Whatever We Do..

[O. Austrud]

Peter Lemkin,
Thank you for your elaborate answer. You are welcome to my house in Norway anytime...

[O. Austrud]

[So, who knows then? Are you, James, just a man who doesn't know all? And just questions everything all the time, just to ubfucate the whole story? (Sorrry for the spelling) The fact that there is a hidden, powerful, Cabal, as Churchill put it, is all too obvious for all us who are still able to see...] posted above by O Astrud...

It is kind of unusual to be called a "cabal-denier" since I am the only one (I have ever seen) who claims to have created and have published a comprehensive chart of the Cabal.

As many have seen, my chart contains around 60 names. So that's a major cabal.

Unexpectedly, I have not received any challenges to the chart (either in reviews or on this site) with two significant exceptions:

1) Some think I should have John D Rockefeller III and/or Nelson Rockefeller specified.

2) Many think that George HW Bush should be on the chart.

I would recommend not only my chart book but also for you, (O Astrud) to read the book "General Walker..." by Dr. Jeffrey Caufield. When reading Caufield's book, you will possibly be astonished that a medical doctor could research from 1992 to 2015 and come up with information and theories with almost no overlap to other books such as the book by Fletcher Prouty.

I estimate that there are around 30,000 published items of evidence in the JFK case. That compares with 32,000 verses in the Bible. And I do confess that I am often accused of questioning everything all of the time.

I am not, however a JFK assassination cover-up artist. Refer to my work and that should become obvious.

James Lateer

(One of these days I will figure out how to do that neat pasting of prior quotes like everybody else does).

Sorry James,
I do not question you. I had just read the book by Prouty, and was kind of fascinated, just like we all are, when read a good book. Sorry.

[Peter Lemkin]

Matlack talked to the Baron in 1975?

After he returned from Haiti?

Where is that info?

Page 173, Mellon's Our Man In Haiti - and other references in the book. It was I who relayed the information from Prouty to Mellon, but Joan confirmed it.

As for Matlack being FOI, that is quite possible, as her boss Lansdale was one of the designers of that secret unit. It was small. I have somewhere in my notes [not at hand at the moment] its maximum size of only a few hundred officers. As I mentioned Nagell was definitely FOI as well as Mil. Intel and CIA. Some CIA documents deny he was CIA, and perhaps he only thought he was CIA, but he was definitely Mil. Intel and FOI. Or the CIA was just denying the truth, as they often do. Another high level spook who was FOI and security for the Manhattan Project [including, acquisition of Nazi enriched nuclear fuel which was used, in part, for the Japanese bombs] and later was connected to JM/WAVE and the most suspicious people there vis-a-vis the JFK assassination. FOI was originally designed by Landsdale to get 'around' the CIA and to do secret and illegal operations the CIA was either against doing or too large an organization to be trusted to do without leaking or messing up. Col. Bishop when interviewed by Russell at Shaw's home almost jumped out of his seat when Russell mentioned FOI by name. Bishop told him to 'be careful when looking into or even discussing that one - no further comment.' Bishop was training and running many of those who were being trained to kill Castro who were turned to kill JFK, IMO. Bishop was FOI I believe. It was an outgrowth of Mil. Intelligence and super-secret until well after the JFK assassination, not even acknowledged nor mentionable by name. They sometimes used individual CIA personnel, but when they did it seems CIA HQ was not so informed of the true nature of the 'project' or perhaps even of the 'loan'. I'm coming more and more around to the idea that CIA, as an organization, played a smaller role in Dallas [although many of the officers and assets DID play major roles!], and that Mil. Intel and FOI played a much larger part than has hitherto been known or acknowledged. These were not the only entities involved, of course, but I think they provided the framework, communication links and provided or sourced the needed players and mechanics; did the clean-up and cover-up operations, etc.

[James Lateer]

As for my thesis that German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was the top leader behind the JFK plot, please refer to the following page from the book Ruckblenden which is the memoir of Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe who was Ambassador to the US from 1958 to 1962.

I believe Adenauer and his allies were planning the assassination based on advice from their longtime colleague Allen Dulles starting in 1960. By the way, Adenauer had known LBJ from 1953, but only met JFK in 1959. They were told by Dulles about the Liberal Wave which would include the 1960 election of JFK:

The following is from page 429 et seq, translated very roughly by google translate:

"Strong horsemen [?] who could engage in an unprepared summit, had something oppressive for all of us.

In March, Adenauer, filled with grim worries, came to America. in last destination was Japan. At the universities of Princeton, Los Angeles and Berkeley he was to be awarded honorary doctorates. As he used to do, he began his America trip in New York. His arrival at the airport had been quite informal and inconspicuous. In a small circle we dined in his suite in the Waldorf Astoria: only with his son Konrad and his former Lotte Multhaupt, further Brentano, the New York General Consul Federer, the personal speaker Bach. The service in the Wal-village [?] was miserable, in the long breaks between the courses I reported on the situation in Washington: I had nothing bad to produce, but nothing that could have helped to improve the mood of the picker [Chancellor??].

In the next few days Adenauer, as we were used to from his early visits, devised a program that could have brought a much finer one to the brink of exhaustion. It started that morning, the next morning - a Sunday -The Mass went to Francis Joseph Cardinal Speilmann at St. Patrick's Cathedral. Afterwards, the cardinal had invited us for his first breakfast in his private room. In contrast to the depressed atmosphere of the previous evening, this was in a very relaxed mood. Spellmann showed us - as evidence of his close relationship with the [Holy Father ??], as he said with some self-irony - a silver plate, presented to him by Cardinal Roncalli, later to be Pope John XXIII.

After a brief visit to the Metropolitan Museum followed in the course many daily one-on-one interviews; At noon during a meal given by the American at the Waldorf Astoria hotel, a joke [?] to the approximately one hundred invited guests - leading personalities of public life, including especially the leaders of Jewish organizations, in the evening at a dinner in the house of our New Consul General Federer held intensive talks with a particularly sought-after group of prominent politicians. In between on Monday a short flight to Princeton to receive an honorary doctorate from the local law faculty, then continuation of the New Drerk program [?]. Individuals to discuss these days were David Ben Gurion, the Israeli Prime Minister, and Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Without any exaggeration it is fair to call the treaty with Ben Gurion a historical event: for the first time after the Jewish murders of the Third

429

Reich, the Israeli and German heads of government met. The fact that the two old gentlemen evidently understood themselves excellently is expressed only in the sentence in the unflattering tone of Adenauer's reminiscences: "Ben-Gurion and I immediately found contact."

Two rounds of talks on these New York days seem worthwhile. Our "observer" at the United Nations, Embassy Werner Dankwort, invited some of his colleagues to lunch Henry Cabot Lodge, the American UN ambassador, the British S: Pearson Dixon; the Frenchman Andre Brard (formerly representative Franois-Poncets in Bonn) and the Japanese Koto Madsudaira. Adi Flauer remarked to Cabot Lodge that he would like to see him debating with Khrushchev at the summit-an unmistakable allusion to the fact that he did not trust [!!!!] the dialectical fluency of Eisenhower in his dealings with Khrushchev.

During his seven-year tenure at the United Nations, Cabot Lodge had earned the reputation of being a tough and skilled debater in dealing with its Soviet counterparts in the Security Council. This man distinguished himself from the reputation that all members of this family, who belong to the oldest aristocracy of Boston, commonly enjoyed: the Cabots, it was said in Massachusetts, only talk to the lodges, and the lodges speak only to God. This former senator and later ambassador to Vietnam and in the years 1968/69 in Bonn knew each other.

If, how to talk to Soviet people. Adenauer's unease was further expressed in the course of the trip, at the dinner in the house of Federer, where he his American interlocutors (McCloy, Shepard Stone, Harriman, Nelson Rockefeller, Senator Javitts [[I feel Javits was in the pay of West Germany, jl.]], General Clay, Robert Murphy, the At that time deputy foreign minister) spoke with extraordinary earnestness and great urgency into the conscience: The prestige of the United States as the leading power of the West is rapidly sinking. Numbers of opinion polls about the diminishing credibility of America's power position served to underpin its arguments.

The German participants (Brentano, Carstens [[a graduate of Yale, jl]], Eckhardt) had the impression that his words had had a strong effect, although Harriman was avoided in partisan polemics against the Republicans, and Murphy (as a loyal official) strove for the firmness and decisiveness of the American To defend policy: When and where did the United States have reason to fear that they were afraid of any ultimate consequences in defending Europe or, in particular, Berlin? I could not help but remind him of three different statements made during the previous weeks of official names

430

"One had rejected the possibility of general nuclear war because of Berlin; another had said that Berlin could not be defended by conventional means; a third had rejected the idea of ​​an airlift in the event of a blockade. The Berliners would not know how to make a verse out of this series of explanations, I said; Do not know what resources were left to realize the American protection of the case in case of emergency.

Following this small dispute with my friend Murphy, [U.S. diplomat Robert Murphy who had many fascist connections in WWII and a friend of Pius XII] of whom I knew that he was one of our most reliable supporters and one of the hardest and most determined followers of a firm and relentless Berlin policy, we discussed whether and to what extent the Chancellor during his public appearances during his trip should strike an alliance-shaking tone. Again, it was Murphy who warned against; he expressed the fear that in such speeches a mixture could be seen in the internal American election campaign. He was probably right. How easily an educated criticism could have worked against production was shown a few days later in Washington, when Adenauer in a conversation with McCloy, Allen Dulles and General Clay repeated his warning criticism in a different form. Even as he spoke, I thought, shocked: That's too much, now he's overdoing it. Exactly the same, his interlocutors acted: none of them was now, in the face of an exaggerated criticism, ready to admit weaknesses and mistakes of the government. The Chancellor drew from this conversation at least the doctrine, in his public speeches more restraint

The meeting with Eisenhower on 15 March, 1960 was undramatic and made little news; the communique had been edited beforehand, it was neither discussed nor modified (with the exception of a subordinate point). However, this process, as well as the subsequent discussion with Herter in the State Department, did not help to resolve Adenauer 's disquiet. She persisted throughout the week and was expressed in a nervous irritability at the last stopover in front of pan [?], in Hawaii.

In Honululu I parted with the Chancellor and his group: while he was flying to Tokyo, I took the opportunity to spend a long day on this Pacific island group, whom I had not even met and who a year before had become the fiftieth member of the Union , Of course, not only did I want to see luxury hotels on the shores of Waikiki, but also the 1941 Japanese attack scene, Peari Harbor. That became me,

431

along with military "briefings" by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Felt, and his staff officers. The day after the departure of the Chancellor's delegation, I addressed Honolulu to the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council on the Berlin issue in the light of the upcoming summit.

[The above sets the stage regarding the hostility and suspicion on the part of Adenauer who was visiting the US prior to the expected upheaval that could come from a President Kennedy. Note that Adenauer met with all the "usual suspects: i.e. Rockefeller, Dulles, McCloy, Henry Cabot Lodge, and hardly anyone outside that sinister clique, ie not JFK].

James Lateer