on VNese. Pru supervised, controlled and financed by Americans. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978), Uncloaking the CIA, 111-125.
Vietnam, Phoenix Program most notorious of counterinsurgency programs. Originated by robert w. Komer, who now headed Civilian Operations Revolutionary Development Staff (CORDS), Phoenix designed to root out secret Vietcong infrastructure in South Vietnam. Miller, N. (1989). Spying for America379.
Vietnam, Phoenix, 68-70 In 69 CIA apparently had attack squeamishness and pulled out of CORDS. Concluded Phoenix inappropriate. It believed North had moved away from military engagement to lacing entire gvt with spies -- possibly as many as 30,000 so Thieu's gvt could be easily overthrown. Baritz, L. (1985). Backfire, 269.
Vietnam, Phoenix op. Every person who ran program from Saigon assigned to program from CIA. Colby and 20,000 + figure of persons killed under Phoenix, see fn ag 440. Phoenix General Ranelagh, J. (1986), The Agency 436-441.
Vietnam, Phoenix Program, beginning circa 66-67 CORDS pacification program. Komer settled on massive intel program on VC who could be neutralized by SVN forces. First called ICEX. Name changed to Phoenix in 69 with SVN version phung hoang. Had interrogation centers in each of SVNs 235 districts and 44 provinces, card files and computerized indexes. Pru's of 50 to 100 men. In Phoenix CIA provided weapons, paid for Saigon computer files, funded and trained PRU's and passed intel to Phoenix. Colby told senate Phoenix killed 20,587 VCI. When questions arose re legality Colby retreated and said 87% killed in regular military actions. Two army lts. Told federal judge they order to maintain kill quota 50 VCI a month. Prados, J. (1986), Presidents' Secret Wars, 307-310.
Vietnam, Phoenix Program evaluation. Robert Komer wrote Phung Hoang has been a small, poorly managed, and largely ineffective effort. Clearly Phoenix failed to eliminate the infrastructure that remained after heavy losses of tet. Ce 274-8. Colby continued to see Phoenix as contributing usefully to attack on VC. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977), The Counterinsurgency Era, notes 328.
Vietnam, Phoenix Program, july 69 "Vietnam information notes" a State Dept publication says: target for 1969 calls for elimination of 1,800 VCI per month. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978). Uncloaking the CIA, 97.
Vietnam, Phoenix Program. Part of total pacification program of gvt VN. Colby testified that in over two and a half years there were 29,000 captured, 17,000 defected and 20,500 killed, of which 87% were killed by regular and paramilitary forces and 12% by police and similar elements. Vast majority killed in military combat, fire fights, or ambushes, and most of remainder were killed in police actions attempting to capture them. Major stress to encourage capture. Borosage, R.L., & Marks, J. (eds.). (1976), The CIA File, 190.
Vietnam, Phoenix Program. Quotas and indiscriminate killing of people. CIA conceived and organized program and regional and provincial officers in charge were all CIA. Colby actually wrote Phoenix directive which Thieu was finally pressured into adopting july 68 Colby conceded Phoenix recorded deaths of 20,587. Powers, T. (1979). The Man Who Kept the Secrets, 181-2.
Vietnam, Phoenix Program, 67-75 Targets members VCI. 637 Military intel advisers assigned to Phoenix. Much money given to VNese police to expand detention facilities. Phoenix org: first the district co - ordination center, diocc, that maintained dossiers on suspected VC. Once enough evidence person placed on police green list. Suspect then jailed without right to civilian trail. In cordon and search ops all villagers lined up and walk past police checkpoint. Next level province interrogation center, pic, staffed by SVNese, Americans and CIA. After interrogation, suspect passed on to province security committee, comprised of police chiefs, military and police intel and advisors. Finally suspects could be imprisoned under law for 2 years. This one way to neutralize. Other way via Provincial Reconnaissance Units, PRUs, who would kidnap or assassinate agents targeted by diocc. Had American advisors from SEALs, Green Berets. Official amnesty program called chieu hoi used to convince VC to surrender. VC categorized as a,b, or c. A were key members, c least impt. National police detention center processed 180,000 a year. American money and effort went into national identification card, id, project. All Vietnamese over age 15 jailed if did not carry a card a RAND computer tracked the 15 million suspects also cross-linked to 10 million dossiers and fingerprints. The Dossier issue 6, 11/83 14-5.
Vietnam, Phoenix, 72-73 The F-6 program was a defensive measure to bolster Phung Hoang after the Easter Offensive. F-6 sought to increase pressure on the VCI by allowing province chiefs to move against suspected cadre on the strength of a single report rather then the usual three. With the culmination of the F-6 program in early 73, the Phoenix Program came to an end. In the spring of 72 phung hoang was absorbed into the national police. The last American advisers left VN in december 72. Various tables, command structure charts in appendix. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 231-251.
Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix Program synthesis police and pm programs. CIA man managing census grievance, rd cadre, counterterror teams and pics. Military intel working with mss, arvn intel and regional and popular forces. Aid managing chieu hoi and public safety, including field police. Needed to bring altogether under special police. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 99.
Vietnam, 67-73 CIA developed Phoenix Program in 67 to neutralize: kill, capture or make defect VCI. VCI means civilians suspected of supporting communists. Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called phung hoang by VNese. Due process totally nonexistent. SVNese who appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 13.
Vietnam, 68-72 NLF according to Nixon adm decimated during Tet Offensive, remainder by Phoenix Program. Nvese officer reported Phoenix resulted in loss of thousands of our cadres. Proof in 2 remaining offensives. In 72 and in 75 they did not rely on guerrillas. Baritz, L. (1985), Backfire, 273.
Vietnam, 68 Phoenix Program quota of 1800 neutralizations per month. Viet Cong Infrastructure system (vciis) fed 3000 names VCI into computer at combined intel center political order battle section. Beginning of computerized blacklist. In Saigon DIA, FBI and CIA used computers. Until 70 computerized blacklist a unilateral American op. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 259.

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"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
Flight of the Phoenix:
From Vietnam to Homeland Security

An Open Letter to Maj. Gen. Bruce Lawlor

by Douglas Valentine
"The implication or latent threat of force alone was sufficient to insure that the people would comply..."
William Colby, RIP
Imagine my surprise to learn that the Bruce Lawlor is serving as the Office of Homeland Security's Senior Director for Protection and Prevention!
I say this in a blatantly exclamatory fashion because I interviewed Lawlor for my book, The Phoenix Program, back in 1988, when he was just a small town lawyer in Vermont. Poor Bruce. He's always had big ambitions, and he'd run for attorney general of Vermont in 1984. But, as he told me with abiding bitterness, his political opponents exploited his self-proclaimed participation in the CIA's Phoenix Program in Vietnam. The bastards had used that awful fact to launch a successful smear campaign against him. And yes, he'd lost the primary election as a result.
Nearly 20 years later Lawlor is still licking his wounds, and there's no doubt that he holds a major general's grudge against the pacifists and peaceniks who smeared him with Phoenix. So now I'm wondering, what's he got in store for people like me?
Here We Go Again
Having former CIA Phoenix officers in important government positions is nothing new in America. I refer you to Congressman Rob Simmons, a friend of Lawlor's, whom Lawlor describes as a "liberal". Simmons, good liberal Episcopalian that he is, ran a CIA Province Interrogation Center in Vietnam. (See The Spook Who Would be a Congressman.)
Having potential war criminals in positions of power is nothing new, but I'm one of those people who believe that all former CIA officers--especially those involved in "extra-legal" counter-terror programs like Phoenix--should not be allowed to hold public office. I believe this, because the CIA is antithetical to democratic institutions. And that's why I was so surprised to see, that the guy I knew as [Image: phoenix.gif]"Bruce", is now Major General Lawlor, and a top-ranking official in the ominous Office of Homeland Security. By which I mean, he's someone who has access to Ashcroft's political blacklist, and he has control over the covert action teams that can be used to neutralize those dissidents.
To get right to the point, I have a sneaking suspicion that Lawlor, like Simmons, is still working for the CIA, and thus poses a major threat to democracy in America.
One of the reasons I have this crazy feeling, is that nowhere in any of Lawlor's official looking, on-line biographies is there any mention of his CIA service. It's like his biographers are deliberately trying to hide his CIA connection from us.
For example, The Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness, "a standing task force of leading practitioners and academic specialists concerned with terrorism and emergency management" (sponsored by Harvard's JFK School of Government, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice), posted an official biography of Major General Bruce M. Lawlor. They mention that he was the "first" commanding general of the Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) located at Fort Monroe. This is extremely important, because the JTF-CS was formed specifically to provide "command and control over Department of Defense consequence management forces in support of a civilian Lead Federal Agency (the CIA?) following a weapon of mass destruction incident in the United States, its territories or possessions (italics added)."
This sounds an awful lot like a prelude to the terror attacks of 11 September, and I'll raise the subject of the JTF-CS in a bit, but for now I'd like to point out that nowhere do Lawlor's friends from Harvard (he's a graduate of Harvard's National Security Fellows Program) or the Departments of Defense and Justice, say that Lawlor was once a CIA officer. (Please see [URL=""]

Likewise, in an earlier biography posted on the Internet, Lawlor was said to be "assigned as the Deputy Director, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans in May 1998. As Deputy Director he monitors Army operations worldwide and oversees National Guard and Reserve Forces Integration efforts."
This too is incredibly important, and relates directly to the terror attacks of 11 September, in so far as the National Guard and Reserves are integral parts of Northcom, the military component of the forthcoming Department of Homeland Security, which will manage the "pacification" of the American people. But before we get into that, let's proceed with the problem of Lawlor's official biographies. In this particular biography, which was posted in November 2000, it says "The General's military service began in 1967. After service in Vietnam from 1971 to 1973, he received a Direct Commission in 1974 as an Intelligence Officer."
Once again, and rather conspicuously, there is no mention that Lawlor was a CIA officer in Vietnam. In fact, you get the feeling that he was in the military. You might go so far as to say that the folks at Homeland Security are dissembling, in order to hide the fact that one of their most senior officers probably still is a CIA officer!
Why would Lawlor consent to this subterfuge, if, in fact, he is an honorable man?
The Phoenix Program
I first read about Lawlor in Everything We Had by Al Santoli. I was researching the Phoenix Program at the time, and Santoli's interview with Lawlor was in a section titled "The Phoenix". Santoli identified Lawlor as having been a CIA case officer in I Corps, from November 1971-December 1973, and he quoted Lawlor as saying that in order to win the Vietnam War, "what we had to do was get in and eliminate the ability of the VC to control or influence the people. That's what pacification was all about. The buzzword was "root out." We tried to go in and neutralize their political structure."
For those who are unfamiliar with Phoenix and its jargon, "neutralize" meant to assassinate, imprison, or turn someone into a defector or double agent.
[Image: lawlor.gif]Lawlor apparently made some very provocative statements to Santoli, including this one: "We permitted the Vietnamese to corrupt the system and we did it because we basically were corrupt ourselves." Lawlor's position about Phoenix seemed to be that it was "an extermination program" that was "used to settle old scores."
In an effort to find out if this was Lawlor's position, I wrote to him and requested an interview. Lawlor agreed, and we did taped interviews, portions of which I included in my book, The Phoenix Program, between pages 407-411.
What Lawlor told me basically confirmed everything Santoli had attributed to him. Except there were some additional, startling details. To begin with, Lawlor told me that he joined the CIA in 1967, while he was getting his BA at George Washington University. The CIA hired him to work the night shift, and after he graduated, he was given the chance to become a regular CIA staff officer. He took the paramilitary course, which included instruction in weapons and military tactics, but he was also trained as a foreign intelligence officer, the kind who manages secret agents. After that he was assigned to the Vietnam Desk at Langley headquarters, where he received specialized training in agent operations in Vietnam, and took a language course in Vietnamese. During this time, Lawlor formed a rapport with the Vietnam Desk officer, Al Seal, and when Seal was assigned as the base chief in Danang, he asked that Lawlor accompany him. Lawlor, notably, was just as gung-ho about fighting the Viet Cong as John Kerrey. (See Bob Kerrey, the CIA and War Crimes.)
Lawlor arrived in Vietnam in November 1971 and was assigned as an undercover staff officer at the US Embassy's translation section. He arrived in Danang a few weeks later, at the beginning of 1972, and was assigned to regional headquarters, in the counter-intelligence office. He worked at that job through the Easter Offensive of 1972, but then things changed dramatically. Lawlor became the Police Special Branch advisor in Quang Nam Province, in which capacity, in the summer of 1972, he did what Rob Simmons had done in nearby Quang Ngai Province; he organized the most aggressive Special Branch officers into a paramilitary Special Intelligence Force Unit that hunted members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the hamlets and villages. As advisor to the Special Branch, Lawlor also ran the Quang Nam Province Interrogation Center, and there got to know the CIA's regional PRU advisor, Patry Loomis. Bored with merely filing reports, Lawlor jumped at the chance, when Loomis asked him if he'd like to out on some PRU operations. That's when Lawlor started dressing in tiger fatigues and going out on ambushes, and traditional PRU "snuff and snatch" operations.
For those unfamiliar with Phoenix lexicon, the PRU--Provincial Reconnaissance Unit--Program was a unilateral CIA operation, formed by the CIA, paid by the CIA, and staffed by mercenary Vietnamese who worked for the CIA, often against the interests of their own government. The PRU were originally called "counter-terror teams" and, according to Nelson Brickham (the man who created the Phoenix program) their job was to go into VC areas "to do to them what they were doing to us." Which means mutilating people, sticking their heads on poles after they were killed, killing the families of suspected VC terrorists or political chiefs, and other unconventional CIA terror tactics.
After the 1972 Easter Offensive the PRU were ostensibly placed under the jurisdiction of the Special Branch, and were renamed Special Reconnaissance Units. At this point the CIA still controlled the PRU purse strings, but it wasn't providing as much money and as a result, it lost a certain amount of control over the PRU leadership. The top ranking [Image: lawlornam.gif]Vietnamese PRU officers turned to graft, drug dealing, and shakedowns to make up the differential. Very bad things started happening. On one unforgettable occasion Lawlor walked into the Hoi An Interrogation Center and saw that a woman, who knew about the regional PRU chief's dirty dealings, had been raped and murdered. Her body was stretched over a table. "All of a sudden," Lawlor told me, "Mr. (Phan Van) Liem (the PRU chief) wants me to go on a mission with him, and the other PRU guys are telling me, 'Don't go!'"
This may seem a minor detail to the people at Homeland Security, or then again, it may be one reason why Lawlor's resume is so lacking in CIA information. You see, all CIA Province Interrogation Center advisors were obligated to report any incidents of torture, murder, or abuse they witnessed. So, where's Lawlor's report?
I believe Lawlor probably filed a report. Back in those rough and tumble Phoenix fighting days he was a man of conscience. For example, when Seal was replaced as the CIA's Regional Officer in Charge (ROIC) of I Corps, the new ROIC, Tom Flores, brought in a new staff. Having worked in the region's counter-intelligence office, Lawlor knew that an NVA spy ring still existed in the area, and that one of these NVA agents was the girl friend of Flores' operations chief. When Lawlor reported this to Flores, he was accused of having "gone native." So Lawlor told the CIA's security chief in Saigon, at which point his office furniture was confiscated and he was handed a ticket home.
"After that I became disillusioned," Lawlor confessed. He tendered his resignation to Ted Shackley in 1974. "The agency betrayed us," he said. "To go after the VCI, we had to believe it was okay. But we were too young to understand what happens when idealism cracks up against reality. We risked our lives to get information on the VCI, information we were told the President was going to read. Then guys who didn't care gave it to superiors more interested in booze and broads."
That's what Bruce Lawlor said to me back in 1988. He was definitely embittered, but there's something weird about him that makes him keep going back for more. When former Director of Central Intelligence William Colby heard that the Phoenix smear campaign had cost Lawlor the 1984 election in Vermont, he offered Lawlor his moral (as it was) support. Lawlor was summoned to Langley and interviewed for a job in the freewheeling Special Operations Division, which was then breaking every international law in places like Nicaragua and Afghanistan. But details of the "gone native" incident surfaced, and Lawlor was not, to his immense disappointment, rehired by the CIA.
Reprisal is the Name of the
Homeland Security Game

People look for vindication in many different ways. Take, for example, the reaction of the right wing to America's humiliating defeat at the hands of the Vietnamese. Phoenix creator Nelson Brickham compared that reaction to the frustration and bitterness of the German nation after the First World War. As we all know, that frustration and bitterness enabled Hitler to do his thing.
Since the terror attacks of 11 September, we've seen the same phenomena here in America. Symbolically, that traumatic event wiped the slate clean. As a result, all the moral and psychological prohibitions on the reactionary right have been lifted, and all the anger and frustrations it cultivated during the Vietnam War, and the Carter and Clinton Administrations, is poised to be unleashed under the aegis of counter-terrorism, not only on the usual suspects--foreign enemies sitting on vast oil reserves, suspected terrorists, and domestic dissidents--but on the unwitting, flag-waving American public as well.
I happen to believe that Bruce Lawlor is one of those frustrated, bitter people. And I believe that he subscribes to the fascist theories of Michael Ledeen. A former counter-terror expert in the corrupt Reagan Regime's State Department and National Security Council, Ledeen in a 1 October 2001 article for the National Review blamed the terror attacks of 11 September on Bill Clinton, "for failing to properly organize our nation's security apparatus."
According to Ledeen, Clinton's sneering lack of respect for security took "a terrible toll on the system, and (Tom) Ridge will not find it easy to instill a proper respect for proper secrecy, even in his own offices. It takes quite a while to stamp out corrupt habits of mind and action."
Leeden's solution to the problem of domestic terrorism is ideological. It is "to stamp out" the "corrupt habits of mind (italics added)" that are still lingering around, somewhere. In other words, the reactionary right wing, as represented by the fascist Bush Regime, with its ambitions for a military dictatorship, must impose its "proper" ideology through the institution of an official Thought Police--the current Office of Homeland Security and the forthcoming Department of Homeland Security. Stamping out, or pacification, is what is required to create the politically correct, security conscious, uniform American citizenry, marching in lockstep with their fellow flag waving TIPsters, that is necessary to win the tough eternal war on terror that lies ahead. It's a matter of will power.
"This is time for the old motto, "kill them all, let God sort 'em out." New times require new people with new standards," Ledeen asserts. "The entire political world will understand it and applaud it. And it will give Tom Ridge a chance to succeed, and us to prevail."
It's obvious that many people with an axe to grind are jumping on the Homeland Security bandwagon. Knowing this, and fearing that Bruce Lawlor is of the Ledeen "reprisal" persuasion, I immediately tried to get an interview with him. I called his office at 202-456-5687 and spoke with his secretary. She said he would call me back, but he hasn't responded.
I know he was angry with me after The Phoenix Program was published. He did not like how I portrayed the CIA, or him, personally. He was so upset he helped a CIA-nik write a rebuttal to my book. So I'm a little concerned, not just for myself, but for anyone who opposed the Vietnam War, and now opposes the Bush Regime's blatantly fascist policies at home and abroad. So I'm writing this as an open letter to General Lawlor.
As far as I know, General Lawlor, we still live in a democracy. Although the Bush regime seems hell bent on using the uninvestigated terror attacks of 11 September as a pretext to turn America into a military dictatorship, we are not yet (as far as I know) under martial law. Public officials, like you, still have a responsibility to respond to our concerns. So speaking on behalf of people concerned by the gaping window of opportunity for the abuse of human rights and civil liberties presented by the corrupt Bush Regime, through its Homeland Security apparatus, here are the main questions that need to be answered:
Questions for Major General Bruce Lawlor
1) What happened in July 1995 to make you leave your law practice and go to the Army War College? Did the CIA have a role in that decision?
2) How did your education at the War College pave the way for your assignment as Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, from June to October 1996? CIA officers often go by the term "Special Assistant." Were you serving as the CIA's liaison to the Supreme Commander?
3) In May 1998 you got the very important job as Deputy Director of Readiness and Mobilization within the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Your job was managing the National Guard and Reserves around the world. Did the CIA help you get this job? How were you involved with the CIA in this position?
4) You were the first commander of the Joint Task Force, Civil Support at Fort Monroe. Your job was to work with civilians. Was this a CIA assignment? How were you involved with the CIA in this position? Was this assignment based in any way upon your Phoenix-related experiences as a CIA officer in Vietnam, and was it precisely that "Phoenix" sensibility that you brought, as your main qualification, to the job? What are your other qualifications? Who else bid for the job? Isn't this where General Wayne Downing was assigned after 11 September, and if so, what was and is your relationship with him, and the CIA, in terms of formulating Homeland Security policy?
5) In a 24 March 2000 statement to Congress, you seemed to be preparing for the Homeland Security job you have now. In a way you predicted the calamitous events of 11 September. Did you, in fact, have any foreknowledge of those attacks?
6) In your statement to Congress you said that as Commanding General of the JTF-CS, you created Civil Support Teams to assist in case of a weapon of mass destruction incident. Formerly known as Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams, CSTs, you said, "are National Guard assets, and thus can function under state or federal authority. They are equipped with sophisticated communications systems that will enable local first responders to talk with neighboring jurisdictions or link up with federal centers of expertise. CSTs are also being equipped with state of the art detection equipment that will enable them to help local first responders quickly identify potential WMD agents." That's what you told Congress. Would you now please tell us what role the CIA plays in CST operations? It sounds like a great CIA cover outfit to me. Are they? Is there a Civil Support team near me? Will you allow me to observe how it functions?
7) In your role as Senior Director for Protection and Prevention at the Office of Homeland Security, what is your relationship with Northcom and the CIA? In fact, what is it that you do? Is it true that the Office of Homeland Security will be strategy-making part of the Homeland Security apparatus, and that the forthcoming Department of Homeland Security will be the tactical and operational part? What is the function of the Homeland Security Council, and what is your relationship with it? Can we have organization charts of these entities, including ones that show where the CIA is hiding it covert assets?
8) Last but not least, please explain the conspicuous absence of any reference to your CIA background in your official biographies. This seems to suggest that you are still CIA. Are you? And tell us, please, if you and others like intend to use your power to seek revenge against your political opponents?
Lingering Doubts
From mid 1972 through 1973 Bruce Lawlor ran the same sort of anti-terror programs that are now in vogue. The CIA has already launched a worldwide Phoenix Program. Is that why he got the Homeland Security job? Is that why the CIA finally let him back inside the fold? Did he promise to allow the CIA to use his Homeland Security programs as a cover to repress political dissent in America? Will he become one of those corrupt officials he hated in Vietnam, and use his power to take revenge on his personal enemies? Is that what Homeland Security is really all about?
Like most Americans, those of us who oppose the Bush Regime's fascist policies are willing to participate in our own defense, if there is in fact a threat, and if in fact the CIA didn't manufacture the threat. We just want honest forthright leaders whose first responsibility is to defend the liberties we cherish, and not to subvert them under the aegis of Homeland Security.
Douglas Valentine is the author of The Hotel Tacloban, The Phoenix Program, and TDY, all of which are available through For information about Mr. Valentine and his books and articles, please visit his website at
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
[size=12]The Phoenix Project and Its Creator, Nelson Brickham[/SIZE]
by Douglas Valentine
Nelson Brickham joined the CIA in 1949, serving first in the sedate Directorate of Intelligence, then transferring in 1955 to the Operations Division, where he served in the high-profile Soviet-Russia Division. Brickham gained a wide range of experience, from running black propaganda and false-flag recruitments, to gathering information on Soviet missile silos. Over the years he developed his own "systems approach" to spookery that he later employed when developing the Phoenix Program.
Brickham volunteered for duty in Vietnam in 1965. In the spring of 1966 he became chief of Field Operations in the Saigon station's Foreign Intelligence "liaison" branch. He had an office in the U.S. Embassy Annex but also spent time with his senior Vietnamese Police Special Branch counterparts in their office at the National Interrogation Center.
Brickham managed the veteran CIA liaison officers who were working with Police Special Branch officers in South Vietnam's 44 provinces. These Vietnamese Special Branch officers functioned like detectives in the intelligence branch of a big-city police department. They also managed the CIA's gulag archipelago of secret interrogation centers. The Special Branch mounted both positive intelligence and counterintelligence operations. In some respects the Vietnamese Police Special Branch is the model for the covert action branch of the Department of Homeland Security.
Upon assuming the job as Chief of Field operations, Brickham inherited and sharpened three existing programs:
1) The Hamlet Informant Program (HIP), in which principal agents working for the CIA and Special Branch recruited informants in the hamlets. This was dangerous work, because no one likes a snitch, and because the snitches often lied and set-up innocent people. Informants know they are unliked, and they need to be motivated. Some of them were blackmailed into becoming informants; others did it for revenge. Money was the most common motivating factor used in recruiting people for the HIP Program. (The eerie resemblance to Ashcroft's short-lived TIPS program need not be emphasized.)
2) The Province Interrogation (PIC) Program. The CIA began building a secret torture chamber in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces in 1964. Try to file an FOIA for information on them and see what happens. The CIA hired Pacific Architects and Engineers to build these facilities. Information from defectors and captured documents was put into the PIC Program reporting system, to which the CIA had total access.
3) Penetrations into the Viet Cong Infrastructure (usually by blackmailing or terrorizing a member of a targetted individual's family) were the most sought-after means of gathering information. Brickham conducted penetrations unilaterally and in liaison with the Special Branch. CIA province officers trained their counterpart Special Branch officers on how to mount penetrations, how to interrogate suspects, and how to recruit informants.
As Chief of Field Operations, Brickham established six regional offices and put a CIA liaison officer in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces. CIA Station Chief John Hart liked this organizational scheme so much that he decided to put a CIA Covert Action paramilitary officer in each province, too. The CIA's Covert Action program under Tom Donohue had a $28-million budget, while Brickham's liaison budget amounted to a paltry $1 million a year. Many Covert Action officers were refugees from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. They ran the CIA's Armed Propaganda Teams (versions of which will soon be deployed by the Department of Homeland Security), Census Grievance Program, Montagnard program, and most importantly, the Counter-Terror (CT) Teams. According to Brickham, the purpose of the CT Teams (versions of which will also soon be deployed in America through the Homeland Security covert action apparatus) was to do to the terrorists what they were doing to us. In Vietnam that meant leaving severed heads on fence posts.
Brickham would eventually bring the liaison and covert action people together in the Phoenix Program. The process began in July 1966 with the Roles and Missions Study, which concluded that military operations alone would not win the Vietnam War, and that a second "Pacification" war was needed 1) to destroy the Viet Cong Infrastructure and 2) win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese through political propaganda and psychological warfare. The Special Branch was assigned the task of attacking the Viet Cong Infrastructure, and Brickham focused on articulating the problem.
President Johnson sent CIA officer Robert Komer to Vietnam in August 1966 to organize this second Pacification war, through the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), formed in October 1966. (OCO is an early model of the current Office of Homeland Security.) OCO "coordinated" field units from the State Department, the Information Service, and the CIA, and had branches for psyops, political action, defectors, public safety, and economic development. At this point Brickham's boss, Howard Stone, the chief of Foreign Intelligence in the CIA's Saigon station, transferred Brickham and his field operations people out of the CIA station and put them in the Revolutionary Development Cadre Program, which was managed by CIA officer Lou Lapham. Considered the CIA's "second" station, the Rev Dev Cadre program taught the CIA's Vietnamese assets how to "pacify" the Vietnamese people.

>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
On 22 November 1966, Brickham presented Robert Komer with his original think piece, titled "Attack Against VC Infrastructure."
"Attack Against VC Infrastructure" was written during the Roles and Missions reorganization in preparation for fighting the pacification war. The Roles and Missions Study and Combined Campaign Plan stressed that increased emphasis should be given to identifying and eliminating the VC Infrastructure (as defined within the document) and to small unit operations designed specifically to destroy guerrilla forces. According to Bickham, "People wanted to know what was meant by the term 'Viet Cong Infrastructure.'" Even the military had no idea, so Howard Stone arranged for Brickham to brief General William Westmoreland.
Brickham wrote "Attack" as the basis for his hour-long Westmoreland briefing. "Attack" was the first time the CIA revealed to the military that it had Province Interrogation Programs (PICs) and that it kept "political order of battle" files.
"Attack" is important because it defines the VCI in its first sentence: "The VC organizational hierarchy, the mangement structure, as opposed to guerrialls for example, VC troops, and even, in many cases, VC terrorists." It adds to this definition all communist party members, front officers, and suicide bombers (sappers). Brickham likened the "attack on the VCI" to going after the Mafia, because the Mafia attracts bad people and uses selective terror and extortion to achieve its goals.
"Attack" is also significant in that it defines the attack as a function of the Police Special Branch, with its HIP, PIC, and penetration operations. Notably, the means of attack were ambushes, counterterror teams, popular and regional forces (like our National Guard and Reserves), Special Forces elements, plus regular Army Search and Destroy, Hamlet Search, and Country Fair operations. One can include the My Lai Massacre in the attack on the VCI, as a Phoenix "concept" operation. Although the attack on the VCI was essentially a secret police operation that relied on blacklists and assassination squads, B-52s and artillery bombardments were also frequently used to neutralize members of the VCI, along with their families and everyone else in their villages and hamlets.
"Attack" mentions the Cong Tac IV program, in which US Army intelligence officers were sent to 20 districts and precincts in and around Saigon. Cong Tac IV organized the initial Phoenix database of VCI on 3-by-5 cards. The CT IV units used regular Army units as a shield to sweep into villages to try to identify VCI from Special Branch blacklists, with the help of the National Police Field Forces. (The Department of Homeland Security is likewise militarizing secret units with police departments across America.)
"Attack" also mentions the Dien Ban DIOCC (mini-PIC) pilot program in Quang Ngai Province. The DIOCCs (District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers) were created by the CIA and Marines in IV Corps.
"Attack" suggested incorporating the Special Branch operations already in place, with the Cong Tac IV and DIOCC programs, and combining them in a national program that coordinated the 22 some-odd intelligence agencies in each province, in the attack on the VCI.
22 November 1966
1. When we speak of the VC infrastructure, we are
speaking of the VC organizational hierarchy, the man-
agement structure, as opposed to guerrillas, for example,
VC ttoops and even, in many cases, VC terrorists. Many
if not most of these latter categories, guerrillas, troops,
and even terrorists, are young people who have been either
impressed or seduced into the VC, and cannot in any way
be considered "hard core" Communists.

2. We do include in "infrastructure" all PRP mem-
bers, and all front organization officers (as opposed
to the rank and file of these front organizations).
Thus all members of a village chapter, all District
Committee and all Province Committee cadre are included
as of course the higher echelons. Region (or Zone) and
COSVN. We would also include members of the so-called
sapper units--these people are harderned <sic> Communist troops,
organized in military formations, to carry out sabotage
and terrorism of the larger and more dramatic nature--
hotel bombings in Saigon, Long Binh ammunition dump,
General Walt's residence. These latter are not casual
acts of terrorism, but carefully planned and fully or-
ganized military operations--Commando type operations.

3. Effective attack on VC infrastructure depends
on precise identification, location, and pattern of move-
ments and activities of these Viet Cong cadre and their
organizational units.

4. To the end of developing intelligence infor-
mation on the infrastructure, we have three operational
collection programs: informant operations; interrogations
of captured (or arrested) and defected VC; and agent
penetrations of VC organizations.

5. Informant operations, as they affect the infra-
structure per se, produce information mainly on hamlet
and village cadre and guerrillas, and to a much lesser
extent on District level cadre. These latter, the Dis-
trict cadre, will be mainly tax-collectors, propagandists,
and so on, those VC elements exposed to the "general
public". Informants can quite often give information
regarding locations of District and higher headquarters,
bases, meetings and so on, without however, providing
useful identification of the persons.

[page 2]

Page Two
6. The interrogation of prisoners and defectors
is by far the most important source of infrastructure
information, in terms of identifications, job decrip-
tion, physical description, activities, base areas, hid-
ing places, and so on. Very rarely, however, can pri-
prisoners or defectors give advance information on locations
and movements, meetings, conferences, et cetera.

7. The third program, agent penetrations, can
produce substantional bodies of infrastructure infor-
mation--identifications of cadre, movements and act-
ivities, and at times advance information of meetings
and conferences. Our handicap here is that agent com-
munications are characteristically slow; so that fre-
uqently, even though an agent has learned in advance of
a cadre conference, we or a military element able to
react, receive the information too late.

8. We have, as of last complete reporting date,
30 September, 137 penetrations of District committees
throughout the country, of which 93 are Police Special
Branch penetrations, and 44 are CIO. We had under
development as of that date 153 additional District
level penetration cases, 92 PSB and 61 CIO. We had,
as of 30 September, 15 Province Committee penetrations,
with an additional 20 under development.

9. An additional source of information not regarded
as a separate operational program, is the exploitation
of captured documents.

10. It is important to realize that, due to VC
use of aliases, VC security compartmentation, and geo-
graphical dispersal of the various sections of, for
example a VC Province Committee the full and complete
true name identificntion of these cadre is very dif-
ficult. Many VC are known only alias.

11. Information from the above four sources is
assembled and collated in Province Police Special Branches.
Once a year, each Province PSB will publish a VC Pol-
itical Order of Battle, which will contain all that
the police know of the VC organization, and a fill-in,
to the extent possible, of the true names of identified
VC cadre. Vietnamese reporting channels are not very
effic1ent however. It turns out that a great deal of

[page 3]

Page Three
information on VC identifications will exist in Police
files at District level, and also in Sub-Sector files.
In order to prepare complete political OB's, for mili-
tary operations, for example, not only will Province
and Sub-Sector will be collected and added. This is a
slow laborious process.

12. Attack against the infrastructure involves a
variety of action "tools". Arrest of terrorists and
saboteurs often lead immediately to the arrest of
underground cells in GVN cities. VC cadre may be
arrested in GVN controlled areas, based on informant
tips or on reports of penetration agents. It is quite
rare, however, to catch high-level cadre in this fashion--
what we get will be city cadre and occasionnlly a Dis-
trict Committee officer. Danang, Qui Nhon, Phan Thiet,
Tuy Hoa, Han Me Thuot, Saigon, Can Tho, are all cities
where (extensive) underground networks have been rounded
up onne or more occasions in 1966.

13. In the country side <sic> several different action
"processes" are employed. First will be the precisely
targetted raid of ambush, based upon intelligence in-
formation regarding the residence or future movements
of one or more cadre. We try, by these and other means,
to capture meetings or conferences of VC Village chapters
and District Committees. These raids or ambushes may be
carried out by the Police, by PRU's by RF, or in some
areas by Special Forces elements. Such raids have been
quite successful, or partially successful - when they
result in one or more VC Village or District Cadre being
killed. Unfortunately, they are more often killed than

14. A second action method is the military search
and destroy, hamlet search or "County Fair" type op-
operation. For these operations, the Police prepare
search lists from their files; to an increasing extent
as a result of encouragement and pressure, they also
collect VC defectors and other sources to use as
"identifiers" of VC caught in these cordon and sweep
operations. A modest number of Viet Cong village and
district cadre will be caught and identified in these

[page 4]

Page Four
operations, and at times one or more Province level or
higher cadre may be caught and identified. Thus in Phuoc
Tuy Province, a recent sweep operation caught a Province
Committee security cadre. In operation Irving, a Zone 5
(VC Region level) economic cadre was captured. Those are
just the most recent such catches.

15. A final and not insignificant aspect of the
attack on infrastructure are the direct military op-
eration targetted on the VC District, Province, or
Region base areas. Whereas it is possible to reach
District Committee bases, meetings, and conferences with
small ground units, and it is possible to capture the
District Cadre, catching Province and higher cadre has
so far, largely been a matter of luck. Province and higher
level cadre very rarely are exposed to capture. However,
almosy all reasonably reliable information on District
Committee meetings, Province Committee and higher base
areas, meeting, and conferences are increasingly result-
ing in air or artillery strikes. Sometimes military
operations are directed against a VC gathering rather
than a <sic> installation. For example, a Marine Battalion
attacked a Quang Nam Province Committee conference last
spring, and more recently, 175mm artillery fire was
directed on the reported site of a combined conference of
MR-4, MR-l and COSVN representatives. We have on occasion
been fortunate enought <sic> to receive after-action information
on such strikes, and we are confident that the damage to
the infrastructure, intterms <sic> of key personnel killed, is

16. The overrunning by Australian troops in January
1966 of the Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee
(now VC Region 4) headquarters in the Ho Bo woods is a <sic>
example of military operational activity. While not cap-
turing "infrastructure", the operation destroyed and dis-
rupted the headquarters, and the documents loss suffered
by the VC unquestionably seriously degraded the Special
Zone Committee capability, at least temporarily.

17. A special Task force has been organized to
launch a combined intelligence/police/military assault
against the MR-4 (Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh Special Zone
Committee) headquarters and base area.


>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
Brickham's second three-page document, "A Concept for Organization for Attack on VC Infrastructure," was written at the behest of CIA station chief John Hart as a plan for a "general staff for pacification." The idea was to present this concept paper to Robert Komer, Lyndon Johnson's personal representative in Vietnam and the CIA officer in overall charge of pacification.
Brickham wrote "Concept" with CIA officer John Hansen, an expert in counter-espionage and computers. Brickham was the organizational man, and used Rensis Likert's three-part "Management By Objective" theory:
1) The "strategy" or "objective" of the organization was better intelligence.
2) The organization was to be structured so that it would have adequate funding without trespassing on any other agency's mandate. Much like the Department of Homeland Security, member agencies provided their own money and personnel, etc.
3) Management of CIA officers in the field was achieved through monthly reporting formats that were plugged into Hansen's computer. To oversee policy-making and operations, Brickham proposed a board of directors with Komer as the Chairman, on the Ford Motor Company "command post" model.
Station Chief John Hart called this concept "ICEX -- Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation." It was much like the current Office of Homeland Security in the White House. The ICEX Saigon staff consisted of three operations officers, a reports management group, and an intelligence group. In the "Concept" paper we first hear of ROICs and POICs -- Regional Operations and Intelligence Coordinators, and Province Operations and Intelligence Coordinators. These ROICs and POICs would play a central role in the Phoenix Program
Brickham identified three problem areas: 1) collection, coordination, and reaction; 2) screening, detention, and judicial processing; and 3) interrogation exploitation. These are all integral elements of the current "war on terror." Notably, the Homeland Security lexicon was emerging in these early plans for the Phoenix Program.
Brickham's "Concept" was approved by the CIA but not adopted by Komer. Komer did not want a general staff, but an "executive action organization that focused on getting the job done."

>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
On 26 May 1967, after Komer rejected the "Concept" paper, Brickham went back to the drawing board and, with Komer's ideas in mind, wrote and submitted "Personal Observations." As Brickham states, it "reflects a management philosophy" and contains "more detailed development of thoughts behind the organization proposals recently submitted to you [ie, Komer]."
"Personal Observations" emphasizes the management system required for the "decentralized" command system Komer wanted. It recites the basic goals and strategy of pacfication, and emphasizes the importance of the military, as well as the CIA, in the attack on the VC Infrastructure. It stresses the importance of "coordination" between the military, the police, and the CIA, and cites examples of coordination problems. Brickham highlights the "war lord complex" as one of the main problems. (One can see George W. Bush descending into this "war lord complex.")
On page 4, Brickham refers to the importance of "modern corporate experience" in developing the decentralized command structure Komer wanted. This includes using computer systems and reporting formats to improve the performance of people in the field. In "Personal Observations," Brickham again refers to the Ford Motor Company model. "In industry and commerce," he writes on page 10, "[Phoenix] officers are known as 'Product Managers' and in appropriate circumstances this approach has proved to be highly effective and valuable."
In "Personal Observations" Brickham turns the attack against the VCI into a business venture. This mindset eventually resulted in Phoenix Coordinators being responsible for neutralizing 1,800 VCI per month. This is a most illuminating document.
[cover page]

26 May 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador R. W. Komer
FROM: Nelson H. Brickham
SUBJECT: Personal Observations

Attached herewith is an informal memorandum summarizing
my personal observations, after twenty months in country,
concerning the requirements of our situation in Vietnam. It
reflects a management philosophy as well as a discussion of
our main problems, and is significant only as it contains
the analysis, rat1onale, and more detailed development of
thoughts behind the organization proposals recently submitted
to you.

[page one]
A. The management system must provide for development
and review of basIc strategy (of pacification) and for review
and/or modification of strategy and programs corresponding to
fundamental changes in the situation or to new opportunities
and requirements.
B. The system must address itself to the radical improve-
ment of basic performance in a number of programs, and it must
address itself to achievement and preservation of coordination
and integration of programs and efforts.
C. The management system must be designed around a highly
decentralized command system, which focal command point (Sector/
Province) must coordinate and manage highly diverse and techni-
cally specialized programs. However, this is done in a series
(44) of largely repetitIve situations.
D. The system must therefore provide clear definition
and communication of goals; it must be sensitive to progress
towards those goals and to deviations from programs and required
levels of performance, and it must be responsive to control,
redirection and corrective action for correction of inadequate
performance and coordination, and corresponding to changing
situations and to problems.
A. Basic National Goals and Strategy of Pacification
Basic goals and pacification strategy, as well as pro-
gram requirements in terms of this strategy, are amply and ade-
quately set forth in a series of documents, notably the Klein
Report, the Roles and Missions Study Group Report, planning
documents issued in November 1966 for the RD 1967 Planning
Conferences, and the 1967 Campaign Plan.
Programs of the several agencIes are responsive to and
in accordance with the basic strategy. A number of these
programs were developed and in existence prior to the drafting
of the above basic documents, and as a matter of fact, were
contributive to their preparation.
The basic programs, especially in the intelligence and
action areas, have all demonstrated their usefulness and
soundness and do not require modification. They do require
coordination, integration, improvement and intensification.
These are management and operating problems (as opposed to
planning and strategy problems).

[page two]
That basic strategy and programs are both comprehensive
and sound does not argue against the fact that modification
can and should be made, as we learn new facts, or as new
problems emerge.
For example, there is too little realization of the impact
of conventional military operations on the "infrastructure"
and on the guerrilla war. Documents captured earlier this
year permitted the first real insight in this facet of the war,
and demonstrated significant degradation of the VC infrastruc-
ture, the VC guerrilla capability, the loss of support from
the villages and hamlets, an increasingly difficult food situ-
ation, etc. There have been only two comprehensive analyses
of these trends (one MACV and one OSA), and their obvious
lessons in terms of militnry operations, military/civil opera-
tions, new requiremerits for attack on infrastructure, have not
been drawn, or incorporated into pncification strategy, except
in a piecemeal fashion.
Likewise, new problems have been recognized or, while
foreseen, have mushroomed to such an extent as to outstrip all
capabilities for handling them. An outstanding example of
such problems is that of disposal of VC after they are captured
The war is a run on a treadmill as long as existing and totally
inadequate process and facilities for detention and neutrali-
zation of captured VC remain unchanged. This is an example of
a problem area requiring very highest level attention and
New opportunities, new insights and new problems must be
incorporated into basic strategy and basic programs, and any
"general staff for pacification" must be ennabled to recognize
and respond to such opportunities, insights and problems.

B. Coordination and Performance
The main problem in Vietnam is one of implementation and
coordination of the various programs, civilian and military. Few
if any of the programs are new. If each program is implemented
with full effectiveness, and if all of them pull together, in
concert, then we could expect quite striking advances in rela-
tively brief time periods.
The first necessity is coordination and integration. in
Province, on the American side; until we achieve that, it is
difficult to talk cooperation and integration on the Victnamese
side. This need for American coordination and improved effec-
tiveness of all elements of the American Province Team has
been constant refrain, in various reports and memoranda, going
back to 1963 (and earlier) Various experiments have been
made in the effort to create coordinated Province Team Appro-
aches, but they have, by and large, not succeeded, or have

[page three]
succeeded in only one or a few Provinces. The OCO structure
has made some progress in certain areas, but it has been
disappointingly slow.
There has been highly varying performance, or program
effectiveness, of the various agencies. This could be
illustrated a dozen different ways. The Provinces have not
been adequately staffed, nor in many cases can it be said that
the people involved have been doing thier <sic> jobs. A Refugee
officer arrives at a District town, kicks bags of rice off of
his helicopter and then disappears. A PFF Company is given
an occasional visit by a so-called advisor. A Public Safety
man is supposed to set up a detention camp: he arrives at
District headquarters in the company of a regionnl OCO staff
officer. looks around for fifteen minutes and disappears,
never to be seen again, and the U.S. Division has to set up
and man the camp for him. ARVN and Sector will have nothing
but contempt for Police intelligence. Certain officers of
some agencies spend as much time in Saigon, or at least out
of Province, as possible; many of them don't budge out of
their Province capitals into the Districts nnd villages. A
MACV Senior Advisor will censor reports so as to present a
rosy picture (if ARVN was as good as he says it is, we should-
n't have a war). One element of OCO will produce a major
staff study without coordination or reference to the line unit
concerned, which study may be radically incorrect. Too many
officers, of all agencies, betray an abysmal ignorance of
programs of their colleagues, programs which they are supposed
to be supporting, or from which they could gain support for
their own operations.
There are the numerous "private wars" going on. One
person pushes one program, which may be in radical conflict
with programs pushed by others, either in his own agency or
in another agency. A combat unit may ignore "infrastructure"
and go around looking for big main force enemy which they
never or rarely find. (This is the "IV Corps Syndrome", but
American units have been known to do the same.) Province
Chiefs, and Sector will force police to ignore infrastructure
and concentrate exclusively on military OB sightings. Combat
units both ARVN and American, will operate in Provinces with no
reference to Sector, and therefore with no reference to or
exploitntion of locally held tactical intelligence, and of
course, without taking advantage of potential local assistance.
Higher command levels will evacuate important prisoners before
local exploitation, especially of "infrastructure" information,
can be done. Each Corps (Region) and each Province develops
its own "war lord" psychology, going off in its owm direction,
not necessarily in accordance with basic program and mission.

[page four]
-4 -
There are numerous grave weaknesses. Province and Sector
will misuse PRU units, committing them to static defense or to
conventional military use in a conventionnl fashion. The Police,
and Police Special Branch will not, except in a few situations,
be incorporated into RD planning, so that they are unable to
program against requirements. OCO Province Reps and Sector
Advisors will "forget" to get inputs from Special Branch Advisors
for the Special Joint Reports.
C. Decentralized Decision Making.
It is totally unfeasible to exercise tactical control of
Province and pacification operations, even with a complete
real time communications systems. This implies tactical control
decentralization to Corps (Region) and Sector (Province) in
accordance with orthodox military and civil organizational
command lines.
This places a high premium on the individual orientation,
initiative and aggressiveness, in the first instance, of Sector
(Province) personnel.
With such far-flung decentralizntion, however, and recog-
nizing (a) the traditional weaknesses of traditional information
systems, (b) the diverse and centripetal tendencies and pressures,
© the necessity for blending together a wide range of diverse
technical specialties, (d) the necessities to monitor progress,
identify problems and initiate corrective action, and (e) the
need in its own right for large amounts of various types of
information, the necessity for detailed central knowledge and
a high degree of program control at Saigon level becomes
D. Reports and Information Systems.
"Modern corporate experience has demonstrated that manage-
ment of large and diverse enterprises requires a wide range of
facts to arrive at good decisions. Accordingly, the benefits
of a comprehensive reporting system are many. It aids decen-
tralization without loss of control and saves executives' time
by locating and anticipating problems, thus enabling them to
concentrate more on finding solutions and preventing adverse
effects. It also spreads scarce executive talent over a larger
number of critical areas."
Centrally designed and controlled reporting and information
systems are therefore becoming more and more prominent in
management literature. This trend towards centralized design
and processing has been given enormous impetus by the advent
of various automated data processing systems, which have a

[page five]
greatly expanded capacity for storing, manipulating and repro-
ducing information, at a greatly incrensed processing speed.
Automatic data processing potential greatly modifies
(increases) substantive raw information requirements at a
central processing point. This process is underway in both
substantive traditional military intelligence collation func-
tions and also in the infrasturcture area, at the CICV automa-
tic data processing center. Therefore, while previously there
was no substantive requirement for raw information transmitted
to Saigon (for other than management spot checking purposes),
now there is.
Proper design of the management reporting and information
system is crucial. This is true not only in terms of information
flow upwards, but also in terms of the feedback to echelons of
the system and to the Provine operations.
The reporting system should be:
-Designed to elicit the kind of performance desired,
by identifying areas that top command believes are of
priority importance and that are subject to continuing
scrutiny. So designed as to focus responsibilities
and induce self-initiated corrective action.
-Designed to serve multiple purposes--i.e., service
requirements of several management echelons simul-
taneously, so as to reduce the number of disparate
excessive and probably uncoordinated requirements
originating in various echelons. Reports system
design must be realistic and not overburdensome,
violation of which destroys either the reporting
system or the officers' effectiveness or both. A
rapidly rising marginal cost of information must be
kept in mind.
-Designed so as to surface, directly or indirectly,
key problem areas requiring top management attention--
misunderstandings, malcoordination, et cetera.
-Designed so as to elicit certain key facts relative
to and reflective of an officer's performance, which
may prove grounds for either corrective or possibly
later disciplinary action.

[page six]
-6 -
The OSA field reporting system was designed expressly with
the above considerations in mind. The following decisions were
a. Its monthly periodic report. This keys the report
in with Liaison Service reporting cycles. A month is
short enough time to permit meaningful feedback and
corrective action, is long enough time to have suffi-
cient activity and accomplishments to include, and is
not so long a period of time as to have too much to
b. The report combines narrative and statistical
reporting. This report is a comprehensive one,
reflecting recurring requirements from Washington,
from Saigon and from Regions. It combines both
objective and factual, and subjective reporting.
c. The report reflects activities, understanding,
and thinking and writing ability. It is designed as
a "projective test", so to speak. The relatively
few officers who (a) perform poorly but write well,
or (b) perform well but write poorly are rather
easily and rapidly discovered and identified.
d. The report focusses on basic program performance
and on key areas of management importance and interest.
e. The report includes items and statistical reporting,
which, correlated with other factors, yield good clues
as to program progress, as to officers <sic> performance as
well as to performance and functioning of related
systems--first-echelon supervision, for example, and
American team cooperation.
f. The report provides a factual and subjective basis
for evaluation and investigation.
<end indentaion>
In addition to the (OSA monthly management report, there
are a variety of other reports required, (most of which
however are prepared by the Liaison Service) and are submitted
as attachments to the basic monthly report. Of special
importance are the so-called spot reports which form the
basis for bi-weekly reports to Washington and for feedback
dissemination to Province. This latter feature--publication
and feedback to Region and Province, is exceptionally impor-
tant, because it reflects and recognizes the Province Officer's

[page seven]
own activities, it tells him what other people are doing,
identifies to him important (and reportable) activities, and
induces a competitive and emulative spirit.
There are of course many more facets to the overall
Province reporting problem than are encompassed by the OSA
reporting system. Sector has its reports, daily, weekly
and otherwise; AID and JUSPAO have theirs, which have been
partially integrated in the OCO modification of the Special
Joint Report (monthly).
The modifications made by OCO in the Special Joint
Report were not too helpful. and as a matter of fact, were
a step backwnrds. The previous SJR was a report requiring
input from all agencies, and carried signatures of all
agencies, reducing opportunity for slanted and distorted
reporting. OCO reduced the signatories to two, the OCO
Province Representative and the Senior Sector Advisor. The
net effect has been that in a number of instances, an input
is no longer requested of the PSB advisor, nor perhaps may
he even see the report. This means that his programs are
reported and commented upon by someone who known relatively
little about them, nor does our officer know what is being
said. The second fault of the new OCO report is its pre-
occupation, in numerous statistical appendices, with trivia.
This is a carryover of the USAID planning and programming
One grave problem which a management reporting system
must address is that of distortion and cover-up. This
has been described by one officer as follows: "... The
whole current system of reporting statistics that prove
either to Congress or to the American public or the
President that successive generations of American officials
in Vietnam are more successful than their predecessors--
these things are just getting in the way of solving the
problem.... Then you have a group of Americans in the
field, the majority of whom serve a one-year tour. They
go through the honeymoon phase in which they try to see
everything good about their counterpart and about the
situation and report it thus. Then they go through a per-
iod of disillusionment, in which they realize that nothing
has been accomplished, but by this time they have become
the victims of their own past reports and they have to
maintain the fiction. Ultimately they go out of there
very discouraged and probably very unhappy with their own
performance because about the time they become knowledge-
able to really do something they are on their way
home and have no desire to hurt their own professional

[page eight]
In addition to management information systems (handled
differently by different agencies), there are numerous sub-
stantive sub-systems now in existence in Vietnam. Police
Special Branch collection and processing of information is
one such sub-system. The PIC system is a separate but
related sub-system. There are various military intelli-
gence sub-systems. The militnry and OSA infrastructure
sub-systems are gradually being brought together, but
tactical intelligence sub-systems are poorly integrated.
Prisoner exploitation sub-systems have been poorly integra-
ted (hopefully now resolved). No effective attack has yet
been devised for measuring impact on and degradation of VC
infrastructure. The Chieu Hoi exploitation and reporting
sub-system leaves much to be desired. Information feedback
to Province of captured documents and prisoner exploitation
by OSA is well established, but is a problem which has only
recently been addressed by MACV.
Some of these sub-systems are clearly and obviously
autonomous and integral. Others however, should just as
clearly and obviously be closely related and integrated,
which they are not. Others yet should exist and don't.
Complementary to a management information system,
there must be a top management investigative or inspection
function. This function must be empowered to conduct or
direct routine and special investigations and reviews, both
announced and unannounced. It must be empowered to impound
files for special investigations, and conduct private as
well as joint interviews. This is not nor should it be
allowed to gain the color of hostile or necessarily cri-
tical investigation. One major purpose is to give the
necessary human and intuitive feel and content, which puts
flesh and blood around the statistical and narrative reports.
The investigative function, in its routine visitation
aspect, can be instructional and "orientational", in terms
of coordination and program functioning (but necessarily
must avoid command direction)

E. Management System Design.
There are several different organizational solutions
at the Mission level responsive to the specifications and
discussion above. These different solutions are not neces-
sarily alternative; they can be regarded as transitional,
one being a step in evolution to the next.

[page nine]
A minimal solution would be similar to that in operation
in the Ford Motor Company. In this, Ford formed an "operating
committee" consisting of all functional Division chiefs,
which meets once a week. A comprehensive statistical report--
between 50 to 60 pages in length--is presented, going into all
factors of production, market, costs, inventories, and
trends. The statistical and narrative presentation is designed
to highlight and focus attention on operating conditions, on
changes, and on indicators, of problem areas. Only three full
time officers are required for the presentation and presentation
of this report (after the system was installed). It required
complete systems design for the reports <sic> content, information
system and computer back-up.
Our problem is substantially different, but is amenable
to the same approach (without its totally statistical content).
Under this concept a working committee would be formed, under
the chairmanship of Mr. Komer, composed of Chief, OSA; J-2;
J-3; Chief, OCO; AD/RDW; Chief RDSD; AD/PSD; Chief, OSA/ID.
The committee probably should meet bi-weekly. This would
constitute the "board of directors" for pacification.
A small and select reports group, working with raw Pro-
vince (Sector) input direct from the various agencies but
also special reports obtained from the agencies, would
systematically cover a series of selected topics, identified
as reflective of key management problem areas. Province staff-
ing by the various agencies would be one such topic. Prisoner
and Chieu Hoi accession and disposition would be another. RD
Team locations, actions and casualties would be another, as
would quantitative and qualitative description of intelligence
reports accessions, PRU operations, et cetera. Province
inspection reports would be presented.
Such a system could be inaugurated almost immediately,
based on input of existing information flow from the various
agencies (raw traffic). A reports group of an estimated four
officers. drawn from MACV, OSA and Mr. Komer's staff could
be formed with little difficulty. One of them should be a
professional information system analyst as well as a statis-
tical expert (from either MACV or USAID MID).
This group, under guidance of the "board of directors"
would begin immediately a review of reporting from all agen-
cies, and undertake immediately an information system design,

[page ten]
per the discussion above. Or, alternatively, the Reports
Group could begin immediately functioning in the staff capa-
city, and two professional consultants in information analysis
could be brought from Washington, for a comprehensive study.
Such a study should in no circumstances require more than
three months time.
A second solution would use the first as a core, or
nucleus, but would add the Program Manager concept. The Pro-
gram Manager concept has been developed in both industry and
government as a method for coordinating, stimulating and
focussing diverse elements and activities of different organi-
zational components, from top-management level. It provides
centralized planning, direction and supervision of the specific
programs, while at the same time preserving the line of command
integrity of each separate organizational component. While
operating with and through regular line of command, the con-
cept permits direct contact with the various action elements,
within the context of the program, this short-circuiting
numerous reporting and managerial "filters".
In industry and commerce, these officers are known as
"Product Managers" and in appropriate circumstances this
approach has proved to be highly effective and valuable.
In Government (e.g., as in the new Department of State
reorganization, and as in the military) they are known as
either Program Managers or Project Officers, depending upon
the echelon or level at which they are functioning. (Additional
information on Product Manager concept is available if desired).

>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
"A Proposal" was presented to Komer in early June 1967. This is the most important "enabling" document in the development of the Phoenix Program. It has annexes on interrogation, data processing, and screening and detention of VCI.
"A Proposal" was accepted by Komer. The idea was to integrate all US and Vietnamese intelligence and counter-insurgency forces. The result was the formation of ICEX, which would later be renamed the Phoenix Program.
In "A Proposal" the CIA is identified as OSA (the Office of the Special Assistant). The document describes the joint combined staff mechanism that Komer favored, operating at the national, corps, and province levels, down to the DIOCs at the district level. ICEX coordinated everyone in an attack on the VCI, under Komer as Deputy Ambassador for Pacification. "A Proposal" presents ICEX as a joint civilian (CIA) and military staff. It reviews all the integral elements of ICEX-Phoenix, but it stresses that the CIA was in charge at every level. Indeed, the CIA would run Phoenix until 1969 when the program became public and the military took over.
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
Dated 9 July 1967, MACV Dir. 381-41 was written by CIA officers James Ward and Evan Parker, and MACV Counter-Intelligence chief Colonel Junichi Buhto. Parker became the first director of ICEX/Phoenix. Ward had his finger on the pulse of field operations, and Buhto was the military's liaison to CIA.
MACV 381-41 officially authorized the ICEX Program. It stated the purpose, scope, concept, and organization of ICEX, while describing its committee system and its principle "rifle shot" (meaning assassination) method of operation. It told where ICEX coordinators would come from (including the Central Registry Detachment) and scheduled the establishment of ICEX committees by 15 July 1967 at corps, province, and district levels.
MACV 381-41 is clearly a unilateral American document, and ICEX is clearly a unilateral American program with no mention of the Vietnamese. This is why it is so important. It is six pages long with an organizational chart at the end.

>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
The three-page cover sheet is a MACCORDS Memorandum from L. Wade Lathram, ACOS, CORDS, referencing a 21 July memo from Evan Parker (MACJOIR-ICEX), titled "Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure 1967-1968."
"Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure" refers to a 16 June 1967 COMUSMACV-approved proposal for the joint civilian (CIA)-military attack on VCI. It notes that MACV 381-41 was distributed on 17 July, and it tells Corps Senior Advisors exactly how to comply with MACV 381-41, by 31 July 1967. It refers to briefings given by Evan Parker, in which Parker told the Corps commanders how to set up ICEX committees. By 19 July there were ten DIOCCs operating, half in I Corps.
According to "Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure," by July the Saigon ICEX headquarters staff included Parker and four part-time CIA staffers, two full-time MACV officers, and one part-time MACV officer. Six more MACV officers were coming, and four more officers were coming from the CIA. The ICEX HQ staff was expected to include 50 people. 126 people were being assigned to the field. This documents notes a plan to brief General Nguyen Ngoc Loan again on 7 August, and notes that he objected to the ICEX Program. An "interrogation study" (Tab 11) was to be completed in November.
"Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure" is a lengthy document. Tab A discusses Program Status and Summary. Tab B lists the twelve Action programs. In many ways Tab B (with its separate tabs) is the guts of the ICEX program. Absolutely essential reading. Tab 10, "Improve Civilian Detention Systems," is in many ways a prelude for Homeland Security.

>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
Dated 4 August 1967, this memo is authored by senior CIA officer George Carver, then serving as senior advisor on Vietnamese affairs to the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA's Vietnam Committee.
The memo explains what the Attack on Viet Cong Infrastructure is, and how it is effected by "the Infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Structure (ICEX)." The document was written by Brickham. It refers to the PICs, and the Roles and Missions Study, and problems between the Vietnamese Army and Police which were preventing the Vietnamese from getting with the program. It identified the people who staffed the ICEX Committee, including Komer at DEPCORDS, the CIA chief of station in Saigon, the MACV J2 and J3, and the CIA's RDC Division chief at CORDS. It is seven pages long, with a cover sheet, and was summarily approved.
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
This is a three-page, self-explanatory document which discusses the 12 Action Programs, ICEX organization and staffing, etc. It refers to ICEX/SIDE. SIDE stands for the Screening Interrogation and Detention Program. This is discussed at length in Don Bordenkircher's book Tiger Cage: An Untold Story.
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
Dated August 1967, this is a SACSA (Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities) ICEX Briefing document. When ICEX was created, General William DuPuy was the SACSA. A former CIA deputy division chief, DuPuy allowed the CIA to handle ICEX/Phoenix as it saw fit, and he readily committed Special Forces to the program. This document is crucial for that reason--it is the document that officially brings the Special Forces into Phoenix.
>>> Explanation of this document, by Douglas Valentine:
This November 1967 MACV Joint Message form "DTG 06 0910Z" is a progress report from Komer to everyone involved in ICEX/Phoenix. See the first page for a recipient list, one of the document's most important features. Another important feature (see page 2) is that the GVN had not yet signed on to the Phoenix program or concept. Komer notes the new government under Nixon's hand-picked candidate, President Nguyen Van Thieu, would soon sign on.
[FONT=Times New Roman, Times, serif][size=12][COLOR=#000000]S...
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.

“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.

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