Jan Klimkowski Wrote:So a random Mechanic takes a dive for the military-multinational-intelligence complex's favourite terrorist cutouts: the KLA and SHIK.
Maybe he can serve his sentence in the military-multinational-complex's outpost that polite people don't talk about: Camp Bondsteel.
Yes, Kosovo is a legitimate law abiding respectable nation now.... :flypig:
Just like the legitimate law abiding nation of the genocidal fascist Ustase: Croatia.
"It means this War was never political at all, the politics was all theatre, all just to keep the people distracted...."
"Proverbs for Paranoids 4: You hide, They seek."
"They are in Love. Fuck the War." Gravity's Rainbow, Thomas Pynchon
"Ccollanan Pachacamac ricuy auccacunac yahuarniy hichascancuta." The last words of the last Inka, Tupac Amaru, led to the gallows by men of god & dogs of war
Some quaint notions expressed in this article but some good information too.
Quote:Kosovo's intelligence services come in from the cold
Intelligence organs loyal
to the major political parties emerge from the shadows
to vie for control over formal security structures.
Jeta XHARRA / Prishtina
The go-ahead given by the United Nations administration in Kosovo, UNMIK, on December 20 for Kosovo government to establish new justice and interior ministries has caused a stir in political circles.
The prospect of Kosovo having its own interior ministry, in particular, has led to unprecedented behind-the-scenes fighting amongst the political parties in the ruling coalition over who will have a hand in running it.
The battle is feeding concerns already held by many local and international analysts that newly-established ministries could be used as tools in inter-party rivalries, rather than working impartially to serve Kosovo's population as a whole.
UNMIK spokesperson Neeraj Singh brought home the point during a regular press conference on December 21, during which he stressed that Pristina will have just three months to see if it can hire staff for the new structures capable of ensuring "the de-politicisation of the process".
At the heart of the problem are numerous shadowy political intelligence agencies who have long dominated matters of internal security in Kosovo. Though loyal to the major political parties, these organisations - whose existence is very much a public secret - are in fact ultimately accountable to no-one and often employ their underworld networks to pursue their own agendas.
The rivalry between these various groups traces back to the mid-Nineties, when Kosovo was still held in a tight grip by the former Yugoslav government in Belgrade. It has been at the root of a number of assassinations and intimidation campaigns against party defectors and political competitors in recent years.
In the wake of this week's announcement, however, Balkan Insight can reveal that the leaders of two groups who dominate the party intelligence sector are prepared to go public for the first time in an effort to clean up their reputation for underworld thuggery and secure a role in setting up formal security structures.
Crucially, each group sees this process as a way of legitimising its activities and winning the right to transform itself into an official intelligence agency in the future.
The moves from these organisations have sparked a debate about whether and how it might be possible to integrate them into a formal security structure without empowering the criminal elements with which they are associated.
With no clear consensus reached as to the best solution, UNMIK and the Kosovo government appear determined for the moment to ignore these organisations and exclude them from official discussions about the future set-up of Kosovo's internal security.
But they may not be able to do so for long. With talks set to begin in January on Kosovo's future political status, pressure is mounting for local leaders and their international counterparts to make important decisions about how to provide proper security both for its majority Albanian population and, crucially, for its Serb minority.
BITTER RIVALRIES Mission-head Soeren Jessen-Petersen has insisted that UNMIK will not allow politicisation of the planned justice and interior ministries. In remarks which seemed to allude to the party-affiliated intelligence services, he has said that the new structures must function "in the interest of all Kosovo citizens and not only in the interest of the political parties".
Larry Rossin, Jessen-Petersen's deputy, appeared to have similar issues on his mind when he announced in a December 20 press release that candidates for the ministerial posts, "must be people who are willing and able to work professionally and impartially, and who can earn the trust of all people in Kosovo, and all communities in Kosovo."
Kosovo has been administered by the UN since the end of the NATO bombing campaign which drove Belgrade security forces from the protectorate in 1999. While key functions have gradually been transferred from UNMIK to local institutions, this is yet to happen in relation to internal security, defence, justice and diplomatic relations.
Speaking during the "Life in Kosovo" televised debate organised by BIRN on November 23, Lulzim Peci, head of the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, KIPRED, which has published a report on the security situation in Kosovo, explained that the party intelligence sector is currently dominated by two groups.
One, the Institute for Researching Public Opinion and Strategies, IHPSO, is a non-governmental organisation, NGO, led by Rame Maraj and widely believed to handle intelligence matters for the politically dominant Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK. The other is the Informative Service of Kosovo, SHIK, which is run by Kadri Veseli and is associated with the leading opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, PDK.
The KIPRED report suggests that the activities of these bodies "range from close protection of party officials to gathering information on, and intimidating, political opponents."
Amongst the acts of violence blamed on these organisations in recent years are a series of assassinations of LDK officials between 1999 and 2002, which created widespread fear amongst members of the party. Whilst nearly all these killings remain unsolved, they were generally attributed to groups associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, which fought Serb security forces before their withdrawal in 1999.
A report published by the international NGO Crisis Group in May this year lists the names of numerous victims of such murders, including a number of LDK activists and bodyguards, a member of parliament and a close advisor to president Ibrahim Rugova.
On the other hand, intelligence services loyal to the LDK are also known to have issued written threats to politicians who defected from the party. Edita Tahiri, who was a senior member of the LDK until she left to form her own party prior to the October 2004 parliamentary election, has been amongst those on the receiving end of such intimidation.
There was a renewed flood of threats and security incidents in April this year, after former prime minister Ramush Haradinaj resigned the post and handed himself over to the Hague tribunal to face war crimes charges. Both the SHIK and the IHPSO appeared to be deeply involved in efforts by their respective parties to make as much profit as possible from the period of political uncertainty that followed.
THE KEY PLAYERS The roots of the IHPSO trace back to the defence and interior ministries formed by Kosovo's parallel government-in-exile in the Nineties. The organisation's chief, Rame Maraj, currently holds the official title of special security advisor to President Rugova.
In a conversation with this author before the "Life in Kosovo" debate, Maraj freely admitted that his IHPSO was an intelligence service linked to Rugova's LDK. "The time has come to demystify these intelligence structures and show we are real people and not monsters," he said.
Maraj was alluding to hostile media coverage that followed a May 10 police raid on IHPSO offices. The police involved were investigating the bombing of Rugova's motorcade on March 15, while the president was on his way to meet with European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana. Solana had travelled to Kosovo in order to urge Rugova to give the PDK a leading role in the government.
Crisis Group noted in its May report noted that, "UNMIK and the KPS [Kosovo Police Service] are increasingly drawn to the premise that elements within the LDK camp were responsible for the explosion." The suspicion is that the bomb, which damaged Rugova's car and injured a passer-by, was intended to provide the president with a pretext to avoid being pushed into broad coalition politics.
The SHIK, on the other hand, emerged from the Popular Movement of Kosovo, LPK, a group of activists and former political prisoners which later became part of the KLA.
The head of the SHIK, Kadri Veseli, was a member of the self-proclaimed Provisional Government of Kosovo, established by the KLA's leader, Hashim Thaci, in 1999. The SHIK continued to exist when the abortive governing body was abolished in February 2000.
Initially financed by funds left over from the war, particularly the "Homeland Calling" fund that financed the KLA, it has since relied on finances from local supporters.
Nowadays, the organisation is quite open about its activities. Veseli, who sits before a wall half covered by a huge reproduction of the SHIK's circular emblem, does not, even on the record, deny that he runs a full-blown intelligence gathering operation.
"We are in a process of transformation and have been so for the last five years," he told Balkan Insight, adding that the SHIK had hopes to play "a more active part" in Kosovo's future by "nationalising its capacities" in some way.
Both Veseli and Maraj insist that they have well-trained, professional staff who are fully capable of playing a part in whatever kind of official intelligence service might be established in Kosovo in the future.
Sources close to both services, however, paint a very different picture.
The IHPSO is thought to number around 300 people, half of whom receive a regular salary of some 200 euro per month from the organisation. The other half are employed as municipal officials, or work in other public institutions.
Amongst those working at a high level within the IHPSO are a number of people who previously worked for the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, SUP, and State Security, DB.
A source close to the IHPSO, who wished to remain anonymous, told Balkan Insight that the organisation is partly financed by donations from Kosovo Albanians living abroad. It also receives a percentage of bribes paid to the LDK by local business people hoping to win tenders for reconstruction and other work, the source added.
The same source explained that the LDK originally decided to form its own intelligence wing immediately after the 1999 conflict, amid fears that the KLA would otherwise succeed in eliminating the party as part of its own efforts to dominate Kosovo politically.
But the organisation's main aim now, the source said, is to keep PDK-head Hashim Thaci out of government.
A senior SHIK official told Balkan Insight that his own organisation is smaller than the IHPSO, with only some 80 to 120 people working exclusively for it.
Most are former KLA fighters who also worked in the Nineties for the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, KLMDNJ, a grass-roots NGO whose main focus was collecting evidence of human rights abuses by the Belgrade security forces.
The official explained that the SHIK comprises four directorates, one of which deals with anti-terrorism activities.
Lulzim Peci of KIPRED confirmed that the existence of both the IHPSO and the SHIK has been tolerated so far, "partly thanks to their cooperation with American and other western intelligence agencies on supplying them information regarding terrorist activities in Kosovo."
The SHIK source said that the organisation's main activity, however, is to root out those who collaborate with the Serbian secret service. "When the SHIK discovers someone is working for the Serbs, we tell them we know and either tell them to stop, or let them continue playing a double game in which we get them to send incorrect information to the Serbs," the source explained.
GOING PUBLIC A survey for the "Life in Kosovo" debate revealed that many ordinary people in Kosovo have real concerns about these party-affiliated security agencies and would like them to show themselves in public.
"Six years after the war, there is no needs for secrets anymore - these party intelligence services should become part of our official institutions," said Osman Ragipi, a 54-year-old engineer.
Members of the SHIK and IHPSO argue that in the past they have had no option but to remain outside the system, since Kosovo has had no official intelligence service which they might otherwise have been able to join.
But amid the scrabble to gain influence within the new interior ministry, the leaders of both groups now seem prepared to come out in public for the first time in order to present themselves as viable candidates to set up an official internal security system.
"We realise we can't go on like this forever," said Kadri Veseli of the SHIK, in reference to his organisation's secretive past.
"We are looking for models of how to integrate our structures into Kosovo's institutions," he added, "by offering our men in fair and open competition for jobs in some future Kosovo intelligence agency."
TO DISSOLVE OR INTEGRATE? A consensus is yet to emerge as to whether and how it might be possible to integrate the party intelligence organisations into an official security structure whilst separating out their criminal elements. But the majority of observers agree that the solution lies somewhere between the two extremes of either legalising the organisations in their current form or dismantling them completely.
Representatives of the international community in Kosovo have called for heavy outside supervision in order to ensure that any future interior ministry does not end up being a tool to be used in party politics.
We understand that a politician needs to be appointed as a minister," said Ian Smailes, head of UNMIK's Advisory Unit on Security, which is in charge of the Internal Security Sector Review, ISSR, process in Kosovo. "But that figure needs to appoint staff on a basis of competence and meritocracy and not on the basis of political affiliation, if there is going to be a security service that serves the whole of Kosovo."
"However, first and foremost," he added, "[the] public has to be educated about what [an] internal security sector review implies in the first place - I consider we have to educate society as a whole."
The ISSR started as a process of security recommendations drawn up by a group of 15 security consultants who came to Kosovo in April. Their work was funded by Britain's defence ministry, its Department for International Development and its Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The consultants' report, which was published on May 6 this year criticised the party intelligence bodies. "Parallel structures, both those instigated by Belgrade and intelligence structures affiliated to political parties, are significant in undermining confidence in security," it said.
But there are concerns that neither the government nor those behind the ISSR process appear willing to take the bull by the horns and start negotiating the future of these influential organisations.
Smailes told Balkan Insight, "There will be a time and a place when all the relevant stakeholders will be incorporated in the internal security sector review - every organisation that can contribute to the security and safety of Kosovo will be eventually included."
When pressed about the bodies led by Maraj and Veseli, however, he said, "I know nothing of them - I know nothing as to who they are and how many people they have".
Ramadan Qehaja, a security advisor to the government, was similarly vague during the "Life in Kosovo" debate. "I am too busy with other work on preparations for the [interior ministry] to preoccupy myself with these structures that allegedly exist," he said.
A Kosovo government advisor, who preferred not to be named, told Balkan Insight that he believed time would soon be called on such organisations. "When we establish our own security institutions, these structures know that there will be less and less of them and more and more of us, official structures," he said.
An advisor to Kosovo prime minister Bajram Kosumi, who also wished to remain anonymous, told Balkan Insight that he was convinced the international community would seek to shut down these services once official structures are created.
"The internationals will say - now enough is enough, you were needed at some times and we used you - but tough luck, this is politics and now you have to stop your activities," the advisor said.
A source within the SHIK, whilst insisting that the organisation would obey such a request if it were made, warned of the risk that its members would then go underground. "We would shut down our offices for sure," he said, adding, "But then, it is better to have an address and let people know where to find us, than be without an address at all."
In the meantime, Ylber Hysa, vice-president of a Kosovo parliament commission set up to deal with security matters, is keen to underline that the new interior ministry has not actually yet been given any mandate to establish or dismantle any intelligence services.
"It is not up to the ministry of internal affairs to create an intelligence service," said Hysaj. He added that, in his opinion, it would be better for Kosovo to have a system whereby the security service is accountable not to the interior ministry, but to the parliament, prime minister or president.
In fact, both the SHIK and the IHPSO agree that a future intelligence service should be separate from the interior ministry.
The ISSR, whose job it is to answer such important questions, is coming under fierce criticism fore failing to properly include the views of locals stakeholders.
Florina Duli, a representative of the Republican Club, a local NGO involved in consultations which form part of the ISSR process, claims that it is not only unofficial party intelligence structures that are being snubbed during the decision-making, but actually the majority of local Kosovans.
Duli told Balkan Insight that, as a result, "There is very little local ownership of the security process."
At the same time, most Kosovans interviewed by Balkan Insight believe that no future Kosovo intelligence service has any chance of survival unless it is closely supervised by internationals.
"It is going to have to be. an outsider who will decide who will be hired, judging with professional criteria," said a member of one party intelligence service, adding, "If it was a local person, the process would be unfair."
Another such source went as far as to say that the head of any new security service ought not to come from the ranks of either party-affiliated structure. "We have a lot of resentment towards each other from the divisions during the war," he said. "Too much has happened to my generation to be able to pack it all up and not look back in anger."
In the end, however, members of both services still hope to play a significant role in Kosovo's future security structures.
"We [parts of the LDK] are strongly lobbying for Rame Maraj as a future interior minister," said Genc Kelmendi, who advises Maraj. "You will see it happening in four weeks if internationals don't stop it."
"The SHIK will be the backbone of any future intelligence service because we have all the structures and professional capabilities needed," Balkan Insight's SHIK source agreed.
Lulzim Peci, of KIPRED, told Balkan Insight that it is naive to expect such a complex problem to be resolved overnight. It is not realistic, he said, "to expect any of these structures to disappear, or to be fully integrated into official structures."
A British foreign office diplomat, who wished to remained anonymous, suggested that the best solution might be to put off dealing with the formation of internal security structures "until Kosovo is ready for it". This might be sometime later in 2006, the diplomat said.
Indeed, delaying decisions on the future of the party intelligence structures currently appears to be the preferred tactic both of UNMIK and of the Kosovo government. But with talks due to get underway soon on Kosovo's political future, it will become increasingly difficult to ignore such fundamental issues.
(Jeta Xharra is BIRN's Kosovo country director. Part of the research for this article was originally carried out for the "Life in Kosovo" debate, which was organised by BIRN to discuss security matters in Kosovo. The debate was broadcast on the Kosovan public broadcaster, RTK, on November 23)
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Hide headerUNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000533 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, INL, DRL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PINR [Intelligence], KDEM [Democratization], EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance], SR [Serbia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], KV [Kosovo] SUBJECT: KOSOVO: HITMAN'S CONFESSION SHAKES KOSOVO POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT REF: PRISTINA 518 PRISTINA 00000533 001.2 OF 003 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED Q PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Kosovo's political establishment has been shaken following allegations that Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) officials were involved in assassination plots during an effort to consolidate power from 1999 to 2003. A Democratic League of Dardania (LDD) member of parliament, Gani Geci, first introduced the assassination charges on the floor of the Kosovo Assembly on November 26, claiming that he had a videotaped confession to the killings from a former operative of the Kosovo Information Service (SHIK), the PDK's now disbanded intelligence wing. The former operative, according to Geci, had evidence of SHIK involvement in assassinations that targeted Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) officials. (Note: Geci was once a member of the LDK and was wounded in an assassination attempt in 2001. Two others were killed in the same attack. End Note) On November 29, Geci released the video confession to the media and identified the purported SHIK operative as Nazim Bllaca. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY (cont.): Later that day, Bllaca held a press conference in front of the Assembly in which he confessed to one murder; said that he was involved in 16 additional cases of murder, beatings, and torture; and charged that prominent PDK officials ordered his criminal acts. Television outlets have aired Bllaca's video in its entirety, and the local media are fixating on the story to the near exclusion of any other current event. On November 30, EULEX arrested Bllaca, but not before it came under criticism from the government and diplomatic circles, including European Quint ambassadors, for responding too slowly. Bllaca is currently under house arrest. The veracity of Bllaca's claims is not clear, but his assertions have reopened old wounds, and the incident is perceived as more than just a crime story. It is a political sensation that has rocked a PM already recovering from an ill-fated ploy to kick the LDK out of government (reftel). EULEX's handling of the case is also being closely followed as a test of its commitment to go after "big fish." END SUMMARY GECI GRABS THE HEADLINES ------------------------ ¶3. (SBU) On November 26, Gani Geci, a deputy from the opposition Democratic League of Dardania (LDD), interrupted an Assembly debate on the European Commission's report on Kosovo to announce that he had evidence that senior government and parliamentary officials were involved in the attempted and successful assassinations of Kosovo Assembly deputies. He waved a DVD in the air and asked Speaker Jakup Krasniqi to play the disk for the Assembly. Geci is a former member of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and he was making a reference to assassination attempts from 2000-2001 against LDK MPs that included himself, Adem Salihaj, and Agim Veliu. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), including Jakup Krasniqi and caucus leader Rame Buja, argued against airing the DVD in the Assembly. LDK caucus leader Lutfi Haziri attempted, but failed, to win support for forming an ad hoc committee to review the evidence. Geci's initial claim sparked media speculation, but he offered no details to substantiate his allegations. A HIT MAN CONFESSES TO THE PRESS -------------------------------- ¶4. (SBU) On November 29, Gani Geci and Adem Salihaj, who, like Geci, is a current member of LDD who had previously represented LDK in the Assembly, held a press conference in the Kosovo Assembly building where they distributed to the media copies of the DVD that Geci had previously proffered to the Assembly. The DVD contained the confession to murder and other crimes of an individual named Nazim Bllaca, who claims that he was once a member of the PDK's shadowy intelligence and clandestine operations group, the Kosovo Information Service (SHIK), which disbanded in 2008, the day before Kosovo's constitution came into force. Geci and Salihaj invited journalists to meet Bllaca in front of the Kosovo Assembly. ¶5. (SBU) During his meeting with the media, Bllaca said that he worked for SHIK from 1999 to 2003 and participated in approximately PRISTINA 00000533 002.2 OF 003 17 crimes -- including assassinations, assassination attempts, beatings, threats, and blackmail -- at SHIK's direction. He told the media that he worked for PDK presidency member Azem Syla and took his direct orders, including the names of people targeted for assassination, from Syla's son-in-law, Shpresim Uka. Bllaca explained that he thought he had been acting on behalf of Kosovo and targeting traitors and those who had collaborated with Serbian authorities, but he said that he later came to believe that factions within SHIK were pursuing other agendas. A MORE DETAILED VIDEO CONFESSION -------------------------------- ¶6. (SBU) Bllaca offers greater detail in his DVD confession, which many media outlets broadcast in its entirety. In addition to Syla, he implicates other senior PDK officials, notably: Xhavit Haliti (MP and Assembly Presidency member), Fatmir Limaj (Minister of Transportation), and Fatmir Xhelili (Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs). During the video confession, Bllaca says that he worked in the execution pillar of the SHIK, which assassinated "collaborators," LDK officials, and ICTY witnesses. According to Bllaca, SHIK's actions against LDK intensified when former president Ibrahim Rugova returned, and SHIK felt it needed to take action against "LDK heads" in order to counter his influence. Bllaca offers detailed accounts of events surrounding a number of murders and other acts of violence that he attributes primarily to Azem Syla. Among his accounts of crimes and misdeeds, Bllaca also claims to have committed one murder himself. PM, PRESIDENT CALL FOR RESPECT FOR RULE OF LAW --------------------------------------------- - ¶7. (SBU) According to our sources, the day after the news broke, Prime Minister Thaci met with President Sejdiu (LDK) and tried to secure (and failed to get) a joint press appearance to reassure the country that Bllaca's claims were spurious. On November 30, Thaci convoked the Quint Ambassadors and noted that the primacy of the rule of law was key in this instance and that he supported a full investigation of the Bllaca allegations devoid of politics. After a special session of the Kosovo Security Council which Thaci called to address the situation, he issued similar statement to the media. President Sejdiu, who met with the Charge to discuss the incident November 30, also issued a statement to the press, calling for respect for the judicial process, as well as for calm among Kosovo's citizens. Sejdiu's private message echoed Thaci's: respect for the rule of law is paramount, and the Bllaca case should be turned over to law enforcement and judicial institutions for proper, non-political investigation. A DEFINING MOMENT FOR EULEX --------------------------- ¶8. (SBU) On November 30, the day after Bllaca's video aired, Thaci leaned on EULEX Deputy Head of Mission Roy Reeve to take immediate action and arrest Bllaca (EULEX Head Yves de Kermabon was out of the country). He also complained to the Quint that EULEX had prevented Kosovo authorities from arresting Bllaca while not moving quickly enough itself to deal with the matter. EULEX did take Bllaca into custody on November 30, but EULEX had originally planned to arrest Bllaca much later in the week. Government, public, and diplomatic pressure prompted it to act sooner. At a December 1 Quint meeting, European ambassadors (except the French), criticized EULEX's handling of the Bllaca case and characterized it as a test of EULEX's credibility. The Italian, German and British heads of mission all said it was key for EULEX to be seen as "on the ball" in this critical case. Quint ambassadors called for EULEX to move beyond its mantra of technical monitoring, mentoring, and advising to a position of "political responsibility" and sensitivity to local political developments. COMMENT ------- ¶9. (SBU) Nazim Bllaca's sensationalist confession has captured Kosovo's full attention. On the day when Kosovo offered its defense of the legality of its declaration of independence before the PRISTINA 00000533 003.2 OF 003 International Court of Justice, Kosovo's front pages focused only on allegations of political assassinations. We do not know where the truth lies in Nazim Bllaca's yarn, but its immediate impact is powerful and negative for a weakened Prime Minister and his PDK party, which is still reeling from an ill-advised attempt to dump LDK from the coalition. It confirms a common perception among Kosovo citizens that PDK is ruthless and prepared to employ violence to achieve its goals, and it does nothing to help PDK as it moves to mayoral runoff elections on December 13. That said, the crisis could yet prove to be an opportunity for EULEX and for Kosovo. If EULEX investigates Bllaca's allegations against top PDK officials thoroughly, and powerful men are called to account for their actions, this incident could help Kosovo to deal with the legacy of political violence from the immediate post-conflict period as well as persuade citizens that the "the rule of law" is more than just a slogan. For now, a EULEX judge on December 1 ordered Bllaca held for 30 days house arrest pending further investigation. MURPHY http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php...RISTINA533
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx
"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.
“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
Kosovo SHIK, Directly Linked With Albanian SHIK Intelligence Organization, Prepares for "Big Push" For Kosovo Independence
Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis - January 16, 2006 Monday
Exclusive. From GIS Station South-East Europe. One of Albania's most radical supporters of jihadist terrorism, the former director of the Albanian Intelligence Agency, SHIK, Bashkim Gazidede, returned with his family to Albania on December 10, 2005, from Turkey, via the Turkish airline, THY.
Gazidede served the Albanian Intelligence Agency from 1992 to 1997 with the full support of then-Pres. Sali Berisha. In 1997 he was the commander in the headquarters for the restraint of the 1997 events held in southern Albania. Gazidede left from Albania two days after the June 1997 elections and until 2001 was fugitive, charged with crimes against humanity during the 1997 events. Today he has been exempted from the charges.
Gazidede is considered to be an extreme fundamentalist, and, based on reliable information provided to GIS, he retains close relations with extreme Islamists and with members of the international terrorist organization al-Qaida . He supports the Islamists in the Balkans and he is the main organizer for the transportation of volunteer Islamist Albanians to join the Chechnya terrorists.
He had twice, in 1996, brought Osama bin Laden to Albania and Kosovo. Bashkim Gazidede had also proposed for the admission of Albania in the Islamic Conference.
Gazidede left Turkey on December 10, 2005, the same day that US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert S. Mueller visited Ankara, and two days before, on December 12, 2005, US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Porter Goss visited Turkey.
According to information retrieved from the Information Agency of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) during the past months, Albanians politicians have provided strategically significant "alerts" -- briefs -- to their illegal Intelligence agencies. The alerts not only concerned the gathering of information on KFOR and the Serbian Security Forces; they also provided tasking to the services to intimidate the Serbian population in Kosovo and to further expel them from the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica.
For that reason, the movement which created "Greater Albania" has also founded an illegal intelligence and security agency in Kosovo, called SHIK -- the same name as with the Albanian Intelligence Agency -- which is concerned with security issues. It was created by Hasim Thaci. Apart from Hasim Thaci, Xhavit Haliti and Kadri Veseli took part in creating SHIK and both are members of the main national Albanian Intelligence Agency. According to information retrieved by the Information Agency of UNMIK, Xhavit Haliti is the mastermind of the new Kosovo SHIK and he controls events behind the scenes. Hasim Thaci is the director of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and he was the former director of KLA.
Kosovo's SHIK is supported by the political parties that control organized crime. These are the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of Thaci, the Alliance for the Kosovo Future (AAK) of Haradinaj, the People's Movement for Kosovo and the Movement for the Liberalization of Kosovo.
The headquarters of the "Governmental Intelligence Agency of Kosovo" is in Pristina, and is called the "Central Command". Moreover, many branch offices operate throughout the province and these are called regional branches. The director of the Central Command is Kadri Veseli, who comes from Kosovska Mitrovica and he is known as "Ljulji". In his absence, Hiljmi Recica is acting as deputy, and he is known as "Petriti".
Central Command consists of the following departments: the Technical and Interception Department, which deals with the interception of cell phones; the Intelligence Department; and the Internal Security Department, which controls the agents.
According to information retrieved from the Information Agency of UNMIK, the main members of SHIK in Kosovo are Xhavit Haliti, Rexhep Selimi, Sabit Geci and Ljatif Gasi. In the headquarters of SHIK in Kosovo, there are approximately 60 personnel, working in three different departments. The first department is responsible for organized crime. Their aim is to expel criminal groups which compete with those of the Kosovo Albanian leadership (ie: essentially, the KLA). The second department is working on "anti-terrorism" issues and it mainly focuses on the Serbian organizations and non-Albanian intelligent agencies in Kosovo. The third department is responsible for counter-surveillance issues and intelligence, focusing on the gathering of information before the international organizations in Kosovo do. Also, SHIK pays 650 to 700 people for information services.
SHIK used as a cover the private company KOBRA; however, KOBRA was forced to close by the decision made by the United Nations (UN) delegate in Kosovo. Therefore, SHIK created two new private companies, BESA SECURITY and BODI GARD. BESA SECURITY engages 50 people and BODI GARD 90 people, while the latter also provides physical protection services. The members of BODI GARD are lightly armed and their real mission is to become a Special Unit for SHIK in order to pressure the Serbs. The headquarters of SHIK in Pristina is in the Grand Hotel, while the regional branches are using the PDK offices of Hasim Thaci.
Meanwhile, the President of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, had founded his own Intelligence Agency in Kosovo. The Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK) of Rugova owns the "Institute of Social Research", which operates as a security agency. This agency is similar to SHIK of Kosovo, although it is smaller. Based on information received by GIS, Rugova has now amalgamated his Intelligence Agency with SHIK. Nevertheless, the cells of the Intelligence Agency of Rugova are members of the former Governmental Security Force of Yugoslavia and their aim is to minister to the needs and interests of LDK, in other words Rugova.
Furthermore, the Albanian Intelligent Agencies have clear missions. Their primary aim is to capture the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica. According to information retrieved by the Information Agency of UNMIK, the command charged with capturing the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica is the "CELAT" group, a special terrorist group of the National Albanian Army (AKSH or ANA). The personnel in charge to accomplish this plan are Bekim Uti, who is the chief of "CELAT"; Ismet Haxha, a member of AKSH and the director of SHIK in Kosovska Mitrovica; and Nexhat Cubreli who is an associate of SHIK. "CELAT" is an extreme Islamist group.
Bashkim Gazidede is the link between the Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT) and SHIK of Kosovo and he retains very close relations with the leader of SHIK, Xhavit Haliti. Gazidede was using Haliti while he was the director of the Albanian Intelligence Agency, SHIK (1992-1997), and the latter was the link between the Albanian SHIK and Kosovo.
On November 17, 2005, the Syrian security forces arrested the Albanian Xhavit Haliti in Damascus as a member of the international terrorist organization al-Qaida . Haliti had studied in Syria and he speaks both Arabic and English. Haliti was located by the Intelligence Agency of a Balkan country and there was evidence that he was gathering funds and he was recruiting volunteers in Europe in order to support the al-Qaida operations of Abu Musab al-Zarqawiin Iraq.
Also, Haliti was very closely linked to the networks of the Chechnya mafia and he was gathering funds for the Chechen terrorist, Shamil Basayef, whose fanatic groups were supported by mujahedin volunteers coming from the Balkans. Also, Haliti was close linked with the director of al-Qaida in Europe, Abou Rabia. He even managed to incorporate his own extremist group consisted by Albanian mujahedin with the Abou Rabia network in Europe. The chief of this group uses the alias "Abou Abdallah", and the acronym AK, He comes from northern Albania.
After January 2003, AK was in the Caucasus with Chechen terrorists and he had transported Moroccans mujahedin to support Shamil Basayef. In July 2003 he entered Iran with a Chechen terrorist group in order to assist the terrorists of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and this group was incorporated with the groups of "Allah's Lions", led by Zarqawi. On August 19, 2003, AK and the Chechen group undertook a terrorist attack against the UN offices in Baghdad; 21 people were killed and among them the leader of the UN mission in Iran, Sergio Vieira de Mello.
A year ago, Xhavit Haliti, along with AK, had organized the assassination of the General Secretary of the Islamic community of Albania in Syria, a high-ranking cleric, Sali Tivari. Further, Xhavit Haliti had moved from Albania to Syria to meet with AK who was still in Syria. Haliti and his group tried to legalize their existence; hence they founded the Islamic party called "Mediu" in Albania, and they provided false ID documents for the four founder members. However, the application was rejected by the Court in Tirane.
Sources, and public documents in the Balkans, and in particular in Albania, provide extensive evidence of their active and dynamic support of international terrorism. On December 12, 2005, the Albanian Government froze the bank accounts and assets of Abdul Latif Saleh, an important member of international Islamist terrorism and a close associate of Osama bin Laden.
Abdul Latif Saleh has dual nationality, Albanian and Jordan. In the past he was the link between Jordanian extremists and Chechen terrorists. Information reveals that Saleh is in Kosovo and he is leading the new terrorist organization, "White Devils", with Bosnian Muslim volunteers and Kosovo Albanians.
In the past, Bashkim Gazidede had close cooperation with Saleh. In 1996 Saleh had accompanied Osama bin Laden during his visits to Albania and Kosovo, via Turkey, from and to the airport of Adana and afterwards from Istanbul. For almost seven years, Gazidede stayed in Turkey and he was protected by MIT. He kept close relations and cooperation with the Chechen terrorist organizations based in Istanbul. Information reveals that he visited Georgia at least four times, where in the Pankisi Gorge, Chechen terrorists groups are located. Also, he retained and still retains relations with the networks of international Islamic terrorism around the world.
The return of Bashkim Gazidede in Albania raises many questions, particularly at a time that Sali Berisha is back in power as Prime Minister of Albania. Gazidede was the former director of the disreputable SHIK and the most trusted person of Sali Berisha.
Bashkim Gazidede has spent the first part of January 2006 in Kosovo, meeting with old associates and new members of Kosovo SHIK. He is also meeting with politicians just a few days before the beginning of the formal negotiations over the future status of Kosovo which will be held in Vienna. http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/dfasa011606.htm
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx
"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.
“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
Jan Klimkowski Wrote:So a random Mechanic takes a dive for the military-multinational-intelligence complex's favourite terrorist cutouts: the KLA and SHIK.
Maybe he can serve his sentence in the military-multinational-complex's outpost that polite people don't talk about: Camp Bondsteel.
Yes, Kosovo is a legitimate law abiding respectable nation now.... :flypig:
Just like the legitimate law abiding nation of the genocidal fascist Ustase: Croatia.
The Pope gave it his blessings. He couldn't be wrong now could he? :pope:
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx
"He would, wouldn't he?" Mandy Rice-Davies. When asked in court whether she knew that Lord Astor had denied having sex with her.
“I think it would be a good idea” Ghandi, when asked about Western Civilisation.
Reads more the like the CV of a very useful man for the deep political players...
"It means this War was never political at all, the politics was all theatre, all just to keep the people distracted...."
"Proverbs for Paranoids 4: You hide, They seek."
"They are in Love. Fuck the War." Gravity's Rainbow, Thomas Pynchon
"Ccollanan Pachacamac ricuy auccacunac yahuarniy hichascancuta." The last words of the last Inka, Tupac Amaru, led to the gallows by men of god & dogs of war
![[Image: 51E77E28DF74EE4792948DE35D244D48.jpg]](http://www.pressonline.com.mk/WBStorage/Articles/51E77E28DF74EE4792948DE35D244D48.jpg)