A Mediterranean Battlefield - Syria

[David Guyatt]

Beijing and Damascus have agreed that the Chinese military will provide humanitarian aid to Syria, a high-ranking People's Liberation Army officer said, adding that the training of Syrian personnel by Chinese instructors has also been discussed.
Director of the Office for International Military Cooperation of China's Central Military Commission, Guan Youfei, arrived in Damascus on Tuesday for talks with Syrian Defense Minister Fahad Jassim al-Freij, Chinese Xinhua news agency reported.
During the negotiation, Guan noted China's consistent diplomatic efforts to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis, adding that Beijing is now seeking closer military ties with Damascus.
Read more
Russia prevented' potential NATO launch of 624 cruise missiles in Syria Defense Minister
"The Chinese and Syrian militaries traditionally have a friendly relationship, and the Chinese military is willing to keep strengthening exchanges and cooperation with the Syrian military," he said.
Guan and al-Freij discussed the enhancement of training and "reached a consensus" on the Chinese military providing humanitarian aid to Syria, Xinhua reported, without providing further details.
According to the agency, Guam also met with a Russian general during his visit to the Syrian capital.
China has been operating in Syria alongside Russia and Iran in a "discreet manner" but now the time has come to "openly" step up anti-terrorist efforts, believes political analyst Roula Talj.
"We will see more involvement of China, of Iran and Russia. They will go [in] stronger after ISIS, especially after Russia-US talks. I do not think the US will have any chance to oppose the interference of these allies. The US president or any candidate will have to answer their own public['s] opinion, so it is good for them that someone else is doing the dirty job," Roula Talj told RT. "In the face of their own public['s] opinion they have to be grateful that somebody else is cleaning the mess they had created, especially as ISIS is getting stronger every day inside of Europe. Of course, they are not extremely happy to see the BRICS countries taking over."
Read more
Russian Tu-22M3 'Backfire' long-range bombers strike ISIS from Iran's Hamadan airfield (VIDEO)
Meanwhile political expert Qin Duo Xu does not foresee any "deep involvement" of the Chinese military in Syria, but says it could be a "significant" first step for China to "get involved in the Syrian situation."
"There are chances that this cooperation will increase a lot," he told RT. "At least China can provide more support or diplomatic cover in terms of cracking down [on] terrorists or some rebel groups that are really extremist in nature."
"If you look at the Chinese media, Chinese public opinion, [you will see] that [the] absolute majority is siding with the Syrian government and support[s] Russian military involvement. China has its own problems with terrorists: At least 100 Chinese citizens are fighting alongside with rebels and Islamic State against the Syrian government," he added. "That is why China does support Russian involvement, does support Syrian government's efforts in [the] fight against terrorists."
It is in China's strategic interests to get involved in the Syrian crisis and "play a larger role" in resolving it, independent China strategist, Andrew Leung said.
"This is really a breakthrough in China's strategies in the Middle East. There appears to be more coordination with countries, like Russia," Leung told RT. "China sees itself as one of the great powers and as befitting a state of great power there is the responsibility to maintain peace and stability in a very important region in the world…as far as the Middle East is concerned it means even more to China because it is a matter of energy security."
Despite being a permanent UN Security Council member and relying on the Middle East for oil, China was previously reluctant to become involved in the Syrian conflict.
Beijing preferred to concentrate on domestic affairs and the territorial dispute with its neighbors in the South China Sea.
It praised Moscow's anti-terrorism efforts in Syria as Russia staged a bombing campaign there in September 2015 to March 2016. Russia still has some of its forces in the country to provide humanitarian and military assistance to Syrian President Bashar Assad's government.

Last year, there were reports that China was sending dozens of military advisers to Syria to help the country fight terrorists.
READ MORE: China's military advisers heading to Syria to help fight ISIS' report
Syria has been engulfed in civil war since 2011, with the government fighting a number of rebel groups, in addition to terrorist groups such as Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) and Al-Nusra Front.

https://www.rt.com/news/356161-china-syr...-training/

I wonder if this is in response to those Neocons who were lining up to tell Hillary to bomb Syrian targets with stand-off weapons when she becomes president? It will make it harder to do that if Chinese military trainers and aid suppliers are embedded in the country along with the Russians too.

[Magda Hassan]

Beijing and Damascus have agreed that the Chinese military will provide humanitarian aid to Syria, a high-ranking People's Liberation Army officer said, adding that the training of Syrian personnel by Chinese instructors has also been discussed.
Director of the Office for International Military Cooperation of China's Central Military Commission, Guan Youfei, arrived in Damascus on Tuesday for talks with Syrian Defense Minister Fahad Jassim al-Freij, Chinese Xinhua news agency reported.
During the negotiation, Guan noted China's consistent diplomatic efforts to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis, adding that Beijing is now seeking closer military ties with Damascus.
.....
China has been operating in Syria alongside Russia and Iran in a "discreet manner" but now the time has come to "openly" step up anti-terrorist efforts, believes political analyst Roula Talj.

https://www.rt.com/news/356161-china-syr...-training/

I wonder if this is in response to those Neocons who were lining up to tell Hillary to bomb Syrian targets with stand-off weapons when she becomes president? It will make it harder to do that if Chinese military trainers and aid suppliers are embedded in the country along with the Russians too.

It will certainly throw a spanner in their works.

I was listening to the radio today and heard that the US is 'disappointed' that Russia is using the Iranian bases to launch their anti ISIS air raids. Now why would any one be 'disappointed' in that?

[Tobias Zackrisson]

Interesting Analysis made by Hate speech International

[QUOTE] Jabhat Fateh al-Sham's income and resources

[FONT=&amp]august 15, 2016 0[/FONT]
ANALYSIS / OPEN-SOURCE INVESTIGATION The jihadist fighters of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in Syria get their money and arms from taxation, tariffs, spoils of war, ransom, donations, oil trading, looting, asset seizure, sieges and smuggling.
By Christiaan Triebert and Rao Kumar
Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Arabic: جبهة فتح الشام; literally "The Front for the Conquest of the Levant", abbreviated as "JFS") is a Sunni Islamist militia fighting in Syria. Some believe the group could become more of a threat to the security of Syria than the so-called Islamic State (IS), since JFS "has established an expansive network of partnerships with local opposition groups that have grown either dependent on or fiercely loyal to the organization"1 and, most recently, its important role in breaking the siege of Aleppo.2 Formerly known as al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria Jabhat al-Nusra, the group renamed itself to JFS and claimed it cut international ties. However, the United States (US) continues to consider the group as a foreign terrorist organisation, and continues to be bombed by especially Syrian and Russian warplanes.

[FONT=&amp]Overview of territorial control in Syria as of early August 2016. Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (blue) holds large parts of Idlib, as well as small parts in the Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Rural Damascus and Dara'a provinces.[/FONT]

IS's influence in the Levant on the decline, while JFS's influence is on the rise. In Syria, IS has lost control of much of north-eastern Syria to the Syrian Democratic Forces and in 2015 IS lost the city of Palmyra to the Syrian government. In Iraq, the so-called international coalition has successfully pushed IS out of Ramadi, Tikrit and Fallujah.3 That being the case, the question of how JFS secures its income and resources is increasingly relevant. Apart from IS, JFS is the most powerful transnational jihadist group operating in Syria. This open-source investigation examines JFS's finances in depth, using a wide variety of sources ranging from the organization's own documents and propaganda to citizen activists on the ground. The article identifies a variety of key income flows, including taxation and tariffs, spoils of war, ransoms, donations, oil, looting and asset seizure, and sieges and smuggling.
Taxation, tariffs and fines
JFS has control of most of the Idlib province, including the city of Idlib, though it works alongside other rebel groups in the region. The organization also holds territory in the western Aleppo province, and some places in the Hama, Homs, and Dara'a provinces. In the city of Aleppo, JFS has small-scale presence in the Bustan al-Qasr, al-Shaar, al-Mallah, Hreitan, and Handarat areas.4

[FONT=&amp]Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (blue) had control of most of the Idlib province as of early August 2016, including the capital Idlib, though the organization works alongside other rebel groups in the region[/FONT]

Taxation
Like IS, JFS governs parts of the territory it controls and has a sophisticated administrative structure. It establishes Islamic courts and carries out public works and civil services. With territorial control also comes the ability to tax and fine locals. JFS imposes a number of taxes on the citizens that live under its rule, including income and business taxes, as well as utility and services taxes.
An example is the JFS's taxation of water. Beneficiaries of a water dam close to the town of Darkush in the Idlib province have to pay 3,000 Syrian pounds per dunum (a unit of area) over the course of 2016, according to a specimen obtained by Jabhat Nusra Violations (JNV), a clandestine group documenting daily life in JFS-controlled territory. That amount is equivalent to about 12.50 euros per 1,000 square metres at the official exchange rate (the actual exchange rate might be different).
The dam beneficiaries are most likely to be farmers that use the water to irrigate their lands. The tax is paid in two instalments: in 2016 the breakdown is 2,000 Syrian pounds per dunum starting from April and a second instalment of 1,000 Syrian pound per dunum due in July. Inquiries can be directed to (JFS's) irrigation office in Darkush. Pro-government sources claim that under the authority of the Syrian government water from the dam for irrigation could be used free of charge.5

[FONT=&amp]At left, a document announcing that beneficiaries of the dam need to pay a 3,000 Syrian pound tax. At right, a rental contract. Both images were published by JNV.[/FONT]

Another specimen published by JNV shows what appears to be a rental contract for a house, hired out by JFS in April 2016. For a period of three months the expenses are 1,000 Syrian pounds, or about 4.15 euros. Under the contract the house is to be returned to JFS after expiration. JFS rents out houses throughout the Idlib province, including Darkush, and the villages of Al-Doisat, Zanbagi, and Jamilieh. The specimen was used by a Twitter account supportive of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to indicate that JFS was taxing internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Idlib province,6 but the claim could not be independently confirmed.
A reporter for the Step New Agency has told Hate Speech International (HSI) that JFS's most stable tax income is what it receives for electricity provided by generators.
Some of the JFS tax and tariff income is given back to local communities, for example in the form of food distribution and electricity. These governing practices have fostered a sense of dependency on JFS. In addition, the security JFS provides to local communities has gained it a measure of respect from residents, as was demonstrated in citizen protests that followed the US designation of JFS as a terrorist organization in 2012.7
Such tributes notwithstanding, local residents regularly mount protests against JFS's governing practices, to which men allegedly affiliated with JFS have responded with heavy fire, causing several deaths and injured among the protesters.8
Import tariffs
With the collapse of state services and institutions, commerce and trade in JFS-held territories has fallen under the management of a complex network of Sharia courts, businesses, smugglers and JFS itself. A key source of JFS's funding is import tariffs' on goods that enter JFS-held territory. While a traditional tariff would be paid in cash or cash equivalents, JFS often takes a percentage of the tariffed goods instead. Exactly how much JFS collects from such import tariffs is not available due to a lack of standardisation and documentation. Some data on the tariff JFS levies on arms and ammunition passing through JFS held territory is available, however. This "arms tariff" is particularly important as it provides JFS with a regular source of the arms and weaponry it needs to sustain operations.
[TABLE="width: 830"]
[TR]
[TD="width: 830, colspan: 6"]JFS arms tariffs (Northern Syria)[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 130"]Location[/TD]
[TD="width: 110"]Province[/TD]
[TD="width: 159"]Month/Year[/TD]
[TD="width: 81"]Tariff %[/TD]
[TD="width: 146"]Tariffed Group[/TD]
[TD="width: 204"]Tariff Reason[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 130"]Azaz9[/TD]
[TD="width: 110"]Aleppo[/TD]
[TD="width: 159"]9/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 81"]25%[/TD]
[TD="width: 146"]Division 30 FSA[/TD]
[TD="width: 204"]To secure safe passage into Syria for Div. 30[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 130"]Northern Syria[/TD]
[TD="width: 110"]Idlib/Aleppo/ Latakia[/TD]
[TD="width: 159"]3/2016[/TD]
[TD="width: 81"]≤50%10[/TD]
[TD="width: 146"]Unspecified FSA[/TD]
[TD="width: 204"]Allow equipment/weapons to pass into Syria[/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]
As part of its arms tariff JFS appears to take up to half of the foreign-supplied weapons sent to the FSA in Northern Syria. Arms tariffs thus seem to be a significant source of supplies and funding for JFS. Furthermore, US and other foreign support for FSA can indirectly result in ammunition and materials for JFS. However, it is important to note that JFS's ability to enact arms tariffs is partially due to its strength in Idlib, Aleppo and Latakia governorates; in areas where JFS is weaker (such as Daraa, Homs, and Rif Dimashq governorate) the JFS "arms tariff" may not be as significant of a funding source.
JFS's tariff system extends beyond arms and ammunition. The group places import tariffs on a variety of standard goods, including construction equipment, building materials, food and fuel. Key goods, such as gasoline and diesel fuel that are important to JFS operations, are likely tariffed at a higher rate. Specific figures on these tariffs are unavailable, but they are certainly a significant factor, as JFS appears to have a documentation system for its tariffs of standard goods.
JFS has a special transit office which hands out passage permits for civilian vehicles. The office falls under the organization's general economic affairs, and is operated jointly with Ahrar al-Sham, a coalition of multiple Islamist and Salafist units which cooperate broadly with JFS.
JNV has published a photo of an JFS/Ahrar al-Sham passage permit, which details the name of the specific good that is being transported, the number of units, and the weight. It also mentions the name of the driver, the car's colour and plate number, and suggests a careful search of the car. This specific permit says the vehicle should be handed off to another checkpoint, called "Um Harteen".

[FONT=&amp]A permit for passage obtained by JNV allegedly showing import tariffs imposed by JFS and Ahrar al-Sham.11[/FONT]

Fines

[FONT=&amp]Specimen indicating the amounts, in Syrian pounds, to be paid for road and traffic violations. Via Aymenn al-[/FONT]

Fines account for a small part of JFS's overall income, but they typify the organization's governing practices. The specimen pictured, from April 2015, lists the amounts to be paid for traffic and road violations in and around Sarmada, Idlib province.12 The fines range from 300 Syrian pounds ("large diesel oil cars and blocks") to 5,000 Syrian pounds ("Violation of the passing of lorries from the main street between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m.").
Another fine may be imposed for tapping into someone else's electricity line. As a punishment, the additional line will be removed and its owner fined "a minimum of [5,000] Syrian pounds in recompense for what he has committed".13
In all, taxation, tariffs, and fines provide a stable income for JFS, just as they do for IS. IS has benefitted as well from salaries still paid by the Iraqi and Syrian governments to civil servants working in IS-held areas.14 According to Step News Agency, the same applies to JFS in the territories it holds.
"The salaries [are] still supported by [the] regime for those who were working as government employees before," one of the agency's reporters in the Idlib province told HSI, though some salaries have been cut to reduce government expenses. Hundreds of employees travel monthly or bimonthly to Hama, a city held by the regime, to pick up their salaries. But JFS and other rebel groups try to stop this, as they want to install their own administrative bodies.
Spoils of war
Spoils of war, or ghanima (Arabic: الْغَنيمَة), are a key source of supplies that allow JFS to conduct offensive operations. While JFS does seize ghanima from the largely Kurdish YPG as well as other rebel groups and IS, the amounts are small compared with the weapons, vehicles and equipment it seizes from the Syrian government.

[FONT=&amp]Small arms captured by JFS near the Kurd Mountains. Photo published on an JFS Telegram channel on 15 April 2016.[/FONT]

Since JFS does not receive as much foreign support as the more moderate rebel factions, ghanima is disproportionately important to JFS. Small FSA groups can rely on foreign backers for weapons and ammunition even if they fail to capture significant amounts of ghanima. In the absence of ghanima, JFS's only options are to make expensive purchases through the black market or to improvise weapons themselves.
Open-source estimation of ghanima
JFS regularly releases video and photographs of major seizures of ghanima after battles. Using research by open-source analysts, an estimate can be made of the total amount of ghanima seized (and published) by rebels in certain battles and campaigns throughout mid-2015. JFS made up a plurality or majority of the rebel forces in these battles and campaigns. These numbers give a very rough estimate of the amount of ghanima seized by JFS. The actual amount of ghanima that JFS obtained in these battles is somewhat higher than the listed total, as not all ghanima is photographed or documented.
[TABLE="width: 886"]
[TR]
[TD="width: 886, colspan: 8"]Selected rebel vehicle seizures (2015)15[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 119"]Location[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]Date[/TD]
[TD="width: 73"]Tanks[/TD]
[TD="width: 111"]IFVs/APCs[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]Self-propelled guns16[/TD]
[TD="width: 119"]"Technicals"17[/TD]
[TD="width: 109"]Bulldozers[/TD]
[TD="width: 99"]Military Transport[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 119"]Abu al-Duhur Air Base18,19[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]9/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 73"]2[/TD]
[TD="width: 111"]3[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]1[/TD]
[TD="width: 119"]Unknown[/TD]
[TD="width: 109"]Several[/TD]
[TD="width: 99"]Dozens[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 119"]Frikka20[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]7/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 73"]0[/TD]
[TD="width: 111"]1[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]0[/TD]
[TD="width: 119"]3[/TD]
[TD="width: 109"]2[/TD]
[TD="width: 99"]0[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 119"]Buhsa21[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]8/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 73"]1[/TD]
[TD="width: 111"]2[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]0[/TD]
[TD="width: 119"]2[/TD]
[TD="width: 109"]0[/TD]
[TD="width: 99"]0[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 119"]Idlib Salient22[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]4/20156/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 73"]33[/TD]
[TD="width: 111"]55+23[/TD]
[TD="width: 129"]6[/TD]
[TD="width: 119"]25+[/TD]
[TD="width: 109"]Unknown[/TD]
[TD="width: 99"]15+[/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]
JFS would not be able to function as effectively as it does without armoured vehicles. Tanks allow the group to shatter enemy frontlines. Infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) act as moving cover for rebels, allowing them to rapidly advance under fire. Civilian trucks and other vehicles, too, are extremely useful for JFS as they can be converted into vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) and used with great effect to shatter enemy morale and cause a rout. For instance, the 2016 South Aleppo offensive saw the effective use of multiple SVBIEDs, leading to rebel gains despite heavy Russian airstrikes. The second battle of Idlib in 2015 saw the use of multiple coordinated SVBIEDs to destroy large government defensive fortifications, leading to the fall of Idlib to the JFS-dominated Jaish al-Fatah rebel coalition. While further discussion of JFS tactics is not within the scope of this project, it is clear that vehicle ghanima (largely seized from the Syrian government and its allies) plays a major role in the group's combat operations. Arms and ammunition are two other major categories of ghanima that must be covered.
[TABLE="width: 815"]
[TR]
[TD="width: 815, colspan: 6"]Selected rebel small arms/light weapons/artillery seizures (2015)[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 121"]Location[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]Date[/TD]
[TD="width: 143"]Artillery/mortars[/TD]
[TD="width: 115"]Small arms[/TD]
[TD="width: 164"]Anti-aircraft guns/HMGs[/TD]
[TD="width: 138"]ATGMS[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 121"]Abu al-Duhur Air Base24,25[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]9/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 143"]4+[/TD]
[TD="width: 115"]Unknown[/TD]
[TD="width: 164"]4-5+[/TD]
[TD="width: 138"]Unknown[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 121"]Frikka26[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]7/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 143"]0[/TD]
[TD="width: 115"]4757+[/TD]
[TD="width: 164"]0[/TD]
[TD="width: 138"]2[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 121"]Idlib Salient27[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]4/20156/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 143"]30+[/TD]
[TD="width: 115"]1,250+[/TD]
[TD="width: 164"]125+[/TD]
[TD="width: 138"]10[/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]
In the category of small arms, light weapons and artillery, we can see that ghanima remains a key source for JFS operations and funding. Accurate small-arms figures are hard to obtain as small arms are often taken from dead enemy fighters and not photographed. The number of captured small arms listed here is therefore drastically understated. The other figures tend to be more accurate; the counts for captured anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are considered a fairly accurate estimate. ATGMs are used by JFS to destroy tanks and other enemy vehicles. Ammunition is the final category of ghanima examined in this article.
[TABLE="width: 845"]
[TR]
[TD="width: 845, colspan: 6"]Selected rebel ammunition seizures (2015)[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 125"]Location[/TD]
[TD="width: 136"]Date[/TD]
[TD="width: 113"]Small arms ammo28[/TD]
[TD="width: 170"]Large-caliber ammo and rockets[/TD]
[TD="width: 171"]Artillery, mortar and tank ammo[/TD]
[TD="width: 130"]ATGM missiles[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 125"]Abu al-Duhur Air Base[/TD]
[TD="width: 136"]9/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 113"]40,00050,000[/TD]
[TD="width: 170"]Unknown[/TD]
[TD="width: 171"]3+[/TD]
[TD="width: 130"]12+[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 125"]Frikka[/TD]
[TD="width: 136"]7/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 113"]15,00025,000[/TD]
[TD="width: 170"]100150+[/TD]
[TD="width: 171"]0[/TD]
[TD="width: 130"]9[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 125"]Idlib Salient[/TD]
[TD="width: 136"]4/2015-6/2015[/TD]
[TD="width: 113"]8 million10 million[/TD]
[TD="width: 170"]30,00040,000[/TD]
[TD="width: 171"]10,00020,000[/TD]
[TD="width: 130"]40+[/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]
These ammunition captures are very rough estimates, and the imprecision should be taken into account in analysis. JFS cannot sustain its offensives without capturing large amounts of ammunition, since it is not easy to buy millions of rounds of ammunition on the black market. While not listed in the total counts due to lack of data, captures of air-defence systems from the Syrian government have been a major factor in neutralizing the Syrian government's air force. Ghanima is the fuel on which JFS runs; without it JFS is nowhere nearly as effective.
Ghanima and the black market
While JFS uses ghanima first and foremost to carry out its operations, it is also a funding source. Throughout Syria there are large black markets where rebel groups can trade and sell unneeded ghanima for cash. Damaged equipment can also be sold to parties who are able to repair it or repurpose it into IEDs or other improvised weapons.29

[FONT=&amp]PG-7 RPG rounds for sale at $800 apiece in a Syrian black market in May 2016.30[/FONT]

The vast majority of black markets worldwide deal exclusively with small arms and small arms ammunition, and it is unusual for ATGMs or mortars to appear for sale. That is not the case in Syria. Syrian black markets feature everything from rifles to anti-aircraft guns to armoured vehicles.31 ATGM components and missiles appear on Syrian black markets frequently.32

[FONT=&amp]A 9M131 missile for the 9K115 Metis ATGM on sale in a Syrian black market in February 2016. Price: $4,300.33[/FONT]

[FONT=&amp]A Russian-made T-55 armed modular vehicle (AMV) for sale in the Syrian black market for $170,000 in April 2016.34[/FONT]

Whether used to fight enemies or sold on the black market for cash, ghanima is a key factor in JFS's operations and governance. It may be impossible to accurately appraise JFS's total ghanima or the total profit from its ghanima sales, but the rough estimates we have clearly show ghanima's importance to JFS.Ransoms
Kidnappings of civilians and, on some occasions, military personnel for ransom have been a significant source of income for JFS. The group has been involved in several high-profile hostage cases, especially between 2012 and 2015.

[FONT=&amp]Screenshot from an JFS video of Fijian UN peacekeepers held hostage. A ransom of $20 million to $25 million was allegedly paid for their freedom, though the UN denies it.[/FONT]

In December 2013, for example, a group of Greek Orthodox nuns was taken hostage from their convent in Ma'loula. The nuns were released in March 2014, reportedly in exchange for $4 million and several prisoners held by the Syrian government. The deal was negotiated by Qatari and Lebanese officials.35 In September 2014, JFS kidnapped 45 Fijian UN peacekeepers near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, claiming that the Blue Helmets were supporting the Syrian government. The peacekeepers were released two weeks later. A ransom of between $20 and $25 million was allegedly paid to JFS, but this has been denied by the UN.
In most cases, countries and organizations will deny that ransom has been paid in exchange of someone's freedom. Relatives of Peter Theo Curtis, an American journalist freed after almost two years in JFS captivity, were not briefed on the terms of his release. Qatar State Security, the intelligence agency that mediated Curtis's release, told journalists that no payment was made, although JFS had demanded over $24 million.36
[TABLE="width: 752"]
[TR]
[TD="width: 752, colspan: 5"]Reported ransom payments to JFS[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 151"]Who[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]Ransom (in million $)[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]Kidnap location[/TD]
[TD="width: 165"]Date[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]Negotiated[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 151"]Peter Theo Curtis (journalist)[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]32537[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]Northern Aleppo province[/TD]
[TD="width: 165"]2012 (kidnapped); 08/2014 (freed)[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]Qatar State Security[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 151"]13 Greek Orthodox nuns[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]438[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]Ma'loula[/TD]
[TD="width: 165"]12/2013 (kidnapped);03/2014 (freed)[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]Qatar, paid by Syria[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 151"]Vanessa Marzullo, Greta Ramelli (aid workers)[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]11391240[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]Near Aleppo[/TD]
[TD="width: 165"]08/2014 (kidnapped); 01/2015 (freed)[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]X[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 151"]45 Fijian UN peacekeepers[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]20412542[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]Golan[/TD]
[TD="width: 165"]08/2014 (kidnapped);09/2014 (freed)[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]Qatar[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 151"]Jose Manuel Lopez, Angel Sastre, Antonio Pampliega (journalists)[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]7438.844[/TD]
[TD="width: 135"]Northern Aleppo province[/TD]
[TD="width: 165"]07/2015 (kidnapped); 05/2016 (freed)[/TD]
[TD="width: 151"]X[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]
Not all hostages have been lucky enough to be ransomed. In the course of 2014, JFS killed four Lebanese soldiers it had taken hostage after the Lebanese government did not respond to JFS's request to withdraw Hezbollah from Syria.
Although ransom payments for hostages do not provide JFS with a stable income, opportunistic kidnappings do raise millions of dollars for the organization. It is a "big financial source", JNV told HSI. Open-source information confirms that hostages for ransom are an effective and lucrative business, accounting for millions of dollars a year to JFS.
International donations
Designated terrorist organizations often enjoy a stream of donations from supporters around the world, and JFS is no exception. Donations can take the form of small amounts from local communities or much larger sums. According to the Treasury of the UK, private donations "from the Gulf are a vital funding stream for [al-Qaeda] affiliated groups".
An obstacle to open-source tracing of donations is the informal value transfer system known as hawala (Arabic: حِوالة‎‎). This system uses intermediaries and brokers to maintain plausible deniability. Once money is donated, it can be passed on to a network of facilitators who deliver the money to JFS without suspicion. This can be done through small money transfers for which no identification documents are needed, or by a person who brings the cash across the border.
However, there have been instances of private businessmen from the Gulf raising funds for JFS publicly. Qatari connections to JFS have become clear in many hostage negotiations. Some Qatari negotiators have also been named by the US Treasury as major JFS fundraisers.
Money is often raised through social media, where fundraisers abuse charity and humanitarian causes or organizations. In one such case, Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'bi of Qatar was designated a terrorism financier by the US in August 2015, and had previously played a role in facilitating a hostage ransom payment.45

[FONT=&amp]A digital flyer for Madid Ahl al-Sham, an online fundraising platform for al-Qaeda.[/FONT]

Online fundraising platforms have also been used to raise money for JFS. Qatari 'Abd al-Latif bin 'Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-Kawari, for instance, used theMadid Ahl al-Sham (Arabic: مدد أهل الشام) platform to raise and arrange the delivery of money to al-Qaeda, according to a US official.46 The network has since been shut down.
US officials believe that Qatar is increasing its efforts to shut down terrorist fundraising networks, though a closer examination by David A. Weinberg in The Long War Journal portrayed Qatar as rather negligent on terror finance: neither al-Kawari nor al-Ka'bi had been arrested near the end of 2015.47
Parts of the Turkish government have also been accused of financially and materially supporting JFS. In 2014, a convoy of three trucks directed by Turkey's MIT intelligence service, supposedly delivering humanitarian aid to Syria, were stopped by Turkish police. Inside the vehicles the police found 935 mortar shells, and confidential gendarmerie documents published on Twitter said that the shipment had been ordered by then-Prime Minister ErdoÄŸan, according to The Daily Beast.48Two similar incidents occurred in January 2015, when humanitarian convoys destined for Syria were stopped. In one case, ammunition was found, while in the other the police were prevented from searching the vehicle.49 A UN document confirmed that arm supplies to JFS had indeed crossed the Turkish border, but it did not state any Turkish government involvement.50
Oil
Oil used to be an important source of income for JFS, as the group occupied oil fields around the Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor. But in mid-2014, ideological and tactical differences increased between JFS and IS, with the latter driving JFS and a number of allied groups out of its key strongholds in the oil-rich Deir ez-Zor province in eastern Syria.51 IS thus gained control over the various oil fields and JFS lost an important source of income.
Nevertheless, JFS and its allies retain control over several mobile oil refineries and oil markets in Idlib province, near Jisr ash-Shugur and Saraqeb.52 The organization is thus able to generate income from oil. According to research by the Financial Times, two types of fuel are sold in the areas JFS controls: "pricier fuel refined in [IS] areas, and cheaper locally refined fuel". Locals often buy a mix of both, using the better quality for their vehicles and the cheaper variety for generators.
Oil-related facilities and smuggling routes linked to JFS have been struck by the Russian Air Force. These strikes began intensifying on 20 May 2016, according to a news briefing from the Russian Armed Forces. Prices of oil and diesel in rebel-held areas have doubled since the air strikes began, according to Financial Times. One effect of higher transport costs has been a rise in food prices.
Looting and asset seizure

[FONT=&amp]Screenshot from a recent video released by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, showing fighting in Ramouseh, Aleppo.[/FONT]

Looting and asset seizure by armed groups is prevalent across Syria. Virtually all sides in the conflict have been accused of looting or asset seizure at one time or another. Verification of individual cases of looting and asset seizure is often challenging due to poor documentation; however, it is often a significant source of funding for actors in the conflict.
It is important to make a distinction between looting and asset seizure for the purpose of this article. "Looting" will refer to cases in which JFS fighters take assets from civilians and other non-combatants without official authorization from JFS leadership. "Asset seizure" refers to when JFS takes assets from civilians with official authorisation from JFS leadership. Looting by JFS fighters has been documented on several occasions. For instance, when the Nasib border crossing in Daraa province fell to rebel hands in April 2015, JFS fighters and other rebels were spotted carrying off goods seized from civilian-driven trucks.53 It is unclear if the goods looted were used by the organization or by JFS fighters.
Both asset seizure and looting often have a sectarian aspect, with JFS targeting minority religious groups. In Idlib, for example, an JFS commander attempted to seize a house from a Druze civilian,54 resulting in the massacre of Druze civilians and the seizure of goods from the house in question. While JFS later condemned the attack, it had had the approval of a commander within the organization at the time.55 While other funding sources may be more important to JFS than looting and asset seizure, the looting across JFS-held territory appears systemic. Even if such activities are not fully approved, repetitive incidents suggest that the group's leadership tolerates them when it targets minority religious groups.
Sieges and smuggling
The war in Syria differs from other recent conflicts in part because of the many sieges that have occurred. One reason besieged urban areas have been able to hold out against foes is the poor quality of forces that operate in Syria. Corruption is rampant on all sides, and sieges are rarely airtight.56 The smuggling of food, ammunition and goods into besieged areas is often both a necessity for the groups and civilians under siege and a way for corrupt besieging units to make extra cash.
When under siege in areas with a significant civilian population, JFS is able to smuggle in basic necessities and sell them to the civilian population. For instance, the group dug tunnels from the besieged East Ghouta area to the Barzeh and Qaboun areas of Damascus.57 This allowed it to sell basic necessities to civilians in the area, providing some funding for the group. Even when tunnels are not built, JFS is able to employ smugglers who bring food and other goods that can be sold to local civilians. This type of "siege smuggling" is only possible in areas where JFS is under siege. The majority of these areas are in Rif Dimashq governorate or in Damascus governorate (i.e. E. Ghouta or the Yarmouk Camp).
The rebels in northern Syria are much stronger than those in southern Syria. Thus in northern Syria, JFS fighters can raise funds by selling goods in government-held pockets under siege. In Idlib governorate the government-held towns of Fu'ah and Kafriya have been under rebel siege since the Second Battle of Idlib in 2015. While a recent truce between the Syrian government and the rebels has allowed the entry of aid to the besieged pocket, corrupt JFS fighters are able to profit by selling goods there.58 This funding source is not significant compared to the money JFS makes from smuggling into pockets besieged by the Syrian government, but that is mostly because there are more besieged rebel pockets across Syria.

[FONT=&amp]Historical artefacts have also been "claimed" by spraying graffiti on them, declaring JFS to be the "heroes of Muslims", according to JNV.[/FONT]

JFS has reportedly also been stealing and selling historical artefacts, predominantly in Idlib province.59 Such artefacts usually leave war-torn Syria via Lebanon or, increasingly, Turkey, according to The Independent in a report focusing on illicit trade from Syria in general, and thus including activities by IS. Once in Turkey, "Syrian artefacts travel out of Turkey's big coastal ports Mersin, Antalya or Izmir alongside smuggled Syrian refugees …. Once they arrive in Europe, usually via Cyprus, Italy, Greece or Portugal, a dealer will concoct false papers for the artefact."60
Conclusion
Among the litany of rebel groups in Syria, JFS stands out for its size, effectiveness and degree of organization. Its ability to finance its operations is a major factor in allowing the group to dominate the field in rebel-held territories in northern Syria. Funding also allows JFS to govern and provide services to civilians, enhancing the group's legitimacy among the population, although many locals have protested fiercely. While much of the organization's income and resources initially came from foreign donors, JFS increasingly relies on funding sources more typical of a government. Taxes, tariffs and fines are typically levied by governments, but are key in JFS's overall funding structure. Unlike most governments, JFS also relies heavily on spoils of war, hostage ransoms and smuggling to fund itself. Looting and asset seizure are also significant funding sources, though both are more typical of a militia than of a group seeking to replace the Syrian government. JFS's diverse funding sources highlight the complex and contradictory nature of JFS itself. It is an armed Islamist group seeking to form an Islamic proto-state or "emirate" in Syria. JFS provides state-like services to the population, but like a typical militia it relies on capturing supplies in battle to fund its operations. JFS is essentially a non-state actor and proto-state that aspires to statehood. The group's complex funding network shows just one facet of the slow and complicated rise of an JFS proto-state in northern Syria. While this growing proto-state may not enjoy the glamour of the IS "caliphate", it is a clearly a rising threat to international security. Indeed, JFS will remain a major player in the Syrian civil war and in the global war on terror for the foreseeable future.
Footnotes:

1. Read the joint report of the Institute of War and the American Enterprise Institute here: http://www.aei.org/publication/al-qaeda-...nd-europe/.
   
2. "In Syria, Rebel Victories At Ramouseh Come With A Price," RFERL, 8 August 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/syria-ramou...03617.html.
   
3. Note the term coalition in this article refers to the CJTF-OIR (Combined Joint Task Force: Operation Inherent Resolve) coalition, not the RSII (Russia-Syria-Iraq-Iran) coalition.
   
4. "Under pressure, Syria's rebels face al-Nusra quandary," Huffington Post, 18 July 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/unde...c8735055e4.
   
5. Facebook post by "Hossein Mortada Press", 9 May 2016: https://www.facebook.com/Hosein.Mortada....1222633410.
   
6. Tweet from @mozamjir4, 10 May 2016: https://twitter.com/alsaik4/status/730017095614922758.
   
7. "Syria Opposition Protests Terrorist Branding of Jabhat al-Nusra by US," Voice of America, 18 December 2012,http://www.voanews.com/content/syria-opp...66708.html.
   
8. "Jabhat al-Nusra competes with Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib," Al Monitor, July 10, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security...trol.html#.
   
9. "U.S.-trained Syrian rebels gave equipment to Nusra: U.S. military," Reuters, September 25, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideas...HO20150925.
   
10. "The Syrian Revolution Against al Qaeda."
    
11. Tweet from @JAN_Violations, 19 April 2016. https://twitter.com/JAN_Violations/statu...2910257152.
    
12. Information via Aymen Jawad al-Tamimi's archive of Jabhat al-Nusra Dar al-Qada documents: http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/03/archi...-documents.
    
13. Information via al-Tamimi's archive of Jabhat al-Nusra's service documents: http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/08/archi...-documents.
    
14. "Keeping the Water Running in the Islamic State," Bellingcat, 14 April 2016, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/201...mic-state/.
    
15. Numbers determined primarily through open-source analysis of social media.
    
16. Includes both self-propelled artillery and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.
    
17. Includes all unarmoured vehicles (civilian and military) that are equipped with machine guns, recoilless rifles, improvised unguided rocket launchers, ATGMs or anti-aircraft guns.
    
18. "The fall of Abu ad-Duhor airbase, the Civil War's longest siege comes to an end," Spioenkop, 10 September 2015,http://spioenkop.blogspot.com/2015/09/th...civil.html.
    
19. Information provided by open-source weapons analyst "Mister X".
    
20. "Ghanima (War Plunder) from Jaish al-Fatah's late July offensive against Frikka and surrounding areas," Type 63, 5 August 2015,http://www.type63.com/2015/08/pulled-fro...s-two.html.
    
21. "SAA Vehicles Losses in Sahal al-Ghab offensive late July to present," Type 63, 15 August 2015, http://www.type63.com/2015/08/saa-vehicl...ml?q=nusra.
    
22. "April 22 to the June 6th: A summary of opposition materiel gains from the Battle for Victory and Battle for al-Ghab," Type 63, 5 August 2015,http://www.type63.com/2015/08/april-22-t...ry-of.html.
    
23. Other miscellaneous armoured vehicles included.
    
24. Information provided by open-source weapons analyst "Mister X".
    
25. http://spioenkop.blogspot.com/2015/09/th...civil.html.
    
26. "Ghanima (War Plunder) from Jaish al-Fatah's late July offensive against Frikka and surrounding areas."
    
27. "April 22 to the June 6th: A summary of opposition materiel gains from the Battle for Victory and Battle for al-Ghab."
    
28. Rough estimate from counting boxes of visible ammunition.
    
29. Tweet from @Aswed_Flags, 12 May 2016: https://twitter.com/Aswed_Flags/status/7...8021794816.
    
30. Tweet from @Aswed_Flags, 20 May 2016: https://twitter.com/Aswed_Flags/status/7...8729811968.
    
31. Tweet from @Aswed_Flags, 21 February 2016: https://twitter.com/Aswed_Flags/status/7...7383592964.
    
32. Tweet from @Aswed_Flags, 30 March 2016: https://twitter.com/Aswed_Flags/status/7...6837014529.
    
33. Tweet from @Aswed_Flags: https://twitter.com/Aswed_Flags/status/7...6558046208.
    
34. Tweet from @Aswed_Flags: https://twitter.com/Aswed_Flags/status/7...2091064322.
    
35. "How the Maaloula nuns were freed," Al Monitor, 11 March 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security...eased.html.
    
36. "Five Hostages," New Yorker, July 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/0...ostages#/5.
    
37. "U.S. Writer Held by Qaeda Affiliate in Syria Is Freed After Nearly 2 Years," New York Times, 24 August 2014,http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/world/...years.html.
    
38. "$4 million ransom paid for nuns' release," NOW, 10 March 2014, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/inthepress/5...ns-release.
    
39. "Exclusive: Italy paying ransoms in Syria and Somalia," Al Jazeera, 9 October 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/ex...39241.html.
    
40. Al Aan, via: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/j...reed-syria.
    
41. This number is disputed, as the UN denies paying any ransom: http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/internatio...ns-release.
    
42. "Israel TV: UN had Qatar pay $25m ransom to free Golan peacekeepers," Times of Israel, 10 October 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/report-qata...n-hostages.
    
43. "Spain paid £7m for release of journalists taken hostage in Syria'," Telegraph, 17 May 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/...-in-syria/.
    
44. "Madrid paid £7.6m ransom for men seized in Syria," The Times, 18 May 2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/spain-...-2hwqxj9g6
    
45. "Treasury Designates Financial Supporters of Al-Qaida and Al-Nusrah Front," U.S. Department of Treasury, 5 August 2015,https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pr...l0143.aspx.
    
46. "US names two Qatari nationals as financiers of terrorism," The National, 6 August 2015, http://www.thenational.ae/world/americas...-terrorism.
    
47. "Analysis: Qatar still negligent on terror finance," The Long War Journal, 19 August 2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2...inance.php.
    
48. "Turkey Turns Up the Heat on the Press," Daily Beast, 19 January 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/20...press.html.
    
49. "Turkish military says MIT shipped weapons to al-Qaeda," Al Monitor, 15 January 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/original...apons.html.
    
50. "UN claim ISIL smuggles weapons via Turkey rejected," Anadolu Agency, 30 December 2014, http://aa.com.tr/en/turkey/un-claim-isil...cted/88224.
    
51. "Islamic State expels rivals from Syria's Deir al-Zor activists," Reuters, 14 July 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-syria-c...I020140714.
    
52. "Inside Isis Inc: The journey of a barrel of oil," Financial Times, 29 February 2016, http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/isis-oil/.
    
53. "Syrian Rebels Abduct Lebanese Truck Drivers on the Jordan Border," The Daily Star, 3 April 2015, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon...order.ashx.
    
54. "Syria Conflict: Al-Nusra fighters kill Druze villagers," BBC, 11 June 2015 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33092902.
    
55. Tweet from @archicivilians
    
56. Siege Watch, 14 July 2016, http://siegewatch.org/#12/10.5438/42.3164.
    
57. "In a surprise move, Nusra digs tunnels and undercuts rebel smugglers by slashing prices," Syria Direct, 9 November 2015,http://syriadirect.org/news/in-a-surpris...ng-prices/.
    
58. "Breaking: Ceasefire Brokered in Al-Zabadani/Madaya and al-Fou'aa/Kafrya," al-Masdar News, 20 September 2015,http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/brea...aakafraya/. [url=https://www.hate-speech.org/jabhat-fateh-al-shams-income-and-resources-an-open-source-investigation/#fnref-2879-58][IMG]https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/72x72/21a9.png[/IM

[David Guyatt]

Jabhat Fateh al-Sham is Al-Nusra rebranded. It used to be Jabhat al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda in Syria, and also al-Qaeda in the Levant (HERE). The US has designated it a terrorist outfit. But hey, don;t let little things lime that stop them becoming a moderate opposition group as far as the US is concerned (HERE).

Al-Qaeda has always been an American tool, as admitted (most unusually) by former British foreign secretary Robin Cook on the day after 7/7, the UK's worst terrorist event. Cook, who soon after (less than a month, in fact) suffered a heart attack on a Scottish mountain whilst walking ------- and came over all dead (see HERE and HERE).

Anyone who believes that relationship ended after the Russians left Afghanistan (which is the accepted limited hangout) need only conduct some Google research on the role played by al-Qaeda with the drug-smuggling Kosovo Liberation Army that was backed by the US and CIA during the designer break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Especially the way the US flew in al-Qaeda soldiers from Afghanistan to Kosovo to aid in the fighting there. Or read HERE.

Different name but the same old US war beast....

[David Guyatt]

Beijing and Damascus have agreed that the Chinese military will provide humanitarian aid to Syria, a high-ranking People's Liberation Army officer said, adding that the training of Syrian personnel by Chinese instructors has also been discussed.
Director of the Office for International Military Cooperation of China's Central Military Commission, Guan Youfei, arrived in Damascus on Tuesday for talks with Syrian Defense Minister Fahad Jassim al-Freij, Chinese Xinhua news agency reported.
During the negotiation, Guan noted China's consistent diplomatic efforts to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis, adding that Beijing is now seeking closer military ties with Damascus.
.....
China has been operating in Syria alongside Russia and Iran in a "discreet manner" but now the time has come to "openly" step up anti-terrorist efforts, believes political analyst Roula Talj.

https://www.rt.com/news/356161-china-syr...-training/

I wonder if this is in response to those Neocons who were lining up to tell Hillary to bomb Syrian targets with stand-off weapons when she becomes president? It will make it harder to do that if Chinese military trainers and aid suppliers are embedded in the country along with the Russians too.

It will certainly throw a spanner in their works.

I was listening to the radio today and heard that the US is 'disappointed' that Russia is using the Iranian bases to launch their anti ISIS air raids. Now why would any one be 'disappointed' in that?

It just occurred to me that when Hillary gets herself settled in Pennsylvania Avenue she'll be sitting at husband Bill's favourite blowjob and relaxation desk...

::hush::

[David Guyatt]

China and Syria

by Thierry Meyssan

Although we don't know the details of what was agreed between the Chinese and Syrian armies, the existence of an agreement between them has modified both the battle-field and the balance of international relations. Last year, the Anglo-Saxon secret services broadcast a number of hair-brained interpretations of this same subject today, Thierry Meyssan gives a precise analysis of the important points.

VOLTAIRE NETWORK | DAMASCUS (SYRIA) | 30 AUGUST 2016 DEUTSCH ESPAÑOL FRANÇAIS ITALIANO PORTUGUÊS РУССКИЙ TÜRKÇE ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΆ NEDERLANDS عربي

Although the visit to Syria by Admiral Guan Youfei (head of the new Chinese Office for International Military Cooperation) was made in the context of a meeting with all of the countries in the region, it has caused some anxiety in the West. For the moment, according to the signed agreement, the Chinese Army has simply agreed to train, in China, Syrian soldiers from the Medical Services. However, everyone understands that this agreement hides something else, since for the last four years, half of Syria's military doctors have been trained in China. Although we do not know what has really been decided, the existence of the agreement marks a change of strategy.Indeed, over the last five years, the Peoples' Republic of China has refused to engage in any form of cooperation which could be interpreted by Washington as military aid. Thus, it has not only refused to deliver weapons, but also civil materials which are indispensable for this war, such as tunnel detectors.Independent of the very important economic assistance offered by Beijing, everyone will remember that Russia had concluded an identical agreement with Syria at the beginning of 2012, prefiguring its military assistance three and a half years later. So is China also preparing to deploy?It is probable that the answer will depend on the speed of US deployment in the China Sea and the provocations by Washington's allies in the region.China's interest in Syria dates from Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The Silk Road crossed Central Asia, passing through Palmyra and Damascus before turning towards Tyre and Antioch. There are very few traces left of this ancient commercial cooperation except for the Pagoda still visible in the mosaics of the Umayyad Mosque, or the Great Mosque of Damascus. President Xi made the restoration of this line of communication (and the creation of a second road through Siberia and Europe) the main objective of his mandate.Beijing's other main interest is the struggle of the Islamic Party of Turkestan, which joined al-Qaïda, then Daesh. Today there is a Uyghur neighbourhood in Ar-Raqqah, and Daesh publishes a newspaper especially for its members.The members of this group are connected to the Naqshbandi Order, a Sufi congregation of which the ex-Grand Mufti of Syria, Ahmad Kuftaru, was the leader. Certain lodges of this order connected with the Muslim Brotherhood in 1961, under the influence of the Anglo-Saxon secret services, CIA and MI6. They participated in the creation of the Muslim World League by Saudi Arabia, in 1962. In Iraq, they organised around Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, and supported the attempted coup d'état by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. In 2014, they sent 80,000 combatants to swell the ranks of Daesh. In Turkey, the Naqchbandis created Millî Görüş of which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was one of the heads. It was this group who, in the 1990's, organised Islamist movements in the Russian Caucasus and the Xinjiang region of China.Even more than the Russians, the Chinese need intelligence about this network, and how it is controlled by Washington and London. In 2001, they believed wrongly that the Anglo-Saxons had changed after the attacks of 11 September, and that they would collaborate with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to fight terrorism. They know today that Syria is an authentic friend in peace.

Source

[David Guyatt]

« Syria - U.S.-Russian Deal Fails (Again) Over Continued Support For Jihadis | Main

September 05, 2016

Syria - Who Wins In The Turkish-Russian Deal?

Two headlines today support the claim that "western" media reporting often defies the observable reality.

• Washington Post: For the first time since 2013, ISIS has no border with NATO
  
• Independent: Isis 'cut off from rest of world' as rebels expel Islamists from Turkish border
  
• From the last one:
  

Isis has lost control of its last territories on the border with Turkey, monitoring groups say, in a major blow to the group's ability to receive foreign fighters from the rest of the world.

Neither is ISIS cut of from the world, nor from NATO. Fighters as well as goods can still cross to and from Turkey like they did throughout the last years.
Just take a look at the map:

bigger

The Turkish-Syrian border between Azaz, Al-Ra'i and Jarablus, with ISIS (grey) on the southern side, was always open for traffic between the two areas. Now the Turkish army and Turkish proxy forces of "moderate rebels" moved into the green strip of land on the Syrian side. This did not seal or close the border, as other countries had demanded. It simply moved the border south. Crossing between the ISIS held area and the Turkish controlled area will now be easier because media will have no access to the area. Deals will be made out of sight and money will flow as well as traffic.
There was no fighting at all about the strip between ISIS and the Turkish forces. The Turks told ISIS to move south and it did so before the Turks and its mercenaries moved in. There was not even one Turkish casualty from fighting ISIS over the area. The change of the territorial borderline was obviously done in mutual agreement.
It is ridiculous that some media try to sell that as a closing of the border or as a cut off. It is the opposite.
Turkey's main intention with this move was to prevent a connection of the (yellow) Kurdish areas in the east and the west. Such a Kurdish controlled connecting strip along the border would indeed have sealed it. ISIS traffic would not have been allowed to pass Kurdish checkpoints.
Turkey will probably try to annex the area it has taken. There are plans to build new cities on the Syrian side to house refugees currently in Turkish camps. Turkey could thereby offload a major burden its war on Syria has brought onto it.
Russia and Iran had agreed to the Turkish move into the area after Turkey promised to end its support for attacks on Aleppo city. It has yet to be seen if Turkey will stick to this promise. Some of the Turkish proxy fighters involved in the attack on Aleppo were pulled back and moved to the now occupied border strip. But material support for the attack in form of ammunition and other supplies seems to continue.
Two decent analyst argue that the agreement, while not entirely preferred, is still in Russia's and Syria's advantage.
Elijah Magnier says (Arabic) (English, unedited) that Russian policy in Syria is like a Matryoshka doll with one item placed inside the other. The most elaborate of these dolls has 50 levels of nesting with a total of 51 dolls. Says Magnier:

Putin seems have pulled out his first Matryushka doll by bombing the enemies of Damascus last September. He pulled out the second smaller doll when accepting a cease-fire. Then he pulled out a third doll by helping to besiege Aleppo the first time. The fourth was skilfully brought out when he supported Erdogan and approved Putin before Obama a safe passage for the Turkish troops into Syria.

Should Turkey move away from the agreement, or the U.S. try something nasty, another outer doll of the 47 left will be removed and a new Russian plan will become visible.
Raphaël Lebrujah of the French Mediapart giving his view (French) (English, machine translated) the Turkish-Russian deal:

Putin has just played a masterstroke. Indeed, in addition to having obtained many benefits from Erdogan, he just throw Turkey, an old adversary in the Syrian hell. Erdogan was carried away by his obsession, the fight against Kurdish.
...
Russia achieved the feat with one stone three hits against three opponents of the regime: the Kurds, the Syrian Islamists and Turkey. By destabilizing relations within these three actors and one against throwing in others it is a masterstroke. Better, the US appear to be divided between pro-Turkish and pro-Kurdish. Indeed, the CIA and US policies appear closer to the Turkish interests and the pentagon, that of the Kurds.

Economically Russia wins by again opening trade with Turkey. The "moderate" Islamist in the new Turkish zone are now separated from the al-Qaeda groups around Aleppo. Turks and Kurds in Syria will stay busy with fighting each other. Indeed Russia can use the Kurds against Turkey should Erdogan try to play foul. A few anti-tank or anti-air weapons smuggled into Turkey's east from Armenia will hurt the Turkish army in its fight against the local PKK. The Turkish conscript army, already weakened through purges after the recent coup, can not absorb high casualties without alarming the Turkish public.
ISIS will still be connected to Turkey. But its fighting power is severely diminished and it is already falling back into guerrilla mode. It now mostly avoids open battles. It will be ground down over time.
Surprises may still come from ISIS as it has some very well trained personnel. Its new military commander is Gulmurod Khalimov, a special forces officer from Tajikistan, long trained in counterterrorism by U.S. advisors and special forces. He replaces the dead Abu Omar al-Shishani, a Chechen special force officer from Georgia, long trained in counterterrorism by U.S. advisors and special forces. Look there! The Russians just dropped a barrel bomb! Nothing to see here, Nothing at all ...

Source

[David Guyatt]

Arms trafficking from Jordan to Syria

by Bashar Ja'afari

VOLTAIRE NETWORK | NEW YORK (USA) | 25 AUGUST 2016 FRANÇAIS عربي 中文 РУССКИЙ ESPAÑOL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to draw your attention to the following:Further to my numerous letters concerning the support the Jordanian regime provides to armed terrorist groups in Syria, including facilitation of the entry via Syrian border crossings of trucks loaded with weapons destined for armed terrorist groups in Syria, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions concerning counter-terrorism, including resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015), I should like to draw to your attention the following:The Jordanian regime has facilitated the entry of trucks loaded with weapons destined for armed terrorist groups in Syria via several border crossings as follows: On 11 July 2016 at 0600 hours, armed terrorist groups brought three tractor-trailer trucks loaded with assorted weapons and ammunition from Jordan into Syria via the Tall Shihab border crossing. They were unloaded at a vineyard in Kharab al-Shahm Farms in the western countryside of Dara governorate. On 24 July at 2130 hours, armed terrorist groups brought four vehicles from Jordan into Syria via the Abu Sharshuh border crossing and headed towards the Rusayi well in the Suwayda' desert. On 27 July at 2300 hours, armed terrorist groups brought seven trucks loaded with tank shells, anti-armour missiles, spare parts for heavy machine guns and assorted ammunition from Jordan into Syria via the Tall Shihab crossing and headed towards the villages of Burayqah and Kudnah in the Qunaytirah countryside. On 3 August at 2145 hours, armed terrorist groups brought eight vehicles from Jordan into Syria via the Abu Sharshuh border crossing into the Suwayhat Abu Sharshuh area and headed towards the Rusayi well in the Suwayda' desert.The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Security Council to assume its responsibility and take a firm approach when responding to this information and all of the information that we have sent in the past regarding the Jordanian regime's ongoing support for the armed terrorist groups that are active across Syrian territory. Such support poses a threat to security and stability in the region and the world.I should be grateful if this letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

Source

[Drew Phipps]

So, the short version of those two posts is that Jordan is arming the "green" Syrian rebels nearest its borders; and, Putin's "masterstroke" means that Turkey is now able to rearm and equip its Daesh buddies without prying eyes... I am also supposing that means that Erdogan and his family will once again be able to profit from oil trades from Daesh- controlled territory.

But I don't really understand how allowing Turkey and Daesh to do business away from "prying eyes" helps Russia's ally, the embattled government of Syria?

[Drew Phipps]

U.S., Russia clinch Syria deal, aim for truce from Monday

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideas...SKCN11F0HC