Wallenberg Family

[Magda Hassan]

Wallenberg family




[/url]
The Wallenberg family (known as The Wallenbergs or simply Wallenbergs) is a prominent Swedish banking family, renowned as bankers, industrialists, politicians, diplomats and philanthropists. The most famous of the Wallenbergs, [url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raoul_Wallenberg]Raoul Wallenberg, a diplomat, worked in Budapest, Hungary, during World War II to rescue Jews from the Holocaust. Between July and December 1944, he issued protective passports and housed Jews, saving tens of thousands of Jewish lives.[1]

History


Raoul Wallenberg Memorial Statue, Great Cumberland Place, London


Oldest known ancestor of the Wallenberg family is Per Hansson (16701741), who in 1692 married Kerstin Jacobsdotter Schuut (16711752). Their son, Jakob Persson Wallberg (16991758) had two marriages. In his first marriage the children called themselves Wallberg, and in his second Wallenberg.[2] Jakob Persson Wallberg (16991758) was the great-grandfather to André Oscar Wallenberg, who in 1856 founded the Stockholms Enskilda Bank, the predecessor of today's Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken.
André Oscar Wallenberg's son Knut Agathon Wallenberg took over as CEO of Stockholms Enskilda Bank in 1886. Like many other Wallenberg relatives, Knut Agathon Wallenberg was also involved in Swedish politics and diplomacy becoming Minister for Foreign Affairs 19141917, and member of the Riksdags first chamber (Parliament of Sweden) 19071919. In 1916, a new legislation made it more difficult for banks to own shares in industrial companies on a long-term basis. Investor was formed as an investment part of Stockholms Enskilda Bank.
Knut Agathon Wallenberg's younger brother Marcus Wallenberg (senior) carried on the tradition and took over as the bank's CEO in 1911, replacing his older brother who was appointed Stockholms Enskilda Bank chairman of the board.
Jacob Wallenberg, eldest son of Marcus Wallenberg (senior), became the bank's CEO after Joseph Nachmanson died in 1927, joined by younger brother Marcus Wallenberg (junior) as the bank's deputy CEO. In 1938, Knut Agathon Wallenberg died (Knut Agathon Wallenberg had died childless). Marcus Wallenberg (senior) was appointed Stockholms Enskilda Bank chairman of the board.
The fourth generation of Wallenbergs joined the family business in 1953, including heir apparent Marc Wallenberg, eldest son of Marcus Wallenberg (junior), who became a deputy CEO at Stockholms Enskilda Bank in 1953, before taking over as CEO in 1958. After a power struggle between Jacob Wallenberg and his younger brother Marcus Wallenberg (junior), Jacob Wallenberg resigned from the board of directors in 1969.
The resignation opened a seat on the bank's board of directors to Peter Wallenberg (senior), younger son of Marcus Wallenberg (junior). Marcus Wallenberg (junior) pushed through a merger agreement between Stockholms Enskilda Bank and rival Skandinaviska Banken in 1971. Soon after, tragedy struck when Marc Wallenberg committed suicide. Observers suggested that the act came possibly because Marc Wallenberg felt himself inadequate to the task of leading what was to become the Scandinavian banking giant Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken. The merger went through in 1972.
Marcus Wallenberg (junior), and younger son Peter Wallenberg (senior), focused their interests on the family's investment companies, Investor and Providentia. Investor now became the family's new flagship business, and, under Marcus Wallenberg (juniors) leadership began actively promoting the restructuring of most of the industrial companies under its control, replacing board members and promoting younger CEO and other management.
Peter Wallenberg (senior) took over after Marcus Wallenberg (junior's) death in 1982. For many outsiders, the change in leadership marked a final moment in the family's more than 100-year dominance of the Swedish banking and industrial sectors. Yet Peter Wallenberg (senior) rose to the challenge, guiding Investor and Sweden's industry into a new era. In 1990, it was estimated that the family indirectly controlled one-third of the Swedish Gross National Product.[3] Peter Wallenberg (senior) stepped down from leadership of Investor in 1997.
In 2006, The fifth generation took over the Wallenberg sphere. Marcus Wallenberg, son of Marc Wallenberg, Jacob Wallenberg and Peter Wallenberg (junior) both sons of Peter Wallenberg (senior).
The Wallenberg family has occasionally been criticized for its nepotism, notably when it was disclosed that Peter Wallenberg (senior) was given a retirement salary of 16 MSEK (EUR 1,6 million) per year from Ericsson, in spite of never having been employed by the company.
Notable family members

• Jacob Wallenberg (17461778), sailor, clergyman and author.
  
• Marcus Wallenberg (17741833), nephew of Jacob Wallenberg, bishop in Linköping.
  
• André Oscar Wallenberg (18161886), son of Marcus Wallenberg, naval officer, newspaper tycoon, banker and politician.
  
• Knut Agathon Wallenberg (18531938), son of André Oscar Wallenberg, banker and politician.
  
• Gustaf Wallenberg (18631937), son of André Oscar Wallenberg, diplomat.
  
• Marcus Wallenberg (senior) ("Häradshövdingen") (18641943), son of André Oscar Wallenberg, banker, industrialist and politician.
  
• Oscar Wallenberg (18721939), son of André Oscar Wallenberg, naval officer and businessman.
  
• Axel Wallenberg (18741963), son of André Oscar Wallenberg, industrialist and diplomat.
  
• Victor Wallenberg (18751970), son of André Oscar Wallenberg, sports shooter.
  
• Raoul Oscar Wallenberg (18881912), son of Gustaf Wallenberg, naval officer.
  
• Jacob Wallenberg ("Juju") (18921980), son of Marcus Wallenberg (senior), naval officer, banker, industrialist.
  
• Marcus Wallenberg (junior) ("Dodde") (18991982), son of Marcus Wallenberg (senior), banker and industrialist.
  
• Carol Wallenberg (19041985), son of Oscar Wallenberg, businessman.
  
• Gustaf Wally (19051966), son of Axel Wallenberg, dancer, actor and theatre manager.
  
• Henry Wallenberg (19081993), son of Victor Wallenberg, consul general in Monaco.
  
• Raoul Wallenberg (1912c.1947), son of Raoul Oscar Wallenberg, diplomat.
  
• Marc Wallenberg ("Boy-Boy") (19241971), son of Marcus Wallenberg (junior), banker.
  
• Peter Wallenberg (senior) ("Pirre") (1926), son of Marcus Wallenberg (junior), banker and industrialist. Current patriarch of the Wallenberg family.
  
• Peder Sager Wallenberg (1935), son of Jacob Wallenberg, architect, businessman.
  
• Jacob Wallenberg (1956), son of Peter Wallenberg (senior), banker and industrialist.
  
• Marcus Wallenberg ("Husky") (1956), son of Marc Wallenberg, banker and industrialist.
  
• Axel Wallenberg ("Wawa") (1958), son of Marc Wallenberg, businessman.
  
• Peter Wallenberg (junior) ("Poker") (1959), son of Peter Wallenberg (senior), businessman.
  

Key people



André Oscar Wallenberg. (18161886)




Knut Agathon Wallenberg. (18531938)




Marcus Wallenberg (senior). (18641943) Wearing the star of a Knight of the Seraphim.




Jacob Wallenberg. (18921980)




Marcus Wallenberg, (junior). (18991982)




Raoul Wallenberg. (1912c.1947)




Marc Wallenberg. (19241971)




Jacob Wallenberg. (1956)


Modern business

The Wallenbergs have a very low-key public profile, eschewing conspicuous displays of wealth. The family motto is "Esse non Videri" (Latin for, "To be, not to be seen").[4] Wallenbergs business empire is often referred to as the Wallenberg sphere, the Wallenberg sphere is a large group of companies where their investment company Investor or foundation asset management company FAM have the controlling interest.
References

1. ^ "Yad Vashem database". Yad Vashem. Archived from the original on 7 February 2007. http://web.archive.org/web/2007020703235...earch.html. Retrieved 12 February 2007. "who saved the lives of tens of thousands of Jews in Budapest during World War II ... and put some 15,000 Jews into 32 safe houses."
   
2. ^ The Swedish family calendar 1989, red. Elisabeth Thorsell, Almqvist & Wiksell Internationell, Stockholm 1989 ISBN 91-22-01318-0 s.360
   
3. ^ http://www.faqs.org/abstracts/Business-i...north.html based on an article in Reed Business Information's International Management
   
4. ^ http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/12/busine...gewanted=3 based on a article in The New York times
   

[Magda Hassan]

http://kindo.com/en/famous-people/marcus...nberg.html

[Magda Hassan]

Raoul Wallenberg and the Complexities of Historic Truth

By Susanne Berger

Sixty years after Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance in the Soviet Union we are left with the same old question: Will the mystery of Wallenberg's disappearance ever be solved? The answer is a definite "yes," with equally strong qualifiers.
Russia has repeatedly insisted that it has no further documents or information which would shed light on Raoul Wallenberg's fate. However, the so-called Eliasson Commission Report from 2003, in a withering critique of the work on the Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, strongly rejects this notion and stops just short of accusing Russian officials of stonewalling.
According to the Eliasson Commission and in the assessment of most Wallenberg experts it has become increasingly clear that Russia holds important records which for one reason or another were not made available to the Swedish-Russian Working Group.
In a new documentary on the Raoul Wallenberg case by German filmmaker Klaus Dexel*, former Soviet Intelligence official Igor Prelin repeatedly refers to information supposedly learned directly from the interrogations of Raoul Wallenberg's colleague, Vilmos Langfelder, who was arrested with him in Budapest. If these and other interrogation records indeed exist [and there is strong indirect evidence that they do] they were never shared with Swedish representatives. *[Der Fall Raoul WallenbergRetter und Opfer. Documentary film by Klaus Dexel, Bechert & Dexel TV Programme, Muenchen 2005]
Yet, despite the severe criticism issued by the Eliasson Commission in 2003 and longstanding concerns over Russian failure to allow direct and full access to critical documentation, there has been very little serious effort to press Russia for this material.
This comes as no surprise. Through the years Sweden has taken a very narrow, very hesitant approach to the Wallenberg question and the work of the Swedish-Russian Working Group was no exception. Part of this is the eternal problem of balancing principled action with the real life demands of the political world. Cold War politics and Swedish neutrality demandsin particular Swedish fears of Russia as well as Sweden's wish to play a meaningful role between the superpowershave heavily influenced the handling of the Wallenberg case and may well influence it today.
Over the years, Swedish neutrality kept Russia in check and ensured clandestine American strategic support. Sweden reciprocated by providing the U.S. already immediately at the end of the war with much needed intelligence on Russia through its far flung commercial enter- prises. Espionage conducted under the guise of normal economic relations is of course as old as the world. However, the use of economics as a tool of wider political and security considerations and its effects on the handling of political issues such as the Wallenberg question, deserves to be more fully examined; meaning in particular the pursuit of Swedish economic interests, and, by extension, U.S. and Western economic and strategic interests in Eastern Europe, the Baltics and elsewhere.
The Allies' failure to seriously punish the leaders of the German industrial cartels, together with a less than rigorous de-Nazification process, increased Stalin's paranoia about the West and heavily contributed to ushering in the Cold War. There is mounting evidence that Raoul Wallenberg's arrest was in part motivated by Soviet wishes to pressure the West for important concessions in postwar negotiations.
In the Wallenberg case these matters gain additional relevance due to the dominant role the Wallenberg family has occupied in Swedish economic and political life. Documentation in the Swedish Foreign Ministry archive indicates that businesses owned by the Wallenbergs provided cover for industrial and military espionage in Eastern Europe in the post war years; activities that were sanctioned and actively supported by the Swedish government.
The Russians certainly had reasons to be suspicious of Sweden: Swedish businesses obtained huge profits in German occupied areas of Russia by facilitating large volume currency transactions and precisely at the time when Raoul Wallenberg was saving the Jews of Budapest, the Wallenberg owned firm SKF handed over its entire inventory of ballbearings to the German Nazi authorities in Hungary. Perhaps most importantly, the Wallenberg brothers were heavily involved in various separate peace initiatives between Germany and the Allies, many of which were at least in part fuelled by the wish to open a joint front against Russian Communism. Since at least 1942 Swedish Intelligence had as its major focus collection of news about Russia. On the other hand, the Russians also had a lot to be grateful for: In a secret deal, Wallenberg business provided them with essential steel and ballbearings in exchange for platinum. It is not known what other deals might have been struck because the relevant documents remain completely inaccessible in Russian Intelligence archives.
The issue matters in other ways as well, from Sweden's signing of a 3 billion SKr credit and trade Agreementwhich included compensation for lost Swedish business in the Baltic and Eastern European countrieswithout once demanding Raoul Wallenberg's return during the negotiation process in 1945/46; to Sweden providing personnel, through the Swedish Red Cross and Swedish businesses, for postwar espionage missions. Most of these remain little known and some of the individuals involved may remain unaccounted for.* It is possible a few may have ended up in Soviet captivity, where as "Swedish representatives arrested in Eastern Europe" they could have easily been confused with Raoul Wallenberg. Establishing their full identity and formal tracking where and when these men were encountered, on the other hand, would have made the evaluation of witness testimonies and with that the whole Raoul Wallenberg inquiry much more efficient. Instead, confusion was allowed to reign. The Swedish government to date has not made a comprehensive list of all Swedish nationals or of individuals working on official assignment for the Swedish state missing in the Soviet Union available to researchers. *see open letter by six historians in Dagens Nyheter, 20 November 2003, Ezergailis et al.
Sweden's passivity in the Wallenberg question has baffled researchers for years. In light of these realities that are slowly emerging, Swedish hesitancy may become more understandable.
In this connection the question of why Sweden's passivity has been so extreme throughout the years attains additional importance. So does in particular the behavior of the Wallenberg family, especially that of Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg, the powerful brothers, who were Raoul Wallenberg's second cousins. The Eliasson Commission concluded that the Wallenberg family's loss of reputation and influence as a result of the Bosch affairwhen American investigators charged that Wallenberg businesses had acted as a cloak for German owners of the Robert Bosch industrial concernmade it impossible for them to effectively pursue the question of Raoul Wallenberg's fate. This assessment is clearly incomplete and only partially valid. According to Swedish historian Ulf Olsson's biography of Marcus Wallenberg, despite some damage to the Wallenberg name in Sweden and abroad, the Wallenberg network of contacts and influence emerged out of World War II largely unscathed and possibly even stronger than before.
With the Soviet threat looming, almost certainly a gentlemen's agreement appears to have been struck between the U.S. and the Wallenberg brothers, as was first suggested by Swedish economist Gunnar Adler Karlsson.* The U.S. government apparently agreed to lift the freeze of Wallenberg assets in the United States in exchange for Swedish support of its anti-Soviet economic policies. This would have rendered any active Wallenberg family support of Raoul Wallenberg difficult, to say the least. But there are also indications that the Wallenbergs simultaneously managed to keep their options open with the Russians: In their book Business at any Price: The Wallenbergs Secret Support of the Nazis Dutch historians Gerard Aalders and Cees Wiebes showed that in the early 1950s, during the Korean war, Swedish ballbearings valued at about $20 million annually somehow found their way into North Korean tanks. *Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. Dagens Nyheter, 1979.
Other new information and questions have recently emerged which deserve follow-up: In 1954after Stalin's and Beria's death and in the wake of new witness testimoniesJacob Wallenberg attempted to contact Soviet authorities through business connections in [then] Czechoslovakia, supposedly stating that the Wallenberg family was ready to make "great sacrifices" in return for information about Raoul Wallenberg's fate. It is not known what came of this foray and why none of these efforts were apparently coordinated with the Swedish Foreign Office. That it was Jacob Wallenberg who took this initiative is noteworthy. There are reports that Raoul Wallenberg was closer to the Wallenberg family than previously known and that he may have worked for Jacob in some type of capacity before going to Budapest, including possibly traveling to Estonia on Wallenberg family business in the 1940s. It also appears that in the aftermath of the Bosch affair relations between Marcus and Jacob were so strained that the two were barely on speaking terms. The question is: Did these differences of opinion also extend to the question of how to search for Raoul Wallenberg?
As for the Swedish government, one is left to wonder why Sweden has never effectively reached out to the international community for help in the Wallenberg question. It did not do so in the beginning of the case, nor does it do so now. Instead, Sweden has made it clear to other countries offering assistance that it alone considers itself in charge of the question and that any country wishing to take action should defer in the matter to Sweden.
If Sweden is truly interested in solving the Raoul Wallenberg case it must be willing to shed its reluctance to examine in depth issues of its complicated past and it must make use of all the means at its disposal. For one, it will have to rigorously pursue the very concrete research results of the past ten years. Without such a commitment any current efforts amount to little more than window dressing. The central role of the Swedish Foreign Office is of course to define and protect national interests. In the Wallenberg case this currently poses an inherent, possibly insurmountable conflict of interest. Political will is essential, on all sides of the problem. Other countries will have to provide serious assistance, meaning finally allowing access to records which remain classified. Aside from Russia, the U.S., Great Britain and Hungary are of central importance.
Whether or not the Wallenberg case can be solved despite of or independently of these problems remains to be seen. Raoul Wallenberg certainly deserves that we try. His case was never just about the fate of one manit is about the rights of millions of people like him who got lost in the wheels of a totalitarian system without a voice. The question of how we balance the rights of individuals with the interests of the state remains as current today as it ever was. For this debate alone historic truth is critical and a democratic society has to vigorously insist on full disclosure. One can only hope that this will be one of the lasting legacies of this case.
Susanne Berger
Susanne Berger, born on December 16, 1963 In Hanover, Germany is a graduate of the American University in Washington, D.C. For six years she served as a consultant to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg. In January 2001, she presented an independent report on her findings, entitled "Swedish Aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg Case."
Her articles about the Wallenberg case and related issues have appeared in various international publications, including Haaretz and Dagens Nyheter.
Ms. Berger is currently working on a book which surveys the extraordinary career of Otto Danielsson, A Chief Inspector with the Swedish Security Police. Danielsson was, among other things, for many years in charge of the Wallenberg case.
Her upcoming publication entitled "Stuck in Neutral: The Reasons behind Sweden's Passivity in the Raoul Wallenberg Case" reviews the 2003 Eliasson Commission Report on the Swedish Foreign Policy Establishment's handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case from 1945-2001 and offers a comprehensive analysis of all its aspects.

http://rwallenberg-int.org/Bulletin/Bul-...cTruth.htm

[Magda Hassan]

Wallenbergs had big role in Sweden WW2 diplomacy, says biography


December 11, 2000
Web posted at: 11:55 AM EST (1655 GMT)


STOCKHOLM, Sweden (Reuters) -- Two cousins of diplomat Raoul Wallenberg played an officially sanctioned but controversial part in neutral Sweden's World War Two diplomacy, according to a new biography.
Businessman Marcus Wallenberg blamed his brother Jacob for a secret share deal with Nazi Germany which almost brought Allied sanctions down on their banking and industrial empire after World War Two, the biography of Marcus Wallenberg shows.
Marcus, who died in 1982 aged 82, is credited in the biography with visionary enterprise in expanding and consolidating the Wallenberg banking and industrial dynasty which is now in its fifth generation.
But the Wallenbergs faced infamy and ruin in 1945 after U.S. troops entered Stuttgart and unearthed incriminating documents in the archives of engineering firm Robert Bosch.
These showed that the Wallenbergs had agreed to sell back their ownership of the American Bosch company, based in Springfield, Massachusetts, to the German parent company after the war, contrary to what the brothers had told Swedish and U.S. authorities.
The Americans were incensed. They already suspected that Jacob was pro-German and were skeptical of Marcus's reputation as pro-Allied. They sought to blacklist the Wallenbergs -- stopping them from operating in any Allied country.
Marcus's response, which has not been fully documented until now, was to play down his own role and shift the blame to Jacob.
In a personal note to the U.S. Treasury Department in December 1945, he expressed regret for the Bosch affair, said it had been badly handled by the family-controlled SEB bank, and that his brother had not taken American sentiment into account.
Ulf Olsson, Professor of Economic History at the Gothenburg School of Economics and author of the biography, said that by emphasizing the differences in approach and saying he would soon be running the bank, Marcus managed to make his own brother one of the scapegoats for the Bosch affair.
"In fact the differences in the brothers' complicity in the matter were not great," Olsson wrote.
But Marcus succeeded in persuading the British, who were later to decorate him for his wartime diplomacy, and the United States not to blacklist the Wallenbergs and their companies.

"The biggest loss was not so much economic as the negative impact on the Wallenberg brothers' reputation inside and outside Sweden," Olsson wrote, noting that for years they were linked in the American press with Nazi Germany.
Raoul Wallenberg not part of family business

Olsson's book "Marcus Wallenberg -- Furthering the Family Fortune" traces how he more than any other Wallenberg shaped the business empire which is still influential today, but also gives intriguing insights into neutral Sweden's role in World War Two.
Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat credited with saving the lives of thousands of Hungarian Jews during the war, is not mentioned in the biography as he was not part of the fiercely exclusive core family that ran the SEB bank-centered group.
"Raoul was never part of the Wallenberg business. He was on the periphery, he never had any money. He met Marcus Wallenberg at family occasions but I don't think they were ever close," Olsson told Reuters.
By contrast Marcus and Jacob were groomed not only to look after the family silver but also for the semi-official role of Swedish emissaries and plenipotentiaries which successive governments were happy to accord the family.
Polyglot, well travelled and with connections in Berlin, Paris, New York and London, the Wallenberg brothers conducted a shuttle diplomacy during World War Two that had more official backing than was believed up until now.
"There was a tradition that when war came, going back to the Franco-Prussian war, the Swedish Foreign Ministry would use internationally well known and oriented people as representatives. They knew how to negotiate trade agreements," Olsson told Reuters.
"In the 1930s there weren't many to choose from and it's not so strange that those two young, well-educated men were used. It's ironic that they ended up in different camps, so to speak," but Sweden needed trade accords with both sides.
As war loomed, Sweden was determined to avoid the embarrassing experience of World War One when Britain and its allies discovered that imports allowed into Sweden had been reexported to Germany.
This time the government wanted Sweden's substantial ore shipments to Germany to be clear and above board while ensuring that export markets to Britain and the rest of Europe stayed open. The Wallenbergs were called in.
Wallenbergs key in reaching trade pacts

Jacob became instrumental in reaching a trade pact with Germany, though Marcus also travelled to Berlin and met top Nazi Hermann Goering in 1938 and again in 1939.
Marcus was made responsible for trade ties with Britain, in the course of which he became a personal friend of R.A. Butler, confidant of Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, and also met future prime minister Winston Churchill.
Through sailing and banking connections, Marcus also knew members of the Finnish government and would later play a role in arranging that country's 1944 truce. Finland had fought with Nazi Germany in an uneasy pact against the Soviet Union but cut its ties to make peace with Moscow and preserve its independence.
"Sweden tried this time to be more open, which they basically succeeded in, at least until 1944 when the system broke down," said Olsson, whose book will be translated into English.
"The fact that the government used the Wallenbergs shows how well established they were and in what high esteem they were held."
Marcus Wallenberg bristled at suggestions in Britain that "the Swedes have sold their souls to the Germans" when they allowed German troops to pass through Sweden to occupied Norway and sold the Nazis more ore than had been agreed.
He had a chance in 1943 to demonstrate his goodwill.
Jacob gave him a message from a German contact, former mayor of Leipzig Carl Goerdeler, enquiring whether Churchill would be willing to drop the demand for unconditional surrender if a group of German generals assassinated Hitler.
Marcus used his British contacts, including Charles Hambro of the banking family, to obtain a cautious but positive response from Churchill, which was relayed back to Germany.
Hitler survived the July 20, 1944, bomb attack, and Goerdeler was executed along with 200 other opponents of the Nazis.
"Marcus Wallenberg did not play a large role," Olsson said, but if the plot had succeeded his role would have been crucial."
Regardless of the outcome the incident showed how effective he was at using his connections and obtaining the ear of Churchill, he said.

[Magda Hassan]

[/FONT]

[/FONT]

Gert Nylander[/FONT]

____________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]

[/FONT]

GERMAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND ENGLAND[/FONT]

Carl Goerdeler and the Wallenberg Brothers[/FONT][/FONT]

[/FONT]

__________________________________________

Banking & Enterprise[/FONT]

No. 2 Stockholm 1999[/FONT]

Electronic issue[/FONT]

[/FONT]

[/FONT]

______________________________________________________________________[/FONT]
[/FONT]

Stiftelsen för Ekonomisk Historisk Forskning inom Bank och Företagande[/FONT]

The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise[/FONT]

Box 16066 S-103 22 STOCKHOLM[/FONT]

[/FONT]

Telephone + 46 8 661 70 55 Facsimile + 46 8 665 34 57[/FONT]

[/FONT]

arkivstiftelsen@sfehf.se http://arkiv.wallenberg.org/[/FONT]

______________________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]
[/FONT]
No. 1 Ulf Olsson: Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Bosch Group, 1939-1950 (1998, 64 pages)[/FONT]
No. 2 Gert Nylander: German Resistance Movement and England. Carl Goerdeler and the Wallenberg Brothers (1999, 100 pages)[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
ã Gert Nylander and The Foundation 1999[/FONT]
Translation by Björn Norrbom[/FONT]
Printed in Sweden 1999 by Centraltryckeriet, Borås[/FONT]
ISSN 1403-2198[/FONT]
Stockholm[/FONT] 1999[/FONT]
Electronic issue[/FONT]

______________________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]

Banking and Enterprise[/FONT]

______________________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]
The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise was established in 1994 for the purpose of promoting research into economic history, esp. business history. With this end in view, the Foundation collects, organizes and manages the historical archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank (1856-1971) and its Management, as well as those of other companies and foundations closely associated with that bank. In 1994-1995, these historical archives were transferred to refurbished premises close to the Villa "Täcka Udden" at Djurgården in Stockholm. [/FONT]
The archives have been made available for research within those areas supported by the Foundation. Since the 1950's these archives are among the most useful and well-used for different business history monographs. Sources from here form the basis of a long series of research. [/FONT]
In order to provide information about its archives, the Foundation has decided to issue a series of publications on the theme Bank and Enterprise. The series will be published mainly in English and present the results of research, which to an essential extent is based upon the archives of the Foundation.[/FONT]
A more detailed, up-to-date information about these matters can be obtained via the Internet. The web-service of the Foundation may be found under http://arkiv.wallenberg.org.[/FONT]
[/FONT]

Marcus Wallenberg[/FONT]

Chairman[/FONT]

[/FONT]

[/FONT] [/FONT]

[/FONT]

_________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]

Contents[/FONT]

_________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]
Preface 7[/FONT]
Background 9[/FONT]
The Documents 21[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Reproduced documents 31[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Carl Goerdeler. Undated memorandum, typed in Stockholm [/FONT]
20 May, 1943. 35[/FONT]
Letter from Jacob Wallenberg to Marcus Wallenberg [/FONT]
21 May, 1943. 41[/FONT]
Marcus Wallenberg´s handwritten notes from a meeting [/FONT]
with Desmond Morton in June, 1943. 46[/FONT]
Handwritten notes by Jacob Wallenberg from a meeting in [/FONT]
Berlin 12 August, 1943. 51[/FONT]
Handwritten draft letter from Marcus Wallenberg to [/FONT]
Desmond Morton 13 August, 1943. 54[/FONT]
Handwritten letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus [/FONT]
Wallenberg 25 August, 1943. 54[/FONT]
Handwritten draft letter from Marcus Wallenberg to [/FONT]
Desmond Morton, undated (6 September, 1943). 55[/FONT]
Letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg [/FONT]
25 September, 1943. 56[/FONT]
Handwritten letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus [/FONT]
Wallenberg 29 September, 1943. 57[/FONT]
Handwritten letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus [/FONT]
Wallenberg 19 October, 1943. 59[/FONT]
Typed letter from Carl Goerdeler to Jacob [/FONT]
Wallenberg 8 November, 1944. 60[/FONT]
Carl Goerdeler´s handwritten letter 24 December, [/FONT]
1944. 64[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Notes 70[/FONT]
References 72 [/FONT]
[/FONT]

[/FONT] [/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]

[/FONT]

_________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]

Preface[/FONT]

_________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]
A description of the history of Stockholms Enskilda Bank played a central part in the preparations for the 100th anniversary of the Bank in 1956. This meant that the archives of the Bank, which had not been used before, were made available to historical research. These archives would prove to contain a great deal of highly interesting and fruitful material.[/FONT]
A historical presentation was published in two parts in connection with the anniversary. After that, a number of monographs on the development of the Bank and several biographies on its leaders have been published on the basis of source material from the archives of the Bank. Several monographs on corporate customers have furthermore benefited from valuable information from these archives.[/FONT]
When word spread about the existence of the archives, many inquiries were received, which generally could be answered. In one particular area, however, the material was too fragile to provide sufficient information, viz. as regards the role that the Wallenberg brothers played as connecting links between the leaders of the German Resistance against Hitler and the British Government.[/FONT]
This situation was completely reversed in 1997 through the recovery of a number of documents in the Bank. Due to their special character, these documents had not been sorted among the series belonging to the Management archives, which was normal procedure, but placed in various envelopes with the instructions that only Jacob Wallenberg, or Marcus Wallenberg, was allowed to open them. There may be several explanations for the fact that these documents were kept separately from the beginning: They had no connection with the regular activities of the Bank, but existed due to the personal action of the top executives of the Bank; They touched upon sensitive issues regarding the relations with foreign powers. The war was still going on and it was important not to bring the documents to the knowledge of unauthorized persons and that they, in case of occupation, quickly could be taken care of and destroyed. It would have been more difficult to arrange for this, if they had been sorted among other documents.[/FONT]
The course of events reflected by the documents had been made possible thanks to Carl Goerdeler, a member of the German Resistance Movement, who had been given a new employment with the company Robert Bosch GmbH in Stuttgart after he broke with the Nazi regime in 1936. Robert Bosch, founder and owner of the company, was a prominent but distinctive personality among the German industrialists. He took a keen interest in social issues and gave important donations to welfare institutions and educational establishments. According to Ritter, he was one of the active opponents of the Hitler rule. He did not content himself with donating large sums of money to the victims of this regime, particularly prosecuted Jewish compatriots and students of divinity. He also gathered a circle of people of a like mind around himself, including Carl Goerdeler.[/FONT]
As a representative of the Bosch Group, Goerdeler got into contact with Stockholms Enskilda Bank and Jacob Wallenberg. Gradually, this business relation developed into a close personal contact that aimed at the establishment of a connection between the German Resistance Movement and the British Government. In addition to Carl Goerdeler and Jacob Wallenberg, the principal parts were played by Marcus Wallenberg and Charles Hambro and it is from these people that the published documents emanate. The purpose of this presentation is to put these people into their proper context, rather than to make an in-depth analysis. It furthermore focuses on the new documents only and has not been expanded to comprise other sources.[/FONT]
The study was recently published in German in the magazine Nordeuropaforum (1998:1) and in Swedish in the magazine Scandia(1998:2). The present presentation has been slightly revised and expanded.[/FONT]
The original texts are naturally the most important for an analysis. But to assist the reader, the Swedish and German texts have been translated into English. [/FONT]
My warm thanks to Björn Norrbom, who is responsible for the English translation.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Stockholm[/FONT], February, 1999 [/FONT]
Gert Nylander[/FONT][/FONT]

[/FONT]

_________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]

Background[/FONT]

_________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]
After Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of the German Reich on 30 January, 1933 the Nazis quickly took control of the entire government apparatus. The National Socialist German Workers' Party, as the complete name read, became the only permitted political party in July 1933. These unparalleled successes could be gained without meeting with any real resistance. The political opposition was paralysed and never given an opportunity of preparing any counter*measures. Opponents and other dissidents were forced away with the help of a superior propaganda machine and through a wave of assaults, arrests and threats. The Nazis were thus able to infiltrate the whole society. In other words, there was a total lack of opportunities for organized resistance by political groups against the Nazis.[/FONT]
The brutal force of the Nazi regime, its oppression of people of different opinions and its special treatment and prosecution of the Jews provoked a hidden opposition, although it took a while before it assumed a more definite shape. It was never widely supported by the population at large. Hitler's expansive foreign policy programme, particularly after he had declared his intention of occupying Czechoslovakia in 1937, made it ever more obvious that his policy would lead to war with the Western Powers. Opposition against such a development was centred around Ludwig Beck, Head of General Staff. In September, 1938, advanced plans existed for an intervention in order to remove Hitler from power. Towards the end of the month, however, the Western Powers gave in to Hitler's demands, allowing Germany to occupy Sudetenland. This success for Hitler led to a serious backlash for the opposition. One problem on this occasion, just like on other later occasions, was that the sworn opponents were dependent upon events beyond their control in order to implement a coup. After the failure, the military opposition disintegrated. Only a core was left. Beck had resigned at an early stage, but remained a unifying figure for the opposition. He was regarded as the obvious choice to become German Head of State, in the event of a change of regime.[/FONT]
As from 1938, the underground civil resistance that had started to grow within Bourgeois conservative circles found a leader in Carl Goerdeler, who built a network of like‑minded people among civil servants, academics, priests and leaders among the workers. In addition, he tried to organize co‑operation between various sectors of opposition within the Church, among students and radical intellectuals. Resistance centred around the groups surrounding Beck and Goerdeler, for which the objective was to implement some kind of a coup d'état. One important feature of their plans was to establish contact with like‑minded people in other countries, particularly in England and the U.S.A., in order to achieve a commitment regarding a separate peace agreement in the event of a coup. These attempts were made through various channels via neutral countries. The Wallenberg brothers represented one of these channels for contacts with England.[/FONT]
Several plans for capturing or liquidating Hitler were prepared, but all failed. Hitler would suddenly change his programme, without any forewarning, as well as place of residence. He was always surrounded by bodyguards. Once Colonel Graf von Stauffenberg eventually implemented a coup on 20 July, 1944, it was a failure. The accounts were ruthlessly settled with the coup-*makers: over a thousand people were arrested, two hundred were sentenced to death by the People's Court and liquidated. [/FONT]
Jacob Wallenberg's close co‑operation with the German Resistance, particularly with Carl Goerdeler, during the Second World War became better known in 1947 through the book "Germany's Underground", written by the American author Allen Welsh Dulles. Another study that was published at the same time was Hans Rothfels' work "Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler. Eine Würdigung", which was published later in a revised and expanded version. In 1953, the German Resistance Movement was analysed in detail in Gerhard Ritter's study "Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung", still considered the standard work on the subject. 1 Several other works have also dealt with this issue. Joachim Fest has recently provided an instructive compilation of the course of events and persons involved in his book "Staatsstreich. Der lange Weg zum 20. juli", published in English with the title "Plotting Hitler's Death. The Story of the German Resistance". In 1997 Ines Reich published her doctoral thesis on Carl Goerdeler's activities from the period as Lord Mayor of Leipzig under the Nazi regime, up to his resignation of office. For a couple of years Erik Carlsson, a Swedish historian, has been working on a doctoral thesis on the subject of Sweden and the German Resistance Movement, which was published in 1998.2[/FONT]
Goerdeler's main contact with England during the war was via the Wallenberg brothers. Both Rothfels and Dulles have emphasized this point. Dulles was able to reproduce an account of Jacob Wallenberg's connections with Goerdeler, which account had been prepared by Jacob Wallenberg himself.3 At an early stage, Goerdeler had reported on the plans for a coup d'état in Germany, aimed at putting Hitler into jail or achieving his liquidation and at substituting the Nazi Government for a new one. The main reason for Goerdeler's having chosen to ask assistance from the Wallenberg brothers was to find out how Western Powers would react to a coup and to assess the prospect of a new German Government reaching a separate peace agreement with the Allies. These plans were very much in focus in the spring and autumn of 1943. However, the plotters had to report repeatedly that they had failed to put them into effect. In November, 1943, Jacob Wallenberg met with Goerdeler for the last time. This was also his last visit to Berlin during the war. He had been dissuaded from returning there, since his contacts with the German Resistance had become known. However, he continued to communicate with Goerdeler. In July 1944 he was asked to receive a person in Stockholm. The person in question was to bring news of the completion of the coup. On 20 July, 1944, the ill‑fated attempt on Hitler's life took place. The proposed messenger was put into jail and executed. Some time later, Goerdeler was to suffer the same fate.[/FONT]
In February 1951 Gerhard Ritter turned to Jacob Wallenberg for further information and clarifications, referring to the above‑mentioned report that Dulles had published. When more than a year had passed without a reply having been received Ritter reverted to the subject. By this time his work on a biography on Carl Goerdeler was quite advanced. Jacob Wallenberg then sent him a memorandum by Goerdeler, dated in May 1943; and also promised to send him a translation of a letter from himself to Marcus Wallenberg from the same period concerning contacts with Churchill.4[/FONT]
Ritter thanked Jacob Wallenberg and expressed his great satisfaction over Goerdeler's memo, which fitted in well with what he had already learnt from papers left by Goerdeler. It furthermore served as a summary of the plans that Goerdeler had entertained at that time, which Ritter found important to have confirmed. Jacob's letter to Marcus Wallenberg was a long time coming. When October, 1953 arrived, Ritter still had not received the promised copy. On the other hand, he had met with Jacob Wallenberg and had had a long and detailed conversation with him in Stockholm in September, in which connection he had received complementary information as regards the above‑mentioned report. Jacob Wallenberg had also granted permission that Goerdeler's memo from May 1943 could be published. A copy is provided below. Ritter makes a full report on this conversation, stressing that the relevant memo is unusually short, compared with other reports by Goerdeler.5 This could probably be explained by the fact that Goerdeler had prepared this document during the night, as requested by Jacob Wallenberg, in order to have it ready for a Swedish courier the following morning.[/FONT]
This proves that both Dulles and Ritter were able to use material for their reports that originated from the Wallenberg brothers, particularly from Jacob. This is how their connections with German and English circles during the war became known outside Sweden. In Sweden, on the other hand, this has not been observed to any significant extent. On more than one occasion, Ritter makes reference to oral information that he has received from Jacob Wallenberg.6 However, the documents to which he refers have not been found in the archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank ‑ where they ought to have been, since all documents were submitted to the files of the Secretariat of the Management as a master of routine.[/FONT]
In the course of various conversations, Jacob Wallenberg was able to recall certain events from the war years and, above all, some of the individuals with whom he had had dealings. One person he mentioned in particular was Goerdeler. On one or two occasions, he made it clear to me that he had not kept any material concerning his contacts with the German Resistance Movement. This was due to the fact that he feared Sweden would be occupied and that such material would then end up in German hands. Or, as he put it: "Nobody should have to be hanged because of me", i.e. because of compromising material being found among his papers. It is in the nature of things that contacts of this sort do not give rise to much written material and that it is better to trust one's memory. Jacob Wallenberg had an excellent memory. Still, it is astonishing how few documents about these extraordinary events that have been preserved in the generally comprehensive and well‑arranged Management archives. Even more surprising and difficult to explain, however, is the fact that Dulles and Ritter were able to obtain copies of documents that undoubtedly existed in these archives as late as 1953.[/FONT]
In 1997, an investigation and inventory were made of the premises of Stockholms Enskilda Bank's Head office at Kungsträdgårdsgatan in Stockholm. This was done for a number of reasons: (i) A new organization for the preservation of the archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Wallenberg family had been created. (ii) The desire to have a complete grasp and detailed knowledge of their contents for the purpose of various research projects. (iii) Pending re*organizations and relocations. A number of documents that had been hidden since the war were then found in a vault belonging to the Management Secretariat. They were found in sealed envelopes, upon which it was written that they could only be opened by Jacob or Marcus Wallenberg. They had been opened and re‑sealed on several occasions. The last time they were opened was in connection with Gerhard Ritter's visit to Jacob Wallenberg on 26 September, 1953. [/FONT]
In August, 1997 these documents were incorporated into the archives that had been set up for the preservation of documents belonging to Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Wallenberg family in 1994. These archives are managed by the Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise.[/FONT]
The dating of the documents alone indicates that they are quite remarkable in nature. Basically, they are related to Goerdeler's efforts during the spring and autumn of 1943 to establish direct contact with Churchill, through his association with the Wallenberg brothers, in order to ascertain what kind of attitude England and the U.S.A. would adopt with respect to negotiations for a separate peace agreement with Germany after the opposition had managed to carry out its plans to depose Hitler and to form a new German Government. As shown above, this was essentially made known through the studies of Dulles, Rothfels and Ritter, although contemporary documents concerning the activities of the Wallenberg brothers in this connection have been lacking. Thanks to the newly discovered documents this can now be clarified.[/FONT]
In order to make the presentation as complete as possible, all other relevant documents in the Management archives of Stockholms Enskilda Bank regarding the Wallenberg brothers' participation in the course of events and their relations with the resistance in Germany have been included together with the above‑mentioned documents. In addition, there is a report on the contacts maintained after the war with Goerdeler's widow Anneliese Goerdeler.[/FONT]
It is considered important to publish these documents and to make them available to research as soon as possible. The material is also of interest for the debate on Sweden's, not least the Wallenberg brothers', relations with Germany and Nazism during the war. It has been the ambition to contribute to presenting as complete a picture as possible of a chain of events during World War II, which was dramatic and important from both a Swedish and international point of view. Time does not allow for a more detailed analysis at this stage.[/FONT]
For background purposes, the following brief presentation of the main characters is provided, viz. Jacob Wallenberg, Marcus Wallenberg and Carl Goerdeler as well as certain basic facts of history.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Jacob Wallenberg [/FONT](1892‑1980) attended the Naval College, in accordance with family tradition, and graduated as a Naval Officer in 1912. He left the Navy, however, and graduated from the Stockholm School of Economics in 1914. After a couple of years of banking practice in Basle, London and New York he started working for the family bank, Stockholms Enskilda Bank, where he was appointed Deputy Managing Director in 1920. Between 1927 and 1946 he was the Managing Director of the Bank.[/FONT]
From its start in 1856, Stockholms Enskilda Bank had been characterized by a strong focus on international business. During A.O. Wallenberg's period, 1856 to 1886, this business was channelled through German, British and, later on, also French banks. His sons and successors, K.A. Wallenberg and Marcus Wallenberg Senior, had continued this international orientation.[/FONT]
During the inter‑war period, business relations with Germany were strongly reinforced, largely owing to Marcus Wallenberg Senior's active participation in the European reconstruction work. This led to the Bank participating in a large number of bond loans to German federal states, towns and companies. Marcus Wallenberg Sr. played a particularly active and central role during the German banking crisis in 1931, when he acted as an adviser to the German Government in the reconstruction of German banks. He also acted as Chairman in the so‑called Stillhalte Court. Jacob Wallenberg managed the Bank's German business relations together with his father[/FONT], which led to a lively and comprehensive correspondence with the leaders of the large German banks.[/FONT][/FONT]
After the Nazis came to power, the conditions of Germany's foreign trade were radically changed. In the summer of 1934, the Swedish Government therefore appointed a Commission for the purpose of negotiating a trade and payment agreement with Germany. This Commission consisted originally of three persons: Arvid Richert, Under‑Secretary of State and later Swedish Envoy in Berlin, Björn Prytz, Managing Director of the Swedish ball‑bearing company SKF and Jacob Wallenberg. Later, the Commission was expanded to a considerable extent, and finally totalled some 50 people. Jacob Wallenberg took part in these negotiations up to 1944. He has been described as Sweden's main negotiator for the exchange of goods with Germany. This was absolutely vital to the Swedish economy during the war. In particular, his name is associated with the construction of a so‑called price scale, according to which a price balance was created between a certain quantity of Swedish iron ore, on the one hand, and certain quantities of German coal and coke, commercial iron and chemical products, on the other hand.7 The extensive network of contacts within the German world of banking and industry that Jacob Wallenberg had built up, partly taken over from his father, was gradually extended to those civil and military circles which formed the opposition against the Nazi regime. The most important figure among these persons was Carl Goerdeler. Through him and others, Jacob Wallenberg was afforded a unique opportunity of obtaining information about internal conditions prevailing in Germany during the war.[/FONT]
Apart from his official mission as negotiator on behalf of the Swedish Government, Jacob Wallenberg was able to establish close contact with the German Resistance Movement and to serve, together with his brother Marcus, as a connecting link between this movement and the Western Powers.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Marcus Wallenberg [/FONT](1899‑1982) passed his examination to become an officer in the reserve in 1919 and graduated from the Stockholm School of Economics in 1920. After banking studies in Geneva, London, New York, Paris and Berlin he started working at Stockholms Enskilda Bank. In 1927, he was appointed Deputy Managing Director and in 1946 he replaced his brother as Head of the Bank. [/FONT]
In September 1939 the Swedish Government appointed a large and well‑balanced delegation of representatives for negotiations with the British Government concerning trade and shipping issues. Erik Boheman, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, was appointed Chairman and Marcus Wallenberg participated as a member of the Delegation. It was probably particularly gratifying for Marcus Wallenberg to accept this assignment since his father had acted in a similar capacity during World War I.[/FONT]
The trade negotiations with Germany and Britain were conducted simultaneously during the autumn and agreements were signed in London on 7 December and in Berlin on 22 December, 1939.8 Due to the aggravation of the crisis between Finland and Russia, Erik Boheman had been recalled to Sweden at the end of October and Marcus Wallenberg had taken over his post as Chairman of the Swedish Delegation. After his return home Richard Sandler, Minister for Foreign Affairs, thanked him by expressing "the Swedish Government's great appreciation of the excellent way in which you both participated and led, the negotiations in London, taking good care of Sweden's interests". Marcus Wallenberg was also appointed Chairman of the Swedish representatives on the permanent Swedish‑British Government Commission, which had been set up to deal with issues associated with the implementation of the trade agreement.9 During the negotiations, Marcus Wallenberg's excellent business relations in London were of great use. [/FONT]They were particularly good with Charles Hambro, whom he got to know in the early 1920s. From then on up to 1939, there exists a comprehensive correspondence between them. Naturally, this close personal contact facilitated work when they became opposite parties in the trade negotiations, like their fathers, Eric Hambro and Marcus Wallenberg Sr., had been during World War I.[/FONT]
[/FONT][/FONT]
Carl Goerdeler [/FONT](1884‑1945) after a successful career in the civil service became Lord Mayor of Leipzig in 1930. With roots in old monarchical Germany he was nationalistic and bourgeois conservative by nature. [/FONT]His organizational talent within administration and finance was noticed on a national level and, in 1931, he was appointed National Inspector of Price Control.[/FONT] After the Nazi take‑over he tried to co‑operate with the new regime for a couple of years. In 1934 he was again given the assignment to supervise the price control. When his term as Lord Mayor ended in 1936, he was re‑elected for a period of twelve years. However, clashes of opinion arose at local level and reached an acute stage in November, 1936. In Goerdeler's absence, the Nazi representatives in the City Administration forced through a decision to remove a monument to the Jewish composer Felix Mendelssohn, a decision that Goerdeler had opposed. After his return to Leipzig he demanded that the monument be restored, to which the party representatives objected. Goerdeler then handed in his resignation and left office effective 1 April, 1937.10 His upright position made him well known all over the country and gave him a great deal of personal prestige. As a result of this decision, Goerdeler retired from public service and had to look for other assignments. He had earlier been offered membership of the Executive Management of the Krupp Group, although Hitler would not approve this after the break. Instead, he was offered a rather independent position as adviser to the electronic company Robert Bosch GmbH in Stuttgart. Robert Bosch, founder and owner of the company, belonged to the opponents to the Hitler regime and had gathered around him a circle of like‑minded people. From the summer of 1937 until the summer of 1939, Goerdeler made a number of foreign travel on the company's behalf.[/FONT] Goerdeler ran into difficulties when his passport was confiscated, but after a call in person on Hermann Göring that problem was solved. He travelled [/FONT]to Belgium, Holland, England, France, Switzerland, Canada, the U.S.A., the Balkan countries, Africa and the Middle East. He established connections with politicians, business leaders and economists in all these countries.11 [/FONT]Goerdeler trusted his own ability to persuade his opposite party through his ways of arguing in personal meetings. [/FONT]He endeavoured to spread knowledge about the existence of a Germany that was different from that of the Nazis, in the hope that reason would prevail and that a World War could be stopped as a result of talks between various people.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Through his background and personality, Goerdeler became the driving force within civil opposition. The Resistance Movement regarded him as a suitable Chancellor of the Reich after Hitler, provided a coup could be carried into effect against the latter. During the war he tried to establish contacts with the British Government in order to avoid an unconditional capitulation after a coup d'état and to procure favourable peace conditions for a new German Government. Jacob Wallenberg and his brother Marcus represented one of his channels in this connection, as appears from the documents provided below. After the attempt on Hitler's life failed on 20 July, 1944, Goerdeler tried to keep out of the way, but was arrested after a couple of weeks, put before the People's Court and sentenced to death in September. Up to the day of his execution, on 2 February, 1945, he kept himself busy in prison unceasingly writing on various subjects.12 On Christmas Eve 1944 he wrote a letter in his prison cell, addressed to the Swedish Envoy in Berlin. This letter, which has been reproduced herein, was to be forwarded to Jacob Wallenberg.[/FONT]
Goerdeler's first contact with the Wallenberg family and Stockholms Enskilda Bank took place on 12 November, 1936 when he, equipped with a letter of introduction from Hjalmar Schacht, Governor of the Reichsbank, was received by Marcus Wallenberg Sr. He was on his way home from a lecture in Helsinki, when the news about the removal of the monument to Mendelssohn reached him in Stockholm. The next time Goerdeler paid a visit to the Bank was on 1 September, 1939, i.e. on the day of the outbreak of the Second World War. The purpose of his visit was to find a Swedish buyer for certain subsidiaries of the Bosch Group in neutral countries. Jacob Wallenberg showed interest and further discussions on the subject were held between him and the Jewish banker Waldemar von Oppenheim. In autumn 1939 rather complicated agreements were being drawn up. Hans Walz, who was close to Robert Bosch, together with K.E. Thomä, Head of the Legal Department, represented the company. The Bank was represented by Rolf Calissendorff and legal counsel.13 Calissendorff was of Jewish origin. He had been employed by the Bank in 1919, worked at the Secretariat of the Management and was later appointed Manager and head of the international section. He had become one of Jacob Wallenberg's closest associates.[/FONT]
In order to prevent Germany's enemies from seizing its foreign subsidiaries, as had been the case during World War I, the Bosch Group wished to place them in the hands of neutral owners. Jacob Wallenberg's interest in the proposed transaction was related to the opportunities that it offered to exchange doubtful German bonds in the portfolio of the Bank against shares in Bosch companies. According to the agreements entered into, the SEB Group purchased eight European subsidiaries in neutral countries as well as the American Bosch Corporation in the U.S.A. In a formal sense, the buyers were subsidiaries of the holding-company Providentia, but the transactions were financed by the Bank. Unsigned additions had been attached to the agreements, according to which the parent company in Stuttgart had the right to repurchase its subsidiaries after the war. As things developed, this sort of arrangement became embarrassing to the Bank. After protracted negotiations and frequent contacts between the Bank and Bosch, the Bank managed to get out of its ownership as regards the European companies in 1942 and 1943.[/FONT]
However, its engagement in the American company lasted much longer and was much harder to master. When the United States of America entered the war in December, 1941 there was an imminent risk that the shares of American Bosch Corporation would be seized by the American authorities, both because of the close relations between the American subsidiary and its German parent company before the war and because of its importance to the U.S. armaments industry.[/FONT]
The Bank now declared to Bosch that it neither could, nor wished to, be bound by any option agreements, due to the new situation. Bosch found itself compelled to agree to cancel the repurchasing rights to the shares and it was also agreed that all additions to the agreements regarding these rights be destroyed. The Bank acted accordingly. To the U.S. authorities the Bank maintained that the purchase of the American Bosch Corporation was a real purchase and a long‑term investment. However, the U.S. Government considered the ownership relations unclear and seized the company as enemy property in May, 1942. After the war, American troops found preserved copies of the cancelled provisions regarding repurchasing rights in the archives of Bosch in Stuttgart. This reinforced American suspicions that a dummy relationship had existed during the war.14 It was this that would then develop into the so‑called Bosch deal. It aroused great attention after the war and put the Bank and its Management in an extremely embarrassing situation. In early August, 1945 the U.S. Treasury declared Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the Wallenberg brothers "special blocked nationals". A permit was required in each individual case in order to have access to assets in the U.S.A. and the Bank was unable to do business in the U.S. on behalf of its customers. The Bosch deal led to an enormous loss of prestige for the Bank both within and outside Sweden and in its relations to both Swedish and U.S. authorities.[/FONT]
In 1947, the blockade was raised, after which the Bosch deal turned into a dispute between Stockholms Enskilda Bank and the American State concerning title to the shares of American Bosch. After years of preparations for a pending trial, a settlement was reached in 1950 to the effect that the Bank got back its original investment, albeit without recompense for any increase in value.15 An indirect consequence of the Bosch deal was that Jacob Wallenberg retired from the post of Managing Director a year or so earlier than expected. At the Annual General Meeting in March, 1946 his brother Marcus succeeded him as Head of the Bank.[/FONT]
The Bosch deal has a very special significance as regards this paper, because it served as a pretext for Carl Goerdeler to meet with Jacob Wallenberg without hindrance and also more frequently than otherwise would have been possible. It also afforded Goerdeler the opportunity of meeting with, and presenting his plans to, Marcus Wallenberg in Stockholm.16[/FONT]
In later conversations, Jacob Wallenberg expressed his astonishment at the fact that Goerdeler could move about so freely in Berlin, apparently without being followed. They nevertheless observed great caution in general, when meeting with each other, seeking places where they felt they could be safe and not overheard. Indoors, they preferred to sit in the centre of a room.[/FONT]
As official representative of Bosch, Goerdeler was able to travel abroad, which he otherwise would not have been allowed to do. Both for his own account and that of the German Resistance Movement he was able to use the Bosch deal as a pretext for maintaining contacts with neutral businessmen; these served as a connecting link with the Western Powers for a planned separate peace agreement and for a common European mustering of strength against the Communist threat.[/FONT]
In order to give an idea of how, and to what extent, these personal contacts were maintained during the war, the following list is provided of the Wallenberg brothers' trips abroad as well as of visits paid, by various people, to Stockholms Enskilda Bank in connection with the subject master of this paper. [/FONT]
[/FONT]
Foreign travel during the war:[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Jacob Wallenberg[/FONT]
10‑23 December, 1939 Berlin[/FONT]
13‑18 January, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
27 May ‑ 6 June, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
23‑26 August, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
12‑14 September, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
17‑19 October, 1940 Berlin[/FONT]
20‑22 January, 1941 Copenhagen[/FONT]
23 January ‑ 1 February, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
22‑26 April, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
2‑5 May, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
3‑15 November, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
23 February ‑ 5 March, 1942 Berlin[/FONT]
12‑15 March, 1942 Berlin[/FONT]
4‑9 June, 1942 Berlin[/FONT]
16‑26 November, 1942 Berlin[/FONT]
17‑20 February, 1943 Berlin[/FONT]
31 May ‑ 3 June, 1943 Lökken Verk[/FONT]
11‑12 August, 1943 Berlin[/FONT]
30 November ‑ 3 December, 1943 Berlin[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Marcus Wallenberg[/FONT]
24 September ‑ 9 December, 1939 London[/FONT]
10 January ‑ 3 February, 1940 London, Paris[/FONT]
22 February ‑ 16 March, 1940 Paris[/FONT]
6‑18 April, 1940 Paris, London[/FONT]
8‑9 August, 1940 Helsinki[/FONT]
11 October, 1940 ‑ 5 February 1941 Berlin-Lisbon-New York-Lisbon-Stuttgart[/FONT]
1‑2 March, 1941 Helsinki[/FONT]
28 April ‑ 3 May, 1941 Zurich[/FONT]
14‑15 July, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
8‑10 September, 1941 Berlin[/FONT]
15‑18 October, 1941 Helsinki[/FONT]
22 October ‑ 22 December, 1941 London[/FONT]
16‑17 January, 1942 Helsinki[/FONT]
7 May - 22 June, 1943 London[/FONT]
5‑7 February, 1944 Helsinki[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Rolf Calissendorff[/FONT]
23‑25 October, 1939 Helsinki[/FONT]
13‑21 December, 1939 Bucharest[/FONT]
15 July ‑ 10 August, 1939 Moscow[/FONT]
10‑17 September, 1939 Moscow [/FONT]
14‑20 June, 1941 Budapest[/FONT]
2‑25 February, 1943 Berlin, Paris[/FONT]
10‑13 November, 1943 Paris, Madrid[/FONT]
[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Visits to Stockholms Enskilda Bank:[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Otto Fischer[/FONT] 22 December, 1939[/FONT]
10‑12 January, 1940[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Carl Goerdeler [/FONT] 1 September, 1939[/FONT]
2 November, 1939[/FONT]
1‑2 December, 1939[/FONT]
13‑18 April, 1942[/FONT]
19‑21 May, 1943[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Alfred Knoerzer[/FONT] 14‑16 May, 1939[/FONT]
19‑22 July, 1940[/FONT]
17‑18 June, 1943[/FONT]
8‑9 September, 1943[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Waldemar von Oppenheim[/FONT] 13‑15 November, 1939[/FONT]
22‑25 January, 1940[/FONT]
21 ‑25 October, 1941[/FONT]
11‑17 February, 1942[/FONT]
9‑11 April, 1942[/FONT]
21‑23 October, 1942[/FONT]
19‑21 August, 1943[/FONT]
8‑13 March, 1944[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Erich Rassbach[/FONT] 2‑4 November, 1939[/FONT]
4‑5 April, 1940[/FONT]
25‑26 September, 1940[/FONT]
11‑12 June, 1941[/FONT]
27 March, 1942[/FONT]
[/FONT]
K.E. Thomä[/FONT] 1‑5 December, 1939[/FONT]
9‑13 January, 1940[/FONT]
4‑5 April, 1940[/FONT]
14‑16 May, 1940[/FONT]
19‑22 July, 1940[/FONT]
25‑26 September, 1940[/FONT]
9‑10 January, 1941[/FONT]
11‑13 June, 1941[/FONT]
12‑17 December, 1941[/FONT]
18‑20 April, 1942[/FONT]
27 May ‑ 2 June, 1942[/FONT]
25‑26 June, 1942[/FONT]
3‑5 August, 1942[/FONT]
5‑8 December, 1942[/FONT]
18‑21 May, 1943[/FONT]
16‑18 June, 1943[/FONT]
8‑10 September, 1943[/FONT]
25‑27 January, 1944[/FONT]
21‑24 April, 1944[/FONT]
8‑10 June, 1944[/FONT]
27 October ‑ 2 November, 1944[/FONT]
1‑7 December, 1944[/FONT]
[/FONT]
Hans Walz[/FONT] 1‑5 December, 1939[/FONT]
1‑7 December, 1944[/FONT]

[/FONT]

_________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]

The Documents[/FONT]

_________________________________________________________[/FONT]

[/FONT]
Only a few of Goerdeler's letters have been preserved in Jacob Wallenberg's correspondence and just two originals. Both reached him while visiting Berlin; one as a cable of 23 February, 1942, the other as a letter dated 18 February, 1943. The new documents are presented below in chronological order:[/FONT]
[/FONT]
20 May, 1943 Carl Goerdeler's plan of implementation.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
21 May Letter from Jacob Wallenberg to Marcus Wallenberg in various versions (drafts) and a letter dated 8 June from Jacob Wallenberg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a memorandum dated 7 June.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
June Marcus Wallenberg[/FONT]'s[/FONT] notes from a meeting with Desmond Morton in London.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
12 July Jacob Wallenberg[/FONT]'s[/FONT] notes from a telephone conversation.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
12 August Jacob Wallenberg[/FONT]'s[/FONT] notes from a meeting with Carl Goerdeler in Berlin.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
13 August Letter from Marcus Wallenberg to Desmond [/FONT]
Morton (draft).[/FONT]
[/FONT]
25 August Letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]

6 September Letter from Marcus Wallenberg to Desmond Morton (draft).
[/FONT]
25 September Letter from Victor Mallet to Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
29 September Letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
19 October Letter from Charles Hambro to Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
9 November Message from Jacob Wallenberg to Rolf Calissendorff.[/FONT]
[/FONT]
8 November, 1944 Letter[/FONT] from Carl Goerdeler to Jacob Wallenberg.[/FONT][/FONT]
[/FONT]
24 December Letter from Carl Goerdeler to the Swedish Envoy in Berlin.[/FONT][/FONT]
[/FONT]
In his important work "German Resistance against Hitler", Klemens von Klemperer presents a broad survey of those different groups which together formed the internal opposition against Hitler and the Nazi regime. In addition to the abundant literature, this presentation is based upon extremely comprehensive source material, mainly from British, German and American archives. Carl Goerdeler's activities are described in detail. Regarding Goerdeler's contacts with the Wallenberg brothers in Sweden the subject of the present study Klemperer writes: "The main sources for the encounters between Goerdeler and the Wallenbergs are Summary of Interview with M. Jacob Wallenberg': Unterredung mit Herrn Jacob Wallenberg, Samstag 26. Sept. 1953 in Stockholm, 14 Uhr 15-16 Uhr'. BA/K Ritter 131; also a summary put together by Jacob Wallenberg for Allen W. Dulles, in Dulles, Germany's Underground, 142-6." [/FONT]17 [/FONT]The last-mentioned memorandum dated 23 April, 1946 is reproduced below. More than anything, this statement by von Klemperer shows the importance of the new contemporary documents.[/FONT]
Between 19 and 21 May, 1943 Goerdeler was in Stockholm. This visit marked the beginning of concrete efforts at establishing contacts between the German opposition and the British Government, with the active participation of the Wallenberg brothers. During intensive conversations, Goerdeler described his own plans and hopes as well as those of the opposition. He also wrote a report on how the implementation of these plans, to which Ritter has made reference and commented upon. On the other hand, Jacob Wallenberg's letter to his brother Marcus who was in London at the time, regarding his (Jacob's) conversations with Goerdeler, has not previously been used in research. [/FONT]
Goerdeler wanted Marcus to report the contents of this letter to Churchill, or to Churchill's personal secretary. The German generals refused to act without having certain preliminary commitments. Such commitments referred to the stopping of all bomb attacks during the liberation action and to the declaration regarding unconditional surrender that had been issued at the Casablanca conference in January, 1943. No military was prepared to assume responsibility for overthrowing Hitler and then for surrendering immediately afterwards. The letter was sent to London via the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which also dispatched cables containing questions from Marcus Wallenberg to Jacob Wallenberg regarding certain wording.[/FONT]
Marcus Wallenberg referred to the contents of the letter on 4 June at a meeting with Winston Churchill's personal secretary Desmond Morton, whom he knew. Before his return to Sweden on 19 June he wrote a memorandum of this conversation, a document that has remained unknown to this day. Morton had reported that the war objectives had been fixed. Nazi Germany had to be crushed. Churchill's aim was to eradicate Nazi gangster rule, which had led the world into this war. It was unthinkable that any advance blessing or approval of any kind of anti-Nazi elements could be granted from responsible allied quarters. When Marcus Wallenberg asked whether a peace settlement without "unconditional surrender" were impossible, Morton categorically replied no. Churchill was unwilling to prolong the war for its own sake. The main objective was to obliterate Nazism and to create guarantees for the preservation of peace in the future. Morton had also said that the bombing of places in revolt would only be ceased if credible information about such a revolution could be provided.[/FONT]
On 12 August, Jacob Wallenberg met with Goerdeler in Berlin. He reported on the reaction in London and made notes of Goerdeler's views on the position. By now, the situation had developed to the point that generals in both east and west were prepared to break off relations with Nazism. After the implementation of a coup, Beck was to become the Supreme Commander and Regent and a new government should be formed on the basis of broad popular support. The representatives of the Nazi regime were to be called to account before a court. It was hoped that both Berlin as well as Leipzig and Stuttgart would be spared from bombings in order not to render a change of regime more difficult. An attempted coup was planned to be implemented before 15 September.[/FONT]
Immediately after his brother's return to Sweden, Marcus contacted Desmond Morton, saying that he had fresh and urgent news for Morton if he was interested. Morton thanked him for the letter via the British Minister in Stockholm. This encouraged Marcus Wallenberg to write a letter on 6 September, in which he gave an account of what his brother had learned from Goerdeler in more detail. The draft of this letter has been preserved.[/FONT]
Marcus Wallenberg received a reply to his letter from unexpected quarters and in an unusual form. It was addressed to him in a private letter from Charles Hambro, dated 29 September. In order to understand the relationship between Hambro and Marcus Wallenberg one must know that both knew each other since the early 1920s and that both, each in his own right, were principal characters in the trade negotiations between England and Sweden. It should also be mentioned that Hambro had remarried Marcus Wallenberg's first wife, Dorothy (Doie) Mackay and that their daughter Ann-Mari (Anis) was living with her mother and stepfather in London. Hambro's son from an earlier marriage was in Sweden during the war, where he attended a private school at Sigtuna together with Marcus Wallenberg's sons. He is referred to as "Poiken" ("the boy"). [/FONT]
Hambro's letter consists of five pages, of which the first and the last are of a private nature, with flowing text. In-between, there were three loose pages of the same paper as the letter itself, but with a completely different text. In this section, reference is made to Marcus Wallenberg's earlier conversations and letters in an indirect manner, which is very hard to understand for an outsider. Hambro wrote that the relevant person should continue his plans, although no promises of any kind could be made. He then underlines that no one was to know that Marcus Wallenberg and himself were in contact on this particular subject, especially not the British legation. All messages were to be forwarded to him alone and in the same way as Marcus Wallenberg had received this particular letter. The messenger was not aware of anything and that was to remain so. He was simply to receive and to pass on letters. The section concluded with an admonishment that it would probably be wise to destroy the pages in question. Special attention was to be paid to Hambro's letter in view of the high position that Hambro held at the time within SOE, Special Operations Executive. Hambro reverted to the subject in a letter dated 19 October, stressing that his earlier information had been approved by more prominent persons than himself and that it was not just a product of his own imagination. He concluded this letter by expressing the hope that he could find a pretext to come and see Marcus Wallenberg.[/FONT]
These letters from Charles Hambro, which have remained hidden since World War II, are extremely interesting in that they provide important information about a course of events which it has not been possible to clarify up to now. It appears that, via Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, a channel had been opened between Carl Goerdeler and Charles Hambro - and thus the British Government.

[Magda Hassan]

STUCK IN NEUTRAL
The Reasons behind Sweden's Passivity in the Raoul Wallenberg Case
Susanne Berger
4793 Williamsburg Blvd
Arlington, VA 22207 USA
sberger@prodigy.net
22 August, 2005
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 2
I. Introduction
II. The Swedish Definition of the Raoul Wallenberg Case
1. The Swedish Public
a. The not-so-favorite son
b. "Proper"
c. The dangers of simplification
2. The Swedish Government and the Swedish Foreign Office
a. A strange creature
b. "Moral courage is our only secret weapon"
c. Hidden motives
d. Old mindsets
III. Other Definitions
1. The U.S.
a. Swedish diplomat with an American task
b. The general definition of the Budapest Mission
c. Intelligence aspects of the Budapest Mission
d. Lack of Swedish - American coordination
2. The Wallenbergs
a. Curious passivity
b. Distant relation?
c. Wallenberg business interests in Hungary
d. Wallenberg interests and their political effect
e. Wallenberg Intelligence connections
f. Signs of doubt
3. Russia
a. The Soviet legacy
b. The current Russian view
c. Early definitions
d. More relevant records have to exist
e. Different possibilities
f. A possible watershed
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 3
IV. Deeper Problems
1. The Limits of the Eliasson Report
a. Question of motives and limited areas of inquiry
b. Need for a more specific analysis of the historical context
c. Focus on early years
d. Lack of systematic analysis
e. Consequences of failure to conduct a systematic analysis
2. Current Definitions
a. Sweden today
b. The neutrality dilemma
"In the minds of responsible government officials it is a far smaller evil to leave a missing
person case unsolved than to seriously question the foundations of the state."
(Arvid Fredborg)
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 4
I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2003 the first independent, non-governmental Commission in the Raoul Wallenberg case presented its findings in
Stockholm.1 Headed by Ingemar Eliasson, a centrist politician and the current Swedish Riksmarskalk,' the group had the task of
examining the Swedish political leadership's actions in the Raoul Wallenberg case from 1945-2001.2 After a twelve-month
investigation the Commission's analysis officially confirmed what everyone has known for decades: That the Swedish government
in large part mishandled the Wallenberg case, especially through its disturbing lack of initiative during the critical early years
1945-47.
Wide-ranging and impressive in both exposition and analysis, the report nevertheless falls short in a number of ways: It cannot
fully explain why Swedish officials in charge behaved the way they did, nor does it clarify why successive Swedish governments
pursued the case with so little enthusiasm. That Sweden chose to abandon Raoul Wallenberg is one thing - that the abandonment
occurred with relative ease, despite the serious and persistent doubts concerning Russian claims about his fate, is quite another. In
its search for Wallenberg over the years Sweden has resembled a car where the driver always has one foot on the brake. Why such
excessive caution? Was the mishandling of the Wallenberg case simply a matter of individual ineptitude and indifference or is it
symptomatic of deeper problems?
Even though answering these questions would pose a challenge to any commission, other shortcomings are less understandable.
The Commission excluded from its deliberations several critical areas of inquiry, among them the full activities of the Swedish
Legation [including those of Swedish Intelligence] and the Swedish Red Cross in Budapest in 1944/45, and later, the Swedish
Foreign Ministry's often questionable handling of witness testimonies in the case. It also did not consider the deeper economic and
political aspects of the Budapest mission and its aftermath, as well as their associated effects on the Wallenberg investigation.
Most importantly, by focusing almost exclusively on the early phase of the Wallenberg case, the Eliasson Commission missed a
chance to determine whether Swedish passivity was a unique and isolated phenomenon, or if it fit a more general pattern of
behavior. So far, official Swedish criticism, like the Russian, has stayed firmly confined to the past. It has not yet touched the
present and with it any individuals who are still living.
Nevertheless, the publication marks a decisive step in the right direction: For the first time Sweden has cast a critical eye on its
own behavior in the Wallenberg affair. In doing so, it has firmly established the idea that earlier Swedish approaches to the
Wallenberg question were too narrow and that a deeper, broader analysis is necessary in order to come to terms with the case.
The report is a 700+ page acknowledgment that in historical investigations details and complexities matter; especially details that,
for various reasons, were long ignored or never considered.
The new study did not yield any direct clues about Wallenberg's fate, but that was never the intention: The truth about what
happened to Raoul Wallenberg is surely known in Moscow and, as the Eliasson report emphasizes, a resolution can only come
from there. The Report concludes that if Russia has stubbornly kept the Wallenberg secret, Sweden largely has enabled Russia to
do so. As for the U.S., the Commission argues it failed Raoul Wallenberg twice. First, by not providing him with adequate
protection for an extremely dangerous mission, which the U.S. had co-initiated and financed; and secondly, by not independently
insisting on a resolution of his fate after Sweden repeatedly rejected U.S. assistance.
In the Eliasson Commission's assessment a closer reading of previously released U.S. and Swedish records raises important
questions about the nature of Raoul Wallenberg's assignment, including his association with Allied Intelligence Services during
the war. The Report argues that uncertainty about Wallenberg's mission may in part explain early Swedish passivity in the case
because Swedish officials considered Raoul Wallenberg primarily an American problem, not a Swedish one. The Eliasson
1Kommissionen om den Svenska Utrikesledningens Agerande i Fallet Raoul Wallenberg. Ett Diplomatiskt Misslyckande. SOU 2003:18.
Stockholm, 2003. The group included some of Sweden's leading historians and political scientists, including Christer Joensson and Kristian
Gerner
2The Riksmarskalk at the court of the Swedish King is the nominal chief of the Court's staff. The Riksmarsalk is responsible for the King's
contacts with parliament and government, and is also involved in the supervision of the Court's financial affairs.
In July 1944 Raoul Wallenberg, a young Swedish businessman, was appointed as a Swedish diplomat and was sent to Budapest, Hungary to aid
the last surviving Jewish community in Eastern Europe. In January 1945 Wallenberg was arrested by Soviet occupation troops and his ultimate
fate remains unknown.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 5
Commission sharply criticizes the Swedish position, but stops short of asking why Sweden so readily embraced such an excuse.
The Commission also chose not to examine the complex American-Swedish political relationship during and after World War II
and its possible effects on the handling of the Wallenberg case
The Commission's Report and other current Wallenberg research ultimately leave two key issues unaddressed:
1. Why did Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance evoke such extreme passivity from his own government and his powerful relatives,
the Wallenberg family? And
2. Why does Russia refuse to reveal the truth about Raoul Wallenbergs fate, despite strong indications that it almost certainly
knows what happened to him? [It certainly knows much more than it has publicly revealed so far]
The Eliasson Report claims that Swedish actions over the years were primarily determined by the changing pictures' that officials
constructed for themselves from the few available fragments of information about Raoul Wallenbergs disappearance. As the
Commission sees it, since this information was often incomplete and contradictory, it further contributed to some of the
inconsistent behavior by Swedish officials.3 Here too, however, the Commission's analysis does not go far enough. Diplomats do
not merely assemble facts: They interpret them in terms of their potential consequences, be it political, economic or strategic. In
other words, how the major actors in Sweden and in Russia assessed the associated risks and overarching interests for themselves,
how they defined the case through the years against the twin backdrop of neutrality and Cold War politics - therein lies the key to
the riddle.
In Sweden this refers foremost to the Swedish government and Foreign Office [Utrikesdepartementet or UD], but also to the
Wallenberg Family and the Swedish public, including journalists and historians; in Russia this means the former Soviet
government and its successors, with strong emphasis on the Security Services. Their basic definitions and interests determined the
early responses to Wallenberg's disappearance and continue to shape actions today. For most of the major parties involved, with
the exception of Raoul Wallenberg's immediate family, the case remains a hot iron that few like to touch. Consequently, they find
the current status quo in the Wallenberg question not only acceptable but in many ways preferable - for very different reasons.
There are indications that the basic definitions and, with them, the basic attitudes to the Wallenberg case are changing. However,
so far these changes have not been substantial enough to penetrate to the core of the mystery.
What follows is an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the most important aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg case as
well as the most recent findings of the Eliasson Commission and other current research, and to place the case in a larger
framework of reference and analysis than has been provided up to now.
II. THE SWEDISH DEFINITION OF THE RAOUL WALLENBERG CASE
1. The Swedish Public
a. The not-so-favorite son
Sweden's relationship with what should be its favorite son has always been a complicated one. His courage and accomplishments
are admired but one senses little obvious affection for the man himself. Most often a question about him will earn little more than a
shrug: "In Sweden nobody cares about Raoul Wallenberg", followed by "The Wallenberg case is dead." Appearances, however,
can be deceiving. While the distance between Raoul Wallenberg and his countrymen is certainly real, the reasons for this distance,
and therefore its basic nature, are quite complex. In fact they are both deeply cultural and historical, as well as purely
circumstantial.
Despite his background as a member of one of Sweden's most powerful families, Raoul Wallenberg has stayed very much a
stranger in his own country. Surprisingly little is known about him, in particular about his adult life immediately before his
departure for Budapest. Wallenberg the person has remained elusive and literally two-dimensional: The public knows him only
from three or four black and white photographs. He has left no tangible inheritance in Sweden, very little correspondence, no
3Together with a number of other "Stoerfaktoren " [disruptive factors], among them contradictory statements by Soviet officials about the state
of Swedish-Soviet relations, as well as the publication of author Rudolph Philipp's book about Wallenberg in 1947 which publicly revealed
Raoul Wallenberg's association with the U.S. War Refugee Board Representative and OSS agent Iver Olsen.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 6
publications, no wife or child, or even close friends. It has been forgotten that in the early years the question of Raoul
Wallenberg's fate evoked great sympathy at home. Thousands of Swedes signed petitions demanding Wallenberg's return. In June
1964, during Soviet Premier Khrushchev's official visit to Stockholm, the daily newspaper "Expressen" - against advice from the
Foreign Office - boldly ran the provocative headline, in Russian:
"Question: Where is Raoul Wallenberg?"4
Various Swedish governments, however, failed to capitalize on this public support and also did nothing to encourage it further.
Sweden began the critical evaluation of its wartime behavior much later than most European countries. As a result, many of the
issues which inevitably affect the Wallenberg case, such as Swedish neutrality policy and Swedish wartime business dealings,
including those of the Wallenberg family, remained largely taboo topics until the 1970's, 1980's and even the 1990's. Unwilling or
unable to dig in their own backyard, only a few Swedish historians subjected the case to scholarly analysis.5 Most did not consider
Wallenberg a serious research topic and simply assumed that most of the facts were known. Even now one senses a certain
reluctance to delve deeply into the subject. It is no surprise that the first in-depth economic-historical study of Wallenberg
business affairs during WW II was made by two Dutch scholars and not by Swedish historians or that no full-length biography has
been published in Sweden on either Raoul Wallenberg or, for example, Count Folke Bernadotte.6 The history of the Holocaust and
Wallenberg's role until recently were not part of the regular Swedish school curriculum.
The Swedish public today is clearly weary of the Wallenberg question. Mixed with this may well be irritation at its own
helplessness. Unable to pierce not only one but numerous walls of silence, the public simply gave up. But while Sweden has never
openly embraced Raoul Wallenberg, there are signs that it is paying attention. The fact that the Press conferences for both the
presentation of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in January 2001 and Eliasson Commission reports attracted record requests
from journalists is just one example.
b. "Proper"
A major reason for Sweden's reticence in the Wallenberg case may be found in the country's socio-political history which is rather
unique in comparison to the rest of Europe. Most notably, the relationship between ordinary Swedes and their government has
been relatively conflict free.7 Swedish neutrality in WWII further confirmed and even enhanced this trait. As a result, Swedish
citizens traditionally have not been inclined to question official rules or to directly challenge the role of the government. In his
memoirs, renowned Hungarian cancer researcher Georg Klein recounts his first impression of Sweden when he arrived there in
1947 as a young university student:
"Clean, rich, well dressed, proper, an almost incredible contrast to
the war hardened Europe. Is this really a peninsula on Europes body?
No, this is an island, protected not only from the war, but also from the
strength derived from shared suffering, this down-to-earth perspective on
life and death." 8
"Proper" is the operative word here: Klein recalls how a waiter refused him entry to a restaurant because he was not wearing a tie.
Given the state of the world at the time, an almost absurd insistence on formality, with a clear message: Above all, form matters.
4Expressen, 22 June, 1964. The article was signed by Per Wrigstad, Expressen's editor-in-chief at the time. See also ECR, Bilaga 4.
5Like Hans Vilius, Bernt Schiller and Rolf Karlbom
6Gerard Aalders and Cees Wiebes. 1989. Affaerer till Varje Pris: Wallenbergs Hemliga Stoed till Nazisterna. Wahlstroems: Stockholm. Swedish
historians who dared to broach the subject, like Gunnar Adler-Karlsson and Maria Pia Boethius, faced strong opposition.
7See for example Rojos, 1991.
8Klein, p. 89.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 7
And from the very beginning, Raoul Wallenberg's life has defied those clear forms. He was born a Wallenberg but was raised
outside the influential banking family. He was an architect by training but jobbed as a businessman. He was not a real diplomat,
not a real spy and ultimately neither dead nor alive. And, like any visionary, he was not afraid to test boundaries and to break the
rules. For form-abiding Swedes this has been very difficult to handle. Making waves or rocking the boat - all that is seriously
frowned upon in Viking culture. Nordic tradition teaches the value of community and equality through its concept of "Jante", a set
of social rules which stresses the importance of modesty, and above all the idea that no one person should consider him-or
herself more important than others.9
c. The Dangers of Simplification
A certain pique over Wallenberg's flaunting of this cultural code resonates in the reproach of his former colleagues who have
characterized Raoul Wallenberg's behavior in Budapest as, among other things, "dumb-daring" [dumdristig] and who have
wondered out loud whether this attitude may not have been at least partially responsible for Wallenberg's later fate.10 It implies
that Wallenberg's absolute determination to succeed, while surely idealistic, was also inherently reckless and egotistical; that there
was a selfishness in his action for which he now paid the price.
Wallenberg's colleagues considered his behavior un-diplomatic, in the truest sense of the word. In their minds, rather than having
set an example for what a diplomat can be, his impetuous approach seriously jeopardized larger Swedish interests.11 Worse, as
Wallenberg's fellow diplomats saw it, he not only broke the rules but in the process he put their own lives in danger. The net
result was a ready reservoir of anger and resentment. Some of his colleagues also objected to the subsequent glorification of his
achievements which they considered exaggerated and which did not adequately acknowledge the assistance Wallenberg had
received from many quarters .
They are not alone. Swedish historians like Paul Levine and Attila Lajos have argued that Wallenberg's fame today is due mainly
to the uncertainty about his later fate.12 They claim that the post-war "myth making" around Raoul Wallenberg has prevented a
realistic evaluation not only of his achievements but of the events in Budapest in general. Levine and Lajos make an important
point: In the end "myth making" is always a form of simplification. When it goes too far, when things are over-simplified, the
essence of any problem is lost. It is therefore absolutely necessary to place Wallenberg into the correct historical context, because
only then can the mechanisms of the Holocaust on all sides - perpetrators, victims, rescuers and bystanders - be fully analyzed
and understood .
But the argument misses the larger issue: The possible exaggeration of Raoul Wallenberg's accomplishments, while certainly of
concern, is merely one aspect of a much larger problem.13 Wallenberg's legacy, after all, ultimately rests less in the number of
people he rescued [and he saved many], than in the humanitarian spirit he embodied and the courage he displayed. What he
9The Jante Laws' are derived from a novel by Danish author Axel Sandemose. Stability and homogeneity are prized values in Swedish society.
10ECR p. 313-317; also Margareta Bauer. Minnesanteckningar fran krigsaren i Budapest 1943-1945 (unpublished). The accounts make it clear
that Wallenberg's humanitarian section worked in chaotic conditions that interfered with the regular operations of the Swedish Legation. There
are contradictory statements as to the degree of corruption, meaning the supply or even the sale of protective papers to German and Hungarian
Nazis, by Wallenberg's staff, and whether or not he knew of or condoned these activities. He certainly knew and condoned the "inflation" of
protective papers in circulation as a result of duplication and forgeries. ECR, p.332
11ibid; see also RA, Rudolph Philipp Papers. Letters by Lars Berg to Rudolph Philipp. Although of course mindful of the influence Swedish
diplomacy afforded him, Wallenberg chafed at its formalism and restrictions. He expresses himself almost sarcastically in a memorandum from
August 1944 in which he asks Per Anger - who was about to depart on a trip to Stockholm - to please urge the Swedish Foreign Ministry to "..
give up the sacred institution of the Provisional Passport and grant us full rights to hand such passports out." RA, Kalman Lauer papers, "P.M.
fuer Gesandschaftssekretaer Anger", 6 August 1944.
12Levine, 2001 and Lajos, 2004.
13Wallenberg was certainly not the lightweight Attila Lajos in particular makes him out to be. Eichmann and his staff were so irritated by
Wallenberg's activities that they openly and repeatedly threatened his life. These threats drew a formal protest from Swedish representatives to
German authorities in both Budapest and Berlin. see Raeddningen, p. 234 -38.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 8
brought to Budapest was the idea of possibility - that rescue was indeed attainable.14 It was this attitude, the will to take action and
to sustain it, combined with a unique talent for organization and negotiation, which turned a small Swedish protective effort into
an extensive rescue operation with safe houses, organized food and clothing supplies and with care offered to orphans and the
sick.15 In the brutal months between the Fascist takeover in October 1944 to the Soviets entering Budapest in January 1945 many
living on the Pest side of the city survived only due to the tireless efforts from men like Swiss legation representative Peter
Zuercher, Raoul Wallenberg and the aid network they had put in place.
Wallenberg's official status as diplomat of a neutral country enabled him to be effective and he had the help of many people who
have not received adequate credit. But Wallenberg inspired those around him and that will always be his greatest accomplishment.
The very real and much more serious problem that remains today, both for Holocaust research and the Wallenberg case, is the
overall simplification of events - before, in and after Budapest - on all levels - political, social and economical - which has led to
serious distraction from the deeper questions about the origins of genocide as well as those surrounding Wallenbergs fate. 16
2. The Swedish Government and Foreign Office
a. "A strange creature"
If the success of Wallenberg's operation is the perfect illustration of what a man with both the vision and the will to make it work
can achieve, then Sweden's efforts to save Raoul Wallenberg are its direct counterpoint. Lack of creativity and imagination run
like a red thread through the official handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case. The Eliasson report chronicles the repeated missteps
and half measures taken by Swedish officials in the early phase of Wallenberg's disappearance, the most critical time to have
brought about his safe return. Many diplomats in the Foreign Office did not consider Wallenberg one of their own, plus his
mission as such did not necessarily enjoy their full sympathies. Pro-German sentiments, deep seated and longstanding, were
prevalent among the Swedish elite which filled the higher ranks of the Foreign Ministry during World War II17
The Eliasson report concludes that Swedish officials considered Wallenberg basically a "saeregen foereteelse," a somewhat
"strange creature".18 Wallenberg was too much of an outsider and in addition he had acquired the stigma of a troublemaker. As
an official Swedish representative in Hungary he had been wildly successful, but his success had the flair of an individualistic
achievement. It did not really altogether constitute a triumph of Swedish diplomacy. Instead, like his Budapest colleagues, many
in the Foreign Office felt that Wallenberg, through his unbridled enthusiasm and impulsiveness, had gotten himself into a mess of
his own making which they now resented having to solve it for him.
The notion that Wallenberg in January 1945 had left to contact the Russians without seeking prior authorization from his superiors
14Both Raoul Wallenberg as well as British SOE operative, Lt. Col. Howie, noted in their respective reports concerning the state of Jewish rescue
in the spring and summer 1944 the general sense of apathy among the Jewish population as a major obstacle to be overcome. As Wallenberg
wrote: "The Jews of Budapest are completely apathetic concerning their own fate. and are hardly doing anything to save themselves." see
Raeddningen, p.151, Raoul Wallenberg's report from 18 July, 1944. And as British Major G.S. Morton noted in his written debriefing of Howie:
""H" said that the treatment of the Jews was most barbarous but at the same time the Jews made no show of resistance whatsoever." PRO.
"Conversation with Lt.Col. Howie, Monday 2nd October, 1944."
15Wallenberg based his efforts on already existing aid mechanisms instituted by the Swedish Foreign Office and the Swedish Legation, Budapest
in the aftermath of the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, such as the granting of Provisional Passports to Jews with formal ties to
Sweden, as well as the efforts of the Swiss Legation under Carl Lutz. Wallenberg boldly expanded this program, introduced the so-called
"Schutzpass" [Protective Pass] and managed to obtain, together with the representatives from other neutral legations, assurances from German
and Hungarian authorities that these papers would be formally recognized. see Gann, 1999 and Levine, 1996.
16For further reading on the origins of genocide see for example Simpson, 1995.
17Richardson, 1996 A number of officials who rose to prominence in the 1960's and 70's even had joined a right-wing extremist party in the
early 1930s, the Nationella Foerbundet, among them former Ambassadors Sverker Astroem [1935] and Gunnar Jarring [until 1939]
18ECR, p. 95
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 9
has persisted for years. The Swedish Minister in Moscow, Staffan Soederblom, wrote in an early telegram to Stockholm that
Wallenberg had disappeared while "sneaking over" to the Russian lines. 19 A recently discovered document proves this not to have
been the case. 20 Yet none of his Budapest colleagues who knew better bothered to publicly correct this misconception.
Consequently, it confirmed the image of Raoul Wallenberg as a slightly reckless, somewhat irresponsible individual.
b. "Moral courage is our only secret weapon"
In stark contrast to Raoul Wallenberg's all out can-do/must-do approach, Swedish officials never took the position that
Wallenberg's case had to be pursued, no matter how difficult the circumstances or uncertain the outcome. As a result, looking for
Wallenberg became a reluctant duty rather than a need. In tens of thousands of pages in the Raoul Wallenberg file at the Foreign
Ministry one cannot find a single hint that Sweden ever considered staking anything on Raoul Wallenberg's return or, as the years
progressed, for information about his fate. The Swedish government also never appealed to the international community for much
needed support and the implication is that Wallenberg had little to no tangible worth for Sweden. The key problem clearly lies in
how Sweden chose to define the Wallenberg question. Most officials saw it strictly as a problem of Foreign Policy, not an issue of
principle. As such, Wallenberg never ranked high on the list of priorities. As the years went by, the Swedish Foreign Office placed
more and more emphasis on handling the case, not solving it.
Even when doubts crept in, the Foreign Office stuck to its position. And these doubts were sometimes severe. In 1958 new
witnesses came forward who claimed to have had contact with Raoul Wallenberg in Vladimir prison after 1947. In light of these
developments the Second Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm, William Owen, had a conversation with his Swedish
colleague Gunnar Lorentzon. According to Owen's report to the State Department from April 1959, Lorentzon readily admitted
that Foreign Minister Unden's highly legalistic approach to the Wallenberg question had been a mistake. He acknowledged that
rather than waiting until Sweden had full proof of Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union, the Swedish government
should have insisted on the truth much more forcefully. In fact, Lorentzon added, Oesten Unden had recently asked him
"whether in his judgment Wallenberg was still alive, to which [Lorentzon] replied that he
thought that there was a 75-35 or 65-25 chance that he was..."21
Owen continued:
"When Lorentzon was asked whether he would rule out the possibility that Khrushchev might
produce Wallenberg alive at some future time, re replied that he thought it possible, and that
in such an event it would be a major sensation in Sweden. "
But doubts and policy have to balance, and even with doubts this strong, policy always won out. When in 1981 a Soviet U-boat
ran ashore in Swedish territorial waters many thought this incident should be used to press the Soviets for the truth about Raoul
Wallenberg. Instead, Swedish officials, in this case former State Secretary Leif Leifland, again retreated and invoked once more
the arguments of propriety:
"We were then, and I am still of the opinion that a civilized nation should not engage in
blackmail." 22
Those who were advocating a more activist Swedish position in the Raoul Wallenberg question simply found themselves
outnumbered. The memoirs of Carl Fredrik Palmstierna, the Private Secretary of King Gustav VI, make it abundantly clear that
Swedish passivity was a general problem and not limited to a handful of individuals. In 1956 Dag Hammerskjoeld, then Secretary
19P2 EU 1, RWD, Soederblom to Foreign Ministry Stockholm, Telegram 14 April , 1945: "Wallenberg smoeg pa eget initiativ oever till
ryssarna."
20 RA, Rudolph Philipp papers. The document summarizes a report by Per Anger from 20 April, 1945 in which he states that Wallenberg asked
for and received permission from Swedish Minister Ivar Danielsson before contacting the Russian authorities in Pest. The document is
unfortunately undated and unsigned and its provenance is unclear. It may be an account of Per Anger's statement, as noted down by Fredrik
von Dardel.
21NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, [DARE release, NND018001]. American Embassy, Stockholm to U.S. Department of State. 28 April , 1959
22 "Was wurde aus Wallenberg?" Documentary. German Television, ZDF 1997. Interview with Leif Leifland.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 10
General of the U.N., was supposed to travel to Moscow, but decided not to raise the Wallenberg case. Palmstierna's anger is
palpable:
"Again that damn UD attitude."23
Palmstierna clearly felt that only determined Swedish insistence vis a vis the Soviets, based on the righteousness of its cause,
would yield any result. In 1956 he summarized his views in a letter to Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow,
emphasizing that
"moral courage is our only secret weapon." 24
The Swedish King Gustav VI also showed little interest in Wallenbergs fate, remarking to his Secretary:
"You surely understand that Raoul Wallenberg is long dead."
Palmstierna blamed Undens influence for the Kings conviction and commented:
"Would royal interference have been of any use? Maybe yes, maybe no. However, when it
is a matter of life and death for a Swede who has been cast out by his own country's
highest authorities into such an adventure, every effort should be made on his behalf.
Gustav VI Adolf never took the courageous step he alone could have taken. 25
c. Hidden Motives
While the Eliasson report outlines for the first time in full the early actions and attitudes of Swedish decision makers, it only
partially explores the deeper motives that may have prompted them. Among basic factors the report cites Sweden's small size and
hence small influence compared to Russia, and the strictly hierarchical authority structure of the Soviet system as a possible
explanation for the failure of Swedish officials to bring about a positive Soviet reply in the Wallenberg question. Only the highest
Soviet representatives were authorized to provide information on central issues. It would therefore have fallen to Oesten Unden as
senior official to demand answers, which he simply did not - not at the formal discussions with his Soviet counterparts at the
United Nations in November 1946, nor during the long months of difficult negotiations that had led to the signing of the
$300,000,000 Swedish-Russian Credit and Trade Agreement in October 1946. 26
The Eliasson Commission sees these failures as evidence that statements by the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, Staffan
Soederblom, to Stalin and other highranking Soviet officials in 1946 - when he repeatedly expressed his belief that Raoul
Wallenberg had died in the chaos of war - did not simply reflect Soederblom's personal opinion. Instead, the Swedish Minister
apparently had been quite certain that the position he presented in those meetings was in general agreement with UD's ideas on the
subject. This assessment is further supported by the fact that Soederblom had returned home to Stockholm for consultations both
before his discussions with Alexander Abramov, departmental head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in December 1945
(Soederblom had been on leave in late1945) and with Stalin in June 1946 (Soederblom had just returned from a brief trip to
23 Palmstierna, p. 195 [Aterigen den daer foerdoemda UD-andan ]. Carl Fredrik Palmstierna's father was a second cousin of Raoul
Wallenberg's mother, Maj von Dardel.
24Ibid, p. 201 [Moraliskt mod var vart enda hemliga vapen]
25Ibid, p. 195 [Du foerstar vael att Wallenberg aer doed foer laenge sen]
Ibid, p. 198 [Kunde ett kungligt ingripande ha lett nagan vart? Kanske, kanske inte. Alltjaemt anser jag, att naer det gaeller liv och doed foer
en svensk som av sitt lands hoegsta myndigheter kastats ut i sadana aventyr, boer dylika foersoek goeras. Gustaf VI Adolf tog aldrig den
frimodiga steg han, ensam av alla, hade kunnat ta.]
26On 7 November, 1946 Sweden and Russia signed a Credit and Trade Agreement, the so-called "Ryssavtalet. " It provided credits of about 1
billion Swedish Crowns, approx. $300,000,000 at the time, to the Soviet Union. Gunnar Haeggloeff apparently urged Unden at some point to
raise the issue of Raoul Wallenberg as part of the negotiations, but Unden refused to consider it. ECR p. 649. In its analysis of the Swedish-
Russian Trade Agreement the Eliasson Commission comes to the conclusion that Soviet interest in the agreement was at its highest by the
summer of 1946, precisely around the time of Stalin's meeting with Staffan Soederbom.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 11
Stockholm in May 1946).
At the very least, Soederblom's statements appear to have had Unden's tacit backing. When in the spring of 1946 Soederblom
suddenly relays to the Swedish Foreign Ministry his impression that despite all expectations Abramov may well be hinting at a
possible exchange of Raoul Wallenberg, he receives no answer. In May 1946 he returns to Stockholm for consultations with
Unden and from that moment on he does not mention the issue of exchange again. Instead, one month later he conveys to Stalin
his conviction that Raoul Wallenberg is dead.
Like his Ambassador in Moscow, Unden appears to have readily embraced the idea that already in 1946 Raoul Wallenberg was
either dead or could not be saved. His reasoning remains largely unclear, considering Sweden held in hand a formal "receipt" for
Wallenberg from the highest Soviet authorities: Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanosov's official note from 17 January, 1945 which
stated that Raoul Wallenberg and his possessions had been placed under Soviet protection.27 According to the Eliasson
Commission, a partial explanation may be found in Unden's political philosophy which was rooted in a fervent belief in
international law and the values of collective security, born out of the ruins of World War I. This left him almost "reflexively
opposed" to any ideas of official government representatives exchanging or bartering human beings. 28 Unden considered such a
thing unacceptable conduct among states.
The wish to position a small country like Sweden to play a meaningful role between the superpowers further inclined the Swedish
leadership against placing any demands on its Soviet neighbor. So did a slight sense of guilt over Swedish actions during the war
which in 1941 had allowed German troops transit through its territory from Norway to Finland.29 The extradition of 167 Baltic
refugees in January 1946, as well as certain aspects of the negotiations for the Trade and Credit Agreement have to be evaluated
against this very background. However, while these surrounding conditions made an exchange of Raoul Wallenberg undeniably
difficult, they also offered opportunities. The Eliasson Commission stresses that while it can appreciate the "moral dilemma" the
Swedish officials faced over the question of a possible exchange,
" in hindsight it can be stated as remarkable that the Swedish Foreign Policy leadership never
appears to have considered the question at all." 30
Instead, as Oesten Unden defined it, in the Cold War era Sweden had to make a choice - to search for Wallenberg or to protect the
larger national interest. By March 1957 Unden let it be known officially that for all intents and purposes the search for Raoul
Wallenberg was over. Publicly the Swedish government challenged the Soviet assertion of February 1957 that Wallenberg had
died of a heart attack in prison already in 1947.31 Behind the scenes, however, Unden gave different marching orders. Only one
day after the receipt of the Gromyko memorandum the American Embassy, Stockholm reported to the State Department in a
confidential message that
"the [Swedish] Foreign Office indicated to the [U.S.] Ambassador that since it had no
proof that Wallenberg was alive after 1947, it is inclined to believe the Soviet story." 32
To his own staff Unden announced that
27MID, Dekanosov to Soederblom, 16 January 1945. Others in the Swedish leadership, like Rolf Sohlman, exhibited similar behavior. See ECR,
p. 507, Letter Sohlman to Unden, 16 May, 1947.
28ECR, p. 510-512. Swedish Security expert Lars Ulfving argues that Unden's failure not to pursue the Wallenberg case was most likely not "a
conscious strategy." If so, Ulving argues, Unden would have referred to it in his diary. The diaries, however, were not kept regularly and were
often sketchy. Ulfving, p. 135
29ECR, p. 514-16
30ECR, p. 602
31On 7 February, 1957 the Soviet Union declared in an official memorandum that Raoul Wallenberg had died in a Moscow prison on 17 July,
1947. Delivered by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the statement is generally referred to as the Gromyko Memorandum.
32NARA, RG 84, American Embassy, Stockholm to the U.S. Department of State. Foreign Service Dispatch. 8 February, 1957.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 12
" .. It appears that Raoul Wallenberg is dead ... One can speculate about other
possibilities, for example, that he has disappeared or is in such a state that he cannot be
shown. These are theoretical possibilities and not very likely. To maintain or build a
relationship with the Soviet Union in a way that this can happen without sacrificing more
important values, belongs to our most important tasks in Foreign Policy. We have in my
opinion no reason to hold a continuous grudge against the Soviet Union." 33
This was the first official formulation of UD's dualist-pragmatist position that in fact had marked the case from the very
beginning: It claimed publicly that the search for Wallenberg's fate was of the highest priority when in reality it certainly was not.
The Eliasson Commission strongly questions Unden's framing of the Wallenberg question in terms of an either-or argument, as
well as the extent of negative repercussions Unden foresaw for Sweden if it had insisted too forcefully on a resolution of the
Wallenberg case. And rightly so, because Unden was not afraid of challenging Russian officials on other occasions. Unden's
biographer Yngve Moeller describes how Unden flew into a rage during a talk with the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm,
Rodionov, because the Russians had expressed objections to the so-called "Trondheim Shipping Lane" [Trondheimleden].34 The
Norwegian port city of Trondheim allowed Sweden to receive shipping merchandise even when the Baltic Sea was frozen.
Moeller writes that Unden was so angered by the Russian position, that he threatened to cancel his official vacation in the Soviet
Union,
"...but the Kremlin was so perplexed about Unden's outburst that they buried their objections
in deep silence."
For some reason Unden was not willing to be equally blunt in the Raoul Wallenberg question. In the end the Eliasson Commission
can only describe Unden's behavior as "remarkable." The report does cast a wide net of criticism: Cabinet Secretary Erik
Boheman, Foreign Minister Christian Guenther, Head of the Political Department, Sven Grafstroem and even former Prime
Minister Tage Erlander are all singled out for severe reprimand. The report draws the conclusion that the attitudes of Unden and
his colleagues had proved devastating for Raoul Wallenberg's chances of return, yet it clearly considers their behavior a unique
phenomenon, unique and unexplained.
The Eliasson Commission report focuses heavily on the time of 1945-47, what the report considers the decisive years. Later years
are only sketchily dealt with. One wishes that the same detail were available here. As the Commission sees it, since Raoul
Wallenberg's fate was most likely decided by 1947, later Swedish behavior was not as relevant. Furthermore, the Commission
claims that with the presentation of the Gromyko Memorandum, which asserted that Raoul Wallenberg had died of a heart attack
in 1947, the Soviet position was intractably locked down. 35 With that, the chances of winning Raoul Wallenberg's release in later
years sharply declined, according to the report.
It is not clear why the Eliasson Commission considers the Soviet position so entrenched. The Gromyko memorandum was, after
all, so vague that it appeared to leave room for future adjustments.36 In fact, there are indications that the content of the
memorandum may have been influenced at least in part in its preparatory stages by the attitude and remarks of high ranking
Swedish officials. As the Eliasson Report stresses repeatedly, both Rolf Sohlman and Oesten Unden in 1955/56 had gone so far as
to suggest to the Soviets possible explanations for Raoul Wallenberg's fate. In retrospect, especially Sohlman's remark to Nikolai
Bulganin in November 1955 appears noteworthy. Sohlman directly alludes to the possibility that
33UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Internal Memorandum, 26 February, 1957.
34Moeller, p. 404 [Men i Kreml hade man tydligen blivit sa perplex oever de Undenska utbrottet, att man begravde sin framstoet i djup tystnad.]
35ECR, p.563 and p.577
36Among other things the statement by the attending physician, A.L. Smoltsov, was not accompanied by an official death certificate or autopsy
report, Wallenberg's personal information was incomplete and the text stated that the information found in Russian archives "might" refer to
Raoul Wallenberg. In addition, Smoltsov's report did not adhere to the very strict rules and channels of communications which governed Soviet
bureaucracy; see SWR and Mesinai. Liquidatsia. 2001. Numerous questions also remain about Smoltsov's service and employment status in July
1947. Smoltsov at the time supposedly was on an extended leave of absence from his job, due to illness. The full facts still remain to be
established.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 13
"Beria and his consorts were to blame (for Wallenberg's fate)." 37
Lack of urgency on the part of Swedish officials to press the case also emerges from a report distributed to the members of the
Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in preparation for Prime Minister Erlander's impending state visit to Moscow in
March 1956:
" ... Some people who are close to Erlander told the members of the Soviet Embassy in
Sweden that Erlander would not have raised the [Wallenberg] question in Moscow but was
forced to discuss it in order to prevent the bourgeois parties from blaming the Swedish
government in the forthcoming Parliamentary elections .... for not being active enough .. in
.... the Wallenberg case." 38
While the Eliasson Commission acknowledges that Unden's reaction to the Gromyko Memorandum marks the full official
formulation of Swedish Realpolitik' in the Wallenberg case, it rejects the notion that Sweden gave up on Raoul Wallenberg after
1957. It cites, for example, the official Swedish demarche of 1959 as an example of continued efforts. 39 It does, however, not
explain how such a demarche could possibly have been effective without the appropriate policy in place to back it up.
d. Old mindsets
In the summary of its findings the Eliasson report states that it
"cannot find any substantial fault with the actions taken by the [Swedish] foreign policy
leadership during the 1950's."40
This may well be its most controversial statement, especially since - by the authors own acknowledgement - their own report in
part contradicts this assertion. In light of the many important questions which remain concerning Swedish conduct in later years,
such a carte-blanche appears inappropriate or at the very least premature. The following decades also were far from problem free.
One example is the decision to officially close the Wallenberg case in 1965. It remained closed for a full fifteen years, until 1979,
when a new witness and the efforts of US Congressman Tom Lantos revived the issue. 41 The Swedish government's approach to
the Soviet Union that same year to exchange Raoul Wallenberg for Stig Bergling, a former Swedish Security official who had been
arrested in March as a Russian spy, was clearly too little too late. 42 The Eliasson Commission strongly questions the wisdom of
37ECR, p. 597. Unden made similar statements when he delivered a note on 9 March, 1956 to Soviet Ambassador Rodionov. In Soviet
documentation Unden is quoted as saying that "the Swedish government would be satisfied with an answer that would hint at Wallenberg's
disappearance being an act of Beria." see among others Carlbaeck-Isotalo, p. 17 and p.23. Carlbaeck also pointed to Tugarinov's [of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's Information Department] memorandum to Andrei Gromyko from 30 December, 1956, which recommended a quick answer to
the Swedes in the Wallenberg case. Tugarinov suggests that Swedish-Soviet relations could hardly get worse, in light of the crisis brought about
by the squashing of the civil uprising in Hungary that autumn and that in light of the remarks by Swedish officials a quick reply would result in
limiting further damage of bilateral relations. see also SWR, p.113
38MID, Information about negotiations with Swedish Prime Minister Erlander during his visit to Moscow, March 1956
As the Swedish- Russian Working Group points out in its report, one has to be careful with interpretation of Russian documents, especially in
terms of deducing true intentions. As it concerns reports from members of the Soviet Legation, Stockholm, for example, there is a tendency of
those representatives to fit the message to what they believed their superiors in Moscow wanted to hear. SWR, 2001
39UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD. On 9 February, 1959 the Swedish government formally asked the Soviet Union to investigate whether or not Raoul
Wallenberg had been imprisoned in Vladimir prison.
40ECR, p. 39
41In 1980 U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos (D-California) introduced legislation in the U.S. Congress that made Raoul Wallenberg an honorary
U.S. citizen.
42The idea for an exchange had apparently been conceived by Bergling himself who had heard of new testimony in the Raoul Wallenberg case,
which stated that he had been alive in the Soviet Union some years earlier.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 14
closing the case for fifteen years, but adds that
"it is not really clear what could have been done."43
Yet the decades after 1950 certainly saw a number of opportunities where it may have been possible to learn more about
Wallenberg's fate. However, these were not pursued or if so, rather halfheartedly. One of the most memorable was an apparent
Soviet approach in 1966, delivered through a representative of the Protestant Church in Berlin, Carl-Gustav Svingel, which
appeared to suggest an exchange, for unspecified compensation, of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroem who had been
arrested in 1963 as a Soviet agent, The Foreign Office refused to even discuss the offer and never even formally interviewed
Svingel.44 Whatever might have been behind the overture, one fact remains: Sweden captured one of the most important Cold War
spies and got absolutely nothing in return.45 This issue alone should be worth a closer look.
The question of what type of signals Sweden sent Russia concerning Raoul Wallenberg in later years, and vice versa, also
deserves closer scrutiny. While Swedish leaders like Prime Minister Tage Erlander continued to raise the question of Wallenberg's
fate after 1957, all the while earning strong Soviet rebuffs, there are indications that many of these later approaches lacked in
both determination and conviction. 46
In May 1964, for example, Swedish and Russian diplomats held discussions in preparation for Soviet Prime Minister Nikita
Khrushchev's upcoming state visit to Sweden. The political atmosphere at the time was highly charged and the lingering issues in
the Raoul Wallenberg threatened to further strain Swedish-Soviet relations. During one of these preparatory discussions Swedish
Ambassador Gunnar Jarring indicated to the head of the Scandinavian Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Kovalyov that
Sweden's main priority was to avoid any negative fallout for the planned visit, especially in the media.
"[Raoul Wallenberg's] family and the press will never tolerate a missed opportunity for
inquiry but it should cause for sure unpleasant publicity." 47
Jarring was particularly anxious about the testimony of Swedish Professor Nanna Svartz which had not yet been released to the
public. In early 1961 Professor Svartz reported that while attending a medical conference in Moscow she had been told by a
leading Soviet physician, A. L. Myasnikov that Raoul Wallenberg was alive at the time in Soviet captivity.48 In their conversation
Jarring explains to Kovalyov that Sweden requires clarification of Svartz's report. However, far from seizing the opportunity of
either Wennerstroem's arrest, or Khrushchev's visit to press for answers, Jarring appears to go out of his way to inform the
Russians that the Wallenberg case as such is no longer a priority for Sweden:
"We do not doubt the note that was presented in 1957," Jarring tells Kovalyov, "but .... it
would certainly not be inappropriate ... to conduct "a new check or - put differently - a
completing check."
43ECR, p. 598
44UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD; see for example P.M. by Leif Belfrage, "ang. Herr Svingels beraettelse." 19 March, 1966. It remains uncertain who
initiated the discussions - whether it was the Soviet side, Svingel's colleague, the East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel [as Svingel claims] or
Svingel himself [approaching Vogel].
45After having been sentenced to life in prison in 1964, Wennerstroem received clemency in 1974 and was released from prison.
46One exception was Erlander's direct request to Khrushchev to immediately return Raoul Wallenberg to Sweden, following the testimony by
Swedish Professor Nanna Svartz.
47UD, P2 Eu 1 RWD, Gunnar Jarring to Leif Belfrage, 26 May, 1964
48UD, P2 Eu I, RWD, Report by Nanna Svartz, 1 February 1961. Myasnikov claimed that Svartz had misunderstood his comments. A formal
face-to-face meeting between Myasnikov and Svartz failed to resolve the issue. Another physician who had been present for part of time during
the initial meeting between Myasnikov and Svartz, Professor Grigory Danishevsky, was never formally questioned. It is not known what
Danishevky has reported to the Russian side of this encounter.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 15
In the following paragraphs of his memo Jarring acknowledges that it is all pretense:
We [Jarring and Kovlayov] pretended to await the results [of the check] and we understood
fully well that they could not be ready before Khrushchev's visit."
According to Kovalyov's account of the meeting, Jarring was even more explicit:
"... The Swedish side only wants to make the Khrushchev visit a success. Investigation, Jarring
added, which the Soviet government would promise, could bring the same result as the
investigation in 1957. On my question what additional investigations the Swedes are talking
about .... Jarring could not answer. Jarring said that he personally understands the difficulties
involved but in this particular case he must take the position as an official representative of
Sweden."49
Even with concessions to the often murky phrasing of diplomatic language and the difficult political conditions at the time, the
message to the Russians was clear: The Raoul Wallenberg case was by now little more than a political irritant and all that was
needed were Russian assurances of a "completing check." When Kovalyov, at the end of the discussions about Wallenberg,
casually mentions Wennerstroem's upcoming sentencing, Jarring informs Kovalyov that
"Sweden does not link these two issues."
It would be quite interesting to know exactly how and why the Swedish government arrived at this position.
The Eliasson Commission argues that after 1950, with the arrival of Swedish Security Police Inspector Otto Danielsson and
Permanent Undersecretary of State, Arne Lundberg, UD's handling of the Wallenberg case dramatically improved. How far these
improvements ultimately reached, however, is open for debate. Oesten Unden was after all still firmly in charge. And when Unden
left office in 1962, the Unden mindset remained deeply entrenched, embodied, among others, by his protege, Sverker Astroem.
Per Ahlmark, former head of the centrist Folkpartiet and one of Astroem's harshest critics, points out that although Astroem was
present in key decision making positions at all critical moments in the case, he does not mention Raoul Wallenberg with one word
in his memoirs:
"The search for Wallenberg was one of the most important issues in UD. Not one word about
that in the book. He claims that the different governments after the war used every
opportunity to bring forth a positive reply about Wallenberg.' ... Why such a lie? Perhaps it is
because Unden was Astroems boss and idol. Unden's ideological neutralism between Stalin's
Soviet Union and the Western powers was shared by his pupil." 50
It is an open secret that high-ranking UD decision makers, especially Oesten Unden and Rolf Sohlman, bore strong sympathies
for the Soviet Union. In 1956 the CIA received information which cast suspicions on Sohlman's attitudes and CIA officials
considered an official investigation.51 Sverker Astroem, for his part, has been publicly accused of aiding Stig Wennerstroem
before his arrest in 1963.52 If in fact real, what effects did those Soviet sympathies have in practical terms? The Eliasson
49MID, from Kovalyov's diary, resolution by Andrey Gromyko, 31 May , 1964
50 Ahlmark. 2002. [Soekandet efter Wallenberg blev det stoersta enskilda aerendet inom UD. Inte ett ord om det i boken. Han pastod dock att
de olika regeringarna efter kriget har utnyttjat alla tillfaellen att fa fram ett hederligt sovjetiskt besked' om Wallenberg. ... Varfoer denna
osanning? Kanske foer att Unden blev Astroems chef och idol. Undens ideologiska neutralism mellan Stalins Sovjet och vaetmaekterna blev
ocksa laerjungens.].
51NARA, RG 84, [NND 947008], message via Air Pouch from Stockholm, 7 December, 1956
52Sundelin. 1999. Sverker Astroem is the acknowledged 'Eminence Grise' of Swedish politics. He rose to prominence during World War II
when he emerged from relative obscurity to accompany Erik von Post to Denmark in 1945 to meet SS Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg in
preparation for Schellenberg's escape to Sweden. He later was assigned to spend time with Schellenberg during his stay at the home of Folke
Bernadotte. It was also by his own account Astroem who accompanied Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontai on her return to Moscow in
March 1945, the critical early phase in the Wallenberg case. He rose to become head of UD's Political Department, later Kabinettssekreterare, as
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 16
Commission does not address this issue in depth. It claims that they had no obvious effect, at least none that can be ascertained in
the official record. Nevertheless, as Magnus Petersson, a Swedish Security Policy expert, argues in an analysis written for the
Commission report, Sweden's attempt to balance Soviet interests, its so-called "Politics of Accommodation"
[Anpassningspolitik],
"combined with a not insignificant, ideologically determined anti-Americanism among many of
the responsible Swedish politicians, could border on or in effect constitute anticipation of
Soviet demands or wishes." 53
Regardless if accusations of espionage should turn out to be true or not, it is a fact that in the post-war years Astroem saw himself
as a critical counterweight to what he considered the false neutralism Sweden had entered into after WWII. While nominally
neutral, Sweden had secretly entered a quasi-alliance with the U.S. Astroem's views have been highly influential, especially in his
capacity as key advisor to the country's leadership, including former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme. In the eyes of Ahlmark
and other critics, like Unden, Astroem championed a policy of "practical neutrality" as the centerpiece of Swedish post-war
neutrality, with devastating consequences. As the critics see it, such a position ultimately draws
"no line between democracy and dictatorship" 54
and is a major reason behind Sweden's failure to submit its recent history to a more critical review, including its behavior in the
Raoul Wallenberg case. 55
The key question that is yet to be answered is exactly why Raoul Wallenberg's fate evoked so little sympathy and so little interest
from the people in charge of his case. Sweden's failure to take advantage of important openings, by not maximizing all efforts,
raises questions about possible hidden motives. Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna remarked on this already in 1976:
"I could very well imagine that certain gentlemen in UD were afraid of Wallenberg's return.
Those who had bet for the sake of prestige or career that he was dead, and had hindered the
investigation, would then appear in an unpleasant light." 56
As time went by, it became ever more difficult to pursue the case, especially in light of new political challenges, like the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and other crises. Former State Secretary Pierre Schori remarked on this in an internal
memorandum in 1985, closely echoing Unden's formulation from 1957:
"The point in time had to arrive some time where we had to tell ourselves that the likelihood
that Raoul Wallenberg lives is so little that it costs too much to continue to drive the
[Wallenberg] question. ... I cannot, dare not claim that he could not still be alive..... But I
think that after all years gone without us receiving new certain information, the likelihood
that he still continues to live has to appear so little that we cannot longer allow that the
question will burden - sometimes poison - our relationship with the Soviets..."57
well as Sweden's representative at the United Nations. Astroem has a reputation as a man of power, not distinct ideology. In an interview with
DN's Mats Wiklund in 2002 he emphasized that he was not "a joiner" and that he has never had a "firm political conviction." Wiklund, 2002.
53Petersson, 2003
54see, among others, Ekdal, December 2002.
55Other observers are less harsh in their assessment. Magnus Petersson, for example, points out that despite his pro-Soviet policies, Unden in
1952 condemned the excesses of Communism as " a fanatical belief system with no tolerance for those with opposing views." Petersson, p. 92.
Astroem was heard by the Eliasson Commission but only briefly, in a two hour interview.
56Palmstierna, p. 200 [Jag mycket vael kunde taenka mig att viss herar i UD var raedda foer Wallenbergs aterkomst. De som av prestige- eller
karriaerskael satsat pa att han var doed och motsatt sig utredningar, komme da i ett obehagligt ljus.]
57UD, P2 Eu 1, 12 February, 1985. P.M. signed by Pierre Schori.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 17
Today, it can be argued that Sweden has even less incentive to solve Raoul Wallenberg's fate. It is a fact, that the longer
Wallenberg lived in captivity, the more problematic the matter becomes for both Russia and for Sweden. Even if Wallenberg died
in 1947, revelations about the background of his case may bear a lot of risks or at the very least involve a number of uncertainties.
Other than the satisfaction of having done the right thing, there would be few potential benefits.
III. OTHER DEFINITIONS:
1. The U.S.
a. "Swedish diplomat with an American task"
In the assessment of the Eliasson report, one major reason why the Swedish Foreign Office officials did not vigorously pursue
Wallenberg's rescue was the idea that he had been a de-facto employee of the U.S. government.58 The reasoning was that since
Wallenberg had freely taken on the job with the War Refugee Board, he accepted the risks of such an assignment. Consequently,
primarily he and his U.S. employers were to blame for his fate. The Eliasson Commission emphatically states that such notions
and the neglect to vigorously pursue Raoul Wallenberg's return were "unacceptable."
The truly important question the Eliasson Commission does not sufficiently explore is why Sweden's distancing from Raoul
Wallenberg was so extreme. In the Commission's assessment the U.S. had designed the "content" of the mission - Sweden had
simply aided in its execution.59 In reality, however, the facts appear to have been far less clear cut. Wallenberg's assignment was
certainly not driven by American interests alone, but came about as a result of a confluence of various private and public interests.
60 Swedish and American interests overlapped in this on various levels.
Aside from its long humanitarian tradition, Sweden had two major incentives why it supported the American efforts in 1944:61 By
then it had become clear that the Allies and not Germany would win the war, plus Sweden had received strong US criticism for its
economic dealings with Nazi Germany which had gone far beyond the limits set by international [bilateral] trade agreements and
the rules governing Swedish neutrality. This concerned in particular the Wallenberg firm's SKF trade in ballbearings. As the
Eliasson Report points out, there are indications of a straightforward understanding: Swedish support for American aims in
Hungary would weigh favorably in U.S. consideration of Swedish behavior. 62 It does, however, not state the key irony: By a
58 The best example of this notion is the Swedish government's suggestion in January 1945 to the American Minister in Stockholm, Hershel
Johnson, to convey U.S. instructions to Raoul Wallenberg through the American Legation, Moscow, since Wallenberg seemed to be under Soviet
protection. ECR, p. 190. As the Commission points out, it would have had to appear rather odd to the Soviets for an official Swedish
representative

[Magda Hassan]

If there really was a special file, i.e. "Lefortovo File", that contained a note that Raoul Wallenberg had died in 1947, this may have
been the Smoltsov note from 17 July, 1947 or a similar note to that effect. It raises the question whether or not this special file was
the one used in preparation of the Gromyko memorandum from 1957. It remains unclear what documentation exactly Soviet
officials relied on in 1956-57 when the memorandum was drafted. Foreign Minister Molotov at least had some direct knowledge
of the events on 17 July, 1947, because MGB Minister Abakumov had personally informed him about developments in the
Wallenberg case on that very date. 240 Did Soviet officials in 1956 then find the Smoltsov note in the "Lefortovo file" [or other
files] or did they construct it on the basis of the information contained in the material and/or Molotovs knowledge, and made the
date retroactively fit Abakumovs notification to Molotov from 1947?
Russian officials have always maintained that the Smoltsov note is authentic, if not in fact, [meaning cause of death by
heartattack,] then in spirit, [meaning Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 or sometime around then.] In her analysis of Russian
documents in 1997 Swedish historian Helene Carlbaeck concludes that Abakumov's letter to Molotov from 17 July, 1947
"strongly increased the validity of the Smoltsov note.241
If indeed authentic, a question nevertheless remains, based on the currently available documentation, whether or not the
[Smoltsov] note about Raoul Wallenberg's alleged death in 1947 could have been conceived as part of an effort to create a false
237SWR, p.139
238SWR, p. 145
239UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Testimony of Sergei Ivanovich Stepanov, 1992. Stepanov bases his statements on his own experiences as well as those
of a colleague, identified as "Dzhirkvelov". This appears to have been either Ilya Dzhirkvelov who had defected to the West in the early 1980's
or a relative.
240A small chance exists that Abakumov did not tell Molotov the full facts of the Wallenberg case. Soviet experts point out that Abakumov in
some cases acted directly on the orders of Stalin, bypassing even the most senior members of the Soviet leadership. In the case of a foreign
diplomat, however, some semblance of information sharing appears to have been upheld.
241Carlbaeck, p. 7
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 50
set of documents, a false trace, with the intention of hiding Wallenberg's fate and/or his identity from certain individuals in the
Soviet administration at that time. 242 The circumstances of Wallenberg's death or disappearance were apparently a matter of great
sensitivity and it is know that as late as 1954 even high ranking Soviet officials were not fully briefed. 243 The effort might have
been abandoned at some point, yet the documentation survived. 244 The issue attains further significance due to the many
unresolved questions concerning the employment status of the physician A.L. Smoltsov in the summer of 1947. Full
documentation on this issue needs to be presented by the Russian side. 245
If two former Soviet Intelligence officials indeed had access to Wallenberg's case file in the archives of the First Main Directorate
of MGB [later KGB], there may be a chance that other individuals with similar access in other years may still be alive and could
testify about what they saw. Further research will have to clarify the contradictions contained in their statements.
The Soviet leadership's wish to steer guilt away from themselves and to implicate Abakumov and Smoltsov, both of whom were
dead by 1957, may account for some of the vague aspects of the Soviet pronouncements. The Swedish Working Group Report
states that by the Russians' own acknowledgment the Gromyko Memorandum was not supposed to reflect the full truth - it was
just to be "a half-truth that would do." 246 The possibility exists that even if Wallenberg had lived beyond 1947, Soviet control or
knowledge of the matter was such that Soviet officials felt reasonably sure that at that moment - in 1956/57 - Raoul Wallenberg
was dead. But if that was so, the question remains why they did not choose to convey this fact - if it indeed was fact - more
forcefully.
Both Russian and Swedish experts have argued that after a few years Raoul Wallenberg was simply not "exchangeable" because
of the sensitive information he would have acquired during his Soviet imprisonment. Beyond that, releasing Wallenberg after
years of denying any knowledge about him would have constituted an enormous embarrassment for the Soviet Union and an
immense propaganda coup for the West. There would have been little or no chance for Soviet officials to "save face." Yet, it is
equally questionable whether or not a deal could not have been struck if the right offer had come along.
Interestingly, even after the Wallenberg case had not been officially raised by Sweden for fifteen years, the documentation shows
that the Russian side, at least in private conversation, did not categorically insist that Raoul Wallenberg was definitely dead in
1947. A good example is the discussion between a Swedish official [Jan Lundvik] and his unidentified Soviet contact in 1979,
immediately after the Swedish side had reopened the case. In his assessment of the meeting Lundvik wrote:
"The official position that the case is once and for all closed and that no new information
can appear because Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 was not expressed. .. In fact he [the
contact] admitted implicitly that there could in fact come information of such a type that it
may cast new light on the case." 247
242There were several cases in which false death certificates were produced by Soviet authorities.
243When Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in October 1954 asked I.A. Serov, the Chairman of the KGB, "when and under what
circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died," Serov gave an evasive reply, referring indirectly to A. Vishinsky's note from August 18, 1947 which
stated that Raoul Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union. In 1954 Gromyko was not yet a full member of the Soviet Politburo. It is not clear
what prompted Gromyko's inquiry.
244The document carries certain notations such as an apparent page number that it would appear to have been part of a file or set of other
documents. As is known from a note written on the side of the document, Smoltsov apparently never sent his report to Abakumov but he
supposedly informed the Minister personally of what had allegedly transpired. This notation would then account for why the document was not
found in other relevant collections. Some researchers have questioned the authenticity of this postscriptum note in the document's margin which
states that he body was cremated without autopsy. The lack of autopsy is suspicious.
245The role of Smoltsov's deputy, a female physician, also needs to be further scrutinized.
246SWR, p. 141
247UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Jan Lundvik to Leif Leifland. 6 September, 1979. Another example is the formulation used by then Russian Foreign
Minister Primakov to his Swedish counterpart, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, in a letter from 17 July, 1997 on the occasion of the supposed 50th
anniversary of Raoul Wallenberg's death. Primakov opens the letter saying "If the Soviet authorities can be believed, [my emphasis] today marks
fifty years after Raoul Wallenberg's death ...." see also report by Goeran Rydeberg, 2001.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 51
What then prevents Russia from telling the truth? There are four basic possibilities why Russia insists on 1947:
1. Nobody knows the truth. Therefore, the case is indeed purely circumstantial. Russian officials argue that the level of internal
secrecy within the Security Services remains so high, that those few individuals who know what happened to Raoul Wallenberg
either still refuse to speak or are now dead. Any documentation that does exist is supposedly incomplete and does not shed light on
Wallenberg's ultimate fate. High-level institutional knowledge, however, was available until very recently and to some degree
remains available today. Anastas Mikoyan survived until 1978. Sergei Kartashov, [Head of the Fourth Department, Third Main
Directorate, MGB in 1947] died only in 1979. Other top members of the Soviet hierarchy lived well into the 1980's and 1990's.
Vyacheslav Molotov was still alive in 1986 and Georgi Malenkov lived until 1988. Viktor Abakumov's Deputy, Nikolai
Selivanovsky, died as recently as 1997. Yevgeni Pitovranov, the Head of the Second Main Directorate MGB, was alive until 1999,
Danil Kopelyanski [interrogator with the Third Directorate, Fourth Department is still living, his colleague Solovov died only
recently.
2. Full knowledge of Wallenberg's death in 1947 exists, but documentation is withheld by an extremely small circle at the
top. Such a scenario is possible, but it raises questions as to why officials would not reveal details if they have already publicly
pondered death by poison and have admitted to Wallenberg's execution by shooting [Yakovlev]. There may be a reluctance to
release the documentation if the cause of death was gruesome or if Wallenberg suffered irreversible physical or psychological
damage as a result of mistreatment. The truth may compromise still living officials who either dealt with the case directly or in its
aftermath. In addition, it may prove impossible to strictly separate and keep separate the facts of Wallenberg's fate from other
aspects of his case, i.e. reasons of his arrest, etc. The culture of the Security Services may well present an insurmountable obstacle,
such as an ingrained unwillingness to acknowledge guilt or to provide essential details to the public. A stalemate then may seem
to be the preferable solution.
3. Wallenberg lived beyond 1947, but not for long. Wallenberg died but later than claimed by the Russians. The Russian side
has steadily retrenched in its position on Raoul Wallenbergs fate. It has moved from complete denial of Wallenberg's presence in
the Soviet Union [1945-1957], to claim of death in 1947 by heart attack [Smoltsov], to death by Execution [Yakovlev]248 Further
adjustments or corrections about Raoul Wallenbergs supposed death, either about the cause or date of death would have serious
repercussions for Russia; and particularly so if he was held beyond the deaths of both Stalin and Beria in 1954 and he then died or
was executed. So, it may not be considered advantageous to admit to the later death date. Again, only a few people know the facts.
This could be a plausible alternative to 1947, especially since some former Soviet officials themselves have raised this possibility.
249
4. Wallenberg lived beyond 1947 and for a considerable time. A less likely scenario, but based on the current evidence it
cannot be dismissed. If in fact true, Wallenberg's survival could not be revealed because it would cast all involved in a very
negative light. 250
248Interfax, 6 December 2000. "In the opinion of .... Academician Alexander Yakovlev, Wallenberg was executed by gunfire at Moscow's
infamous Lubyanka prison in the years of Stalin's regime .."
249UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, see for example testimonies of Remenyi [1984], Stepanov [1992], and Solovov [1997] Most Soviet officials who
consider it possible that Raoul Wallenberg lived past July 1947, believe he was no longer alive after the mid- 1950's. In 1952/53 the Hungarian
government, on Soviet orders - apparently in connection with the so-called [Jewish] Doctors' Plot' -, prepared a number of show trials which
were to expose an alleged "conspiracy" by certain Jewish organizations, [especially the Joint], and American/British interests, charging
collaboration with both Hungarian and German Fascists during World War II. In a subplot to this conspiracy it was to be "proven" - by forced
testimony - that Raoul Wallenberg had been murdered in Budapest already in January 1945. A key question is why Stalin decided to take up the
Wallenberg issue precisely at this time. A similar effort to prove Raoul Wallenberg's death in Budapest in 1945 had been made by the Hungarian
High Court already in 1948. The planned trials in Hungary fit the theme of Stalin's anti-Semitic campaign of the period, exemplified by the
'Doctors' Plot', which in turn was connected to the arrest of MGB Minister of State Security V. Abakumov. Interestingly, Abakumov was never
charged with Raoul Wallenberg's murder. One would think that Stalin would have liked to blame Abakumov for this crime. The early 1950's
also saw increased pressure by the Swedish government to obtain clarity about Wallenbergs fate. After Stalin's death in 1954 the preparation for
the show trials in Budapest continued for some months before they were finally stopped by Beria. see Ember, 2000.
250For an analysis of the Russian failure to present valid evidence for Raoul Wallenberg's death in 1947 and for the possibility of Raoul
Wallenberg's longterm survival after 1947 see Mesinai. "Beyond Reasonable Doubt." 2001
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 52
d. More relevant records have to exist
The possibility that Raoul Wallenberg's fate is not known is minimal. So is the chance that all critical documentation has been
destroyed. There are strong indications that at least part of Raoul Wallenberg's personal file is available in Moscow. This idea
appears to be supported by some of the items among Wallenberg's personal belongings which were returned to his family in
October 1989. These consisted, among other things, of large amounts of foreign currencies, his diplomatic passport and his
prisoner registration card. Russian claims that these items were discovered by chance in a sealed packet found on a shelf in the
FSB archives seem hardly credible. Under the extremely strict Soviet bureaucratic rules items such as Wallenberg's passport
should under normal circumstances have been kept as part of his prisoner/personal and/or his investigative file.251
The existence of the currency too raises questions. Money was held on the prisoner's behalf, and his belongings traveled with him from prison to
prison, where they were stored by the respective prison administration. As Susan Mesnai has pointed out, once the prisoner in question died,
under official Soviet administrative rules any currency was permanently confiscated by the State within six months of his death. If Raoul
Wallenberg indeed died in 1947, why then was the currency not confiscated?
If, on the other hand, Soviet authorities in 1989 did not return the original bills taken from Raoul Wallenberg, but simply issued authentic World
War II bills - from their vast holdings - to reimburse Wallenberg's family, then the question arises how they knew what amount they should
return. A receipt stating the precise amount taken from Raoul Wallenberg when he arrived in prison should have been kept as part of his prisoner
file. Therefore, this raises the question whether in 1989 Soviet officials did not in fact take the information directly from Wallenberg's file.252
Critical records of Wallenberg's fellow prisoners that have so far not been shown to researchers also appear to exist. In a new
documentary on the Wallenberg case former Soviet Intelligence official Igor Prelin on several occasions cites information which
he claims come directly from the interrogations with Vilmos Langfelder. According to Prelin, Langfelder made potentially
compromising statements concerning Raoul Wallenberg's activities in Budapest:
"Together with Wallenberg his driver, Vilmos Langfelder, was arrested. He was also
questioned, he told us where they drove together and what they were interested in. And he said
that in the actions of Wallenberg there were moments which, as you would say, fell outside the
framework of his regular duties as a representative of the Red Cross or as a diplomat. That is
he did not concern himself only with matters which dealt exclusively with Jewish rescue. He
[Langfelder] told us many interesting things."253
Prelin also claims that according to existing documentation in Russian prison archives, Raoul Wallenberg was called to
interrogation the day before his supposed death on 17 July, 1947. No such documentation - if it indeed exists - was shared with
Swedish representative during the official ten year investigation of the Wallenberg case. 254
There are plenty of other indications that at least some relevant documentation survives. Declassification of official secrets in
Russia is, by Russian archivists'own admission, in a deplorable state. 255 Anatoly Prokopienko, former head of the Special
Archives, has repeatedly gone on record to say that the current failure to solve the Wallenberg case is due to a lack of political
will, not lack of documentation 256 Other leading experts, like Nikita Petrov of 'Memorial', agree with this assessment.257 It is
251see UD, P2 EU I, RWD, Memo to the Swedish-Russian Working Group Vadim Birstein and Arseny Roginsky. 28 March, 1991; and Mesinai.
2001. Liquidatsia. Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic passport should have been kept in an envelope attached to his personal file. Addressbooks
were in some instances kept as part of the investigative file.
252see SWR, p. 324, Appendix 44, excerpt from Susan Mesinai's report "Strict Isolation and the numbering of prisoners."
253Klaus Dexel, Bechert & Dexel Gmbh, 2004. Interview with Igor Prelin,
254Prelin's statement have proven to be of questionable validity at times. However, the matter deserves to be thoroughly checked.
255Mikhail Prozymenschikov. 2004. "Declassifying Soviet Archives." RIA Novosti, 2 February.
256see for example Anatoly Prokopienko. Izvestia, 25 September, 1997. Systematic document destruction in the Raoul Wallengberg case
appears to have taken place, especially in the 1950's . See Rydeberg, 2001. However, most experts, including the late Andrey Sakharov, argue
that the critical information about Raoul Wallenberg's fate was almost certainly preserved.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 53
clear that all critical decisions concerning important foreign prisoners were not made by Stalin alone but were a matter of approval
in some form for the Politburo. According to Petrov, Abakumov should have formally reported to Stalin about his actions
concerning Raoul Wallenberg and such a report should have been given in writing. 258
In his memoirs Vadim Bakatin who headed the KGB for four short months in 1991, expresses his surprise how many Politburo
decisions were taken in the Wallenberg case in later years and how little documentation was found which would explains the
genesis of these decisions. 259 It is precisely this type of documentation which currently remains inaccessible. Ocobye Papki, the
special papers of the Instantsi, i.e. the Central Committee and the Politburo [especially for the years 1946/47] - open only up to
1934; Stalin's personal papers - only partially released; records of Foreign and Military Intelligence - most have remained
completely closed. 260 In addition, no access currently exists to critical correspondence records of MGB/KGB with the Soviet
leadership, records of the Soviet rezidentura' in Stockholm for pertinent years, records of the Soviet side of the Allied Control
Council, Hungary or Rumania and its communications with Moscow - the list goes on.
That highly relevant information existed at least into the mid-1950's is made clear by a remarkable document from the Russian
Foreign Ministry collection. The document refers to a letter from a man called "Shiryagin" who apparently in April 1956
possessed important information about Raoul Wallenberg's fate. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the letter
significant enough to forward it to the Committee of State Security [KGB] with the following comment and a direct request to
silence Shiryagin:
"The Foreign Ministry received a letter written probably by I.S. Shiryagin who lives in the
village of Vodenino, Charkov region,which contains some information about the Swedish
diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. Probably Comrade Shiryagin, having a sincere motive to help
search for Wallenberg, will reveal the content of his letters to other people and finally the
Swedish Embassy would hear about the matter. Probably you will come to the conclusion that
it will be necessary to advise Shiryagin - in a very careful manner - through your channels not
to spread the news about Wallenberg." 261
It should also be noted that it is almost impossible for a prisoner to be lost in the Soviet system, at least not for extended periods of
time. A special Commission after Stalin's death, headed by Anastas Mikoyan, made a thorough appraisal of all prisoners in Soviet
prisons and camps, foreigners and secret prisoners included. MVD [Ministry of Interior] headquarters in Moscow also conducted
strict regular inspections and reviews of all facilities, especially of those prison and camp departments which dealt with secret
documentation and/or prisoners. This took place in close cooperation with MGB/KGB which oversaw a number of special prisons
and camps. 262
e. A possible watershed
A rather interesting exchange between an unidentified Russian journalist and Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov, head
of the FSB archives, during the presentation of the Russian Working Group Report at a press conference in Moscow on 16
257Memorial' is the leading Human Rights Group in Russia concerned with chronicling the fates of millions of citizens who perished in Soviet
camps and prisons.
258Bob Kimmel [Producer]. 2001. Searching for Raoul Wallenberg. Intrepid Documentaries. Interview with Nikita Petrov.
259Bakatin, p 188,"Sixteen Politburo decisions for approval of the Wallenberg notes between 1952 and 1986! That I had not expected." These
included the Svartz-Myasnikov discussions from 1961-1965 which were presented for Central Committee and Politburo review. Only a few
papers about this issue have been recovered so far.
260No representative of SVR, Russian Foreign Intelligence, was a member of the Swedish-Russian Working Group.
261MID, Raoul Wallenberg File, Gribanov to KGB, 13 April, 1956. Neither Shiryagin's original letter nor any other follow up documentation is
supposedly available in the archives of the former KGB. It is not clear whether or not Shiryagin's information did indeed pertain to Raoul
Wallenberg or to which time Shiryagin's information refers, before or after 1947.
262GARF, Fond 9414, opis 3366, Files of the Control and Inspection Department of the Gulag. MVD SSSR.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 54
January, 2001 provides a strong hint that officials know more than they have said and that there may be strong internal factors at
play which have so far prevented a full disclosure of Raoul Wallenberg's fate:
Question: It is common knowledge that the Soviet leadership distorted the truth intentionally. ... When did it happen that the Soviet
or Russian leadership decided sincerely to find out the truth? Was is it in 1985 or 1989?263
Vinogradov: It's an interesting question, but you should address it to the government. You always put me in a tight spot. I have to
express my position as a citizen. ...
Question: I am asking your personal opinion
Vinogradov: ... You know that there are always secrets in a family. Some things can be said, and some cannot be said. When we
read the cases, I wish I never read them. These are rather moral and ethical questions. But sometimes they go beyond political
considerations, like, for example Russian-Swedish relations. ... "264
If former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, intentionally misrepresented the truth in 1989 - when he invited Raoul
Wallenberg's immediate family to Moscow where they were presented with his personal belongings - then President Putin could
be placed in the unenviable position of exposing a number of former Soviet officials such as Gorbachev or people like former
Soviet Premier and Head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, to public embarrassment. 265 In the case of Gorbachev and others it could
even lead to possible legal prosecution - however theoretical that possibility may be. In a certain sense, Gorbachev's half-truths
may have complicated Putin's position considerably. The arrest of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in London some
years ago has significantly and permanently changed the legal landscape in international human rights cases.266 So has the issue of
government compensation for victims of slave labor in Nazi Germany. It is clear that the concept of restitution can be transferred
to Russia. In more than one sense, the truth about Raoul Wallenberg's fate could prove to be a watershed event for Russia. Putin
so far has not touched the issue of Soviet era crimes. He has publicly condemned them, yet one of Putin's first acts after he came
to power was to lay a wreath at Yuri Andropov's grave. 267 The symbolic meaning of that gesture was understood by every
Russian watching on TV.
IV. DEEPER PROBLEMS
1. The Limits of the Eliasson Report
a. Question of motives and limited areas of inquiry
The Eliasson report states that due to time restrictions it had to leave out of its evaluation five relevant areas of inquiry, among
them important questions about Raoul Wallenberg's activities in Budapest, those of the Swedish Legation, Swedish handling of
witness testimonies in the case, as well as the fate of other Swedish citizens in Soviet captivity. 268 The report provides some
indication that the activities of the Swedish Legation - especially its representation of various foreign interests, its secret support of
Allied Intelligence and unresolved questions about unofficial contacts with Hungarian and German Nazi authorities - and the
2631985 marked the beginning of 'Perestroika', 1989 the return of Raoul Wallenberg's personal belongings.
264Press conference with Federal Security Service Official Vladimir Vinogradov on Raoul Wallenberg." RIA Novosti. 16 January, 2001
265President Gorbachev did not meet Raoul Wallenberg's family personally, but delivered his message through the chief archivist, Rudolf
Pikhoya.
266The British Magistrate Ronald Bartle announced his ruling concerning Spain's request for extradition of General Pinochet with the words
"There will be one law for one world." London, 8 October, 1999.
267Arkady Ostrovsky. "Inside the Kremlin: Russia still has the attributes of a democracy but, managed by the Siloviki, this could become
illusory." The Financial Times, 24 February, 2004.
268ECR, p. 64
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 55
Swedish Red Cross especially deserve closer scrutiny. 269 The release of excerpts from the interrogation protocols of Hermann
Grosheim-Krisko, a German/Russian businessman of dubious reputation, in 1991 offered confirmation that the Soviets suspected
the Swedish Legation personnel of both pro Nazi and anti-Soviet activities. 270
Newly discovered documentation raises questions about the work as well as the attitude of the Swedish Legation personnel and
the strains that this may have caused among the staff. 271 According to numerous witnesses, tensions between Valdemar Langlet,
the official Swedish Red Cross representative, and Wallenberg ran especially high. The two repeatedly clashed over funding and
competency issues. This notion is confirmed by a memorandum from 1962, which recounts a conversation between Swedish
professor Nanna Svartz and Hungarian physician Professor Ruszniak [sic]. Svartz writes that Ruszniak had known Wallenberg
personally and that he, according to his account, had had frequent contact with him in 1944. Svartz reports that according to
Ruzniak it was well known that in his own Legation
"Wallenberg faced great difficulties from different quarters ... especially from Valdemar
Langlet." 272
Of considerable importance is the question of why Swedish officials never formally debriefed the returning Swedish Legation and
Red Cross members. Interestingly enough, the Soviet protocols of interrogations conducted with the Swedish Legation staff in
Hungary and Rumania also have never been presented. It would be of some interest to know how exactly Wallenberg's colleagues
portrayed his activities for the Russians.273 Another intriguing question is why Lars Berg was allowed to leave when he, like
Raoul Wallenberg, was clearly suspected of collaboration with the Germans. 274
Important questions also remain concerning the issue of Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic status. What exactly was his status in the
eyes of both the Swedish and Soviet governments, specifically at the time of Wallenberg's arrest in January 1945? Inexplicably,
the Swedish Minister Ivar Danielsson handed over official authority to Mikhail Kutusov-Tolstoy, making him, a foreigner' [a
269Some of these questions are touched upon in Lajos, 2004. Lajos, however, emphasizes the socio-political aspects of Jewish rescue in
Budapest. He does not cover in depth the actions or contacts of particular individuals other than Raoul Wallenberg, both in terms of rescue
work as well as the numerous intelligence interests that existed in 1944 Hungary. His essay also does not address any economic issues, including
questions related to business or economic warfare.
270FSB, Interrogation protocol of Grosheim-Krisko from 20 April, 1945, Grosheim-Krisko had worked in Hungary since 1941, including for the
German Economic Administration [Deutsche Wirtschaftsdienst]. Through the years he had had business contacts with several Swedish firms. He
obtained a position at the Swedish Legation, Budapest through the intervention of Nandor Batisfalvy, the Hungarian Police Chief in charge of
foreigners. Grosheim -Krisko was one of the many controversial figured who associated with Swedish Legation, Budapest.
271In several letters to the Swedish Minister in Rumania, Reuterswaerd, Valdemar Langlet strongly insinuates his criticism of the Swedish
Legations behavior during 1944 and the handling of issues such as the safekeeping of valuables on behalf of certain individuals. ECR, p. 266;
also P57, letter from 24, 28 March and 1 April, 1945 respectively. See also poem by Lars Berg from June 1945. The poem gives the strong
impression that the Legation had a fairly restrained involvement with Jewish rescue efforts. Wallenberg is pointed out as the being the only one
who is always running around and who does not take time out to relax.
272von Dardel, private collection. Report by Nanna Svartz, 1962. A Dr. Istvan Ruzniak, a physician working in Szeged who provided
information to Raoul Wallenberg, is mentioned by Levai, p.267.
273ibid. Especially after they had heard the Kossuth Radio report on March 8, 1945 which stated that Raoul Wallenberg had been murdered by on
the way to Debrecen. The member of the Swedish Legation, Budapest also had access to Langlet's letters to Reuterswaerd in Bukarest, in
which he speculates about Raoul Wallenberg possible death.
Questions remain also about the role of Edvard Engestroem who had been accused of reporting the activities of the Swedish Legation to German
and Hungarian Nazi officials. Engestroem was later detained by the Russians, but was quickly released,. His is file at SAEPO raises questions
about his possible role as a Soviet informer. Interestingly, U.S. archival records indicate that Engestroem received a payment of $1666 from the
U.S., as discussed with Count Bonde of the Swedish Legation, in 1946. NARA, RG 56, State Department, Special Projects Division. 14 January,
1946. Another entry from September 1945 discusses transfer of relief funds for Swedish subjects, so Engestroem may have been the recipient in
this connection.
274According to Sudoplatov, representatives of Soviet Military Intelligence at the Hungarian front [Smersh] had received information that Raoul
Wallenberg was "an established asset of German, American and British Intelligence." Sudoplatov, p. 268
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 56
White-Russian national], and not Raoul Wallenberg the official Swedish representative in Pest. To make matters worse, even
though Raoul Wallenberg apparently had explicitly requested permission from his superior Danielsson to contact the Russian
troops in Pest, Danielsson claimed as early as April 1945 that Wallenberg had left without seeking prior authorization for such a
contact.275
Raoul Wallenberg had been included in the official list handed over by Staffan Soederblom to Soviet authorities in December
1944, requesting Soviet protection of official Swedish Legation Staff. And when Danielsson authorized Wallenberg to contact
Soviet troops he obviously asked him to do so in official [Swedish] capacity. Yet in the aftermath of Wallenberg's disappearance
Danielsson repeatedly went out of his way to stress that Wallenberg had not been official Swedish Charge d'Affaire when the
Soviets marched in to Budapest, clearly 276 So, precisely at the most critical time, Raoul Wallenberg's status was left completely
undefined. Goeran Rydeberg goes so far to say that this uncertainty, both about Wallenberg's original responsibility or authority
and the work that had been carried out, as well the lack of coordination with the rest of the Swedish Legation and with the
authorities in Stockholm, now in January 1945 left the members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest open to "blackmail."277 If
there were fears of Soviet aggression, Rydeberg writes, it would conceivably have led to a wish to distance the Swedish personnel
from Wallenberg's activities.
Oddly enough, it was Staffan Soederblom who in the first weeks after Wallenberg's disappearance not only recognized the danger
of Wallenberg's situation but who urged the Swedish Foreign Office to take action on his behalf. 278 The tone of his early
communications with Stockholm is businesslike and shows traces of true concern. February 8, 1945:
"Question whether Wallenberg .. - who is registered as Secretary of Legation ... ought to
get instructions concerning his status."
And later:
"My thought .... was that Wallenberg is instructed to take up contact with the new Hungarian
government ... in his capacity as official representative... Some information of this kind seems
even more suitable since Wallenberg probably has not gotten the least sign of life from home."
279
Soederblom's attitude toward Wallenberg, however, undergoes a visibly strong shift one day after his meeting with Ivar
Danielsson and the other members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest on April 13, 1945 in Moscow. Whereas before
Soederblom's tone had been sober
- "Wallenberg disappeared since January 17 when he intended to depart by car "- ,
on April 14, he now suddenly claims that
"Wallenberg snuck on his own initiative over to the Russian lines,"
implying strong personal disapproval and even inappropriateness of Wallenberg's behavior.
Why such sudden hostility towards Wallenberg? Why did Danielsson portray Wallenberg's behavior in such a negative light, since
he himself had given Wallenberg permission to contact the Russian troops? And why was this impression never corrected once the
275In addition, Wallenberg's diplomatic passport which was due to expire on 31 December, 1944 had been only haphazardly extended by Per
Anger with a simple handwritten note. Wallenberg also had been issued a regular Swedish passport before his departure to Budapest [Nr. 1044,
issued on 14 June, 1944] This passport was not returned by the Russian side in 1989.
276UD, P2 Eu 1, Telegram Celsing to Stockholm, 19 November 1946.
277Rydeberg, p. 78
278see von Dardel. 1997
279UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 57
members of the Swedish Legation returned home to Sweden? 280
Other important questions remain. One day after the Soviet controlled Hungarian radio had announced on March 8, 1945 that
Raoul Wallenberg had been killed on his way to Debrecen, Ivar Danielsson on 9 March requested a meeting with the highest
Soviet representative in Hungary, General Pavlov to discuss issues concerning the conduct of the Swedish Legation during the
previous months. 281 No records of these discussions have been made available. On that same day, Margareta Bauer prepared a
formal statement concerning the handling of Russian records at the Swedish Legation, Budapest. 282 The issue appears to have
been of some concern.
During the half-day stay in Moscow on 13 April, 1945, Danielsson and Soederblom conferred for some time in private. Topics
covered, among other things, were the violence and destructive behavior of the Soviet occupation troops, the work of the Swedish
Red Cross [and the problem of Valdemar Langlet's activities], the interests of Swedish businesses, Raoul Wallenberg's activities
and disappearance, as well as the issue of valuables the Swedish Legation had stored on prominent Hungarians' behalf. This last
point in particular Soederblom stresses repeatedly and he also several time emphatically urges Stockholm
"to thoroughly analyze all information the Swedish Legation members have available."
before he takes further steps with Soviet authorities. 283
In an interview Per Anger recalls that a visibly agitated Soederblom, with a reference to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic
countries, admonished him
"Remember, when you get home to Sweden, not a bad word about the Russians." 284
When Soederblom returned to Stockholm for consultations in November 1945, neither he nor Ivar Danielsson met with Raoul
Wallenberg's parents Maj and Fredrik von Dardel, despite their repeated requests. Soederblom made it clear that his conclusion
that Raoul Wallenberg had died was based on information he had received from the returning members of the Swedish Legation,
Budapest. 285
The issue of what exactly transpired in Budapest, during and immediately after the humanitarian mission, the personal attitude of
the Swedish Legation members towards Raoul Wallenberg and the information they provided to the Russians need to be examined
in depth. Equally critical is it to determine the possible motives behind the Swedish government's inclination to accept Raoul
Wallenberg's death and who or what considerations may have influenced that decision. Even when word came in the fall of 1945
from a well-placed Hungarian source - the Hungarian National Bank President Takaczy who served at the will of the Soviet
occupation power - that Wallenberg had been arrested by Soviet forces, the Foreign Office apparently already had accepted the
inevitability of Wallenberg's demise and conveyed this conviction to U.S. officials. The last line of a telegram from the State
Department, addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and signed by the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, explains
that
"the [Swedish] FONOFF [Foreign Office] feels that even if the info is true [about
280The impression lingers to this day. The Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group even makes the point in its report of January
2001. Per Anger does mention Wallenberg's request for permission in his book Med Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest, published in 1979.
281See Stefan Lindgren. 1994. "Doeljer Sverige medvetet sanningen om Raoul Wlalenbergs oede?" Sveriges Radio. 3 October.
282UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD. Statement signed by Margareta Bauer. 9 March, 1945. In a joint statement written after the war Per Anger and Ivar
Danielsson reported that General Pavlov had informed them that he had received orders from Moscow to take charge of the members of the
Swedish Legation, Budapest and to send them home via Bukarest and Moscow. No documentation concerning Pavlov's alleged orders or his
conversation with Danielsson has been released from Russian archives.
283UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Soederblom, 17, April 1945.
284Per Anger. 1985. With Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest. Holocaust Library. p. 132; see also Bob Kimmel [Producer]. 2001. Searching for
Raoul Wallenberg. Intrepid Documentaries. Interview with Per Anger.
285UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Soederblom to the Foreign Office, 18 December, 1945
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 58
Wallenberg's arrest], the Soviets will never produce Wallenberg alive."286
Aside from the understandable limitations of the scope of its research and for all its detail, the Eliasson Report is quiet on several
other critical points. One is not only the possible motives behind Swedish behavior, but also the larger implications of this
behavior. For example, one should ask what the consequences for the Raoul Wallenberg case would have been, if certain highranking
members of the Foreign Office sympathized with the Soviet Union, or perhaps even did the Soviets' bidding. Surely,
there would have been very little incentive to drive the search for Raoul Wallenberg energetically. What about the curious
passivity of the Wallenberg family? Did it set the tone for UD's actions in the case? And what would Raoul Wallenberg have
reported on his return to Sweden? That the Russians had ample reasons to be concerned about releasing Wallenberg is clear, but
were there also problematic issues resulting from Swedish activities - such as Wallenberg business, for example, or the activities
of the Swedish Legation/Red Cross in terms of representation of foreign interests and/or ties to various intelligence circles - that
can account for the general lack of enthusiasm in Sweden to actively pursue his return?
b. Need for a more specific analysis of the historical context
Closely related to this is the second problem: The Commission Report evaluates the Wallenberg case primarily against the larger
background of Swedish-Soviet relations, meaning Sweden's general security and economic policy considerations of the Cold War
period.287 The Eliasson Report, however does not focus on the ebb and flow of events within this larger framework or how specific
events affected the handling of Wallenberg case as such. This is a critical omission, since the Wallenberg case - as the Commission
recognizes but does not outline in detail - did not take place in isolation. Two main aspects characterized Sweden's behavior: Fear
of its neighbor to the East and need for accommodation. These were met by a policy that combined a strategy of deterrence - by
making it clear that in case of an attack Sweden would hold out long enough until it received help from Western powers - and
"bridge building" between the superpowers, which later turned into a policy of assuring the Soviet Union of Sweden's
commitment to neutrality. 288 By focusing purely on the larger picture, however, the Eliasson Commission neglects the subtlety of
the situation.
A mere month after the Gromyko memorandum, on 5 March, 1957 came the formal Soviet complaint over years of Swedish
espionage [in conjunction with American and British efforts] in the Baltic countries. Despite its clear guilt, Sweden denied all
knowledge. 289 Aside from the obvious intention of wishing to discredit Sweden, the timing of the revelation that the Soviets had
penetrated the Allied/Swedish network for the past seven years raised several questions. Rolf Sohlman, the Swedish Ambassador
in Moscow suggested that "as odd as it may appear" there were in fact signs that the Soviet action
"was designed as a gesture to Sweden to improve relations." 290
In light of a number of internal and external pressures, like the worldwide condemnation the Soviets had received for the brutal
squashing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, there were strong signs that overall Soviet policy was designed to reach out to
286NARA, RG 59. Records of the U.S. Special War Problems Office. 20 September, 1945. It has not been possible to trace the source of this
comment on the Swedish side. The last line of the telegram is crossed out and a handwritten note states that "Mr. Clattenberg agreed to
omission." Clattenberg was then the head of the Special War Problems Office, which dealt with a variety of issues arising from the war,
including refugees and the tracing of lost diplomatic personnel. No additional material concerning the Wallenberg case has been found among
the records of this collection. The Special War Problems Office served as a type of liaison to the FBI and OSS/CIA.
287The Eliasson Commission commissioned three background studies on Soviet-Swedish relations which formed the basis of its analysis: Olof
Kronvall. Oesten Undens sovjetsyn och sovjetpolitik 1945-1962; Magnus Petterson. Svensk-sovjetiska saekerhetspolitiska relationer 1945-1960;
and Professor Kent Zetterberg. Oesten Undens syn pa det internationella systemet och den internationella politiken 1919-1965. The Commission
Report, however, does not relate the Raoul Wallenberg case to other specific events in those critical years
288In his analysis Petersson recognizes four distinct phases for Swedish-Soviet relations until 1960: 1945-1947: Relations were relatively good;
1948-1953 increasing tensions; 1954-1956 lessening of tensions; 1957-1960 relations again more tense.
289Kadhammar, p. 152-3. [Det aer med uppriktig foervaning ...Noten innehaller en rad orimliga pastaenden och beskyllningar ... faller pas sin
egen orimlighet svenska myndigheter star helt fraemmande foer varje slags agentverksamhet i spionagesyfte pas sovjetryskt territorium ...]
290UD, HP 1 Eu, P.M. by Rolf Sohlman, March 8, 1957 and Sohlman to Unden March 12, 1957.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 59
Sweden in the hope that it would continue its official Neutrality Policy. 291
Leaving aside for a moment the question whether or not Sohlman's assessment of the Soviet action is valid, it is clear that both
Sohlman and Unden at this moment define Raoul Wallenberg and the other arrested Swedish agents as the cost Sweden has to
incur for detente and not as the price it could possibly exact from the Soviets in return for Swedish assurances of continued
adherence to its Neutrality position. 292
In this connection, Soviet attempts from 1956-57 to conduct unofficial talks in the Raoul Wallenberg case between the Finnish
diplomat Ake Frey and Soviet official Pavel Erzine and later Viktor Vladimirov also deserve further scrutiny.293 During these
discussions the Swedes not only for the first time received Soviet confirmation [although unofficially] that Wallenberg had
indeed been held prisoner in the Soviet Union, they also received a hint that Wallenberg's background was of some interest to the
Russians. On 20 December, 1956, towards the end of a two-year exchange, Vladimirov asks Ake Frey whether it would be
possible to discuss "off the record" a Russian draft answer before the Soviets present the official answer in the Wallenberg case.
Vladimirov adds somewhat cryptically that
"humanitarian aspects do not have much meaning in Moscow."
That Wallenberg belonged to a well known family was "more to the point." 294
However, on 18 January, 1957 the head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Political Department at the time, Sverker Astroem,
informs Frey that from the Swedish side it would hardly be possible to conduct secret discussions. 295 Eighteen days later, on 6
February, 1957, the Soviets Deputy Foreign Minister presents the Soviet claim that Wallenberg had died in 1947.
Some years later Ake Frey explained that in his mind the negotiations in 1955-57 had been serious but that the Chief of the
Political Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Enckell, had suddenly ordered him to break off contact.296 Enckell
apparently acted in close coordination with the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The Frey-Vladimirov contacts were conducted parallel
to official preparations of the Gromyko memorandum. In an interview with the Swedish-Russian Working Group Viktor
Vladimirov explained that the Soviet leadership wanted to find out exactly what information the Swedish government possessed in
1956.297
291He pointed out that Sweden had not been singled out for public criticism in either of the main Soviet newspapers, Izvestia or Pravda and that
the general tone of the Soviet protest had been exceedingly polite. Another indication is that Bulganin and Khrushchev through intermediaries
expressed the wish to be invited to Sweden for an official visit. They were told this would be impossible in light of recent events in Hungary. see
UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, P.M. from 2 July, 1957, Sven Fredrik Hedin reports about his discussion with Soviet official at the Soviet Embassy in
Stockholm, Slabov.
292In his memorandum Sohlman expresses no concern for the fate of the fourteen men who were arrested seven years earlier, nor does he raise
the question of how Sweden might obtain their release. On the importance of the timing of the Gromyko memorandum in light of events in
Hungary in 1956 see Barany, 1997. There is also no indication that Sohlman or Unden were considering taking advantage of the arrest in August
1956 - a few months after Prime Minister Tage Erlander's formal visit to Moscow - of Russian spy Anatole Ericsson, who had been charged with
stealing radar secrets from L.M. Ericsson. Ericsson was quickly sentenced to twelve years hard labor in October 1956.
293For a more detailed account see Berger, 2001.
294Records about the Vladimirov-Frey discussions are not accessible in Russian archives. These were highlevel exchanges: Pavel Erzine's
superior, the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, Boris Podtserob, was for years Head of Vyatcheslav Molotov's Secretariat, including for the
critical years of the Raoul Wallenberg case, 1946/47; Pavel Erzine was the Chief KGB Rezident' in Turkey and later President of Patrick
Lumumba University in Moscow.
295UD, P2 EU1, RWD, P.M. signed by Sverker Astroem. 18 January, 1957.
296UD, P2 EU 1, RWD, handwritten P.M. by Sten Aminoff, 30 September, 1964. Frey further claimed that his career was ruined as a result of
his involvement in the negotiations.
297According to Victor Vladimirov, the Swedish/Finnish contacts had been ordered directly by Ivan Serov, the head of the KGB. Sudoplatov
[Russian edition], p. 651-653. The Soviets should have actually had a reasonably good idea about Swedish state of knowledge in the Raoul
Wallenberg case, through Swedish press accounts, formal and informal contacts in Sweden, etc. Experts generally agree that at the very least
Molotov and Serov knew the truth about Wallenberg's fate. Sudoplatov claims that the true purpose of Vladimirov's mission was to reestablish
contacts with the Wallenberg family. He also states that "Vladimirov had information that the Wallenberg family was definitely interested in
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 60
If Molotov and Serov had clear information about Raoul Wallenberg's death in 1947, such efforts would seem somewhat
excessive, especially since the Soviet side should have had a fairly clear idea about the state of Swedish knowledge in the
Wallenberg affair from a variety of sources. It is possible that the discussions with Sweden served purely as a distraction and delay
tactic before the official Soviet response was to be presented.298 Ake Frey repeatedly reported his impression that at the time of the
discussions Raoul Wallenberg appeared to be dead. Nevertheless, it should be of some interest to determine how much the
Gromyko Memorandum is a reflection of the failure of these Russian contacts. In other words, it will have to be determined if it
would have been possible to gain further concessions from the Russians in light of their wish for improved relations with Sweden
than were reached during those years.
Instead of pursuing the problem from all possible angles, Swedish officials slowly stripped the Raoul Wallenberg case of all
relevant complexities and interrelated aspects. In fact, Sweden chose to handle all major Cold War cases - such as the
disappearance of a DC-3 spy plane with a eight-men crew in 1952 over the Baltic Sea or the arrest as a Russian spy of Swedish
Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroem in 1963 - in perfect isolation from each other. Stig Wennerstroem operated as a Russian
agent for almost two decades and he apparently did not act alone. 299His betrayal of the DC-3 cost the lives of eight men, yet he has
been allowed to live out his life in comfort and security in his own country. If he had help, as has been alleged, those who
supported him were most likely just as well positioned in Swedish society as Wennerstroem himself. The full impact of his
activities and those of his potential helpers on the Swedish government's handling of various Cold War issues remains essentially
unexplored. 300
The important question is: Were these cases handled separately to increase chances of a resolution or mainly to prevent "cross
contamination," to avoid one issue dredging up related problems in another case? Even when the Russians tried to link them, as
happened on at least one occasion in the Wallenberg and Wennerstroem case, Swedish officials did not react.
c. Focus only on early years
The third problem is that, as already mentioned earlier, the Eliasson Report focuses on the early events in the Raoul Wallenberg
case. It is vital that the behavior in later years be subjected to the same scrutiny. It has to be determined how detrimental Swedish
Minister Staffan Soederblom's behavior in 1945/46 really was. In other words, one cannot simply assume that there was no chance
to rescue Raoul Wallenberg after 1947. The question posed by the Eliasson Commission for the time 1945-47 - What did Swedish
officials really know and when did they know it? - is just as relevant for the following decades.301 Were Swedish officials truly
safeguarding "a higher good" [viktigare vaerden], that is the national security of the many, as Oesten Unden claimed in 1957, or
were they primarily protecting the special interests of a few? Why, for example, are there essentially no records from the Swedish
Foreign Intelligence Service in this case? Even if it was beyond its scope to provide operational advice or intelligence, one would
expect it to have provided some type of evaluation in the question. If not, then this lack of referral or exchange between Swedish
agencies raises questions about how seriously the case was pursued in later years.
sabotaging any discussion of Raoul Wallenberg's mission in Hungary." Sudoplatov's statements have proved false or questionable on a number
of issues and have to be considered with greatest caution. No records concerning Vladimirov's contacts with Ake Frey have so far been released
from Russian Intelligence Archives.
298Soviet records from the period show that the Soviet leadership already in the spring of 1956 had decided to delay its answer to Sweden at least
until after Swedish parliamentary election in the Fall of 1956, apparently for tactical consideration. According to Aminoff's P.M. from 1964 Frey
stated that the Soviets appeared to not possess information about Wallenberg's fate after a certain point in time.
299Tore Forsberg, a former Swedish Security Police official, questions Anders Sundelin's theory that Stig Wennerstroem was helped by
unidentified accomplices. However, most analysts argue that the issue remains open. see Forsberg, 2003.
300Sweden also may have had one spy operating in Russia, aside from agents infiltrating the Baltic states. Isaac Markovich Wolfin, was an
employee of the Soviet Legation, Stockholm in the early 1940's and later served as a Swedish language instructor at a GRU [military
intelligence] School. He was arrested in the fall of 1946, on charges of espionage. His prisoner registration card carries the notation "Swedish
spy". Wolfin appears to have agreed to cooperate and seems to have functioned as a cell spy. [see Makinen/Kaplan, 2001]
301So is the state of knowledge in other countries, like the U.S. and Britain.
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 61
An archivist once told me that
"the problem with the Wallenberg case in Russia is that everything is closed; and in Sweden,
that everything is open."
He was making an oblique reference to Sweden's principle of openness' [Offentlighetsprincipen] which makes it very difficult to
keep information secret by placing very severe restrictions on both the length of time and the reasons for which documents may be
classified. This has had the unintended effect that officials who may feel very strongly that certain documents should stay secret,
see no other option but to take them out of circulation. There are several instances, where former officials handed back
documentation they had removed from Swedish archives during their service. So, aside from unknown diaries and memoirs one
cannot discount that here and there additional information remains locked away in private attics or basements.
d. No systematic analysis
Out of this grows the fourth problem, namely that the Eliasson Commission does not thoroughly examine how much attitudes and
assumptions guided Swedish behavior, especially in later years. Many officials were inclined to believe and not afraid to say so in
private conversations that Raoul Wallenberg had died in 1947 and that any further search was futile. Most officials met the
continued insistence of Wallenberg's relatives to pursue the truth with thinly veiled impatience and downright irritation. Far
from a source of pride, for many officials the case became simply a cause for embarrassment. Quite a few let this personal belief
influence their official handling of the case. 302 This tendency was so strong that it persisted even when new information was
presented. As a result, important details were lost or simply ignored. Ambassador Krister Wickman's statement in 1972 in Vienna
summarized official UD policy for that time:
"For us, the Wallenberg case is a closed chapter." 303
Subconsciously or intentionally - nowhere did assumptions have such a devastating effect as in the handling of witness
testimonies. The report states that an effective system of evaluation for testimonies has been in place since 1951 [when Otto
Danielsson joined the case]. This is simply not true.304 One just has to read through the UD materials to ascertain that witness
interviews were far from uniform or systematic. Neither was analysis or follow-up of the gathered information. Instead both were
often haphazard and incomplete. There are countless examples of testimonies whose most critical points were not adequately
followed up despite compelling reasons to pursue the leads they provided.305 In many cases the witnesses themselves were
disparaged. It should be stressed that the problem was never with the rank and file. Many worked extremely hard for years to
record and pursue any trace of information about Raoul Wallenberg. The problem is that Sweden's present-day view and political
definition of the Raoul Wallenberg problem is in its essence not very different from Oesten Unden's definition of 1957. Another is
the Swedish Foreign Office's absolute determination to protect the country's carefully crafted image which officials fear might
suffer irreparable harm if certain facts came to light. 306
302As can be seen from the diary of Ulla Lindstroem, one of Undens closest associates, even in 1956 Unden did not believe that Raoul
Wallenberg had ever been held prisoner in the Soviet Union. SWR, p. 107 [Lindstroem's diary entry dates from 1 April, 1956, the time of Prime
Minister Erlander's official visit to the Soviet Union.]
303UD, HP1 G/Oesterrike, 14 January, 1971.
304There were occasional efforts to summarize and analyze accumulated material, i.e. Sjoeborg [1951] and Nystroem [1986], but this is not the
same as pursuing a continuous, systematic approach.
305For example, in the Svartz - Myasnikov question Swedish officials completely ignored the fact that a second physician - Professor Grigory
Danishevsky - had been present during parts of the meeting in 1961; no attempts to formally interview Carl Gustav Svingel were made until the
early 1990's; in 1984 Karoly Remenyi, a highranking Intelligence officer in AVO/AVH in the early 1950s, testified that his superior, Sandor
Rajnai had potentially important information in the Wallenberg case. Rajnai, a close associate of KGB Chief Yuri Andropov and by 1984 the
Hungarian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was never questioned. He died in 1994. Remenyi stated that from his contacts with Soviet advisors
he learned that Raoul Wallenberg was alive after 1947, but was presumed dead after 1954/55; in 2001 a witness reported quite detailed
information about a Swedish diplomat possibly having been held in a psychiatric facility in Barnaul during the 1970's. This information was not
followed up at all. Independent consultants to the Swedish-Russian Working Group did not have full or unhindered access to all witness
testimonies.
306A big factor also is the UD's deeply ingrained code of loyalty. Public criticism of UD officials is anathema and even internal disagreements
Susanne Berger Stuck in Neutral Page 62
e. Consequences of the failure to conduct a systematic analysis
Most importantly, many officials failed to acknowledge the larger complexities of the problems posed by the Wallenberg inquiry.
Instead of systematically registering, analyzing and crosschecking all details, Swedish officials often handled each witness
testimony on its own terms. As a result, they routinely ignored statements which did not fit their expectations. For example, no less
than 38 individuals reported having contact or hearing of Raoul Wallenberg in Lubianka or Lefortovo prison in the years after
1947.307 Many of these testimonies were dismissed outright because it was assumed that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947 and
that the accounts echoed Wallenberg's earlier stay in these prisons. Or it was believed that the prisoner in question was simply
another Swede. There were in fact several hundred of them held captive in the Soviet Union through the years.
Not of all these men have been fully identified. In the case of Swedish espionage missions to the Baltic countries in the late 1940's
it is not known how many Swedes or individuals working in official Swedish capacity ended up in Soviet captivity. 308 Questions
also persist as to missing individuals from Swedish Red Cross or other missions in Eastern Europe after WWII. 309 For almost
sixty years the Swedish government has not had a comprehensive list/database of all Swedish citizens and other Scandinavians
held in Soviet captivity - it is finally now in the process of constructing one. 310
Swedish nationals were even reportedly held in Vladimir prison. A witness stated that in the early 1950's he met a Swedish man
named "Eriksson" who, together with two colleagues, had been officially associated with the Red Cross in Eastern Europe in the
mid 1940s. 311 A similar encounter with a "Swedish diplomat" arrested in Eastern Europe in 1945 was related by German prisoner
of war, Theodor von Dufving.312 Based on their very similar case profile, these men could have easily been mistaken for Raoul
Wallenberg throughout Soviet camps and prisons. Establishing their full identity and formal tracking when and where these men
were encountered, on the other hand, would have made the evaluation of witness testimonies and with that the whole Raoul
Wallenberg inquiry much more efficient. Instead, confusion was allowed to reign. What resulted was the wholesale dismissal of
testimonies as "unreliable" which might have yielded very useful information, if a larger framework of analysis had been
employed. 313
are to be avoided. As the former U.S. Ambassador to the United States, Jan Eliasson, recently put it in

[Magda Hassan]

Investor AB



Address:
Arsenalsg 8c
Stockholm
S-103 32
Sweden

Telephone: 46 8 614 20 00
Fax: 46 8 614 21 50
http://www.investorab.com

Statistics:
Public Company
Incorporated: 1916
Employees: 320
Total Assets: SEK 163.65 billion ($14.27 billion) (2003)
Stock Exchanges: Stockholm
Ticker Symbol: INVE
NAIC: 551112 Offices of Other Holding Companies


Company Perspectives:
Vision: To deliver superior returns to shareholders by establishing Investor AB as a globally recognized entrepreneurial and active owner of companies with high growth and profit potential. Goal: To grow net asset value in excess of market cost of capital over a business cycle.


Key Dates:
1856: André Oscar Wallenberg founds Stockholms Enskilda Banken (SEB).
1863: Wallenberg backs creation of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken.
1916: Investor AB is formed after new legislation restricting direct ownership by banks of shares in industrial companies.
1946: Wallenbergs form second investment vehicle, Providentia.
1971: Merger of SEB and Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken creates S-E Banken but reduces Wallenbergs to minority ownership; Investor now becomes family flagship, joined by new investment company, Export-Invest.
1992: Investor acquires Providentia.
1994: Investor acquires Export-Invest.
1995: Investor forms start-up investment specialist, Novare Kapital.
1999: Marcus Wallenberg is named president and CEO of Investor.
2002: Company increases shareholding in most of its long-term investments, including ABB, Electrolux, Ericsson, SEB, and WM-data.
2003: Company acquires stake in Hi3G, joint-owned by Hutchison Whampoa.
2004: Investor AB becomes candidate to re-acquire control of Scania after European Commission directs Volvo to sell off its stake in that company.


Company History: Investor AB is the flagship of the Wallenberg financial empire--the family has long dominated northern Europe's financial sector and, through Investor and other investment vehicles, owns as much as 40 percent of the value of companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (as well as a share of the exchange itself). Once an offshoot of the family's core banking business--now known as SEB--Investor AB has itself become the family's largest business, with more than SEK 163 billion ($14 billion) in assets at the end of 2003. Investor is the holding vehicle for the Wallenberg's primary investments, many of which date back to the beginning of the 20th century. As such the company holds major and often controlling stakes in much of Swedish industry, including Atlas Copco, Electrolux, Ericsson, Gambro, SEB, and WM-data. Together, these six companies represent the vast majority of the company's total assets. At the turn of the 21st century, Investor began seeking to reduce its reliance on "old-fashioned" industrial investments, launching a thrust to increase its number of "New Investments," and especially the high technology sector. Among the group's recent acquisitions is a controlling stake in Hi3G, one of Sweden's high-speed mobile telephone licenses. More than a simple investment group, Investor plays an active role in the operation of the companies in which it invests, appointing CEOs, taking seats on the board of the directors, and steering mergers and acquisitions. With its own listing on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, the company has nonetheless been under pressure from its own shareholders to reduce its large-scale investments in favor of smaller, more flexible, and more short-term stakes. The company is led by CEO Marcus Wallenberg, the fifth generation of the Wallenberg family to oversee its financial empire.
19th-Century Financial Empire
Founded in 1916, Investor AB already represented some 60 years of the Wallenberg family's influence in Sweden's financial and industrial communities. By then, too, the family had already cemented its position as one of the most influential family dynasties in Scandinavia--and in the whole of Europe. Yet, into the 18th century, the Wallenbergs, or Persson, as the family was originally known, remained rooted in Sweden's peasant class.
Upward mobility began for the family, originally from Skärkinds parish, near Norrköping, when Jacob Persson was named constable of the parish in the early decades of the 18th century. Persson later married the daughter of a member of the Swedish clergy--a mark of his improved social standing--and changed his name to the more upwardly mobile name of Wallberg. Jacob Wallberg died in 1758. The influence of the church remained strong in Swedish society through the second half of that century, and both of Wallberg's sons, Jacob and Marcus, entered the clergy themselves, signifying the family's growing prominence. Both Jacob and Marcus then adopted the family name of Wallenberg.
The next generation of Wallenbergs carried on the family's ascension, when Marcus Wallenberg, born in 1774, became Bishop of Linköping in 1819, signaling the family's arrival near the top of Swedish social life. Yet it was the following generation that was to found the family's financial empire. Born in 1816, André Oscar Wallenberg was the youngest son of Marcus Wallenberg. When the elder Wallenberg died in 1833, André left school and began working as a deck hand on a ship trading between Sweden and the United States. Wallenberg then attended the Swedish Naval Academy, graduating in 1835. Yet, with no opening for an immediate appointment into the Navy's officer ranks, Wallenberg returned to the United States, gaining experience on merchant shipping lines.
Wallenberg, however, had already begun developing his business and financial interests, helping to set up Sweden's first steam boat company, and, in 1837, cofounding the Ostergötlands Enskilda Banken. Wallenberg later led that bank's extension, forming branches in Härnosand and Sundsvall in the 1850s, before founding his own bank, Stockholms Enskilda Banken (SEB), in 1856. The following decade, Wallenberg backed the formation of Sweden's first joint-stock limited liability bank, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken. In the meantime, Wallenberg continued to develop his influence in Sweden's political, social, and economic circles, joining the country's parliament.
André Wallenberg was joined by eldest son Knut, born in 1853. Although Knut Wallenberg was made a member of the family bank's board of directors in 1874, he went to work overseas, namely for Credit Lyonnais in France, where he deepened his banking experience before joining SEB full-time at the end of the decade--in time for the financial crisis that nearly caused the bank's collapse. Yet the bank was able to rebuild in the 1880s, in part by using Knut Wallenberg's French connections in order to place SEB in position as acting broker for foreign capital investments in Sweden. The country's financial crisis had also given the company the opportunity to take significant shares in a number of Sweden's fledgling industrial companies. These shareholdings became the basis of the future Investor AB.
André Wallenberg died in 1986, and Knut Wallenberg took over as leader of the family's financial and industrial empire, which included among other interests a growing shipping business. In 1892, Wallenberg was joined by one of his younger brothers, Marcus Wallenberg, who was named the bank's vice-president that year. Wallenberg, who held a legal degree from Uppsala University, took charge of restructuring and then building up the group's industrial shareholding. Together, Knut and Marcus Wallenberg developed SEB into a two-pronged powerhouse, building up its financial arm while putting together a diversified web of industrial holdings. By the turn of the century, the Wallenberg family was already the most powerful in Sweden, dominating its industrial sector.
Named Sweden's foreign minister, Knut Wallenberg transferred his CEO position to Marcus Wallenberg in 1911. Despite the Wallenberg family's dominant position in Swedish life, SEB was confronted with new legislation, enacted during World War I, which severely restricted the ability of the country's banks to hold long-term shares in Swedish industrial companies. In response to the new legislation, the Wallenbergs set up Investor AB in 1916, transferring its vast industrial shareholdings to the new holding company. From the start, therefore, Investor held majority positions in a number of Sweden's oldest and most prominent industrial companies, such as Scania, Atlas Copco, and others.
Wallenberg Flagship: 1970s
Marcus Wallenberg's growing political commitments led him to step down from the bank's leadership toward the end of World War I. His place was temporarily filled by an outsider to the family, Joseph Nachmanson, who had nonetheless served on the bank's board of directors since 1909 and had become a close confidant of Marcus Wallenberg. Nachmanson was credited with helping to guide the bank through the turbulent economic period after World War I, conducting a conservative investment strategy that prepared SEB for the economic collapse of the late 1920s and early 1930s.
By then, the third generation of the Wallenberg family had taken the leadership of the family empire. Jacob Wallenberg, eldest son of Marcus Wallenberg (Knut Wallenberg had died childless), had spent his early career working for foreign banks before joining SEB as a junior officer in 1918. After Nachmanson died in 1927, Jacob Wallenberg became the bank's president, joined by younger brother Marcus as the bank's vice-president. Nonetheless, Marcus, Sr., remained a strong presence in the family concern until his death in 1943.
As their father and uncle before them, the new generation of Wallenbergs proved complementary partners, with Jacob Wallenberg taking charge of leading the family's banking business, while Marcus Wallenberg developed its industrial holdings, helping to steer the company's growing range of businesses. Indeed, the bank's sound financial health during the Depression era allowed it to gain significant shareholding positions in many of Sweden's most important industrial companies. The family also took advantage of Sweden's acceptance of preferential share levels, in which certain classes of shares were accorded a stronger proportion of voting rights than others. As such, the Wallenberg's were able to parlay an investment stake into majority control of a company--for example, the group's 4 percent equity stake in Electrolux gave it control of nearly 94 percent of the company's voting rights.
While the Wallenberg family became world renowned for the heroic action of Raoul Wallenberg during World War II, the family's financial dealings led it into difficulties at the end of the war. In 1939, the Bosch company had approached SEB, offering to sell its American subsidiary to the bank in order to prevent it being taken over by the U.S. government--and turned over to Bosch's American competitors--in the event of the U.S. entry into the war. Jacob Wallenberg agreed to the transaction. At the end of the war, however, the bank was accused of having acted as a front for Bosch's continued ownership of its U.S. subsidiary. Threatened with SEB becoming blacklisted in the United States, Jacob Wallenberg agreed to step down from the bank's presidency, and instead was named chairman of both Investor and a newly formed family investment vehicle, Providentia, established in 1946. Marcus Wallenberg then became SEB president--which, in keeping with banking legislation, barred him from active involvement in the family's industrial investment companies.
Nearly 50 years later, the Wallenberg family's conduct during World War II was once again called into question, when it was revealed that SEB had accepted gold and securities stolen by the Germans from Dutch Jews during the war. At the same time, however, observers recognized that the importance of SEB and Sweden itself--as Germany's sole export market during the war--had played a role in providing the leverage needed to save tens of thousands of lives, not only through Raoul Wallenberg's efforts in Hungary, but also within Sweden itself.
The fourth generation of Wallenbergs joined the family business in 1953, including heir apparent Marc Wallenberg, eldest son of Marcus, Jr., who became an assistant director at SEB in 1953, before taking over as president after his father resigned the position in 1958. Marcus, Sr.'s decision meant that he was now eligible to take a position on the boards of the family's investment companies, Investor and Providentia, leading to a power struggle between him and Jacob Wallenberg.
Marcus Wallenberg ultimately triumphed over his brother, who resigned in 1969, opening his seat on the bank's board of directors to Peter Wallenberg. With Jacob Wallenberg out of the picture, Marcus Wallenberg pushed through a merger agreement between SEB and rival Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken in 1971. Soon after, however, tragedy struck the Wallenberg family when Marc Wallenberg committed suicide--observers suggested that the act came possibly because Wallenberg felt himself inadequate to the task of guiding what was to become the Scandinavian banking giant S-E Banken. The merger went through in 1972.
As a result of the merger, the Wallenberg family lost its majority control of the bank, including control of the bank's voting rights. Instead, Marcus Wallenberg, and younger son Peter, focused their interests on the family's investment companies, including Investor, Providentia, and a new investment vehicle created at the time of the bank merger, Export-Invest. Investor now became the family's flagship business, and, under Marcus Wallenberg's leadership began actively promoting the restructuring of most of the industrial companies under its control, replacing board members and promoting younger CEOs and other management.
Peter Wallenberg took over after Marcus Wallenberg's death in 1982. For many outsiders, the change in leadership marked a final moment in the family's more than 100-year dominance of the Swedish banking and industrial sectors. Indeed, the Wallenbergs were coming under increasing pressure to reform their shareholdings as a new range of foreign investors took significant stakes in former "Wallenberg" companies. Yet Peter Wallenberg rose to the challenge, guiding Investor--and Sweden's industry--into a new era.
Refocusing in the New Century
Investor under Peter Wallenberg drew back from the direct control over the operations of its holdings--in this sense, Wallenberg's strategy was more akin to uncle Jacob Wallenberg's leadership than his father's. The company also developed new competence in administration, market research, and finance, as well as a dedicated mergers and acquisitions team, and other competencies in order to provide support services to its corporate holdings.
Investor now pushed through a steady stream of mergers and acquisitions among its core holdings, resulting in the ultimate creation of the Stora Enso paper giant; the Swedish-Swiss ABB (Asea Brown Boveri), considered the first major cross-border European group; and the creation of Saab-Scania through a merger with GM. The company also divested parts of its longtime holdings, such as Kema Nobel. In 1991, Investor bought out GM's share of Saab-Scania. Meanwhile, the company split off parts of ABB as a new, publicly listed holding company, Incentive, which later developed into medical equipment group Gambro--itself controlled by Investor.
In 1992, Investor became the Wallenberg family's primary investment vehicle, through the takeover of Providentia. In 1994, the company also took over Export-Invest, then formed a new investment subsidiary, EQT, in partnership with SEB. The following year, the company created another investment subsidiary, Novare Kapital, part of its Investor Growth Capital division, which focused on investing in start-up companies.
Investor began a program of reducing its shareholding position in many of its long-term investments. After splitting Saab and Scania into two separate companies in 1995, Investor sold a 55 percent stake in Scania in a public listing on the Stockholm and New York Stock Exchanges. The following year, the company sold a stake in Saab to British Aerospace, then listed the automaker in a public offering. That year also saw the merger of Stora with Finland's Enso, creating Stora Enso, and the launch of the merger between Investor-held Astra with Zeneca, completed in 1998.The following year, the Wallenberg family regained control of S-E Banken, which was then renamed SEB.
Peter Wallenberg stepped down from leadership of Investor in 1997, replaced by Percy Barnevik, who had previously served as chairman of ABB, seconded by another longtime Wallenberg associate, Claes Dahlback. The latter gave up his position in 1999, however, as a new generation--the fifth--prepared to take over the reins of the company. Marcus Wallenberg, then 43, took over as company CEO, and set out to lead Investor--and the Wallenberg financial empire with it--into the new century. Investor now began to concentrate on building up a portfolio of shorter-term "New Investments," such as its purchase in 2003 of a major stake in Hi3G, part owned by Hutchison Whampoa, one of the winners of a high-speed mobile telephone license for the Swedish market. At the same time, Investor moved to solidify its positions in many of its core long-term holdings, including the acquisition of additional shares in ABB, Electrolux, Ericsson, SEB, and WM-data in 2002.
By 2004, Investor's commitment to long-term positions gave it a lift, as a strong performance by Ericsson during the previous year lifted Investor's own value. The company was also buoyed by a decision by the European Commission directing Volvo to sell off its stake in Scania--a move that opened the opportunity for Investor to regain its control over another of its oldest investments. Investor appeared to be a worthy flagship to carry the Wallenberg family empire into a new century.
Principal Subsidiaries: Atlas Copco AB (15%); Electrolux (6%); Ericsson (5%); Gambro AB (20%); Saab Automobile AB (20%); SEB (20%); WM-data (19%).
Principal Competitors: Dioss Holding spol S.R.O. ; Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group Inc.; Nissei Sangyo Company Ltd.; Barclays Bank Plc; American International Group Inc.; AXA UK PLC; Tomoegawa Paper Company Ltd.; General Electric Capital Services Inc.; Aviva plc; KBC Bankverzekeringsholding; Prudential Public Limited Co.




Further Reading:

• Gumbel, Peter, "Putting on Heirs: A New Generation Is Leading Europe's Biggest Family Firms Toward New Profits--and Risks," Time, March 24, 2003, p. A10.
  
• Hopkins, Nic, "Wallenbergs Will Go Back to the Future," Times, October 18, 2003, p. 59.
  
• Kochan, Nick, "Drawing a Bead on a Swedish Dynasty," Euromoney, September 2001, p. 200.
  
• ------, "No Longer a Family Affair," Business Week, December 17, 2001, p. 22.
  
• Lindgren, Hakan, Succession Strategies in a Large Family Business Group: The Case of the Swedish Wallenberg Family, paper prepared for the 6th European Business History Association Annual Congress in Helsinki, August 22-24, 2002.
  
• Rubin, Dana, "Old Wine, New Bottle?," Institutional Investor International Edition, October 1999, p. 42.
  
• Shearlock, Peter, "Trim the Empire," Banker, March 1996, p. 22.
  

Source: International Directory of Company Histories, Vol.63. St. James Press, 2004.

[Magda Hassan]

http://www.muckety.com/Jacob-Wallenberg/642.muckety
Click this link for relationship diagram
Jacob Wallenberg




Gender: Male

Age in 2011: 57


Areas of interest:

business
, nonprofits

Biographical information:


Jacob Wallenberg is chairman of the board of Investor AB, a Swedish industrial holding company, and has held this position since April 2005.

-- Bio source: SEC proxy statements



Financial information:


As an officer, director and/or owner of publicly traded securities, Jacob Wallenberg has filed documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission. >> See filings

Jacob Wallenberg current relationships:

ABB Group - director
Atlas Copco AB - vice chairman
Coca-Cola Company - director
Indian School of Business - governing board member
Investor AB - chairman
Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation - board member
Lauder Institute - governor
Nobel Foundation - board member
Peterson Institute for International Economics - director
SAS AB - vice chairman
SEB, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken - vice chairman
W Capital Management - board member
Jacob Wallenberg past relationships:

2008 Bilderberg conference - participant
Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States - vice chairman

Muckety map information sources include:


Securities and Exchange Commission

[Magda Hassan]

Jacob Wallenberg, chairman of Investor: The crisis creates opportunities

Investor ett tungt namn i Sverige.

Investor - a big name in Sweden.

Bakom namnet står bank- och industrifamiljen Wallenberg, som i nu sex generationer haft stor betydelse för utvecklingen av svenskt näringsliv.

Behind the name stands banking industry and the Wallenberg family, which now six generations had great significance for the development of Swedish industry.

Möt i denna intervju ordföranden för Investor och familjens nuvarande överhuvud, Jacob Wallenberg.

Meet in this interview the President of the Investor and the family's current head, Jacob Wallenberg.

Är man rätt positionerad och har en stark balansräkning är det nu man kan göra de intressanta affärerna, säger Jacob Wallenberg.

- Are you properly positioned and has a strong balance sheet, it is now doing the interesting business, "says Jacob Wallenberg.

Bilder: Michael Melanson.

Photos: Michael Melanson.

Det är en uppsluppen Jacob Wallenberg som Aktiespararen möter för att summera Wallenberggruppens läge efter en tung vinter och vår.

It is a spirited Jacob Wallenberg as Shareholders' Association meets to summarize the Wallenberg group mode after a heavy winter and spring.

Trots finanskris, djup lågkonjunktur och börsvärden som doppat djupt under vintern säger han sig sova lugnt om natten.

Despite the financial crisis, deep recession and stock market values dipped deep in winter says he sleep at night.

I själva verket ger börsens ledande ägarfamilj i högsta grad signaler om att den nu siktar på nya viktiga investeringar.

In fact, the Exchange's leading owning family in the highest degree of signal that it is now aiming for major new investments.

Det är kontratecken mot för ett par år sedan.

It is counter-evidence against a couple of years ago.

Fortfarande i högkonjunkturen började Investor då att hålla igen.

Still, the boom began when the investor to hold back.

Sedan kom de vältajmade försäljningarna av aktieposterna i Scania och OMX, som fyllde på kassan med över 20 miljarder kronor.

Then came the well timed sales of stakes in Scania and OMX, which replenished the fund with more than 20 billion.

Annat var det 1993, i förra krisen.

Things were different in 1993, the last crisis.

Då var Jacob Wallenberg en av bankcheferna på SE-banken.

Then it was Jacob Wallenberg one of the bank managers at U.S. Bank.

Fadern, Peter Wallenberg, skulle ännu några år fungera som ägargruppens överhuvud.

His father, Peter Wallenberg, were still a few years working as head of the investor group.

I dag leds Wallenbergsfären av trion Jacob, kusinen Marcus ("Husky") och brodern Peter junior, kallad "Poker".

Today, led by the Wallenberg sphere trio Jacob, his cousin Marcus ("Husky") and his brother Peter Jr., known as "Poker".

Men det är Jacob som frontar mot massmedierna i egenskap av ordförande i Investor, Wallenbergsfärens "maktbolag", där de strategiska greppen i portföljbolagen tas.

But it is Jacob who fronts the media in his capacity as chairman of Investor, the Wallenberg Sphere "power company", where the strategic concepts for the portfolio companies are taken.

Investor startades 1916, och historiken är långtifrån så rak och händelsefattig som den ibland beskrivs.

Investor was founded in 1916, and history is far from being as straightforward and uneventful as it is sometimes described.

I själva verket har bolaget varit inne i en rad branscher och företag och backat ur många.

In fact, the company has been in a variety of industries and companies, and backed away from many.

Dock kvarstår själva navet, i form av banken SEB, som ytterst härstammar från förfadern André Oscar Wallenbergs entreprenörskap på 1860-talet.

However, this still remains the hub, in the form of bank SEB, which is ultimately derived from ancestor André Oscar Wallenberg's entrepreneurship in the 1860s.

När bankens oberoende skakades 1993 i den svenska bankkrisen var det en kris för hela sfären.

When the bank's independence was shaken in 1993 in the Swedish banking crisis was a crisis for the whole sphere.

Åren 19972001 skedde en form av tvärkast i Investors strategi.

The years 1997-2001 were a form of cross-casting in Investor's strategy.

Under ordförande Percy Barnevik och VD Marcus Wallenberg blottlade Investor, vid sidan av de 15 kärninnehaven, satsningar i hundratals onoterade bolag världen över.

During President Percy Barnevik and CEO Marcus Wallenberg revealed the Investor, in addition to the 15 core holdings, investments in hundreds of private companies worldwide.

Samtidigt ökade bolagets öppenhet; inte minst skärptes ägarstyrningen mot intressebolagen.

At the same time increasing its transparency, not least tightened ownership steering of the associated companies.

Detta har följts av en tillströmning av aktieägare, som i dag är uppe i 140 000, liksom det ovanliga för ett investmentbolag att hela 1/3 av kapitalet ägs av utländska händer.

This was followed by an influx of shareholders, which is now up to 140 000, and the unusual for an investment that the whole third of the capital owned by foreign hands.

Lågt räknat äger sannolikt mer än 80 procent av Sveriges drygt 2 miljoner aktieägare något av de Wallenbergkontrollerade bolagen, som summerar till långt över 1 000 miljarder kronor i börsvärden.

Conservatively, probably owns more than 80 percent of Sweden's over 2 million shareholders of any of the Wallenberg-controlled companies, which add up to well over 1000 billion in market capitalization.

Röstmajoriteten ligger hos av familjen Wallenberg kontrollerade stiftelser, varav den största är Knut och Alice Wallenbergs stiftelse.

Majority of voting rights lies with the Wallenberg family-controlled foundations, the largest of which is the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation.

I dag kan man öppet räkna till 123 bolag i vilka Investor är ledande ägare:

Today you can open a count of 123 companies in which Investor is a leading owner:

1. Kärninvesteringarna, de som ska vara "för evigt", enligt VD, har minskat till åtta: ABB, Astra Zeneca, Atlas Copco, Electrolux, Ericsson, Husqvarna, Saab och SEB.

1st Core investments, those that will be "forever", as CEO, has been reduced to eight: ABB, Astra Zeneca, Atlas Copco, Electrolux, Ericsson, Husqvarna, Saab and SEB.

2. Nio operativa investeringar: Gambro, Lindorff och Mölnlycke (alla tre stora nog att i en nära framtid noteras på börsen) samt Biovitrum, Caridian BCT, Grand Hotel i Stockholm, Kunskapsskolan, Tre/Skandinavien och Novare.

2nd Nine operating investments: Gambro, Lindorff and Mölnlycke (all three large enough to be in the near future are listed on the stock exchange) and Biovitrum, Caridian BCT, the Grand Hotel in Stockholm, Knowledge Schools, Three / Scandinavia and Novare.

3. 106 onoterade bolag av två typer, riskkapitalbolag och utköpsbolag (alla listas på Investors webbplats).

3rd 106 unlisted companies of two types, private equity and buyout companies (all listed on the Investor's website).

Ett antal härstammar från åren 19971998, men många tillkom under högkonjunkturen 20052007.

A number derived from the years 1997-1998, but many were added during the boom period from 2005 to 2007.

Alla, som är placerade i Investor Growth Capital, ska på sikt säljas.

All of which are located in the Investor Growth Capital, will eventually be sold.

Finansiellt är de tre nivåerna spännande och svarar på kritiken om att Investor länge har vilat för tungt i mogna, trygga men lågpresterande jätteföretag.

Financially, the three levels of exciting and responds to criticism that Investor has long rested on heavily in the mature, safe but low-performing big companies.

De långsiktiga avkastningskraven är 8, 15 respektive 20 procent per år på de tre uppräknade kategorierna, samtidigt som de två senare har vuxit i andel (snart 1/3) på bekostnad av den första i Investors totala portfölj, substansvärderad till 115 miljarder kronor.

The long-term rate of return is 8, 15 and 20 percent per year in the three categories listed, while the latter two have grown in proportion (almost 1 / 3) at the expense of the first in the Investor's portfolio, net asset valued at 115 billion.

Detta innebär att risken i hela investmentbolaget har ökat.

This means that the risk throughout the investment company has increased.

I dag nämner knappast någon Percy Barneviks namn, efter pensionsskandalen i ABB och det fatala köpet av amerikanska Combustion Engineering och efterföljande asbestskandal som höll på att sänka hela ABB i dag Investors värdemässigt tyngsta investering.

Today, hardly anyone mentions Percy Child's name, after the pension scandal in the ABB and the disastrous purchase of American Combustion Engineering and next asbestos scandal was about to lower the entire ABB - Today Investors value heaviest investment.

Men faktum är att Barneviks satsning på riskkapitalbolag snarare verkar ha fått en stark röst i Jacob Wallenberg, som tycks brinna för området när frostvindarna annars för tillfället slår kring sektorn.

But the fact is that the Children's focus on private equity firms rather seems to have been a strong voice in Jacob Wallenberg, who seems passionate about the field when frost-winds else at the moment turn around the sector.

Här ser Investor en viktig framtida chans, i bolag som under högkonjunkturåren avkastade 25 procent.

Here Investor an important future opportunity, in the company during the boom years a return of 25 percent.

I själva verket kontrollerar Wallenbergsfären säkert långt fler bolag än de 123.

In fact, controls the Wallenberg sphere certainly far more companies than the 123rd

Genom de gamla ägarstiftelserna, riskkapitalrörelsen EQT fonder (startades 1994) och andra bolag finns ytterligare kända och okända innehav.

By the old ownership foundations, venture capital operations EQT's funds (founded 1994) and other companies are more known and unknown ownership.

Bara EQT-fonderna har en investeringsram på 138 miljarder kronor, mer än hela Investors värde.

Just EQT Funds have an investment of 138 billion, more than all Investors value.

Investor har i dagsläget ett åtagande att på begäran, vid behov, betala in 8,5 miljarder kronor i fonderna.

Investor has in the current situation a commitment that, upon request, if necessary, paying 8.5 billion in funds.

Liksom Industrivärden har Investor en rätt okänd portföljförvaltning, en del som inte ger någon större resultateffekt men som kan ge Investor viktiga löpande marknadssignaler.

Like Industrivärden Investor a true and unknown portfolio, some with no major impact on earnings, but that can give Investor significant ongoing market signals.

Här ligger också den stora minoritetsposten i börsbolaget Elekta.

This is also the large minority holding in listed company Elekta.

Att posten placerats här innebär att den kan säljas när som helst i stället för att, som det ibland spekulerats, Investor skulle lägga ett bud på strålkanonbolaget.

The item is placed here means that it can be sold at any time, rather than, as is sometimes speculated, Investor would make a bid for strålkanonbolaget.

Här ligger också den kontroversiella minoritetsposten i norska Aker.

This is also the controversial minority holding in the Norwegian Aker.

Mats Blomberg har för Aktiespararens räkning träffat Investors ordförande sedan 2005, Jacob Wallenberg, för att höra mer om krisen, bonusdebatten, Investors väldiga nätverk, framtiden, ansvaret för svensk industri och vad Wallenberggruppen står för i dag.

Mats Blomberg for Shareholders' Association's behalf met with Investor's chairman since 2005, Jacob Wallenberg, to hear more about the crisis, bonus debate, Investor's vast network, future, responsibility for the Swedish industry and what the Wallenberg Group stands for today.

Det är intressant läsning.

It is interesting reading.

Aktiespararen: I sommar är det två år sedan de första tecknen på finanskrisen kom.

Shareholders' Association: This summer, two years ago the first signs of financial crisis came.

Med orderfall på 1530 procent i stora verkstadsföretag, kreditbrist och avstannande tillväxt i BRIC-länderna borde ni inte vara oroliga, med de enorma värden som Investor och Wallenbergsfären kontrollerar?

In order cases of 15-30 percent in large engineering companies, credit shortages, and slowing growth in the BRIC countries - should not you be worried, with the huge values of Investor and the Wallenberg sphere controls?

Jacob Wallenberg: Vi är det.

Jacob Wallenberg: - We are there.

Ingen har väl sagt att vi inte är oroliga tvärtom!

No one has well said that we are not worried - quite the opposite!

De som sitter i styrelsen för vår räkning framför vår oro för marknadsutvecklingen.

Those sitting on the board on our behalf in our concern for the market.

Sedan måste man sätta det i varje bolags perspektiv.

Then you have to put it in each company's perspective.

Det viktiga är att vi på ett tidigt skede tagit upp det här på styrelsenivå i varje bolag.

The important thing is that we are at an early stage, raised this at board level in each company.

Sedan har den operativa ledningen fått ta ställning.

Then there is the operational management had to react.

Har det verkligen varit nödvändigt signalerna har väl funnits tidigt hos varje företag?

Has it really been necessary - the signals have been well early in each company?

Jo, absolut, men alla ser det på lite olika sätt.

- Yes, absolutely, but everyone sees it slightly differently.

I vissa bolag var det redan framkört, medan andra har varit riggade för tillväxt.

In some companies, it was already running, while others have been rigged for growth.

Detta svarar också på frågan hur vi arbetar generellt.

This responds to the question of how we work in general.

När vi ser någonting vi tycker är angeläget lägger vi upp det på styrelsebordet och tar en diskussion.

When we see something we think is the state position we put it up on the board table and take a discussion.

Är det brådskande ringer vi VD.

Is that urgent call you president.

Jag upplever i dag att de stora börsbolagen är väl framkörda.

I feel today that the major listed companies are well run out.

De har vidtagit en mängd åtgärder: jobbat på effektiviteten, likviditeten, har banklinor på plats och en beredskap för att kunna hantera ett ytterligare negativt utfall.

They have taken a variety of measures: working on the efficiency, liquidity, the bank lines in place and a readiness to deal with one additional adverse outcome.

Om marknaden vänder till positiv är det minst av alla problem.

If the market returned to positive is the least of all problems.

Men är det verkligen rätt att redan prata om begynnande investeringsmöjligheter, som Investor gjort under våren?

But is it really right that already talk about emerging investment opportunities, the Investor made in the spring?

Ja, är man rätt positionerad och har en stark balansräkning är det nu man kan göra de intressanta affärerna.

- Yes, you are properly positioned and has a strong balance sheet, it is now doing the interesting shops.

När tillgångsvärdena pressats ned kan man göra affärer som när ekonomin vänder kommer att upplevas som väldigt positiva och högavkastande.

When asset values are depressed you can do business that when the economy begins to be perceived as very positive and high yielding.

I varje enskild kris har betydande förmögenhetsöverföringar skett.

In every crisis has significant wealth transfers occurred.

Det finns de som överbelånat sig och är i skriande behov av likviditet och som måste sälja billigare än de hade tänkt sig.

There are those who over mortgaged themselves and are in desperate need of cash and which must selling cheaper than they had in mind.

Det ser du överallt nu.

There you see everywhere now.

Man kan till exempel köpa obligationer till halva värdet.

For example, you buy bonds to half the value.

I USA kan du köpa en våning till lägre pris än på många år.

In the U.S. you can buy an apartment for a lower price than in many years.

Det är samma sak i näringslivet.

It's the same in business.

Vad vågar ni då ge er på nu, affärer i hundramiljonersklassen eller mångmiljardinvesteringar?

How dare ye give you for now, business in one hundred million class or multi-billion dollar investment?

Vi har investerat i Biovitrum för ett antal hundra miljoner kronor.

- We have invested in Biovitrum for several hundred million dollars.

Det kommer naturligtvis att finnas andra liknande exempel, både mindre och större.

It will of course be other similar examples, both small and large.

Vårt jobb är att hela tiden följa de möjligheter som finns.

Our job is to constantly monitor the available opportunities.

Det som borde ligga i den andra vågskålen är att vi kanske bara har sett början på nyemissionsvågen.

What should be in the other tip is that we may have only seen the beginning of issue scales.

Det måste väl kunna fresta på Investors kapacitet också?

Surely there must be tempting for Investors capacity as well?

Investor, som huvudägare i ett antal bolag, måste ha en finansiell beredskap för att kunna bistå om så skulle behövas.

- Investor, as the majority owner of several companies, needs a financially prepared to assist if needed.

Vi har redan deltagit i SEB och Husqvarnas nyemissioner.

We have already participated in the SEB's and Husqvarna's new issues.

Vi har visat att vi både är kapabla och villiga i de två fallen.

We have shown that we are both able and willing in the two cases.

Vi har förordat nyemissioner tidigt.

We have advocated new issues early.

Vi tror att det kan bli trångt i dörren den dagen många kommer samtidigt.

We think it can get crowded in the door that day many will at the same time.

Hur mycket pengar handlar det om?

How much money is involved?

Vi har runt 20 miljarder kronor att röra oss med; det är vår rörelsefrihet.

- We have around 20 billion to move us, it is our freedom of movement.

När vi fått alla utdelningar i vår har vi drygt 3 miljarder i nettokassa, resten har vi tagit upp i lån.

Once we receive all dividends in our we just over 3 billion in net cash, the rest we have taken up the loans.

Kan det finnas dolda skyldigheter i gruppen?

Could there be hidden obligations in the group?

Stämmer det inte till eftertanke att ni är involverade i och delägare i marknadens största riskkapitalbolag, EQT?

Is it not true to the thought that you are involved in and part owner of the market's largest private equity firm, EQT?

I slutet av april kom det fram att ni exempelvis måste skjuta till en miljard till finska Sanitec, som ligger i EQT-händer.

In late April, it emerged that for example, you have to shoot for a billion Finnish Sanitec, which is located in EQT-hands.

Det finns inga dolda åtaganden.

- There are no hidden commitments.

Investor är investerare i alla EQT fonder, inte ägare.

Investor is an investor in all EQT funds, not owners.

EQT är ett antal fonder, där varje fond har ett antal investerare.

EQT is a number of funds, each fund has a number of investors.

Varje fond gör ett antal investeringar, och varje investering står på sina egna ben.

Each Fund makes a number of investments, and each investment is at their own feet.

Om sedan en investering går åt skogen måste fonden ta ställning till om den ska gå tillbaka till sina investerare och eventuellt begära in mer kapital.

Then, if an investment goes wrong, the Fund has to decide whether to go back to their investors and possibly ask for more capital.

Men alla fonderna är juridiskt fristående från varandra.

But not all funds are legally independent of each other.

Det finns inget moderbolag som tar från fond 6 och stoppar pengar i fonderna 1 eller 3.

There is no parent who takes from six fund and put money in the funds 1 or 3.

Men sedan den dag investerarna skrev på har de ett juridiskt ansvar att skjuta till ett visst kapital till dess en viss fond är full-investerad.

But since the day the investors wrote in, they have a legal responsibility to inject some capital, until a particular fund is fully-invested.

Om fonden inte dragit alla pengar från investerarna utan väntat med en del kan den komma tillbaka och vilja ha mer.

If the Fund does not draw any money from investors without waiting with some it may come back and wanting more.

Då är investerarna skyldiga att tillföra pengar.

Then, investors are required to put money.

I den mån Investor som investerare i en individuell fond inte har skjutit till alla de pengar vi ställt upp på från början, och fonden begär kvarvarande kapital, då kommer vi självklart att göra det.

To the extent that Investor as investors in an individual fund had not fired at all the money we had agreed to from the beginning, and the Fund requested the remaining capital, then we will obviously do so.

Men det är en ren tidningsanka att vi skulle ha något slags ansvar för EQT.

But it is a pure canard that we would have some responsibility for EQT.

Kan det vara bra att ha en del av de här 20 miljarderna kvar vid årsskiftet vi kan ju möta fler mörka år?

Will it be good to have some of these 20 billion remaining at the end - we can of course meet more dark years?

Ja, absolut!

- Yes, absolutely!

Vi tar en dag i sänder.

We take one day at a time.

Vi har ingen brådska.

We have no rush.

Det kommer att finnas goda möjligheter under lång tid framöver.

There will be a good opportunity for a long time to come.

Har ni gjort några scenarier av utvecklingen de närmaste åren?

Have you made any of the scenarios in the coming years?

Vi tittar på varje individuellt bolag och gör prognoser.

- We look at each individual company and make forecasts.

Vi ser hela tiden på om bolagen är korrekt kapitaliserade.

We see all the time on whether companies are properly capitalized.

Det är en del av vår aktiva ägarroll.

It is part of our active ownership role.

Finns det en risk för att vi kan stå inför en bristsituation om nio månader gäller det att ta upp den frågan i dag och inte om sju månader.

Is there a risk that we may face a shortage of nine months for it to take up the issue today and not for seven months.

"Vår kärlek till bolagen har inte ändrat sig för att vissa av dem inte är noterade."

"Our love of the companies has not changed for some of them are not listed."

Med tanke på krisen var försäljningen av Scaniaaktierna, där ni fick in 17,5 miljarder kronor, väldigt vältajmad.

In view of the crisis was the sale of the Scania shares, which you received 17.5 billion, very well timed.

Är det tänkbart att ni kan släppa fler kärninvesteringar för att få loss pengar och rädda annat om det fortsätter att vara tungt?

Is it conceivable that you could release any more nuclear investment to free up money and save the other if it continues to be heavy?

Sakligt sett jobbar vi inte så.

- Objectively speaking, we are working not so.

Scania såldes faktiskt till Volkswagen (VW) redan 2000.

Scania actually sold to Volkswagen (VW) already in 2000.

Då gick Investor och Volkswagen ut med ett gemensamt pressmeddelande där VW välkomnades som den nya huvudägaren i Scania.

Then the Investor and Volkswagen issued a joint press release in which VW was welcomed as the new principal shareholder in Scania.

Det var efter att Volvo hade begått midnattsräden mot Scania och sedan fått nej av EU-kommissionen till en sammanslagning.

It was after that Volvo had committed midnight raid on Scania and then been rejected by the EU Commission for a merger.

Allt detta låg utanför vår kontroll.

All this was outside our control.

Det är Volvo som genom sitt agerande kom att se till att Scania blev utlandsägt.

It is Volvo, which through their actions was to ensure that Scania was foreign owned.

När vi efter VW intåg inte kunde ha någon meningsfull påverkan på Scania längre sade vi att hellre än att vi ska sitta med våra aktieägares pengar i ett bolag vi inte kan utöva ett aktivt ägarskap i är det bättre att vi investerar dem någonstans där vi kan applicera vår affärsmodell.

When, after VW's entry could not have any meaningful impact on Scania longer, we said that rather than we should sit with our shareholders' money in a company, we can not exercise active ownership in it is better that we invest them somewhere where we can apply our business model.

Sedan råkade detta sammanfalla med finanskrisen och har gett oss en betydande ekonomisk flexibilitet.

Since this happened to coincide with the financial crisis and has given us a significant financial flexibility.

Det är vi naturligtvis oerhört tacksamma för.

We are of course extremely grateful for.

Men även före försäljningen var vi allmänt sett försiktiga med vår balansräkning.

But even before the sale, we were generally conservative with our balance sheet.

Hur ser du på betydelsen av enskilt aktieägande i dag?

How do you see the importance of individual share ownership in the day?

Det är en tillgång att en stor mängd människor i Sverige är aktiesparare och därför intresserade av och engagerade i att det finns en fungerande aktiemarknad.

- It is an asset to a large number of people in Sweden are shareholders and therefore interested in and committed to the existence of a functioning stock market.

Individuellt aktiesparande är fundamentalt viktigt.

Individual stock market investments are fundamentally important.

Därför är det viktigt att vi har en väl fungerande kommunikation kring aktiemarknaden och bolagen.

It is therefore important that we have a well functioning communication about the stock market and companies.

Det är därför också viktigt att det finns organisationer av karaktären Aktiespararna, som har viljan och intresset att engagera sig för små aktieägare och deras frågor.

It is also important that there are organizations of the character Shareholders Association, which has the willingness and interest to engage in the small shareholders and their issues.

Där någonstans tror jag att man skapar ett genuint intresse för företagande, entreprenörskap och för mycket av det som är så grundläggande i vårt samhälle.

There somewhere, I think that creates a genuine interest in entrepreneurship and for much of what is so fundamental to our society.

Många hajade nog till när Investor accepterade erbjudandet om att sälja Scaniaaktierna för 200 kronor, utan att det blev ett allmänt bud.

Many were startled enough to where investor accepted the offer to sell the Scania shares for 200 kronor, but it became a public bid.

I dag sitter över 100 000 ägare med aktier i Scania som är värda runt 50 kronor.

Today is over 100 000 owners of shares in Scania, which is worth around 50 crowns.

Kan detta hända igen?

Could this happen again?

Vi representerar 140 000 aktieägare som via oss har en betydande investering.

- We represent 140 000 shareholders through us has a significant investment.

Vi får ett bud.

We get a bid.

Vi begär då att detta bud ska ges till alla aktieägare.

We requests that this bid should be given to all shareholders.

VW avvisar det och säger "detta eller inget".

VW rejects it and says "this or nothing".

Då har vi ett ansvar gentemot våra aktieägare.

Then we have a responsibility to our shareholders.

Om vi då inte tar budet utan av något grumligt skäl tar ett steg åt sidan har jag 140 000 aktieägare som borde vara rasande på mig.

If we do not take the offer without any murky reasons, take a step aside, I have 140 000 shareholders should be furious at me.

Men jag tycker att det varit ännu bättre om alla aktieägare i Scania hade fått samma bud.

But I think it would have been even better if all the shareholders in Scania had received the same bid.

I Investor är de så kallade kärninvesteringarna nere i 8 till antalet.

The Investor is the so-called core investment down to eight in number.

För 13 år sedan var de 15.

For 13 years ago was the 15th

I stället har vi fått se en tillväxt av "operativa investeringar" och onoterade bolag i portföljen.

Instead we have witnessed a growth of "operational" investments and unlisted companies in the portfolio.

Kommer denna fördelning att se likadan ut om 510 år?

Will this distribution look the same in 5-10 years?

År 2001 bytte vi bolag med stiftelserna, och SKF, Stora Enso och SAS hamnade då där.

- In 2001 we changed our company foundations, and SKF, Stora Enso and SAS ended when there.

Gambro har vi köpt ut från börsen och äger fortfarande.

Gambro, we bought out of stock and still owns.

Vi har sålt Scania, OMX och WM-data, men vi har tillfört bland annat Mölnlycke och Lindorff.

We have sold Scania, OMX and WM-data, but we have brought, inter alia, Mölnlycke and Lindorff.

Totalt sett har vi huvudägaransvar för i stort sett lika många bolag som tidigare.

Overall, we have the main ownership for almost as many companies as before.

När riskkapitalverksamheten började på 1990-talet inträffade något fundamentalt viktigt.

When the venture capital operations began in the 1990s occurred something fundamentally important.

Innan dess sålde inte företag divisioner och affärsområden som inte passade in.

Before that did not sell corporate divisions and business units that did not fit.

När utköpsbolagen kom in i bilden hade en ny tillgångsklass skapats, och många bolag mår bättre av att utvecklas utanför börsen.

As buyout firms came into the picture had a new asset class was created, and many companies are feeling better by developing off-exchange.

Men vår kärlek till bolagen har inte ändrat sig för att vissa av dem nu inte är noterade.

But our love for companies has not changed for some of them now are not listed.

Allting behöver inte vara noterat, som förr i tiden.

Everything need not be quoted, as in the past.

Det finns ett slags hatkärlek till investmentbolag bland professionella, som när ni får etiketten "maktbolag".

There is a sort of love / hate relationship to the investment company, among professionals, that when you get tagged with "power company".

Om vi tittar på Investors utveckling tio år tillbaka är investmentbolagsrabatten ungefär lika stor som då.

If we look at the Investor's development for ten years is the holding company discount about the same as then.

Vad beror det på?

Why is that?

Rabatten är vad den är.

- The discount is what it is.

Vår bedömning är att i varje enskilt fall göra så bra affärer som möjligt för Investor, vilket är bästa sättet att minimera substansrabatten.

Our assessment is that in each case as good business as possible for the Investor, which is the best way to minimize the discount.

Men på såväl fem och tio som femtio år har vi slagit jämförbara index.

But in both five and ten fifty years we have found comparable indices.

Det hade varit toppen om vi varit ännu duktigare, men vi har i varje fall inte underpresterat.

It would have been great if we have been even better, but we have not over done.

Investor är mer än de omkring 150 människorna som arbetar i bolaget.

Investor is more than the approximately 150 people working in the company.

Hur stort är egentligen ert nätverk?

What is really your network?

Generellt är vi i Investors styrelse och ledning på olika sätt i kontakt med stora delar av de operativa ledningarna och styrelserna i alla de företag vi är stora ägare i. Bara där får vi ihop en 400500 människor på olika ställen i världen.

- In general we are in the Investor's board and management in different ways to connect with much of the operational managements and boards of all the companies we are big owners in. Only where we get together a 400-500 people in different places in the world.

Sedan har vi ett annat nätverk i kapitalmarknaden.

Then there is another network in the equity market.

Och överallt är vi i kontakt med ägargrupperingar.

And everywhere we are in contact with owner groups.

Vi talar om tusentals personer och organisationer.

We are talking about thousands of people and organizations.

Genom att komma i kontakt med olika beröringsytor bygger vi nätverk, som inte är statiska utan rör på sig hela tiden.

By coming into contact with various touchpoints, we are building networks that are not static but moves all the time.

Davosmötet är ett bra exempel där tusentals ledande näringslivsrepresentanter från hela jordklotet träffas under en vecka.

Davos meeting is a good example in which thousands of leading business representatives from around the globe get together for a week.

Det är en enorm möjlighet att bygga kontaktnät.

There is a tremendous opportunity to build contacts.

Vårt nätverk är en del av strategin, något vi arbetar aktivt med.

Our network is part of the strategy, something we are actively working with.

Och det betyder mycket för oss.

And it means a lot to us.

Wallenbergfamiljen är historiskt känd för sin kontaktyta i kanslihuset.

Wallenberg family is historically known for its interface in the Chancellery.

Hur har ni gjort för att uppnå denna position?

How did you do to achieve this position?

Svenskt näringsliv har givetvis politiska kontakter.

- Confederation of Swedish Enterprise has obviously political contacts.

Dock är denna tradition mindre utvecklad i Sverige än i något annat land jag känner.

However, this tradition less developed in Sweden than in any other country I know.

I Sverige har vi en tradition, som jag tror är utomordentligt gammal, att vi i näringslivet tar kontakt med departementet när vi har ett problem, och då tas vi alltid emot.

In Sweden we have a tradition, which I think is extremely old, that we in the business world makes contact with the department when we have a problem, and then we are always against.

I många länder sker ett löpande utbyte mellan politik och näringsliv, där folk också byter jobb mellan de två sidorna.

In many countries the importance of regular exchanges between politics and business, where people also change jobs between the two sides.

I Sverige förekommer det knappt, vilket jag tycker är synd.

In Sweden, there are hardly, which I think is a shame.

Vad står Wallenberggruppen för i dag?

What is Wallenberg Group of today?

Ni pratar gärna historia, men vad driver er?

You talk like history, but what drives you?

Vad anser du själv är ditt uppdrag?

What do you consider yourself is your mission?

Ytterst är uppdraget som ordförande i Investor att generera en konkurrenskraftig avkastning för aktieägarna.

- Ultimately, the position of Chairman of the Investor to generate a competitive return for shareholders.

Det gör vi genom att applicera en affärsmodell.

We do this by applying a business model.

Vi har en vision och ett arbetssätt där vi jobbar med företagen och vidareutvecklar dem så gott vi kan.

We have a vision and an approach where we work with businesses and develop them as best we can.

Man får inte heller glömma att vår grundläggande värdering är att vara långsiktiga, aktiva engagerade ägare och att alltid göra det som är rätt för de individuella bolagen.

One must not forget that our core value is to be long, active and committed owners to always do what is right for the individual companies.

Ibland innebär detta att vi minskar kontrollen över ett bolag, och det går upp i ett annat sammanhang som när Asea gick ihop med schweiziska Brown Boveri och när Astra Zeneca, Stora Enso och SE-banken bildades.

Sometimes this means that we reduce the control of a company, and it goes up in a different context - that when Asea merged with Swiss Brown Boveri, and when AstraZeneca, Stora Enso and U.S. Bank was formed.

Sedan har familjen ett uppdrag för stiftelserna också, som är huvudaktieägare i Investor.

Since the family has a mission of foundations as well, which is the principal shareholder of Investor.

Stiftelserna är allmännyttiga, och destinatärerna, de som enligt stiftelseurkunden är mottagare av medel, vill ha avkastning och har också rätt att ställa krav på det.

The foundations are public, and beneficiaries, those under the memorandum of association is a recipient of funds, want returns and are also entitled to demand it.

Vi måste med andra ord se till att Investor ger en bra totalavkastning.

We must therefore ensure that the investor gives a good total return.

Vi förflyttar oss nu till 2025.

We move now to 2025.

Du och din kusin fyller snart 70 år, Victoria är kanske drottning och euron valuta.

You and your cousin will soon turn 70 years old, Victoria is perhaps the queen and the euro currency.

Hur ser Investor ut då?

What is the investor at that time?

Vem leder Wallenberggruppen?

Who leads the Wallenberg group?

Min vision är högst odramatisk.

- My vision is highly dramatic.

Vi kommer att driva samma grundläggande affär, syftande till att vidareutveckla företag.

We will pursue the same basic business, aiming to further develop the business.

Vi kommer att vurma för småföretagare såväl som för storföretagande.

We will RAVE OVER small business owners as well as for big business.

Vi kommer att vara engagerade i företag som i sin tur är engagerade i hela världen.

We will be engaged in business which in turn is involved in the whole world.

Vi är kvar i vissa nyckelindustrier, men det har kanske tillkommit något vem vet?

We are left in certain key industries, but it may have been something - who knows?

Men det är samma grundläggande värderingar.

But it's the same basic values.

Vi har hållit på med det här i 150 år, och jag tror att vi fortsätter i 150 år till.

We have been doing this for 150 years, and I think we will continue for 150 years.

Sedan kommer föremålet för vår kärlek att ändras från tid till annan.

Then comes the object of our love will be changed from time to time.

Och ytterst hoppas jag på väsentligt fler aktieägare.

And ultimately I'm hoping for substantial numbers of shareholders.

Jag hoppas naturligtvis att de kommer att känna att vi gett dem en bra avkastning, därför att vi varit skickliga och att våra företag har utvecklats väl.

I sincerely hope that they will feel that we have given them a good return, because we have been skilled and that our businesses have performed well.

Jag tror också att det är jag, min bror samt Marcus och hans bror Axel som leder gruppen.

I also think it's me, my brother, and Marcus and his brother Axel leading group.

Sedan hoppas jag också att vi då ser en ung generation, den sjätte generationen, växa upp och komma med i bilden.

Then, I also hope that we will see a young generation, the sixth generation, grow up and come into the picture.

"Bonusstopp går för långt"

"Bonus Top go too far"

I ljuset av stora och många varsel om uppsägningar av jobb under vintern och våren har företagsledningars ersättningar utöver fast lön varit en het potatis i debatten.

In light of the large and many of dismissal notices of job during the winter and spring managements compensation beyond base salary has been a hot potato in the debate.

Företag i Wallenbergsfären har förstås också omfattats, och här har en bred skiljelinje mellan näringslivet å ena sidan och fack och politiker å den andra målats upp, ofta i grälla färger.

Companies in the Wallenberg sphere, of course, also benefited, and this is a broad divide between the business sector on the one hand, and unions and politicians on the other hand painted, often in garish colors.

Aktiespararen: Driver rörlig ersättning fram överdrivet risktagande, som det hävdats från politiskt håll?

Shareholders' Association: Driver variable pay out excessive risk-taking, which is claimed by politicians?

Jacob Wallenberg: DÃ¥ talar du huvudsakligen bank.

Jacob Wallenberg: - When you speak mainly banking.

Där tror jag att det är angeläget att det när det finns rörliga ersättningar kopplade till kortsiktig verksamhet, som utlåning, också finns någon form av kontrollmekanism.

I too believe that it is certainty that when there are variable remuneration linked to short-term activities, such as lending, also is some form of control mechanism.

Man ska inte bara kunna göra korta affärer och ta hem sin bonus och så går värdet åt skogen sju månader senare utan att man får ta konsekvenserna.

One should not only be able to make short-term transactions and take home their bonus - and so the value goes to the dogs seven months later without having to face the consequences.

Det fungerar inte.

It does not work.

Där måste vi hitta nya former.

There has to find new forms.

Är det medvetet att ni på stämmorna tycks ha visat stort tålamod med alla frågor och allt missnöje som visats kring ersättningsprogrammen?

Are you aware of the voices seem to have shown great patience with all issues and all discontent that has been shown around compensation programs?

Vår inställning är att en bolagsstämma är genuint till för små aktieägare, som inte har möjlighet att komma i kontakt med beslutsfattare och styrelsemedlemmar under det löpande året.

- Our attitude is that a general meeting is authentic to the small shareholders, who are not able to connect with decision makers and board members during the current year.

Det är ju faktiskt enda gången!

It's actually the only time!

Du har själv också sagt att ni måste vara beredda på att diskutera nivåer, det som andra aktörer har värjt sig för.

You yourself have said that you must be prepared to discuss the levels, what other players have resisted the idea of.

Har jag gjort det?

- Did I do that?

Jacob Wallenberg ser utstuderat förvånad ut och tittar samtidigt underfundigt mot intervjuaren när påpekandet om ersättningsnivåer tas upp.

Jacob Wallenberg see elaborate surprised and looking at the same time subtle to the interviewer when the comment on the reimbursement rates be raised.

Men "lyssnar" ni på alla synpunkter?

But "listening" you to all views?

Tar ni till er kritiken?

Takes you to your criticism?

Du får väl själv göra din bedömning, om du tycker det ...

- You'll have to make your own assessment, if you think it ...

Självklart lyssnar vi!

Of course, we listen!

Vi är en del av den breda debatten och måste delta i den vara lyhörda för vad individer säger och vad samhället säger.

We are part of the broader debate and must participate in it - listen to what people say and what society says.

Om det sedan gäller struktur av ersättningssystem, nivåer av ersättningssystem eller något annat det har jag inga som helst problem med.

If, next, the structure of compensation, levels of remuneration or anything else - I have no problem with.

Men den individuella styrelsen måste ges mandatet och förtroendet att fatta sina beslut utifrån de principer som lagts fast.

But the individual board must be given the mandate and the confidence to base their decisions on the principles laid down.

I dag tillåts ingenting, och det tror jag inte en sekund på.

Today nothing is allowed, and I do not think for a second.

Det är bara ett utslag av en populistisk debatt.

There is only one manifestation of a populist debate.

Är det inte allvarligare än så att decennier av politikerförakt nu också riskerar att spillas vidare till ett tilltagande företagsledarförakt?

Is it not more serious than that - that decades of political contempt now threaten to spill on to a growing managerial contempt?

Vi är inte speciellt populära som det är.

- We are not particularly popular as it is.

Samtidigt har vi ett uppdrag vi måste utföra i det samhälle vi verkar i. Vi måste givetvis också vara lyhörda.

While we have a mission we must do in the society we operate in. We must of course also be sensitive.

Men samhället måste också respektera oss.

But society must also respect us.

Man får inte glömma att de företag jag har ansvaret för har omkring 5 procent av sin verksamhet i Sverige, resten finns ute i världen.

One should not forget that the companies I have responsibility for has about 5 percent of its operations in Sweden, the rest are in the world.

Vi har kollegor och kunder där ute som vi måste ta hand om på ett sätt som är acceptabelt i deras kultur.

We have colleagues and clients out there that we must take care of in a manner that is acceptable in their culture.

Det är en balansgång.

It is a balancing act.

Det finns bolag där VD i dag tjänar 50 gånger en golvarbetares lön.

There are companies where the CEO today earns 50 times a worker's wage floor.

Är det ett missförstånd när politiker anser att sådana nivåer har drivit fram krisen?

Is it a misunderstanding when politicians believe that such levels have driven the crisis?

Jag kan konstatera att ersättningsfrågan är en viktig fråga och ser fram emot att delta i debatten framöver.

- I note that the compensation issue is an important issue and looks forward to participating in the debate to come.

Varför väljer du att inte svara "ja" eller "nej" på frågan?

Why do you choose not to answer "yes" or "no" to the question?

Jag tror inte att debatten gagnas av att man går in på detaljnivå; den är så emotionell just nu.

- I do not think that the debate would benefit from that going into the details, it is so emotional right now.

Men det finns bolag som tagit bort rörliga ersättningar helt och hållet, så uppenbarligen har vi lyssnat.

But there are companies who removed the variable compensation in full, so obviously we have listened.

Sedan ska vi hitta nya tankar, idéer och strukturer som kan ta oss framåt i den internationella konkurrensen och vidareutveckla våra företag.

Then we will find new thoughts, ideas and structures that can take us forward in international competition and further develop our business.

För mer detaljerade synpunkter måste jag först analysera vad vi nu gått igenom.

For more detailed comments, I must first analyze what we have now gone through.

Diskussionen kommer rimligen att dyka upp till stämmorna om ett år.

The discussion will probably turn up to meetings in a year.

Ni har berättat att Investors VD-lön sätts efter förmågan att uppfylla samhällsansvar, effektivitet och förmåga att göra affärer.

You have said that Investor's CEO salary is the ability to fulfill social responsibility, efficiency and ability to do business.

Kan detta system komma att införas på andra ställen?

Can this system be introduced in other places?

Det är redan så i många bolag.

- There are already so many companies.

Vad gäller Investors VD var det för att peka på att i flera av våra bolag är inte de rörliga ersättningarna kopplade enbart till vinsten.

As for Investor's president was there to point out that in several of our companies are not the only variable remuneration linked to profits.

De har också andra mål, alltså mjuka kriterier som är mätbara.

They also have other goals, that is soft criteria that are measurable.

Exakt vilka mål det handlar om varierar från bolag till bolag.

The exact targets involved varies from company to company.

Går då den svenska regeringen för långt när den med AP-fondernas ägarmakt vill försöka stoppa alla former av rörliga ersättningar?

Runs when the Swedish government for long when the AP funds' ownership of power to try to stop all forms of variable compensation?

Ja.

- Yes.

Den går alldeles för långt.

It goes way too far.

Finns det en risk för att det här blir ett politiskt instrument för att föra fram andra ägarfrågor?

Is there a danger that this becomes a political tool to bring forward other ownership issues?

Uppenbarligen att det finns en risk är uppenbart!

- Apparently - there is a risk is obvious!

Har ni pratat med politikerna om det?

Have you spoken to politicians about it?

Det vill jag inte kommentera.

- That I will not comment.
http://www.aktiespararna.se/artiklar/Rep...jligheter/