29-06-2011, 06:12 PM
http://michael-hudson.com/2011/06/privat...ife-worse/
June 14, 2011
By Michael Hudson
How Bankers are using the Debt Crisis to welcome in the Financial Road to Serfdom
Financial strategists do not intend to let today's debt crisis go to waste. Foreclosure time has arrived. That means revolution or more accurately, a counter-revolution to roll back the 20th century's gains made by social democracy: pensions and social security, public health care and other infrastructure providing essential services at subsidized prices or for free. The basic model follows the former Soviet Union's post-1991 neoliberal reforms: privatization of public enterprises, a high flat tax on labor but only nominal taxes on real estate and finance, and deregulation of the economy's prices, working conditions and credit terms.
What is to be reversed is the "modern" agenda. The aim a century ago was to mobilize the Industrial Revolution's soaring productivity and technology to raise living standards and use progressive taxation, public regulation, central banking and financial reform to distribute wealth fairly and make societies more equal. Today's financial aim is the opposite: to concentrate wealth at the top of the economic pyramid and lower labor's returns. High finance loves low wages.
The political lever to achieve this program is financial. The European Union (EU) constitution prevents central banks from financing government deficits, leaving this role to commercial banks, paying interest to them for creating credit that central banks monetize for governments in Britain and the United States. Governments are to go into debt to bail out banks for loans gone bad as do more and more loans as finance impoverishes the economy, stifling its ability to pay. Yet as long as we live in democracies, voters must agree to pay. Governments are sovereign and debt is ultimately a creature of the law and courts.
But first, voters need to understand what is happening. From the bankers' perspective, the economic surplus is what they themselves end up with. Rising consumption standards and even public investment in infrastructure are seen as deadweight. Bankers and bondholders aim to increase the surplus not so much by tangible capital investment increasing the overall surplus, but by more predatory means, headed by rolling back labor's gains and stiffening working conditions while gaining public subsidy. Banks "create wealth" by providing more credit (that is, debt leverage) to bid up asset prices for real estate and enterprises already in place assets that either are being foreclosed on or sold off under debt pressure by private owners or governments. One commentator recently characterized the latter strategy of privatization as "tantamount to selling the family silver only to have to rent it back in order to eat dinner."[1]
Fought in the name of free markets, this counter-revolution rejects the classical ideal of markets free of unearned income paid to special interests. The financial objective is to squeeze out a surplus by maximizing the margin of prices over costs. Opposing government enterprise and infrastructure as the road to serfdom, high finance is seeking to turn public infrastructure into rent-extracting tollbooths to extract economic rent (the "free lunch economy"), while replacing labor unions with non-union labor so as to work it more intensively.
This road to neoserfdom is an asset grab. But to achieve it, the financial sector needs a political grab to replace democracy with financial technocrats. Their job is to pretend that there is no revolution at all, merely an increase in "efficiency," "creating wealth" by debt-leveraging the economy to the point where the entire surplus is paid out as interest to the financial managers who are emerging as Western civilization's new central planners.
Frederick Hayek's Road to Serfdom portrayed a dystopia of public officials seeking to regulate the economy. In attacking government so one-sidedly, his ideological extremism sought to replace the checks and balances of mixed economies with a private sector "free" of regulation and consumer protection. His vision was of a post-modern economy "free" of the classical reforms to bring market prices into line with cost value. Instead of purifying industrial capitalism from the special rent extraction privileges bequeathed from the feudal epoch, Hayek's ideology opened the way for unchecked financial power to make a travesty of "free markets."
The European Union's financial planners claim that Greece and other debtor countries have a problem that is easy to cure by imposing austerity. Pension savings, Social Security and medical insurance are to be downsized so as to "free" more debt service to be paid to creditors. Insisting that Greece only has a "liquidity problem," European Central Bank (ECB) extremists deem an economy "solvent" as long as it has assets to privatize. ECB executive board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi explained the plan in a Financial Times interview:
FT: Otmar Issing, your former colleague, says Greece is insolvent and it "will not be physically possible" for it to repay its debts. Is he right?
LBS: He is wrong because Greece is solvent if it applies the programme. They have assets that they can sell and reduce their debt and they have the instruments to change their tax and expenditure systems to reduce the debt. This is the assessment of the IMF, it is the assessment of the European Commission.
Poor developing countries have no assets, their income is low, and so they become insolvent easily. If you look at the balance sheet of Greece, it is not insolvent.
The key problem is political will on the part of the government and parliament. Privatisation proceeds of €50bn, which is being talked about some mention more would reduce the peak debt to GDP ratio from 160 per cent to about 140 per cent or 135 per cent and this could be reduced further.[2]
A week later Mr. Bini Smaghi insisted that the public sector "had marketable assets worth 300 billion euros and was not bankrupt. Greece should be considered solvent and should be asked to service its debts,' … signaling that the bank remained firmly opposed to any plan to allow Greece to stretch out its debt payments or oblige investors to accept less than full repayment, a so-called haircut."[3] Speaking from Berlin, he said that Greece "was not insolvent." It could pay off its bonds owed to German bankers ($22.7 billion), French bankers ($15 billion) and the ECB (reported to be on the hook for $190 billion) by selling off public land and ports, water and sewer rights, ownership of the telephone system and other basic infrastructure. In addition to getting paid in full and receiving high interest rates reflecting "market" expectations of non-payment, the banks would enjoy a new credit market financing privatization buy-outs.
Warning that failure to pay would create windfall gains for speculators who had bet that Greece would default, Mr. Bini Smaghi refused to acknowledge the corollary: to pay the full amount would create windfalls for those who bet that Greece would be forced to pay. He also claimed that: "Restructuring of Greek debt would … discourage Greece from modernizing its economy." But the less debt service an economy pays, the more revenue it has to invest productively. And to "solve" the problem by throwing public assets on the market would create windfalls for distress buyers. As the Wall Street Journal put matters bluntly: "Greece is for sale cheap and Germany is buying. German companies are hunting for bargains in Greece as the debt-stricken government moves to sell state-owned assets to stabilize the country's finances."[4]
Rather than raising living standards while creating a more egalitarian and fair society, the ECB's creditor-oriented "reforms" would roll the time clock back to oligarchy. Not the post-feudal oligarchy of landlords owning land conquered militarily, but a financial oligarchy accumulating banking claims and bonds growing inexorably and exponentially, leaving little over for the rest of the economy to invest or consume.
The distinction between illiquidity and insolvency
If a homeowner loses his job and cannot pay his mortgage, he must sell the house or see the bank foreclose. Is he insolvent, or merely "illiquid"? If he merely has a liquidity problem, a loan will help him earn the funds to pay down the debt. But if he falls into the negative equity that now plagues a quarter of U.S. real estate, taking on more loans will only deepen his net deficit. Ending this process by losing his home does not mean that he is merely illiquid. He is in distress, and is suffering from insolvency. But to the ECB this is merely a liquidity problem.
The public balance sheet includes land and infrastructure as if they are surplus assets that can be forfeited without fundamentally changing the owner's status or social relations. In reality it is part of the means of survival in today's world, at least survival as part of the middle class.
For starters, renegotiating his loan won't help an insolvency situation such as the jobless homeowner above. Lending him the money to pay the bank interest (along with late fees and other financial penalties) or stretching out the loan merely will add to the debt balance, giving the foreclosing bank yet a larger claim on whatever property the debtor may have available to grab.
But the homeowner is in danger of being homeless, living on the street. At issue is whether solvency should be defined in the traditional common-sense way, in terms of the ability of income to carry one's current obligations, or a purely balance-sheet approach taken by creditors seeking to extract payment by stripping assets. This is Greece's position. Is it merely a liquidity problem if the government is told to sell off $50 billion in prime tourist sites, ports, water systems and other public assets in order to pay foreign creditors?
At issue is language regarding the legal rights of creditors vis-Ã -vis debtors. The United States has long had a body of law regarding this issue. A few years ago, for instance, the real estate speculator Sam Zell bought the Chicago Tribune in a debt-leveraged buyout. The newspaper soon went broke, wiping out the employees' stock ownership plan (ESOP). They sued under the fraudulent conveyance law, which says that if a creditor makes a loan without knowing how the debtor can pay in the normal course of business, the loan is assumed to have been made with the intent of foreclosing on property, and is deemed fraudulent.
This law dates from colonial times, when British speculators eyed rich New York farmland. Their ploy was to extend loans to farmers, and then call in the loans when the farmer's ability to pay was low, before the crop was harvested. This was indeed a liquidity problem which financial opportunists turned into an asset grab. Some lenders, to be sure, created a genuine insolvency problem by making loans beyond the ability of the farmers to pay, and then would foreclose on their land. The colonies nullified such loans. Fraudulent conveyance laws have been kept on the books since the United States won its independence from Britain.
Creditors today are using debt leverage to force Greece to sell off its public domain having extended credit beyond its ability to pay. So the question now being raised is whether the nation should be deemed "solvent" if the only way to carry its public debt (that is, roll it over by replacing bad old loans with newer and more inexorable obligations) is to forfeit its land and basic infrastructure. This would fundamentally alter the relationship between public and private sectors, replacing its mixed economy with a centrally planned one planned by financial predators with little care that the economy is polarizing between rich and poor, creditors and debtors.
The financial road to serfdom
Financial lobbyists are turning the English language and economic terminology throughout the world into a battlefield. Creditors are to be permitted to take the assets of insolvent debtors from homeowners and companies to entire nations as if this were a normal working of "the market" and foreclosure was simply a way to restore "liquidity." As for "solvency," the ECB would strip Greece clean of its public sector's assets. Bank officials have spoken of throwing potentially 150 billion euros of property onto the market.
Most people would think of this as a solvency problem, at least if one defines solvency as meaning the ability to maintain the kind of society one has, with existing public/private checks and balances and living standards. It is incompatible with scaling down pensions, Social Security and medical insurance to save bondholders and bankers from taking a loss. The latter policy is nothing less than a political revolution.
The asset stripping that Europe's bankers are demanding of Greece looks like a dress rehearsal to prevent the "I won't pay" movement from spreading to "Indignant Citizens" movements against financial austerity in Spain, Portugal and Italy. Bankers are trying to block governments from writing down debts, stretching out loans and reducing interest rates.
When a nation is directed to replace its mixed economy by transferring ownership of public infrastructure and enterprises to a financial class (mainly foreign), this is not merely "restoring solvency" by using long-term assets to pay short-term debts to maintain its balance-sheet net worth. It is a radical transformation to a centrally planned economy, shifting control out of the hands of elected representatives to those of financial managers whose time frame is short-term and extractive, not long-term and protective of social equity and basic needs.
Creditors are demanding a political transformation to replace democratic lawmakers with technocrats appointed by foreign bankers. When the economic surplus is pledged to bankers rather than invested at home, we are not merely dealing with "insolvency" but with an aggressive attack. Finance becomes a continuation of war, by economic means that are to be politicized. Acting on behalf of the commercial banks (from which most of its directors are drawn, and to which they intend to "descend from heaven" to take their rewards after serving their financial class), the European Central Bank insists on a political revolution to replace democratic government by a technocratic elite not of industrial engineers, but of "financial engineers," a polite name for asset stripping financial warriors. If Greece does not comply, they threaten to wreak domestic financial havoc by "pulling the plug" on Greek banks. This "carrot and stick" approach threatens that if Greece does not sign on, the ECB and IMF will withhold loans needed to keep its banking system solvent. The "carrot" was provided on May 31 they agreed to provide $86 billion in euros if Greece "puts off for the time being a restructuring, hard or soft," of its public debt.[5]
It is a travesty to present this revolution simply as a financial exercise in solving the "liquidity problem" as if it were compatible with Europe's past four centuries of political and classical economic reforms. This is why the Syntagma Square protest in front of Parliament has been growing each week, peaking at over 70,000 last Sunday, June 5.
Some protestors drew a parallel with the Wisconsin politicians who left the state to prevent a quorum from voting on the anti-labor program that Governor Walker tried to ram through. The next day, on June 6, thirty backbenchers of Prime Minister George Papandreou's ruling Panhellenic Socialist party (Pasok) were joined by some of his own cabinet ministers threatening "to resign their parliamentary seats rather than vote through measures to cut thousands of public sector jobs, increase taxes again and dispose of €50bn of state assets, according to party insiders. The biggest issue for the party is stringent cuts in the public sector … these go to the heart of Pasok's model of social protection by providing jobs in state entities for its supporters,' said a senior Socialist official."[6]
Seeing the popular reluctance to commit financial suicide, Conservative Opposition leader Antonis Samaras also opposed paying the European bankers, "demanding a renegotiation of the package agreed last week with the troika' of the EU, IMF and the European Central Bank." It was obvious that no party could gain popular support for the ECB's demand that Greece relinquish popular rule and "appoint experienced technocrats to half a dozen essential ministries to implement the EU-IMF programme."[7]
ECB President Trichet depicts himself as following Erasmus in bringing Europe beyond its "strict concept of nationhood." This is to be done by replacing elected officials with a bureaucracy of cosmopolitan banker-friendly planners. The debt problem calls for new "monetary policy measures we call them non standard' decisions, strictly separated from the standard' decisions, and aimed at restoring a better transmission of our monetary policy in these abnormal market conditions." The task at hand is to make these conditions a new normalcy and re-defining solvency to reflect a nation's ability to pay debts by selling the public domain.
The ECB and EU claim that Greece is "solvent" as long as it has assets to sell off. But if populations in today's mixed economies think of solvency as existing under existing public/private proportions, they will resist the financial sector's attempt to proceed with buyouts and foreclosures until it possesses all the assets in the world, all the hitherto public and corporate assets and those of individuals and partnerships.
To minimize opposition to this dynamic the financial sector's pet economists understate the debt burden, pretending that it can be paid without disrupting economic life and, in the Greek case for example, by using "mark to model" junk accounting and derivative swaps to simply conceal its magnitude. Dominique Strauss-Kahn at the IMF claims that the post-2008 debt crisis is merely a short-term "liquidity problem" and one of lack of "confidence," not insolvency reflecting an underlying inability to pay. Banks promise that everything will be all right when the economy "returns to normal" as if it can "borrow its way out of debt," Bernanke-style.
This is what today's financial warfare is about. At issue is the financial sector's relationship to the "real" economy. From the latter's perspective the proper role of credit that is, debt is to fund productive capital investment and spending, because it is out of the economic surplus that debts are paid. This requires a financial regulatory system and tax system to maximize growth. But that is precisely the fiscal policy that today's financial sector is fighting against. It demands preferential tax-deductability for interest to encourage debt financing rather than equity. It has disabled truth-in-lending laws and regulations to keeping interest rates and fees in line with costs of production. And it blocks governments from having central banks to freely finance their own operations and provide economies with money. And to cap matters it now demands that democratic society yield to centralized authoritarian financial rule.
Finance and democracy: from mutual reinforcement to antagonism
The relationship between banking and democracy has taken many twists over the centuries. Earlier this year, democratic opposition to the ECB and IMF attempt to impose austerity and privatization selloffs succeeded when Iceland's President GrÃmsson insisted on a national referendum on the Icesave debt payment that Althing leaders had negotiated with Britain and the Netherlands (if one can characterize abject capitulation as a real negotiation). To their credit, a heavy 3-to-2 majority of Icelanders voted "No," saving their economy from being driven into the debt peonage.
Democratic action historically has been needed to enforce debt collection. Until four centuries ago royal treasuries typically were kept in the royal bedroom, and loans to rulers were in the character of personal debts. Bankers repeatedly found themselves burned, especially by Habsburg and Bourbon despots on the thrones of Spain, Austria and France. Loans to such rulers were liable to expire upon their death, unless their successors remained dependent on these same financiers rather than turning to their rivals. The numerous bankruptcies of Spain's autocratic Habsburg ruler Charles V exhausted his credit, preventing the nation from raising funds to defeat the rebellious Low Countries to the north.
The problem facing bankers was how to make loans permanent national obligations. Solving this problem gave an advantage to parliamentary democracies. It was a major factor enabling the Low Countries to win their independence from Habsburg Spain in the 16th century. The Dutch Republic committed the entire nation to pay its public debts, binding the people themselves, through their elected representatives who earmarked taxes to their creditors. Bankers saw parliamentary democracy as a precondition for making sound loans to governments. This security for bankers could be achieved only from electorates having at least a nominal voice in government. And raising war loans was a key element in military rivalry in an epoch when the maxim for survival was "Money is the sinews of war."
As long as governments remained despotic, they found that their ability to incur more debt was limited. At this time "the legal position of the King qua borrower was obscure, and it was still doubtful whether his creditors had any remedy against him in case of default."[8] Earlier Dutch-English financing had not satisfied creditors on this count. When Charles I borrowed 650,000 guilders from the Dutch States-General in 1625, the two countries' military alliance against Spain helped defer the implicit constitutional struggle over who ultimately was liable for British debts.
The key financial achievement of parliamentary government was thus to establish nations as political bodies whose debts were not merely the personal obligations of rulers, but truly public and binding regardless of who occupied the throne. This is why the first two democratic nations the Netherlands and Britain after its 1688 dynastic linkage between Holland and Britain in the person of William I, and the emergence of Parliamentary authority over public financing developed the most active capital markets and became Europe's leading military powers. "A funded debt could not be formed so long as the King and Parliament were fighting for the mastery," concludes the financial historian Richard Ehrenberg. "It was only after the [1688] revolution that the English State became what the Dutch Republic had long been a real corporation of individuals firmly associated together, a permanent organism."[9]
In sum, nations emerged in their modern form by adopting the financial characteristics of democratic city states. The financial imperatives of 17th-century warfare helped make these democracies victorious, for the new national financial systems facilitated military spending on a vastly extended scale. Conversely, the more despotic Spain, Austria and France became, the greater the difficulty they found in financing their military adventures. Austria was left "without credit, and consequently without much debt" by the end of the 18th century, the least credit-worthy and worst armed country in Europe, as Sir James Steuart noted in 1767.[10] It became fully dependent on British subsidies and loan guarantees by the time of the Napoleonic Wars.
The modern epoch of war financing therefore went hand in hand with the spread of parliamentary democracy. The situation was similar to that enjoyed by plebeian tribunes in Rome in the early centuries of its Republic. They were able to veto all military funding until the patricians made political concessions. The lesson was not lost on 18th-century Protestant parliaments. For war debts and other national obligations to become binding, the people's elected representatives had to pledge taxes. This could be achieved only by giving the electorate a voice in government.
It thus was the desire to be repaid that turned the preference of creditors away from autocracies toward democracies. In the end it was only from democracies that they were able to collect. This of course did not necessarily reflect liberal political convictions on the part of creditors. They simply wanted to be paid.
Europe's sovereign commercial cities developed the best credit ratings, and hence were best able to employ mercenaries. Access to credit was "their most powerful weapon in the struggle for their freedom," notes Ehrenberg, in an age whose "growth in the use of firearms had forced them to surround themselves with stronger fortifications."[11] The problem was that "Anyone who gave credit to a prince knew that the repayment of the debt depended only on his debtor's capacity and will to pay. The case was very different for the cities, who had power as overlords, but were also corporations, associations of individuals held in common bond. According to the generally accepted law each individual burgher was liable for the debts of the city both with his person and his property."
But the tables are now turning, from Icelandic voters to the large crowds gathering in Syntagma Square and elsewhere throughout Greece to oppose the terms on which Prime Minister Papandreou has been negotiating an EU bailout loan for the government to bail out German and French banks. Now that nations are not raising money for war but to subsidize reckless predatory bankers, Jean-Claude Trichet of the ECB recently suggested taking financial policy out of the hands of democracy:
But if a country is still not delivering, I think all would agree that the second stage has to be different. Would it go too far if we envisaged, at this second stage, giving euro area authorities a much deeper and authoritative say in the formation of the country's economic policies if these go harmfully astray? A direct influence, well over and above the reinforced surveillance that is presently envisaged? …
At issue is sovereignty itself. In this respect, the war being waged against Greece by the European Central Bank (ECB) may best be seen as a dress rehearsal not only for the rest of Europe, but for what financial lobbyists would like to bring about globally.
Footnotes
[1] Yves Smith, "Wisconsin's Walker Joins Government Asset Giveaway Club Naked Capitalism, February 22, 2011.
[2] Ralph Atkins, "Transcript: Lorenzo Bini Smaghi," Financial Times, May 30, 2011.
[3] Jack Ewing, "In Asset Sale, Greece to Give Up 10% Stake in Telecom Company," The New York Times, June 7, 2011.
[4] Christopher Lawton and Laura Stevens, "Deutsche Telekom, Others Look to Grab State-Owned Assets at Fire-Sale Prices," Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2011.
[5] Landon Thomas Jr., "New Rescue Package for Greece Takes Shape," The New York Times, June 1, 2011.
[6] Kerin Hope, "Rift widens on Greek reform plan," Financial Times, June 7, 2011.
[7] Ibid. See also Kerin Hope, "Thousands protest against Greek austerity," Financial Times, June 6, 2011: "Thieves, thieves … Where did our money go?' the protesters shouted, blowing whistles and waving Greek flags as riot police thickened ranks around the parliament building on Syntagma square in the centre of the capital. … Banners draped nearby read Take back the new measures' and Greece is not for sale' a reference to the government's plans to include state property and real estate for tourist development in the privatisation scheme."
[8] Charles Wilson, England's Apprenticeship: 1603-1763 (London: 1965), p. 89.
[9] Richard Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance (1928), p. 354.
[10] James Steuart, Principles of Political Economy (1767), p. 353.
[11] Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 44f., 33.
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How a $13 Trillion Cover Story was Written
June 17, 2011
By Michael Hudson
Free money creation to bail out America's elite financial speculators, but not for Social Security or Medicare
Only the "Crazies" Get the Bank Giveaway Right
Financial crashes were well understood for a hundred years after they became a normal financial phenomenon in the mid-19th century. Much like the buildup of plaque deposits in human veins and arteries, an accumulation of debt gained momentum exponentially until the economy crashed, wiping out bad debts along with savings on the other side of the balance sheet.
Physical property remained intact, although much was transferred from debtors to creditors. But clearing away the debt overhead from the economy's circulatory system freed it to resume its upswing. That was the positive role of crashes: They minimized the cost of debt service, bringing prices and income back in line with actual "real" costs of production. Debt claims were replaced by equity ownership. Housing prices were lower and more affordable, being brought back in line with their actual rental value. Goods and services no longer had to incorporate the debt charges that the financial upswing had built into the system.
Financial crashes came suddenly. They often were triggered by a crop failure causing farmers to default, or "the autumnal drain" drew down bank liquidity when funds were needed to move the crops. Crashes often also revealed large financial fraud and "excesses."
This was not really a "cycle." It was a scallop-shaped ratchet pattern: an ascending curve, ending in a vertical plunge. But popular terminology called it a cycle because the pattern was similar again and again, every eleven years or so. When loans by banks and debt claims by other creditors could not be paid, they were wiped out in a convulsion of bankruptcy.
Gradually, as the financial system became more "elastic," each business recovery started from a larger debt overhead relative to output. The United States emerged from World War II relatively debt free. Downturns occurred, crashes wiped out debts and savings, but each recovery since 1945 has taken place with a higher debt overhead. Bank loans and bonds have replaced stocks, as more stocks have been retired in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and buyback plans than are being issued to raise new equity capital. Behind every LBO is the desire to keep stock prices high, lavishing rewards to managers via the stock options they give themselves.
But after the stock market's dot.com crash of 2000 and the Federal Reserve flooding the U.S. economy with credit after 9/11, 2001, there was so much "free spending money" that many economists believed that the era of scientific money management had arrived and the financial cycle had ended. Growth could occur smoothly with no over-optimism as to debt, no inability to pay, no proliferation of over-valuation or fraud. This was the era in which Alan Greenspan was applauded as Maestro for ostensibly creating a risk-free environment by removing government regulators from the financial oversight agencies.
What has made the post-2008 crash most remarkable is not merely the delusion that the way to get rich is by debt leverage (unless you are a banker, that is). Most unique is the crash's aftermath. This time around the bad debts have not been wiped off the books. There have indeed been the usual bankruptcies but the bad lenders and speculators are being saved from loss by the government intervening to issue Treasury bonds to pay them off out of future tax revenues or new money creation.
The Obama Administration's Wall Street managers have kept the debt overhead in place toxic mortgage debt, junk bonds, and most seriously, the novel web of collateralized debt obligations (CDO), credit default swaps (almost monopolized by A.I.G.) and kindred financial derivatives of a basically mathematical character that have developed in the 1990s and early 2000s.
These computerized casino cross-bets among the world's leading financial institutions are the largest problem.
Instead of this network of reciprocal claims being let go, they have been taken onto the government's own balance sheet. This has occurred not only in the United States but even more disastrously in Ireland, shifting the obligation to pay on what were basically gambles rather than loans from the financial institutions that had lost on these bets (fraudulently inflated loans) onto the government ("taxpayers").
The government took over the mortgage lending guarantors Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (privatizing the profits, "socializing" the losses) for $5.3 trillion almost as much as the entire national debt. The Treasury lent $700 billion under the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) to Wall Street's largest banks and brokerage houses. The latter re-incorporated themselves as "banks" to get Federal Reserve handouts and access to the Fed's $2 trillion in "cash for trash" swaps crediting Wall Street with Fed deposits for otherwise "illiquid" loans and securities (the euphemism for toxic, fraudulent or otherwise insolvent and unmarketable debt instruments) at "cost" based on full mark-to-model fictitious valuations.
Altogether, the post-2008 crash saw some $13 trillion in such obligations transferred onto the government's balance sheet from high finance, euphemized as "the private sector" as if it were the core economy itself, rather than its calcifying shell.
Instead of losing on their bad bets, bad loans, toxic mortgages and outright fraudulent claims, the financial institutions cleaned up, at public expense. They collected enough to create a new century's power elite to lord it over "taxpayers" in industry, agriculture and commerce who will be charged to pay off this debt.
If there was a silver lining to all this, it has been to demonstrate that if the Treasury and Federal Reserve can create $13 trillion of public obligations money electronically on computer keyboards, there really is no Social Security problem at all, no Medicare shortfall, no inability of the American government to rebuild the nation's infrastructure.
The bailout of Wall Street showed how central banks can create money, as Modern Money Theory (MMT) explains. But rather than explaining how this phenomenon worked, the bailout was rammed through Congress under emergency conditions. Bankers threatened economic Armageddon if the government did not create the credit to save them from taking losses.
Even more remarkable is the attempt to convince the population that new money and debt creation to bail out Wall Street and vest a new century of financial billionaires at public subsidy cannot be mobilized just as readily to save labor and industry in the "real" economy. The Republicans and Obama administration appointees held over from the Bush and Clinton administration have joined to conjure up scare stories that Social Security and Medicare debts cannot be paid, although the government can quickly and with little debate take responsibility for paying trillions of dollars of bipartisan Finance-Care for the rich and their heirs.
The result is a financial schizophrenia extending across the political spectrum from the Tea Party to Tim Geithner at the Treasury and Ben Bernanke at the Fed. It seems bizarre that the most reasonable understanding of why the 2008 bank crisis did not require a vast public subsidy for Wall Street occurred at Monday's Republican presidential debate on June 13, by none other than Congressional Tea Party leader Michele Bachmann who had boasted in a Wall Street Journal interview two days earlier, on Saturday, that she voted against the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) "both times."
She complains that no one bothered to ask about the constitutionality of these extraordinary interventions into the financial markets.
"During a recent hearing I asked Secretary [Timothy] Geithner three times where the constitution authorized the Treasury's actions [just [giving] the Treasury a $700 billion blank check], and his response was, Well, Congress passed the law.' …With TARP, the government blew through the Constitutional stop sign and decided Whatever it takes, that's what we're going to do.'"
Clarifying her position regarding her willingness to see the banks fail, she explained:
I would have. People think when you have a, quote, bank failure,' that that is the end of the bank. And it isn't necessarily. A normal way that the American free market system has worked is that we have a process of unwinding. It's called bankruptcy. It doesn't mean, necessarily, that the industry is eclipsed or that it's gone. Often times, the phoenix rises out of the ashes.[1]
There were easily enough sound loans and assets in the banks to cover deposits insured by the FDIC but not enough to pay their counterparties in the "casino capitalist" category of their transactions. This super-computerized financial horse racing is what the bailout was about, not bread-and-butter retail and business banking or insurance.
It all seems reminiscent of the 1968 presidential campaign. The economic discussion back then between Democrat Hubert Humphrey and Republican Richard Nixon was so tepid that it prompted journalist Eric Hoffer to ask why only a southern cracker, third-party candidate Alabama Governor George Wallace, was talking about the real issues. We seem to be in a similar state in preparation for the 2012 campaign, with junk economics on both sides.
Meanwhile, the economy is still suffering from the Obama administration's failure to alleviate the debt overhead. He should be making banks write down junk mortgages to reflect actual market values and the capacity to pay. Foreclosures are still throwing homes onto the market, pushing real estate further into negative equity territory while wealth concentrates at the top of the economic pyramid. No wonder Republicans are able to shed crocodile tears for debtors and attack President Obama for representing Wall Street (as if this is not equally true of the Republicans). He is simply continuing the Bush Administration's policies, not leading the change he had promised. So he has left the path open for Congresswoman Bachmann to highlight her opposition to the Bush-McCain-Obama-Paulson-Geithner giveaways.
The missed opportunity
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the presidential campaign between Barack Obama and John McCain was peaking toward Election Day on November 4. Voters told pollsters that the economy was their main issue their debts, soaring housing costs ("wealth creation" to real estate speculators and the banks getting rich off mortgage lending), stagnant wage levels and worsening workplace conditions were what mattered. However, in the wake of Lehman, the main issue under popular debate was how much Wall Street's crash would hurt the "real" economy. If large banks went under, would depositors still be safely insured? What about the course of normal business and employment?
Credit is seen as necessary; but what of credit derivatives, the financial sector's arcane "small print"? How intrinsic are financial gambles on collateralized debt obligations? Remember CDOs were called "weapons of mass financial destruction" by no less than Warren Buffett. They have little to do with retail banking or even business banking and insurance, but are financial bets on the economy's zigzagging measures.
Without casino capitalism, could industrial capitalism survive? Or had the superstructure become rotten and best left to "free markets" to wipe out in mutually offsetting bankruptcy claims?
Mr. Obama ran as the "candidate of change" from the Bush Administration's war in Iraq and Afghanistan, its deregulatory excesses and giveaways to the pharmaceuticals industry and other monopolies and their Wall Street backers. Today it is clear that his promises for change were no more than campaign rhetoric. There even has been continuity of Bush Administration officials committed to promoting financial policies to keep the debts in place, enabling banks to "earn their way out of debt" at the expense of consumers and businesses. Read $13 trillion in government bailouts and subsidy.
History is being written to depict the policy of saving the bankers rather than the economy as having been necessary as if there were no alternative, that the vast giveaways to Wall Street were simply "pragmatic." Financial beneficiaries claim that matters would be even worse today without these giveaways. It is as if we not only need the banks, we need to save them (and their stockholders) from losses, enabling them to pay and retain their immensely rich talent at the top with even bigger salaries, bonuses and stock options.
It is all junk economics well-subsidized illogic, quite popular among fundraisers.
The Obama Plan
From the outset in 2009, the Obama Plan has been to re-inflate the Bubble Economy by providing yet more credit (that is, debt) to bid housing and commercial real estate prices back up to pre-crash levels, not to bring debts down to the economy's ability to pay. The result is debt deflation for the economy at large and rising unemployment but enrichment of the wealthiest 1% of the population as economies have become even more financialized.
This smooth continuum from the Bush to the Obama Administration masks the fact that there was a choice, and even a clear disagreement at the time within Congress, if not between the two presidential candidates, who seemed to speak as Siamese Twins as far as their policies to save Wall Street (from losses, not from actually dying) were concerned.
Wall Street saw an opportunity to be grabbed, and its spokesmen panicked policy-makers into imagining that there was no alternative. And as President Obama's chief of staff Emanuel Rahm noted, this crisis is too important an opportunity to let it go to waste. For Washington's Wall Street constituency, the bold aim was to get the government to save them from having to take a loss on loans gone bad loans that had made them rich already by collecting fees and interest, and by placing bets as to which way real estate prices, interest rates and exchange rates would move.
After September 2008 they were to get rich on a bailout euphemized as "saving the economy," if one believes that Wall Street is the economy's core, not its wrapping or supposed facilitator, not to say a vampire squid. The largest and most urgent problem was not the inability of poor home buyers to cope with the interest-rate jumps called for in the small print of their adjustable rate mortgages. The immediate priorities sat at the top of the economic pyramid. Citibank, AIG and other "too big to fail" institutions were unable to pay the winners on the speculative gambles and guarantees they had been writing.
It was as if the economy had become risk-free, not overburdened with debt beyond its ability to pay.
Making the government absorb their losses instead of recovering the enormous salaries and bonuses their managers had paid themselves for selling these bad bets required a cover story to make it appear that the economy could not be saved without the Treasury and Federal Reserve underwriting these gambling losses. Like the sheriff in the movie Blazing Saddles threatening to shoot himself if he weren't freed, the financial sector warned that its losses would destroy the retail banking and insurance systems, not just the upper reaches of computerized derivatives gambling.
How America's Bailouts Endowed a Financial Elite to rule the 21st Century
The bailout of casino capitalists vested a new ruling class with $13 trillion of public IOUs (including the $5.3 trillion rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) added to the national debt. The recipients have paid out much of this gift in salaries and bonuses, and to "make themselves whole" on their bad risks in default to pay off.
An alternative would have been to prosecute them and recover what they had paid themselves as commissions for loading the economy with debt.
Although there were two sides within Congress in September 2008, there was no disagreement between the two presidential candidates. John McCain ran back to Washington on the fateful Friday of their September 26 debate to insist that he was suspending his campaign in order to devote all his efforts to persuading Congress to approve the $700 billion bank bailout and would not debate Mr. Obama until that was settled. But he capitulated and went to the debate. On September 29 the House of Representatives rejected the giveaway, headed by Republicans in opposition.
So Mr. McCain did not even get brownie points for being able to sway politicians on the side of his Wall Street campaign contributors. Until this time he had campaigned as a "maverick." But his capitulation to high finance reminded voters of his notorious role in the Keating Five, standing up for bank crooks. His standing in the polls plummeted, and the Senate capitulated to a redrafted TARP bill on October 1. President Bush signed it into law two days later, on October 3, euphemized as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.
Fast-forward to today. What does it signify when a right-wing cracker makes a more realistic diagnosis of bad bank lending than Treasury Secretary Geithner, Fed Chairman Bernanke or other Bush-era financial experts retained by the Obama team?
Without the bailout, the gambling arm of Wall Street would have collapsed, but the "real" economy's everyday banking and insurance operations could have continued. The bottom 99 percent of the U.S. economy would have recovered with only a speed bump to clean out the congestion at the top, and the government would have ended up in control of the biggest and most reckless banks and AIG as it did in any case.
The government could have used its equity ownership and control of the banks to write down mortgages to reflect market conditions. It could have left families owning their homes at the same cost they would have had to pay in rent the economic definition of equilibrium in property prices.
The government-owned "too big to fail" banks could have been told to refrain from gambling on derivatives, from lending for currency and commodity speculation, and from making takeover loans and other predatory financial practices. Public ownership would have run the banks like savings banks or post office banks rather than gambling schemes fueling the international carry trade (computer-driven interest rate and currency arbitrage) that has no linkage to the production-and-consumption economy.
The government could have used its equity ownership and control of the banks to provide credit and credit card services as the "public option." Credit is a form of infrastructure, and such public investment is what enabled the United States to undersell foreign economies in the 19th and 20th centuries despite its high wage levels and social spending programs. As Simon Patten, the first economics professor at the nation's first business school (the Wharton School) explained, public infrastructure investment is a "fourth factor of production." It takes its return not in the form of profits, but in the degree to which it lowers the economy's cost of doing business and living. Public investment does not need to generate profits or pay high salaries, bonuses and stock options, or operate via offshore banking centers.
But this is not the agenda that the Bush-Obama administrations chose. Only Wall Street had a plan in place to unwrap when the crisis opportunity erupted. The plan was predatory, not productive, not lowering the economy's debt overhead or cost of living and doing business to make it more competitive. So the great opportunity to serve the public interest by taking over banks gone broke was missed. Stockholders were bailed out, counterparties were saved from loss, and managers today are paying themselves bonuses as usual. The "crisis" was turned into an opportunity to panic politicians into helping their Wall Street patrons.
One can only wonder what it means when the only common sense being heard about the separation of bank functions should come from a far-out extremist in the current debate. The social democratic tradition had been erased from the curriculum as it had in political memory.
Tom Fahey: Would you say the bailout program was a success? …
BACHMANN: John, I was in the middle of this debate. I was behind closed doors with Secretary Paulson when he came and made the extraordinary, never-before-made request to Congress: Give us a $700 billion blank check with no strings attached.
And I fought behind closed doors against my own party on TARP. It was a wrong vote then. It's continued to be a wrong vote since then. Sometimes that's what you have to do. You have to take principle over your party.[2]
Proclaiming herself a libertarian, Ms. Bachmann opposes raising the federal debt ceiling, Pres. Obama's Medicare reform and other federal initiatives. So her opposition to the Wall Street bailout turns out to be from a lack of understanding about how governments and their central banks can create money with a stroke of the computer pen, so to speak. (If the printing presses can work for Wall St, surely they too can for the people's health?) But at least she was clear that bank counterparty gambles made by high rollers at the financial race track could have been wiped out without destroying the banking system's key economic functions.
The moral
Contrasting Ms. Bachmann's remarks to the panicky claims by Mr. Geithner and Hank Paulson in September 2008 confirm a basic axiom of today's junk economics: When an economic error becomes so widespread that it is adopted as official government policy, there is always a special interest at work to promote it.
In the case of bailing out Wall Street and thereby the wealthiest 1% of Americans while saying there is no money for Social Security, Medicare or long-term public social spending and infrastructure investment, the beneficiaries are obvious. So are the losers.
High finance means low wages, low employment, low industry and a shrinking economy under conditions where policy planning is centralized in the hands of Wall Street and its political nominees, rather than in the safekeeping of more objective administrators.
Footnotes:
[1] Stephen Moore, "On the Beach, I Bring von Mises": Interview with Michele Bachman, Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2011.
[2] CNN Republican Presidential Debate, Transcript, June 13, 2011, http://www.malagent.com/archives/1738
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Privatizing Will Make Life Worse
June 24, 2011
By Michael Hudson
November 12, 1989, New York Times
PERESTROIKA GOES SOUTH
This article was published in the NYT more than 20 years ago, forecasting precisely what has happened.
I attended the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington
last month. When the meetings ended, I was left with the impression that no further writedowns
would be forthcoming for Latin America's debtor countries unless they followed the lead of Mexico.
To do this, countries like Brazil and Argentina would have to sell off their public utilities, some
potentially profitable industrial corporations and some service industries like airlines.
In the past, one met mostly bankers at these big international meetings. Now there are a lot of
lawyers.
For Latin America the foreclosure process has begun, but for the time being it is called privatization
or debt-for-equity swaps. Countries hoping to borrow more money from creditor-nation
governments, the I.M.F. and the World Bank, are being told to help themselves by relinquishing
ownership of their basic economic infrastructure.
In advocating this brave new world of privatizing hitherto public monopolies, these local investors
and their partners, the international banking and investment community, cite a number of truisms.
Private-sector managers will run enterprises more efficiently, the proponents of privatization say.
This argument has merit, as far as it goes. But it should be remembered that the troubled savings
and loan institutions in Texas were all privately run businesses.
But more important, in the United States and Europe there exists a balance between private
profitability and the public's need for popularly priced power, transport and other services. This
balance is insured by public regulatory agencies and is backed by antitrust legislation.
But few Latin American or other third world economies have ever had to develop these regulatory
traditions because their governments have owned the major public utilities and other monopolies.
The fact that private ownership of these enterprises will be a new experience for these countries
means that it may not have the same salutary consequences as in the United States.
Proponents of privatization say that a sell-off of utilities will reduce government budget deficits.
They argue that privatization will turn government-owned businesses, which are often fiscal drains
on a country, into private tax-paying entities. As a result, lower federal deficits may help slow the
endemic inflations that plague most debtor economies.
But for the population at large, shifting the economic burden away from government (and hence the
taxpayers) may turn out to be largely illusory. For what the government saves in subsidies may be
paid by users of these utilities in the form of higher power, phone and transport rates charged by the
new proprietors.
Fortunately, there are alternatives to the above scenarios. The most obvious one is to keep these
monopolies public but restructure them as truly independent corporations by bringing in the best
management possible. The alternative to badly run public enterprise is not necessarily privatization,
but better administration with effective checks and balances against incompetence and malfeasance.
A second option is to put public regulatory and antitrust legislation in place before it is too late. The
objective is to hold privatizers to their promises by making them absorb the penalty for their own
possible inefficiency, by enjoying lower profits rather than extorting higher rates from consumers.
After all, why should third world populations deserve less than the United States in this respect?
Whatever option is chosen, the possible outcomes are relatively clear. If the new purchasers of public
utilities are foreign, it will constitute a retrogression from neocolonialism back to direct colonialism.
If domestic investors buy a nation's economic infrastructure, they will achieve a higher degree of
power than has been attained by investors in the United States and Europe. The upshot of this may
be an unprecedented economic polarization in countries where wealthy citizens already have a strong
influence on government.
But the most likely outcome is an alliance between wealthy local families and foreign banks and
other international investors. That would give the takeover process a cosmopolitan patina.
One way or another, the debt-into-equity conversion represents a foreclosure on the mismanaged
economies of the third world. But behind the rhetoric of today's privatization, one must always ask,
Qui bono? Who will benefit from the prospective economic changes? In my opinion, it will be the
rich and the creditor banks who benefit from these schemes. For the people in general, and for
public-employee labor unions, privatization means that life may well be more expensive in the
future.
June 14, 2011
By Michael Hudson
How Bankers are using the Debt Crisis to welcome in the Financial Road to Serfdom
Financial strategists do not intend to let today's debt crisis go to waste. Foreclosure time has arrived. That means revolution or more accurately, a counter-revolution to roll back the 20th century's gains made by social democracy: pensions and social security, public health care and other infrastructure providing essential services at subsidized prices or for free. The basic model follows the former Soviet Union's post-1991 neoliberal reforms: privatization of public enterprises, a high flat tax on labor but only nominal taxes on real estate and finance, and deregulation of the economy's prices, working conditions and credit terms.
What is to be reversed is the "modern" agenda. The aim a century ago was to mobilize the Industrial Revolution's soaring productivity and technology to raise living standards and use progressive taxation, public regulation, central banking and financial reform to distribute wealth fairly and make societies more equal. Today's financial aim is the opposite: to concentrate wealth at the top of the economic pyramid and lower labor's returns. High finance loves low wages.
The political lever to achieve this program is financial. The European Union (EU) constitution prevents central banks from financing government deficits, leaving this role to commercial banks, paying interest to them for creating credit that central banks monetize for governments in Britain and the United States. Governments are to go into debt to bail out banks for loans gone bad as do more and more loans as finance impoverishes the economy, stifling its ability to pay. Yet as long as we live in democracies, voters must agree to pay. Governments are sovereign and debt is ultimately a creature of the law and courts.
But first, voters need to understand what is happening. From the bankers' perspective, the economic surplus is what they themselves end up with. Rising consumption standards and even public investment in infrastructure are seen as deadweight. Bankers and bondholders aim to increase the surplus not so much by tangible capital investment increasing the overall surplus, but by more predatory means, headed by rolling back labor's gains and stiffening working conditions while gaining public subsidy. Banks "create wealth" by providing more credit (that is, debt leverage) to bid up asset prices for real estate and enterprises already in place assets that either are being foreclosed on or sold off under debt pressure by private owners or governments. One commentator recently characterized the latter strategy of privatization as "tantamount to selling the family silver only to have to rent it back in order to eat dinner."[1]
Fought in the name of free markets, this counter-revolution rejects the classical ideal of markets free of unearned income paid to special interests. The financial objective is to squeeze out a surplus by maximizing the margin of prices over costs. Opposing government enterprise and infrastructure as the road to serfdom, high finance is seeking to turn public infrastructure into rent-extracting tollbooths to extract economic rent (the "free lunch economy"), while replacing labor unions with non-union labor so as to work it more intensively.
This road to neoserfdom is an asset grab. But to achieve it, the financial sector needs a political grab to replace democracy with financial technocrats. Their job is to pretend that there is no revolution at all, merely an increase in "efficiency," "creating wealth" by debt-leveraging the economy to the point where the entire surplus is paid out as interest to the financial managers who are emerging as Western civilization's new central planners.
Frederick Hayek's Road to Serfdom portrayed a dystopia of public officials seeking to regulate the economy. In attacking government so one-sidedly, his ideological extremism sought to replace the checks and balances of mixed economies with a private sector "free" of regulation and consumer protection. His vision was of a post-modern economy "free" of the classical reforms to bring market prices into line with cost value. Instead of purifying industrial capitalism from the special rent extraction privileges bequeathed from the feudal epoch, Hayek's ideology opened the way for unchecked financial power to make a travesty of "free markets."
The European Union's financial planners claim that Greece and other debtor countries have a problem that is easy to cure by imposing austerity. Pension savings, Social Security and medical insurance are to be downsized so as to "free" more debt service to be paid to creditors. Insisting that Greece only has a "liquidity problem," European Central Bank (ECB) extremists deem an economy "solvent" as long as it has assets to privatize. ECB executive board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi explained the plan in a Financial Times interview:
FT: Otmar Issing, your former colleague, says Greece is insolvent and it "will not be physically possible" for it to repay its debts. Is he right?
LBS: He is wrong because Greece is solvent if it applies the programme. They have assets that they can sell and reduce their debt and they have the instruments to change their tax and expenditure systems to reduce the debt. This is the assessment of the IMF, it is the assessment of the European Commission.
Poor developing countries have no assets, their income is low, and so they become insolvent easily. If you look at the balance sheet of Greece, it is not insolvent.
The key problem is political will on the part of the government and parliament. Privatisation proceeds of €50bn, which is being talked about some mention more would reduce the peak debt to GDP ratio from 160 per cent to about 140 per cent or 135 per cent and this could be reduced further.[2]
A week later Mr. Bini Smaghi insisted that the public sector "had marketable assets worth 300 billion euros and was not bankrupt. Greece should be considered solvent and should be asked to service its debts,' … signaling that the bank remained firmly opposed to any plan to allow Greece to stretch out its debt payments or oblige investors to accept less than full repayment, a so-called haircut."[3] Speaking from Berlin, he said that Greece "was not insolvent." It could pay off its bonds owed to German bankers ($22.7 billion), French bankers ($15 billion) and the ECB (reported to be on the hook for $190 billion) by selling off public land and ports, water and sewer rights, ownership of the telephone system and other basic infrastructure. In addition to getting paid in full and receiving high interest rates reflecting "market" expectations of non-payment, the banks would enjoy a new credit market financing privatization buy-outs.
Warning that failure to pay would create windfall gains for speculators who had bet that Greece would default, Mr. Bini Smaghi refused to acknowledge the corollary: to pay the full amount would create windfalls for those who bet that Greece would be forced to pay. He also claimed that: "Restructuring of Greek debt would … discourage Greece from modernizing its economy." But the less debt service an economy pays, the more revenue it has to invest productively. And to "solve" the problem by throwing public assets on the market would create windfalls for distress buyers. As the Wall Street Journal put matters bluntly: "Greece is for sale cheap and Germany is buying. German companies are hunting for bargains in Greece as the debt-stricken government moves to sell state-owned assets to stabilize the country's finances."[4]
Rather than raising living standards while creating a more egalitarian and fair society, the ECB's creditor-oriented "reforms" would roll the time clock back to oligarchy. Not the post-feudal oligarchy of landlords owning land conquered militarily, but a financial oligarchy accumulating banking claims and bonds growing inexorably and exponentially, leaving little over for the rest of the economy to invest or consume.
The distinction between illiquidity and insolvency
If a homeowner loses his job and cannot pay his mortgage, he must sell the house or see the bank foreclose. Is he insolvent, or merely "illiquid"? If he merely has a liquidity problem, a loan will help him earn the funds to pay down the debt. But if he falls into the negative equity that now plagues a quarter of U.S. real estate, taking on more loans will only deepen his net deficit. Ending this process by losing his home does not mean that he is merely illiquid. He is in distress, and is suffering from insolvency. But to the ECB this is merely a liquidity problem.
The public balance sheet includes land and infrastructure as if they are surplus assets that can be forfeited without fundamentally changing the owner's status or social relations. In reality it is part of the means of survival in today's world, at least survival as part of the middle class.
For starters, renegotiating his loan won't help an insolvency situation such as the jobless homeowner above. Lending him the money to pay the bank interest (along with late fees and other financial penalties) or stretching out the loan merely will add to the debt balance, giving the foreclosing bank yet a larger claim on whatever property the debtor may have available to grab.
But the homeowner is in danger of being homeless, living on the street. At issue is whether solvency should be defined in the traditional common-sense way, in terms of the ability of income to carry one's current obligations, or a purely balance-sheet approach taken by creditors seeking to extract payment by stripping assets. This is Greece's position. Is it merely a liquidity problem if the government is told to sell off $50 billion in prime tourist sites, ports, water systems and other public assets in order to pay foreign creditors?
At issue is language regarding the legal rights of creditors vis-Ã -vis debtors. The United States has long had a body of law regarding this issue. A few years ago, for instance, the real estate speculator Sam Zell bought the Chicago Tribune in a debt-leveraged buyout. The newspaper soon went broke, wiping out the employees' stock ownership plan (ESOP). They sued under the fraudulent conveyance law, which says that if a creditor makes a loan without knowing how the debtor can pay in the normal course of business, the loan is assumed to have been made with the intent of foreclosing on property, and is deemed fraudulent.
This law dates from colonial times, when British speculators eyed rich New York farmland. Their ploy was to extend loans to farmers, and then call in the loans when the farmer's ability to pay was low, before the crop was harvested. This was indeed a liquidity problem which financial opportunists turned into an asset grab. Some lenders, to be sure, created a genuine insolvency problem by making loans beyond the ability of the farmers to pay, and then would foreclose on their land. The colonies nullified such loans. Fraudulent conveyance laws have been kept on the books since the United States won its independence from Britain.
Creditors today are using debt leverage to force Greece to sell off its public domain having extended credit beyond its ability to pay. So the question now being raised is whether the nation should be deemed "solvent" if the only way to carry its public debt (that is, roll it over by replacing bad old loans with newer and more inexorable obligations) is to forfeit its land and basic infrastructure. This would fundamentally alter the relationship between public and private sectors, replacing its mixed economy with a centrally planned one planned by financial predators with little care that the economy is polarizing between rich and poor, creditors and debtors.
The financial road to serfdom
Financial lobbyists are turning the English language and economic terminology throughout the world into a battlefield. Creditors are to be permitted to take the assets of insolvent debtors from homeowners and companies to entire nations as if this were a normal working of "the market" and foreclosure was simply a way to restore "liquidity." As for "solvency," the ECB would strip Greece clean of its public sector's assets. Bank officials have spoken of throwing potentially 150 billion euros of property onto the market.
Most people would think of this as a solvency problem, at least if one defines solvency as meaning the ability to maintain the kind of society one has, with existing public/private checks and balances and living standards. It is incompatible with scaling down pensions, Social Security and medical insurance to save bondholders and bankers from taking a loss. The latter policy is nothing less than a political revolution.
The asset stripping that Europe's bankers are demanding of Greece looks like a dress rehearsal to prevent the "I won't pay" movement from spreading to "Indignant Citizens" movements against financial austerity in Spain, Portugal and Italy. Bankers are trying to block governments from writing down debts, stretching out loans and reducing interest rates.
When a nation is directed to replace its mixed economy by transferring ownership of public infrastructure and enterprises to a financial class (mainly foreign), this is not merely "restoring solvency" by using long-term assets to pay short-term debts to maintain its balance-sheet net worth. It is a radical transformation to a centrally planned economy, shifting control out of the hands of elected representatives to those of financial managers whose time frame is short-term and extractive, not long-term and protective of social equity and basic needs.
Creditors are demanding a political transformation to replace democratic lawmakers with technocrats appointed by foreign bankers. When the economic surplus is pledged to bankers rather than invested at home, we are not merely dealing with "insolvency" but with an aggressive attack. Finance becomes a continuation of war, by economic means that are to be politicized. Acting on behalf of the commercial banks (from which most of its directors are drawn, and to which they intend to "descend from heaven" to take their rewards after serving their financial class), the European Central Bank insists on a political revolution to replace democratic government by a technocratic elite not of industrial engineers, but of "financial engineers," a polite name for asset stripping financial warriors. If Greece does not comply, they threaten to wreak domestic financial havoc by "pulling the plug" on Greek banks. This "carrot and stick" approach threatens that if Greece does not sign on, the ECB and IMF will withhold loans needed to keep its banking system solvent. The "carrot" was provided on May 31 they agreed to provide $86 billion in euros if Greece "puts off for the time being a restructuring, hard or soft," of its public debt.[5]
It is a travesty to present this revolution simply as a financial exercise in solving the "liquidity problem" as if it were compatible with Europe's past four centuries of political and classical economic reforms. This is why the Syntagma Square protest in front of Parliament has been growing each week, peaking at over 70,000 last Sunday, June 5.
Some protestors drew a parallel with the Wisconsin politicians who left the state to prevent a quorum from voting on the anti-labor program that Governor Walker tried to ram through. The next day, on June 6, thirty backbenchers of Prime Minister George Papandreou's ruling Panhellenic Socialist party (Pasok) were joined by some of his own cabinet ministers threatening "to resign their parliamentary seats rather than vote through measures to cut thousands of public sector jobs, increase taxes again and dispose of €50bn of state assets, according to party insiders. The biggest issue for the party is stringent cuts in the public sector … these go to the heart of Pasok's model of social protection by providing jobs in state entities for its supporters,' said a senior Socialist official."[6]
Seeing the popular reluctance to commit financial suicide, Conservative Opposition leader Antonis Samaras also opposed paying the European bankers, "demanding a renegotiation of the package agreed last week with the troika' of the EU, IMF and the European Central Bank." It was obvious that no party could gain popular support for the ECB's demand that Greece relinquish popular rule and "appoint experienced technocrats to half a dozen essential ministries to implement the EU-IMF programme."[7]
ECB President Trichet depicts himself as following Erasmus in bringing Europe beyond its "strict concept of nationhood." This is to be done by replacing elected officials with a bureaucracy of cosmopolitan banker-friendly planners. The debt problem calls for new "monetary policy measures we call them non standard' decisions, strictly separated from the standard' decisions, and aimed at restoring a better transmission of our monetary policy in these abnormal market conditions." The task at hand is to make these conditions a new normalcy and re-defining solvency to reflect a nation's ability to pay debts by selling the public domain.
The ECB and EU claim that Greece is "solvent" as long as it has assets to sell off. But if populations in today's mixed economies think of solvency as existing under existing public/private proportions, they will resist the financial sector's attempt to proceed with buyouts and foreclosures until it possesses all the assets in the world, all the hitherto public and corporate assets and those of individuals and partnerships.
To minimize opposition to this dynamic the financial sector's pet economists understate the debt burden, pretending that it can be paid without disrupting economic life and, in the Greek case for example, by using "mark to model" junk accounting and derivative swaps to simply conceal its magnitude. Dominique Strauss-Kahn at the IMF claims that the post-2008 debt crisis is merely a short-term "liquidity problem" and one of lack of "confidence," not insolvency reflecting an underlying inability to pay. Banks promise that everything will be all right when the economy "returns to normal" as if it can "borrow its way out of debt," Bernanke-style.
This is what today's financial warfare is about. At issue is the financial sector's relationship to the "real" economy. From the latter's perspective the proper role of credit that is, debt is to fund productive capital investment and spending, because it is out of the economic surplus that debts are paid. This requires a financial regulatory system and tax system to maximize growth. But that is precisely the fiscal policy that today's financial sector is fighting against. It demands preferential tax-deductability for interest to encourage debt financing rather than equity. It has disabled truth-in-lending laws and regulations to keeping interest rates and fees in line with costs of production. And it blocks governments from having central banks to freely finance their own operations and provide economies with money. And to cap matters it now demands that democratic society yield to centralized authoritarian financial rule.
Finance and democracy: from mutual reinforcement to antagonism
The relationship between banking and democracy has taken many twists over the centuries. Earlier this year, democratic opposition to the ECB and IMF attempt to impose austerity and privatization selloffs succeeded when Iceland's President GrÃmsson insisted on a national referendum on the Icesave debt payment that Althing leaders had negotiated with Britain and the Netherlands (if one can characterize abject capitulation as a real negotiation). To their credit, a heavy 3-to-2 majority of Icelanders voted "No," saving their economy from being driven into the debt peonage.
Democratic action historically has been needed to enforce debt collection. Until four centuries ago royal treasuries typically were kept in the royal bedroom, and loans to rulers were in the character of personal debts. Bankers repeatedly found themselves burned, especially by Habsburg and Bourbon despots on the thrones of Spain, Austria and France. Loans to such rulers were liable to expire upon their death, unless their successors remained dependent on these same financiers rather than turning to their rivals. The numerous bankruptcies of Spain's autocratic Habsburg ruler Charles V exhausted his credit, preventing the nation from raising funds to defeat the rebellious Low Countries to the north.
The problem facing bankers was how to make loans permanent national obligations. Solving this problem gave an advantage to parliamentary democracies. It was a major factor enabling the Low Countries to win their independence from Habsburg Spain in the 16th century. The Dutch Republic committed the entire nation to pay its public debts, binding the people themselves, through their elected representatives who earmarked taxes to their creditors. Bankers saw parliamentary democracy as a precondition for making sound loans to governments. This security for bankers could be achieved only from electorates having at least a nominal voice in government. And raising war loans was a key element in military rivalry in an epoch when the maxim for survival was "Money is the sinews of war."
As long as governments remained despotic, they found that their ability to incur more debt was limited. At this time "the legal position of the King qua borrower was obscure, and it was still doubtful whether his creditors had any remedy against him in case of default."[8] Earlier Dutch-English financing had not satisfied creditors on this count. When Charles I borrowed 650,000 guilders from the Dutch States-General in 1625, the two countries' military alliance against Spain helped defer the implicit constitutional struggle over who ultimately was liable for British debts.
The key financial achievement of parliamentary government was thus to establish nations as political bodies whose debts were not merely the personal obligations of rulers, but truly public and binding regardless of who occupied the throne. This is why the first two democratic nations the Netherlands and Britain after its 1688 dynastic linkage between Holland and Britain in the person of William I, and the emergence of Parliamentary authority over public financing developed the most active capital markets and became Europe's leading military powers. "A funded debt could not be formed so long as the King and Parliament were fighting for the mastery," concludes the financial historian Richard Ehrenberg. "It was only after the [1688] revolution that the English State became what the Dutch Republic had long been a real corporation of individuals firmly associated together, a permanent organism."[9]
In sum, nations emerged in their modern form by adopting the financial characteristics of democratic city states. The financial imperatives of 17th-century warfare helped make these democracies victorious, for the new national financial systems facilitated military spending on a vastly extended scale. Conversely, the more despotic Spain, Austria and France became, the greater the difficulty they found in financing their military adventures. Austria was left "without credit, and consequently without much debt" by the end of the 18th century, the least credit-worthy and worst armed country in Europe, as Sir James Steuart noted in 1767.[10] It became fully dependent on British subsidies and loan guarantees by the time of the Napoleonic Wars.
The modern epoch of war financing therefore went hand in hand with the spread of parliamentary democracy. The situation was similar to that enjoyed by plebeian tribunes in Rome in the early centuries of its Republic. They were able to veto all military funding until the patricians made political concessions. The lesson was not lost on 18th-century Protestant parliaments. For war debts and other national obligations to become binding, the people's elected representatives had to pledge taxes. This could be achieved only by giving the electorate a voice in government.
It thus was the desire to be repaid that turned the preference of creditors away from autocracies toward democracies. In the end it was only from democracies that they were able to collect. This of course did not necessarily reflect liberal political convictions on the part of creditors. They simply wanted to be paid.
Europe's sovereign commercial cities developed the best credit ratings, and hence were best able to employ mercenaries. Access to credit was "their most powerful weapon in the struggle for their freedom," notes Ehrenberg, in an age whose "growth in the use of firearms had forced them to surround themselves with stronger fortifications."[11] The problem was that "Anyone who gave credit to a prince knew that the repayment of the debt depended only on his debtor's capacity and will to pay. The case was very different for the cities, who had power as overlords, but were also corporations, associations of individuals held in common bond. According to the generally accepted law each individual burgher was liable for the debts of the city both with his person and his property."
But the tables are now turning, from Icelandic voters to the large crowds gathering in Syntagma Square and elsewhere throughout Greece to oppose the terms on which Prime Minister Papandreou has been negotiating an EU bailout loan for the government to bail out German and French banks. Now that nations are not raising money for war but to subsidize reckless predatory bankers, Jean-Claude Trichet of the ECB recently suggested taking financial policy out of the hands of democracy:
But if a country is still not delivering, I think all would agree that the second stage has to be different. Would it go too far if we envisaged, at this second stage, giving euro area authorities a much deeper and authoritative say in the formation of the country's economic policies if these go harmfully astray? A direct influence, well over and above the reinforced surveillance that is presently envisaged? …
At issue is sovereignty itself. In this respect, the war being waged against Greece by the European Central Bank (ECB) may best be seen as a dress rehearsal not only for the rest of Europe, but for what financial lobbyists would like to bring about globally.
Footnotes
[1] Yves Smith, "Wisconsin's Walker Joins Government Asset Giveaway Club Naked Capitalism, February 22, 2011.
[2] Ralph Atkins, "Transcript: Lorenzo Bini Smaghi," Financial Times, May 30, 2011.
[3] Jack Ewing, "In Asset Sale, Greece to Give Up 10% Stake in Telecom Company," The New York Times, June 7, 2011.
[4] Christopher Lawton and Laura Stevens, "Deutsche Telekom, Others Look to Grab State-Owned Assets at Fire-Sale Prices," Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2011.
[5] Landon Thomas Jr., "New Rescue Package for Greece Takes Shape," The New York Times, June 1, 2011.
[6] Kerin Hope, "Rift widens on Greek reform plan," Financial Times, June 7, 2011.
[7] Ibid. See also Kerin Hope, "Thousands protest against Greek austerity," Financial Times, June 6, 2011: "Thieves, thieves … Where did our money go?' the protesters shouted, blowing whistles and waving Greek flags as riot police thickened ranks around the parliament building on Syntagma square in the centre of the capital. … Banners draped nearby read Take back the new measures' and Greece is not for sale' a reference to the government's plans to include state property and real estate for tourist development in the privatisation scheme."
[8] Charles Wilson, England's Apprenticeship: 1603-1763 (London: 1965), p. 89.
[9] Richard Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance (1928), p. 354.
[10] James Steuart, Principles of Political Economy (1767), p. 353.
[11] Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 44f., 33.
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How a $13 Trillion Cover Story was Written
June 17, 2011
By Michael Hudson
Free money creation to bail out America's elite financial speculators, but not for Social Security or Medicare
Only the "Crazies" Get the Bank Giveaway Right
Financial crashes were well understood for a hundred years after they became a normal financial phenomenon in the mid-19th century. Much like the buildup of plaque deposits in human veins and arteries, an accumulation of debt gained momentum exponentially until the economy crashed, wiping out bad debts along with savings on the other side of the balance sheet.
Physical property remained intact, although much was transferred from debtors to creditors. But clearing away the debt overhead from the economy's circulatory system freed it to resume its upswing. That was the positive role of crashes: They minimized the cost of debt service, bringing prices and income back in line with actual "real" costs of production. Debt claims were replaced by equity ownership. Housing prices were lower and more affordable, being brought back in line with their actual rental value. Goods and services no longer had to incorporate the debt charges that the financial upswing had built into the system.
Financial crashes came suddenly. They often were triggered by a crop failure causing farmers to default, or "the autumnal drain" drew down bank liquidity when funds were needed to move the crops. Crashes often also revealed large financial fraud and "excesses."
This was not really a "cycle." It was a scallop-shaped ratchet pattern: an ascending curve, ending in a vertical plunge. But popular terminology called it a cycle because the pattern was similar again and again, every eleven years or so. When loans by banks and debt claims by other creditors could not be paid, they were wiped out in a convulsion of bankruptcy.
Gradually, as the financial system became more "elastic," each business recovery started from a larger debt overhead relative to output. The United States emerged from World War II relatively debt free. Downturns occurred, crashes wiped out debts and savings, but each recovery since 1945 has taken place with a higher debt overhead. Bank loans and bonds have replaced stocks, as more stocks have been retired in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and buyback plans than are being issued to raise new equity capital. Behind every LBO is the desire to keep stock prices high, lavishing rewards to managers via the stock options they give themselves.
But after the stock market's dot.com crash of 2000 and the Federal Reserve flooding the U.S. economy with credit after 9/11, 2001, there was so much "free spending money" that many economists believed that the era of scientific money management had arrived and the financial cycle had ended. Growth could occur smoothly with no over-optimism as to debt, no inability to pay, no proliferation of over-valuation or fraud. This was the era in which Alan Greenspan was applauded as Maestro for ostensibly creating a risk-free environment by removing government regulators from the financial oversight agencies.
What has made the post-2008 crash most remarkable is not merely the delusion that the way to get rich is by debt leverage (unless you are a banker, that is). Most unique is the crash's aftermath. This time around the bad debts have not been wiped off the books. There have indeed been the usual bankruptcies but the bad lenders and speculators are being saved from loss by the government intervening to issue Treasury bonds to pay them off out of future tax revenues or new money creation.
The Obama Administration's Wall Street managers have kept the debt overhead in place toxic mortgage debt, junk bonds, and most seriously, the novel web of collateralized debt obligations (CDO), credit default swaps (almost monopolized by A.I.G.) and kindred financial derivatives of a basically mathematical character that have developed in the 1990s and early 2000s.
These computerized casino cross-bets among the world's leading financial institutions are the largest problem.
Instead of this network of reciprocal claims being let go, they have been taken onto the government's own balance sheet. This has occurred not only in the United States but even more disastrously in Ireland, shifting the obligation to pay on what were basically gambles rather than loans from the financial institutions that had lost on these bets (fraudulently inflated loans) onto the government ("taxpayers").
The government took over the mortgage lending guarantors Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (privatizing the profits, "socializing" the losses) for $5.3 trillion almost as much as the entire national debt. The Treasury lent $700 billion under the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) to Wall Street's largest banks and brokerage houses. The latter re-incorporated themselves as "banks" to get Federal Reserve handouts and access to the Fed's $2 trillion in "cash for trash" swaps crediting Wall Street with Fed deposits for otherwise "illiquid" loans and securities (the euphemism for toxic, fraudulent or otherwise insolvent and unmarketable debt instruments) at "cost" based on full mark-to-model fictitious valuations.
Altogether, the post-2008 crash saw some $13 trillion in such obligations transferred onto the government's balance sheet from high finance, euphemized as "the private sector" as if it were the core economy itself, rather than its calcifying shell.
Instead of losing on their bad bets, bad loans, toxic mortgages and outright fraudulent claims, the financial institutions cleaned up, at public expense. They collected enough to create a new century's power elite to lord it over "taxpayers" in industry, agriculture and commerce who will be charged to pay off this debt.
If there was a silver lining to all this, it has been to demonstrate that if the Treasury and Federal Reserve can create $13 trillion of public obligations money electronically on computer keyboards, there really is no Social Security problem at all, no Medicare shortfall, no inability of the American government to rebuild the nation's infrastructure.
The bailout of Wall Street showed how central banks can create money, as Modern Money Theory (MMT) explains. But rather than explaining how this phenomenon worked, the bailout was rammed through Congress under emergency conditions. Bankers threatened economic Armageddon if the government did not create the credit to save them from taking losses.
Even more remarkable is the attempt to convince the population that new money and debt creation to bail out Wall Street and vest a new century of financial billionaires at public subsidy cannot be mobilized just as readily to save labor and industry in the "real" economy. The Republicans and Obama administration appointees held over from the Bush and Clinton administration have joined to conjure up scare stories that Social Security and Medicare debts cannot be paid, although the government can quickly and with little debate take responsibility for paying trillions of dollars of bipartisan Finance-Care for the rich and their heirs.
The result is a financial schizophrenia extending across the political spectrum from the Tea Party to Tim Geithner at the Treasury and Ben Bernanke at the Fed. It seems bizarre that the most reasonable understanding of why the 2008 bank crisis did not require a vast public subsidy for Wall Street occurred at Monday's Republican presidential debate on June 13, by none other than Congressional Tea Party leader Michele Bachmann who had boasted in a Wall Street Journal interview two days earlier, on Saturday, that she voted against the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) "both times."
She complains that no one bothered to ask about the constitutionality of these extraordinary interventions into the financial markets.
"During a recent hearing I asked Secretary [Timothy] Geithner three times where the constitution authorized the Treasury's actions [just [giving] the Treasury a $700 billion blank check], and his response was, Well, Congress passed the law.' …With TARP, the government blew through the Constitutional stop sign and decided Whatever it takes, that's what we're going to do.'"
Clarifying her position regarding her willingness to see the banks fail, she explained:
I would have. People think when you have a, quote, bank failure,' that that is the end of the bank. And it isn't necessarily. A normal way that the American free market system has worked is that we have a process of unwinding. It's called bankruptcy. It doesn't mean, necessarily, that the industry is eclipsed or that it's gone. Often times, the phoenix rises out of the ashes.[1]
There were easily enough sound loans and assets in the banks to cover deposits insured by the FDIC but not enough to pay their counterparties in the "casino capitalist" category of their transactions. This super-computerized financial horse racing is what the bailout was about, not bread-and-butter retail and business banking or insurance.
It all seems reminiscent of the 1968 presidential campaign. The economic discussion back then between Democrat Hubert Humphrey and Republican Richard Nixon was so tepid that it prompted journalist Eric Hoffer to ask why only a southern cracker, third-party candidate Alabama Governor George Wallace, was talking about the real issues. We seem to be in a similar state in preparation for the 2012 campaign, with junk economics on both sides.
Meanwhile, the economy is still suffering from the Obama administration's failure to alleviate the debt overhead. He should be making banks write down junk mortgages to reflect actual market values and the capacity to pay. Foreclosures are still throwing homes onto the market, pushing real estate further into negative equity territory while wealth concentrates at the top of the economic pyramid. No wonder Republicans are able to shed crocodile tears for debtors and attack President Obama for representing Wall Street (as if this is not equally true of the Republicans). He is simply continuing the Bush Administration's policies, not leading the change he had promised. So he has left the path open for Congresswoman Bachmann to highlight her opposition to the Bush-McCain-Obama-Paulson-Geithner giveaways.
The missed opportunity
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the presidential campaign between Barack Obama and John McCain was peaking toward Election Day on November 4. Voters told pollsters that the economy was their main issue their debts, soaring housing costs ("wealth creation" to real estate speculators and the banks getting rich off mortgage lending), stagnant wage levels and worsening workplace conditions were what mattered. However, in the wake of Lehman, the main issue under popular debate was how much Wall Street's crash would hurt the "real" economy. If large banks went under, would depositors still be safely insured? What about the course of normal business and employment?
Credit is seen as necessary; but what of credit derivatives, the financial sector's arcane "small print"? How intrinsic are financial gambles on collateralized debt obligations? Remember CDOs were called "weapons of mass financial destruction" by no less than Warren Buffett. They have little to do with retail banking or even business banking and insurance, but are financial bets on the economy's zigzagging measures.
Without casino capitalism, could industrial capitalism survive? Or had the superstructure become rotten and best left to "free markets" to wipe out in mutually offsetting bankruptcy claims?
Mr. Obama ran as the "candidate of change" from the Bush Administration's war in Iraq and Afghanistan, its deregulatory excesses and giveaways to the pharmaceuticals industry and other monopolies and their Wall Street backers. Today it is clear that his promises for change were no more than campaign rhetoric. There even has been continuity of Bush Administration officials committed to promoting financial policies to keep the debts in place, enabling banks to "earn their way out of debt" at the expense of consumers and businesses. Read $13 trillion in government bailouts and subsidy.
History is being written to depict the policy of saving the bankers rather than the economy as having been necessary as if there were no alternative, that the vast giveaways to Wall Street were simply "pragmatic." Financial beneficiaries claim that matters would be even worse today without these giveaways. It is as if we not only need the banks, we need to save them (and their stockholders) from losses, enabling them to pay and retain their immensely rich talent at the top with even bigger salaries, bonuses and stock options.
It is all junk economics well-subsidized illogic, quite popular among fundraisers.
The Obama Plan
From the outset in 2009, the Obama Plan has been to re-inflate the Bubble Economy by providing yet more credit (that is, debt) to bid housing and commercial real estate prices back up to pre-crash levels, not to bring debts down to the economy's ability to pay. The result is debt deflation for the economy at large and rising unemployment but enrichment of the wealthiest 1% of the population as economies have become even more financialized.
This smooth continuum from the Bush to the Obama Administration masks the fact that there was a choice, and even a clear disagreement at the time within Congress, if not between the two presidential candidates, who seemed to speak as Siamese Twins as far as their policies to save Wall Street (from losses, not from actually dying) were concerned.
Wall Street saw an opportunity to be grabbed, and its spokesmen panicked policy-makers into imagining that there was no alternative. And as President Obama's chief of staff Emanuel Rahm noted, this crisis is too important an opportunity to let it go to waste. For Washington's Wall Street constituency, the bold aim was to get the government to save them from having to take a loss on loans gone bad loans that had made them rich already by collecting fees and interest, and by placing bets as to which way real estate prices, interest rates and exchange rates would move.
After September 2008 they were to get rich on a bailout euphemized as "saving the economy," if one believes that Wall Street is the economy's core, not its wrapping or supposed facilitator, not to say a vampire squid. The largest and most urgent problem was not the inability of poor home buyers to cope with the interest-rate jumps called for in the small print of their adjustable rate mortgages. The immediate priorities sat at the top of the economic pyramid. Citibank, AIG and other "too big to fail" institutions were unable to pay the winners on the speculative gambles and guarantees they had been writing.
It was as if the economy had become risk-free, not overburdened with debt beyond its ability to pay.
Making the government absorb their losses instead of recovering the enormous salaries and bonuses their managers had paid themselves for selling these bad bets required a cover story to make it appear that the economy could not be saved without the Treasury and Federal Reserve underwriting these gambling losses. Like the sheriff in the movie Blazing Saddles threatening to shoot himself if he weren't freed, the financial sector warned that its losses would destroy the retail banking and insurance systems, not just the upper reaches of computerized derivatives gambling.
How America's Bailouts Endowed a Financial Elite to rule the 21st Century
The bailout of casino capitalists vested a new ruling class with $13 trillion of public IOUs (including the $5.3 trillion rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) added to the national debt. The recipients have paid out much of this gift in salaries and bonuses, and to "make themselves whole" on their bad risks in default to pay off.
An alternative would have been to prosecute them and recover what they had paid themselves as commissions for loading the economy with debt.
Although there were two sides within Congress in September 2008, there was no disagreement between the two presidential candidates. John McCain ran back to Washington on the fateful Friday of their September 26 debate to insist that he was suspending his campaign in order to devote all his efforts to persuading Congress to approve the $700 billion bank bailout and would not debate Mr. Obama until that was settled. But he capitulated and went to the debate. On September 29 the House of Representatives rejected the giveaway, headed by Republicans in opposition.
So Mr. McCain did not even get brownie points for being able to sway politicians on the side of his Wall Street campaign contributors. Until this time he had campaigned as a "maverick." But his capitulation to high finance reminded voters of his notorious role in the Keating Five, standing up for bank crooks. His standing in the polls plummeted, and the Senate capitulated to a redrafted TARP bill on October 1. President Bush signed it into law two days later, on October 3, euphemized as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.
Fast-forward to today. What does it signify when a right-wing cracker makes a more realistic diagnosis of bad bank lending than Treasury Secretary Geithner, Fed Chairman Bernanke or other Bush-era financial experts retained by the Obama team?
Without the bailout, the gambling arm of Wall Street would have collapsed, but the "real" economy's everyday banking and insurance operations could have continued. The bottom 99 percent of the U.S. economy would have recovered with only a speed bump to clean out the congestion at the top, and the government would have ended up in control of the biggest and most reckless banks and AIG as it did in any case.
The government could have used its equity ownership and control of the banks to write down mortgages to reflect market conditions. It could have left families owning their homes at the same cost they would have had to pay in rent the economic definition of equilibrium in property prices.
The government-owned "too big to fail" banks could have been told to refrain from gambling on derivatives, from lending for currency and commodity speculation, and from making takeover loans and other predatory financial practices. Public ownership would have run the banks like savings banks or post office banks rather than gambling schemes fueling the international carry trade (computer-driven interest rate and currency arbitrage) that has no linkage to the production-and-consumption economy.
The government could have used its equity ownership and control of the banks to provide credit and credit card services as the "public option." Credit is a form of infrastructure, and such public investment is what enabled the United States to undersell foreign economies in the 19th and 20th centuries despite its high wage levels and social spending programs. As Simon Patten, the first economics professor at the nation's first business school (the Wharton School) explained, public infrastructure investment is a "fourth factor of production." It takes its return not in the form of profits, but in the degree to which it lowers the economy's cost of doing business and living. Public investment does not need to generate profits or pay high salaries, bonuses and stock options, or operate via offshore banking centers.
But this is not the agenda that the Bush-Obama administrations chose. Only Wall Street had a plan in place to unwrap when the crisis opportunity erupted. The plan was predatory, not productive, not lowering the economy's debt overhead or cost of living and doing business to make it more competitive. So the great opportunity to serve the public interest by taking over banks gone broke was missed. Stockholders were bailed out, counterparties were saved from loss, and managers today are paying themselves bonuses as usual. The "crisis" was turned into an opportunity to panic politicians into helping their Wall Street patrons.
One can only wonder what it means when the only common sense being heard about the separation of bank functions should come from a far-out extremist in the current debate. The social democratic tradition had been erased from the curriculum as it had in political memory.
Tom Fahey: Would you say the bailout program was a success? …
BACHMANN: John, I was in the middle of this debate. I was behind closed doors with Secretary Paulson when he came and made the extraordinary, never-before-made request to Congress: Give us a $700 billion blank check with no strings attached.
And I fought behind closed doors against my own party on TARP. It was a wrong vote then. It's continued to be a wrong vote since then. Sometimes that's what you have to do. You have to take principle over your party.[2]
Proclaiming herself a libertarian, Ms. Bachmann opposes raising the federal debt ceiling, Pres. Obama's Medicare reform and other federal initiatives. So her opposition to the Wall Street bailout turns out to be from a lack of understanding about how governments and their central banks can create money with a stroke of the computer pen, so to speak. (If the printing presses can work for Wall St, surely they too can for the people's health?) But at least she was clear that bank counterparty gambles made by high rollers at the financial race track could have been wiped out without destroying the banking system's key economic functions.
The moral
Contrasting Ms. Bachmann's remarks to the panicky claims by Mr. Geithner and Hank Paulson in September 2008 confirm a basic axiom of today's junk economics: When an economic error becomes so widespread that it is adopted as official government policy, there is always a special interest at work to promote it.
In the case of bailing out Wall Street and thereby the wealthiest 1% of Americans while saying there is no money for Social Security, Medicare or long-term public social spending and infrastructure investment, the beneficiaries are obvious. So are the losers.
High finance means low wages, low employment, low industry and a shrinking economy under conditions where policy planning is centralized in the hands of Wall Street and its political nominees, rather than in the safekeeping of more objective administrators.
Footnotes:
[1] Stephen Moore, "On the Beach, I Bring von Mises": Interview with Michele Bachman, Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2011.
[2] CNN Republican Presidential Debate, Transcript, June 13, 2011, http://www.malagent.com/archives/1738
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Privatizing Will Make Life Worse
June 24, 2011
By Michael Hudson
November 12, 1989, New York Times
PERESTROIKA GOES SOUTH
This article was published in the NYT more than 20 years ago, forecasting precisely what has happened.
I attended the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington
last month. When the meetings ended, I was left with the impression that no further writedowns
would be forthcoming for Latin America's debtor countries unless they followed the lead of Mexico.
To do this, countries like Brazil and Argentina would have to sell off their public utilities, some
potentially profitable industrial corporations and some service industries like airlines.
In the past, one met mostly bankers at these big international meetings. Now there are a lot of
lawyers.
For Latin America the foreclosure process has begun, but for the time being it is called privatization
or debt-for-equity swaps. Countries hoping to borrow more money from creditor-nation
governments, the I.M.F. and the World Bank, are being told to help themselves by relinquishing
ownership of their basic economic infrastructure.
In advocating this brave new world of privatizing hitherto public monopolies, these local investors
and their partners, the international banking and investment community, cite a number of truisms.
Private-sector managers will run enterprises more efficiently, the proponents of privatization say.
This argument has merit, as far as it goes. But it should be remembered that the troubled savings
and loan institutions in Texas were all privately run businesses.
But more important, in the United States and Europe there exists a balance between private
profitability and the public's need for popularly priced power, transport and other services. This
balance is insured by public regulatory agencies and is backed by antitrust legislation.
But few Latin American or other third world economies have ever had to develop these regulatory
traditions because their governments have owned the major public utilities and other monopolies.
The fact that private ownership of these enterprises will be a new experience for these countries
means that it may not have the same salutary consequences as in the United States.
Proponents of privatization say that a sell-off of utilities will reduce government budget deficits.
They argue that privatization will turn government-owned businesses, which are often fiscal drains
on a country, into private tax-paying entities. As a result, lower federal deficits may help slow the
endemic inflations that plague most debtor economies.
But for the population at large, shifting the economic burden away from government (and hence the
taxpayers) may turn out to be largely illusory. For what the government saves in subsidies may be
paid by users of these utilities in the form of higher power, phone and transport rates charged by the
new proprietors.
Fortunately, there are alternatives to the above scenarios. The most obvious one is to keep these
monopolies public but restructure them as truly independent corporations by bringing in the best
management possible. The alternative to badly run public enterprise is not necessarily privatization,
but better administration with effective checks and balances against incompetence and malfeasance.
A second option is to put public regulatory and antitrust legislation in place before it is too late. The
objective is to hold privatizers to their promises by making them absorb the penalty for their own
possible inefficiency, by enjoying lower profits rather than extorting higher rates from consumers.
After all, why should third world populations deserve less than the United States in this respect?
Whatever option is chosen, the possible outcomes are relatively clear. If the new purchasers of public
utilities are foreign, it will constitute a retrogression from neocolonialism back to direct colonialism.
If domestic investors buy a nation's economic infrastructure, they will achieve a higher degree of
power than has been attained by investors in the United States and Europe. The upshot of this may
be an unprecedented economic polarization in countries where wealthy citizens already have a strong
influence on government.
But the most likely outcome is an alliance between wealthy local families and foreign banks and
other international investors. That would give the takeover process a cosmopolitan patina.
One way or another, the debt-into-equity conversion represents a foreclosure on the mismanaged
economies of the third world. But behind the rhetoric of today's privatization, one must always ask,
Qui bono? Who will benefit from the prospective economic changes? In my opinion, it will be the
rich and the creditor banks who benefit from these schemes. For the people in general, and for
public-employee labor unions, privatization means that life may well be more expensive in the
future.
"Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws. - Mayer Rothschild
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience! People are obedient in the face of poverty, starvation, stupidity, war, and cruelty. Our problem is that grand thieves are running the country. That's our problem!" - Howard Zinn
"If there is no struggle there is no progress. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will" - Frederick Douglass
