The Power of the Paedos - another high profile case hits the 'never happened' wall?

[Jan Klimkowski]

A caring Royal:

By Keir Mudie

'Diana saved my life': Elm guest house victim met princess when he was sleeping rough

2 Feb 2013 21:00

Sunday People

Man claims he was subjected to horrific abuse at the Elm from the age of 10
Diana, Princess of Wales Diana, Princess of Wales
PA

Another victim of the Elm guest house scandal believes Princess Diana saved his life, the Sunday People has revealed.

The man, now in his forties, met the princess when he was sleeping rough outside a London church.

He claims he was subjected to horrific abuse at the Elm from the age of 10 while he was in care at Grafton Close children's home.

Diana gave him food and helped him find a temporary home as he battled to rebuild his life in his twenties after escaping care.

He left a tribute to Diana at Kensington Palace when she died in the Paris car crash of 1997.

The man said: "I have rebuilt my life and I owe it all to Diana.

"She kept in touch with me even after she'd helped my back on my feet. I have lost a real friend."

The man claims he saw money exchanged with his then carer and his abusers at the Elm guest house before he was taken back to the Grafton Close home.

[Jan Klimkowski]

Two early Lobster articles on Kincora, with good original material.

The conclusions are inevitably provisional and cautious.

The stench is noxious.

First piece.

Kitson, Kincora and counter-insurgency
in Northern Ireland
Robin Ramsay
Part 1
Issue 24 of the Covert Action Information Bulletin (Summer 1985) is chiefly devoted
to recent activities of U.S. government agents and agents provocateurs inside radical
and labour organisations: the 'sanctuary movement', the Native American movement
and one industrial dispute, are analysed as case studies. They are preceded by a long
essay, The New State Repression, by Ken Lawrence, a frequent CAIB contributor and
member of CAIB's Board of Advisors. In his essay, a kind of theoretical framework
for the case studies which follow it, Lawrence seeks to document "striking advances
(which) have emerged in the functioning of the (U.S.) secret police." For Lawrence,
"By the end of the sixties it was clear to the establishment that its
traditional methods of social control were weakening, and that its
repressive apparatus was insufficient as a backup. A new approach was
needed, one that started from scratch and challenged some of its own
most fundamental beliefs about social order. The person who responded
to the needs was ...(British) Brigadier Frank Kitson ." Kitson's book, Low
Intensity Operations (London 1971) is "the basic manual of counterinsurgency
method in Western Europe and North America. "
At this point in his essay Lawrence starts to get things wrong. He begins with Part 1 of
Kitson's three-stage sketch of the typical insurgency, The Preparatory Period.
"Kitson says the police and the army have to take advantage of the first
stage of popular struggle to deploy themselves, to infiltrate the enemy.
That is when people are not on their guard, when the police can get their
spies and provocateurs, 'in place' so that when open rebellion develops,
as he says it must, agents are already there."
This really isn't an accurate sketch of Kitson's Preparatory Period. Kitson writes:
" Looking in retrospect (emphasis added) at any counter-subversion or
counter-insurgency, it is easy to see that the first step should have been
(emphasis added) to prevent the enemy from gaining an ascendancy over
the civil population, and in particular to disrupt his efforts at establishing
his political organisation." (p67)
Kitson is thinking here of British operations in Kenya and Malaya in the 1950s in
which he played a minor part. But, in retrospect the 'Preparatory Period' of each of
these campaigns was certainly not what Lawrence describes as "nothing is happening;
all is calm". In practice, as Kitson notes, his suggestions for the P.P. are "difficult to
achieve because for a long time the government may be unaware that a significant
threats exists." (p67)
The central difficulty for Kitson-type theorisers is distinguishing between the
preparatory stages of insurgency and ordinary political activity: they may look the
same. Precisely because this is so Kitsonesque ideas are dangerous. Unable to
distinguish readily between genuine subversion in embryo and ordinary nonsubversive
political actions, it is rational for the state to treat all critical political
activity as potentially subversive. But it is important to grasp that Kitson doesn't
advocate this: he just doesn't address the problem, assuming that a 'significant threat'
can be readily identified early on.
For Kitson, the Army - and the book was written for and about the Army, not the
police - " should become involved as soon as a threat is detected. " Notice that Kitson
is talking about 'subversion', defined by him as "all illegal measures short of armed
force taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the
country at the time, or to force them to do things they do not want to do", and
'insurgency', "the use of armed force by a section of the people against the
government" (pp 3/4, emphases added). This is hardly Lawrence's "the police ...
prepare themselves and start penetrating the opposition" in a period when "nothing is
happening, all is calm." Kitson is much more circumspect than Lawrence's account
suggests.
Lawrence's loose interpretation of Kitson's writing extends to his version of Kitson's
biography:- "the commander of British counter insurgency forces in the North of
Ireland for many years" - actually he was commander of a single battalion in Belfast
for just two years, 1970-72; and to the sources of Kitson's book - "most of his
examples.....are drawn from Britain's war in Ireland and the US war in Indochina" -
which just isn't the case. The examples he uses are from all over the world, particularly
from Britain's post WW2 colonial experience. Northern Ireland hardly gets a mention.
How could it? Kitson wrote his book in 1970 when the British Army had been in
Northern Ireland for a year, a year Kitson had spent at Oxford University reading the
literature on counter insurgency.
Lawrence makes much of Kitson's advocated use of the 'pseudo' or 'counter' gang,
"which he (Kitson) claims to have invented in Kenya." But in the first place this isn't
true. Kitson is very careful in his memoir Bunch of Five (London 1977) not to claim
this:
"There was in fact nothing original about the idea itself, variations of
which have been used in countless wars throughout history." (p49) (1)
And in the second place, although Kitson claims that the 'counter gang' was important
in the war against the Mau Mau in Kenya, it takes up a tiny section of Low Intensity
Operations - half of page 100 as far as I can see, and then in the context of an
insurgency (defined above). This is a very long way from Lawrence's view of 'pseudo
gangs' as an "excellent example of the way repressive forces attempt to criminalise
their political opponents." (emphasis added)
Lawrence's fragmented and inaccurate account of Kitson's complex proposals is
offered as the explanatory framework for some recent U.S. developments - basically
the work of one Louis Guiffrida. Lawrence quotes one section from a manual written
by Guiffrida which, he says, "borrows from Kitson." This is the first section of that
"borrowing".
"Most students of the revolution would agree that "peaceful dissent" is
the first step towards revolution and that this trend signals the opening
phase of the "new revolution". These issues be they social, cultural,
political or economic, snowball and often appear to the casual observer
as being full of truth and at least justified. In short it is fashionable to
direct smears, threats and even open hostility towards the policeman. He
is, symbolically, at least, everything which is wrong with our society.
WHEN THE NECESSARY RESPECT AND REVERENCE ARE
DESTROYED, VIOLENCE, AS WE KNOW IT, WILL BE HEROISM".
"Despite the widespread and continuing application of Kitson's strategy
on both sides of the Atlantic" - for which he offers no evidence - "it has
failed to stem the tide of insurgency where it has been applied most
diligently and for the longest time, Ireland, and has suffered setbacks
elsewhere. " (Where for example?)
At this point in his essay Lawrence introduces another book by an English Army
officer with experience in Northern Ireland: Robin Evelegh's Peace Keeping in a
Democratic Society (C. Hurst and Co., London 1978). This, says Lawrence, is "the
most persuasive critique and proposals to modify Kitson's basic strategy".
Here things begin to get pretty confusing. Evelegh gets Lawrence's 'Kitson treatment'
and his 170 pages are boiled down to three basic proposals: compulsory ID cards,
steps to make it easier for informants to be generated, and soldiers being given the
right to demand the production of driving licenses and vehicle documents.
These fragmented and really quite inaccurate accounts of Kitson's and Evelegh's ideas
are used by Lawrence to present the U.S. as pursuing a "two track strategy" employing
Evelegh's and Kitson's ideas simultaneously. The evidence for these large claims?
"At the same time as apparently benign Evelegh-type policies are being
implemented such as requiring every child on welfare to have a Social
Security number, the more draconian Kitson methods are also advancing
mostly under the banner of counter-terrorism." Viz. "new super-secret
counter-terrorist units in various branches of the military ... new policy ...
of pre-emptive strikes against suspected terrorists...the obliterat(ion) of
any distinction between domestic and international terrorism ... strange
military forces ... every time a militant anti-war protest is held... every
police force worthy of the name has been thoroughly militarised with
SWAT teams, tactical squads, helicopter patrols, infra-red night vision
paraphernalia and the like."
This catalogue's links with Kitson's ideas seem to me to be tenuous in the extreme.
The U S. have had 'special forces' for decades; having an anti-terrorist group tells us
nothing about how many of Kitson's ideas they have adopted; SWAT teams were
developed in the 1960s, weren't they?
Perhaps I have made my point. Perhaps, also, I have laboured the whole business. But
these are important issues and it seems important to me that the details are given. It
should be clear to the reader that the kindest interpretation of Lawrence's use of Kitson
and Evelegh is that he is simply playing the old game of picking out a few bits and
pieces which support the thesis you fancy at the time. Which is not to say the
Lawrence's thesis is wrong - I really don't know - just not proven, and hardly made
more plausible by his cavalier way with his material.
Quite why Lawrence wants to impose this flimsy Kitson/Evelegh structure on recent
U.S. trends is unclear to me. There is little, if anything, in the case studies which
follow Lawrence's piece that can't be found in abundance in the domestic history of
the US. The agent provocateur has been a routine tool of US capital for at least half a
century. (Don't I remember Dashiel Hammet being one for the Pinkertons before
becoming a writer?) There are examples of the U.S. state setting up phoney radical
organisations - 'pseudo gangs' in Lawrence's sense. Think of Lee Harvey Oswald's
bogus branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. And Athan Theoharis' recent paper
on the FBI's use of the American Legion membership as domestic informers is
testimony to an informer network which I'm sure Kitson and his ilk in Northern
Ireland would have given their eye-teeth to have. (2) (Incidentally, Kitson himself
wrote in Low Intensity Operations that "the United States is well ahead in thinking on
the overall direction of counter insurgency and counter subversive operations." (p52)
Lawrence's central problem is the apparent lack of any evidence of the specific
influence of Kitson's ideas outside the UK. But then it is not obvious to me that
Kitson's ideas are anything more than they appear to be: a synthesis of a wide range of
counter-insurgency experience. Kitson happened to do the synthesis but any bright
graduate student could have done the same. (3)
The extent to which Kitson's book was merely a synthesis of previous experience
becomes very clear as soon as you read, say, an account of the Malayan 'emergency'.
A version of this - as seen from the top of the British administration in Malaya - is
contained in the recent Templer:Tiger of Malaya, by John Cloake (London 1985).
Reading this after re-reading Kitson and Evelegh, what struck me most forcibly was
the extraordinary powers that Templer had as combined High Commissioner (civil
administration) and Director of Operations (military administration). Templer was an
absolute dictator, and as dictator was able, eventually, to achieve the kind of
comprehensive and coordinated intelligence, police, military and propaganda
operation which is at the heart of Kitson's thesis, but which was never really achieved
in Northern Ireland.
One of the striking sections of the Templer book is an excerpt from a letter Templer
wrote in 1954:
"In the areas to be skimmed of troops I propose to use special squads of
jungle fighter ... they will really be "killer squads" (though I can promise
you I won't call them that, with a view to the questions you might have to
answer in the House). They will be at the disposal of the Special Branch
... to use on any good information which comes in. We have always set
our face against the use of "killer squads" in infantry battalions or the
police generally, since it has a bad effect on the fighting morale of all
those who are not in the "killer squads" since they never get a proper
crack. This new conception is, however, quite different." (emphasis
added) (p260)
Curious that he thought it a new conception. Very similar things had been done in
Palestine by the British in the late 1940s. (4) In these Palestine operations an 'antiterrorist'
squad was set up under the leadership of one ex SOE and one ex SAS man.
"The squads consisted largely of ex-soldiers rather than experienced
police or intelligence personnel", and their overall commander used them
"to exploit existing intelligence to capture or kill insurgents themselves. "
(5)
In contemporary Northern Ireland the SAS and E4A, the Royal Ulster Constabulary's
Mobile Support Unit have had a similar role. (6)
The Palestine 'killer squads' grew out of a unit called the Police Mobile Force and one
of their operations which has been documented involved the use of a laundry van as
cover. In one of those curious historical parallels, one of the British covert operations
in Northern Ireland, the so-called Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF) also used a
laundry van as cover until it got 'blown' and several MRF personnel got killed. The
MRF is the best documented example of a 'pseudo gang' we have from Northern
Ireland. (7)
In The Kitson Experiment (London/Dublin 1983), the French journalist Roger Faligot
makes a reasonable case for the proposition that some of Kitson's synthesis was tried
out in Northern Ireland. But his claim (p21) that 'from 1975 onward (Kitson's ideas)
were totally implemented " (emphasis added) sits uneasily with post 1975 reports of
competing and conflicting counter-insurgency and intelligence operations in Northern
Ireland. (8)
Evelegh's book, in essence, is a series of arguments for specific proposals which
would lead to an approximation of Templer's coordination-through-dictatorship in
Malaya. Two of Evelegh's main proposals - compulsory ID cards and the easier use of
informers - are taken directly from Templer's campaign, and Evelegh makes it quite
explicit that his desire for an "overall coordinating authority" is based on Templer's
demonstration of what that could achieve and Evelegh's experience in Northern
Ireland where such coordination did not exist. (9)
Evelegh's suggestion for such a coordinating authority in a counter-insurgency
campaign on the British mainland is a civilian structure based on a reintroduction of
the World War 2 "Regional Commissioners" who would be "the executive head of all
military, police and civil departments " (10). This is in contrast to both Kitson's plans
in Low Intensity Operations and the Army Land Manual (See note 3 above) which
both foresaw a parallel civil and military structure. Such a two-track structure already
exists in civil defence planning for 'Home Defence Regions' (civil) and Regional
Military Commanders (military). To my knowledge Evelegh's proposed fusing of the
two has not been adopted. (11)
Evelegh's proposals are, if anything, more draconian than Kitson's. In a sense, as
Lawrence suggests, they are a modification of Kitson's ideas in the light of experience
of Northern Ireland. But, as I have tried to show, Evelegh's solutions are to be found in
earlier British counter-insurgency campaigns.
In retrospect it is not surprising that the British state, whose experience of counterinsurgency
was of rural societies, should find life in Northern Ireland a more complex
proposition - even without the complication of the "enemy" being white and Englishspeaking.(
12) If the war in Northern Ireland is a 'colonial war', by the standards of
other British colonial wars it has not been waged as one. Evelegh's book is a long
wistful look at the powers available in previous real colonial wars not available in
Northern Ireland.
Nor is it obvious to me that even with Evelegh's proposed new powers the Provos
would be defeated. The British state would still be a long way from having the kinds
of powers available in Malaya which included widespread curfews, collective
punishments for villages believed to be aiding the insurgents, and the relocation of
whole communities.
The area of the British state's social control assets where colonial methods have been
introduced wholesale is policing. As the BBC TV programme 'Brass Tacks' on the
police assaults on the miners at Orgreave and the students at Manchester University
showed, the British police have now adopted the public order/crowd control and
dispersal methods, not of Northern Ireland, but of Hong Kong. (13)
Roy Henry, until recently Hong Kong's Commissioner of Police, described Hong
Kong's use of force by the police in four stages, culminating in the use of firearms.
"You never use automatic fire, of course, and you never deliberately aim
to kill. You aim for the knee. And you give a very clear and distinct
warning first." (14)
This makes quite an interesting contrast with the Royal Ulster Constabulary's Mobile
Support Unit's methods. The Deputy Chief Constable of the RUC is quoted as saying
that MSU members '"were not trained to fire at peoples' legs but at their bodies to put
them permanently out of operation."
The MSU were trained by the SAS and "many were ex members of the British Army
and rushed through the formalities of police training."(15) Cf Palestine above.
Continuities ....
The MSU are a counter-insurgency group and not a riot police, of course. Even so,
they are - nominally at any rate - a police counter-insurgency force, and a British one
at that. A very significant step has been taken.
Discovering that the British police began acquiring Hong Kong methods in 1981, the
only surprise, surely, is that they had waited so long.
Kitson's 1970 survey of the counter-insurgency operations around the world is
essentially a survey of defeats for state forces or temporary successes followed by
political defeat. Northern Ireland is going down as another defeat, and not just because
of the British state's failure to defeat the military aspects of the insurgency there.
In an interesting recent paper, Don Parsons shows how far from just being the victims
of same Kitsonesque campaign by the British state, the Protestant/ Loyalist and
Catholic/Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland's urban areas have taken control
of large areas of community life - what might be called the local welfare state - areas,
the control of which both Kitson and Evelegh saw as essential to any successful
counter-insurgency operation. Parsons offers this, from one John Oliver, a senior civil
servant in Northern Ireland among his evidence:
"A well-meaning but dangerously vague concept of community action is
offered as a replacement (to party politics). Potentially more dangerous
still is the astonishing new growth of community associations some with
dubious connections (ie the paramilitaries - Don Parsons) but nonetheless
intent upon imposing their will on housing, roads, development,
community hall, libraries and so on to the virtual exclusion of elected
politicians and of rational argument, financial considerations, ordered
priorities and the other realities of public administration." (16)
The shootings and bombings of the past 15 years in Northern Ireland may have been
less significant than the failure of the British state's social and economic policies. If
what we have seen in the past ten years is, as Faligot claims, a coordinated counterinsurgency
campaign - and I don't believe this - then both military and civil wings of
that campaign have been failures. The British state is withdrawing from the north of
Ireland.
Robin Ramsay
Part 2



In the present political climate the news of yet another (the fifth) inquiry into the
Kincora Boys Home scandal must be assumed to be yet another holding operation by
the British state. Even if the British state would now find some of the dirt buried there
useful to use against the Loyalist politicians in Northern Ireland, the ramifications are
so enormous and so dangerous that the entire episode remains a total 'no-go' area.
Below we reproduce two long articles, one directly related to Kincora and one which
throws some light on the milieu in which the scandal took place. These articles are,
literally, just the tip of an iceberg of colossal dimensions. When - if - all this comes
out it will make Watergate look relatively insignificant.
However, for the moment all we can offer is these two pieces, and it is appropriate that
it is the Ramsay half of the Lobster who is trying to write this introduction, because I
find the entire Kincora episode extremely difficult to get a grip on and suspect that
almost everyone else reading this does, too. This, then, is a beginner's introduction to
Kincora, written by a beginner.
There are three major strands in the early part of the story. There was a boys home in
Belfast, called Kincora. Several of the male staff running Kincora were homosexuals
and assaulted some of the boys. Complaints were made as far back as 1967 but
nothing was done. One of the staff was William McGrath, who is the second strand.
McGrath tried to set up his very own Protestant paramilitary group called TARA.
Quite what TARA did, and whether it was McGrath's idea alone, or something cooked
up by British intelligence, is not clear to me. TARA does look rather like what I can
only call a would-be paramilitary group. The second of the two documents refers to it
never getting beyond the planning stages. Whose planning isn't clear.
The British state's "security forces" are the third strand. They heard about the events at
Kincora (presumably through their contacts with the Loyalist-dominated Royal Ulster
Constabulary) and found it of interest (a) because of TARA qua paramilitary group;
(b) because in the little world of Orange politics McGrath knew many of the leading
figures; and © because, homosexuality being an offence in Northern Ireland, Kincora
- and its related events - offered potential for blackmail by the security forces.
Intimately involved in this was Colin Wallace, whose biography is given in the first of
the two documents. Wallace worked in/with - which isn't yet clear - the Psyops
department of the British Army in Northern Ireland, appears to have become disgusted
with some of the things that were going on there, got forced out of his job and
eventually convicted of manslaughter. He claims he was framed. As the material
below shows the Psyops operations were directed against both Republican and
Loyalist groups.
The second of the two pieces below is a reprint from the Irish Times of an internal
review of the Kincora episode written by Wallace while still working for the British
state. This document alone proves that all the subsequent official denials of a 'coverup'
of the Kincora events are lies.
The first of the pieces is by, and about, Captain Fred Holroyd. Like Wallace he was
involved in, and became disgusted by some of the things that he witnessed in Northern
Ireland, and has subsequently blown the whistle on them via articles in the New
Statesman with Duncan Campbell and on Channel 4 TV. To some extent the
Wallace/Holroyd/Kincora stories are now interlinked.
The political significance of all this is impossible to exaggerate. The British public
(and many of its politicians) are still almost totally ignorant of the things that have
been done in Northern Ireland by the British state. As far as I am aware only Roger
Faligot (see above) and Kennedy Lindsay have produced substantial accounts of some
of the counter-insurgency operations in Northern Ireland, and these fragments from
Wallace and Holroyd serve to show that even Faligot and Lindsay's accounts are still
scratching the surface.
If Holroyd's account of battles within the British intelligence services hardly supports
Faligot's claim that an integrated Kitsonesque regime was introduced in Northern
Ireland, the activities he describes here speak of a campaign savage enough. Holroyd's
reference to cooperation between the British intelligence and security forces and some
of the Protestant paramilitary groups shows one operational response of the British
state to the problem of being 'piggy in the middle' - they joined forces with the side
which was, supposedly, 'loyalist'. My enemy's enemy is my friend.
If, at a micro-level, the 'Loyalist' paramilitary forces have on occasion been co-opted
by the British state, at a macro level they have mostly been an obstacle in the way of
any kind of solution to the 'problem'. How the British government will deal with this
'problem' now that the deal has been struck with the Republic remains unclear. The
recent arms charges against a group of Protestants in Glasgow, and the appointment of
ex-SAS men to the top three positions in the British Army in Northern Ireland might
suggest that one's assumption of a serious clamp-down on the Protestant paramilitaries
will turn out to be correct.
If there was ever a political poisoned chalice, it is the one currently being proffered the
Dublin Government by the British state.
Captain Fred Holroyd writes:
Captain Fred Holroyd, whose revelations of unlawful activities by members of the
Security Forces in Ulster in the early 1970s initiated an RUC and Garda inquiry, is
currently in correspondence with Mrs Thatcher. He has pointed out to her that the
Ulster Director of Public Prosecutions' statement that "there was insufficient evidence
to bring charges against anyone" is simply not true. The Special Investigation Branch
(SIB) of the Royal Military Police carried out their own investigation of Holroyd's
allegations and found them to be true. Ministry of Defence officials decided that only
a minimum of cooperation would be given to the RUC team in the hope that the
investigations would be dropped. This aim appears to have been achieved. However,
the case will not go away. The New Statesman, which published Holroyd's allegations
after checking them out with TV's Diverse Reports programme, has received a
statement, made in 1978, which not only confirms the allegations made, but also
describes how MI5 was responsible for a campaign of denigration against Holroyd
after he resigned his Commission in the Army.
This statement, which is highly detailed, was given to the safekeeping of a Surrey
solicitor in 1980 by none other than Colin Wallace, the civil servant employed at
Headquarters Northern Ireland until 1978 as "Head of Production Services" in the
notorious "black propaganda" unit, Information Policy.
Wallace is now aware that the RUC detectives who came to the Lewes Prison to
interview him on his knowledge of the Kincora affair, frequently left him to interview
Holroyd before returning to Ulster. These detectives were aware that Wallace knew
the background to Holroyd's case, and could independently support his allegations, but
never once asked him to make a statement, nor indeed ever even mentioned Holroyd.
Wallace's independent evidence was never mentioned by the RUC team to Holroyd; in
fact the detectives went to great lengths to try and convince Holroyd that they could
find no supporting evidence for his allegations. This extraordinary behaviour by
Superintendent George Caskey and his subordinates Inspectors Ronnie Mack and
Edward Cooke has not been explained, and can only lead to grave suspicions of yet
another cover-up of events of a politically embarrassing nature.
In January of this year (ie 1985) Wallace sent a comprehensive dossier to Mrs
Thatcher which included the material relating to Holroyd's allegations. At this time the
RUC investigation had been going on for over two years and the Ulster Director of
Public Prosecutions' decision to terminate it with no prosecutions was made on exactly
the same date as the Prime Minister's office acknowledged receipt of the dossier. The
decision was made before the DPP could see the contents of the file. This sudden
decision, after two years, before the RUC had to accept the evidence independently
corroborating Holroyd' s allegations, appears to support the belief in a Governmentinspired
cover-up.
Captain Holroyd was an officer in the Royal Corps of Transport, who, after
volunteering for "special duties", was trained at the Joint Services of Intelligence
(JSSI) at Ashford in Kent as a Military Intelligence Officer (MIO). After three months
at JSSI at Templer Barracks (also the Depot of the Intelligence Corps), he was posted
to Ulster for three years. His unit was called the Special Military Intelligence Unit
(Northern Ireland) (SMIU, NI). Controlled from an office next door to the Head of
Special Branch RUC, at RUC HQ, Belfast, it was commanded in the 70's by Lt. Col.
Brian Dixon and then Lt. Col. John Burgess, both of the Intelligence Corps.
These Commanding Officers, with a small staff, controlled a Military Intelligence
Officer (MIO) and his assistant, a Field Intelligence NCO (FINCO) attached to each
RUC Division, and a number of Liaison Intelligence NCO's (LINCO) perhaps fifty
operatives overall.
The prime role of the unit members was the passage of information and intelligence
between the Army and the RUC at all levels up to Brigade. However, some of the
successful operatives were recruited by Mr Craig Smellie of MI6, to operate on crossborder
duties. Holroyd was one of this small group.
John Colin Wallace, an Ulsterman from Ballymena, was a civil servant employed at
Headquarters Northern Ireland. Initially his first contact with the Security Forces was
in the late 1960s when he gave up his job in pharmaceuticals and became a Public
Relations Officer (PRO) with the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). When the present
troubles started in earnest he worked at HQNI at Lisburn. He was promoted and
became, in effect, the key officer at PRO.
In the early 1970s General Frank Kitson's theories of information control in a counterinsurgency
situation became very fashionable and there developed a period of
reorganisation in the PRO set up. Hugh Mooney of the Information Research
Department (IRD) was posted to Stormont to advise on the setting up of a secret
department to be used for psychological operations (PSYOPS). This unit was called
Information Policy and was given a legitimate role as a cover for its secret role. Lt.
Col. Jeremy Railton was the Commanding Officer (CO) and Colin Wallace was
ordered to attend a rigged application interview for the job of "Head of Production
Services". (The interview was necessary to conform with Civil Service regulations.)
Production Services, having comprehensive printing facilities, provided forgeries of
various sorts - driving licenses (Holroyd's Eire driving license in a false name, for
example), CIA identity cards, posters, press ID cards, bank statements and so on.
Information Policy (Inf Pol) went into the psyops arena with smear campaigns against
political figures and other individuals selected by MI5 (Denis Payne) and MI6
(Douglas Allen) working at Stormont. As so often happens in this kind of
unaccountable work, as time went on more and more senior people wanted tasks done,
and conflicts of interest caused Wallace - as the man in the middle - problems.
Ultimately he had to face the problem of the MI5 officers wanting to use the "dirty
tricks" facilities, not to defeat terrorism in Ulster, but against legitimate politicians in
England. He also had to live with the knowledge of the Intelligence link with the
Kincora Boys Home, and his unauthorised briefings of the Irish press (albeit
encouraged off the record by disgusted Army officers) led him to become regarded as
a threat to some members of the Intelligence community.
Fred Holroyd was also having problems with his contemporaries in the Brigade area
centred on Lurgan. His written Army charter clearly laid down that his prime loyalty
should be to the RUC Special Branch, but 3 Infantry Brigade Commander, Colin
Wallis-King, and his Intelligence Staff, saw Holroyd as a "Trojan Horse" who could
penetrate RUC Intelligence and pass it on for Army Brigade to exploit. After seeking
advice from his CO at SMIU (NI), Holroyd refused to be used in this way, incurring
hostility and subsequently non-cooperation from HQ 3 Brigade.
Holroyd, although strictly obeying his charter, was aware that his RUC colleagues
were far from being impartial policemen. Time after time Loyalist terrorists would
operate without any serious attempt by the RUC to impede or catch them. On the few
occasions when Loyalists were caught red-handed, police action was minimised and
the culprits were soon back in action. One specific Special Branch officer handled
Loyalist terrorist affairs. His lack of impartiality was commented upon initially in an
unfavourable way by HQ 3 Brigade. But in the middle 1970s the covert SAS troop
based at Castledillon, and controlled by 3 Brigade, were operating hand in glove with
this officer. This was at a time when murders and political assassinations became
rampant and "own goals" like the bomb which went off at the ambush of the Miami
Show Band, revealed the participation of Loyalists from Portadown.
Holroyd also became aware of a series of "dirty tricks" being carried out by HQ 3
Brigade - weapon "planting", arms cache booby-trapping, blackmail and coercion,
kidnapping and the like. After making known his feelings about these activities,
Holroyd began to experience a series of odd incidents, remarkably similar to those
experienced by Colin Wallace, who had also been making the point that unlawful
activities, especially those involving innocent people, were absolutely counter
productive to the forces of law and order and would eventually lead to a lack of belief
in their credibility.
It would appear that the element of MI5 at Stormont and HQNI, who by 1975 had
taken control of intelligence in the province after a bitter struggle with MI6, decided
that either Holroyd and Wallace became implicated with the "dirty tricks" exponents,
or, alternatively, they would have to be removed, and, if necessary, discredited so that
any revelations that they might make, would not be believed. Both men were
approached and asked to carry out unlawful tasks. Holroyd was given an
unattributable weapon by WO2 Eric Hollis, Intelligence Collator at HQ 3 Brigade and
asked to plant it on a victim. In fact he handed it to the RUC Special Branch. Wallace
was asked to prepare a paper codenamed Clockwork Orange 2, a feasibility study
designed to be used to discredit British politicians in England. (Clockwork Orange 1
was a study of methods of discrediting Ulster public figures, used most effectively by
the Security Forces.)
Wallace's prevarications led to what can be considered stage 2 of MI5's policy: both
Wallace and Holroyd were informed quite separately that their "covers" had been
blown and that they were in grave danger of assassination. It was suggested to them
both that it was in everyone's interests if they left the Province and returned to
England. Holroyd was able to prove to the staff of HQ 3 Brigade, who were the
executor's of MI5's plan in this case, that this proposition was nonsense. Wallace, who
also realized that no new events pointed to his being assassinated, also made
objections to being posted.
More extreme measures were called for and now MI5 decided that whatever was
necessary to be done, would be, in order to remove the perceived threat of these
outspoken critics of MI5's policies.
Part 3
This report originally appeared in the Irish Times in June 1985, as part of a series of
articles by Ed Maloney and Andy Pollak - to whom all credit for taking this story
seriously.
The report was written by - the original is initialled by - Colin Wallace in November
1974. The editing out of names was done by the Irish Times . As their introduction to
the piece said, it "sharply contradicts every British Government assurance that there
was no cover-up of the affair nor any knowledge of it in British military circles."
Confidential
to: - (---)November 8th 1974.
"TARA" - Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated with the Homosexual
Community in Belfast.
Reference A: Attached RUC background paper on "TARA"
Reference B: Attached RUC report on the death of Brian McDermott.
Reference C: Your request for a press investigation into the matters referred to above.
1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the
background to "TARA". Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and
there are various items of important information missing from it. It is difficult
to say whether these flaws are the result of poor Intelligence or whether they
are disinformation provided for our consumption.
2. If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has
been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults in these hostels, then I
would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information
and exclude the rather contentious and, indeed, politically suspect material
contained in the above. As you know I did try to develop press interest in this
matter last year but without any success. I also feel that it is difficult to justify
our interest in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my
opinion, TARA is no longer of any security interest.
3. In theory TARA was basically a credible concept from a loyalist paramilitary
point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body
could, no doubt, have made good use of the Orange Order's normal selection
and "vetting" ' system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had
ready-made facilities for clandestine training by making use of the Orange
halls throughout the province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, mainly
because of William McGrath's rather strange political views which are more
akin to Irish Nationalism than Unionism, and the fact that other organisations
which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the loyalist community
at that time, sprang up during the period.
4. Reference A deals with McGrath's background in considerable detail but it is
inaccurate in a number of respects. The Kincora hostel in Newtonards Road
where he works was opened in 1959 under the control and administration of
Belfast Corporation welfare department. He does not, as the paper claims, "run
the hostel" - he is employed as a "housefather". The warden of Kincora is
Joseph Mains and the deputy warden is Raymond Semple. Mains was
appointed in 1959 and Semple in 1964. Both men are known homosexuals.
Indeed various allegations of homosexual assault on the inmates were
investigated by senior ------ ----- in 1967 but no action was taken against
anyone. (See notes of a report by Mr ---- at flag 'N")
5. It is untrue to say that allegations of assaults on the inmates of Kincora '"began
shortly after his appointment". As I have pointed out in para 4 above,
allegations were made as early as 1967 and there is also evidence that assaults
may have taken place as early as 1959, soon after Mains was appointed.
6. Reference A claims that McGrath "is a known homosexual" but it avoids any
mention of his links with other key figures in the local homosexual community,
other than to insinuate that a number of well known political personalities with
whom he came into contact were also homosexuals. For example, in para 6 of
reference A, it is claimed that McGrath left his previous employment ".........."
whereas our information would tend to indicate that .......... is well known in
unionist party circles (see also..........) and was for some time............. (see flag
"M") .......... and McGrath .......... and .......... has been actively engaged in
trying to have McGrath removed from Kincora 's own version of events (see
flag "0") is, of course, very enlightening, but I would suggest that it should be
treated with caution until it can be substantiated because of the antagonism
between them. It would also appear that many of the RUC source reports on
this matter after 1971 originated from ..........
7. McGrath was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast
Corporation welfare department in 1972-73, following allegations of more
homosexual assaults on the inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources
confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints had been received about his
behaviour and that although the complaints had been passed to .......... and to
the RUC, no action had been taken against him. This would appear to be
confirmed, to some extent, by Mr....... (see flag "R") in 1973.
There were of course similar allegations relating to other hostels during this
period (see Bawnmore, Westwinds, Burnside etc) and this conflicts with
reference A's assertion that the allegations were confined to Kincora.
8. It should be remembered that the 1967 Sexual Offences Act does NOT apply to
Northern Ireland and homosexual intercourse between adults or with minors is
a criminal offence. The apparent lack of interest, therefore, by the welfare
authorities and the RUC is quite remarkable. Furthermore the claim made by
Mrs ..... (see flag "Q") that key individuals in the ...... were themselves
homosexuals and thus .......... but also covered up the offences that took place
and protected the offenders, requires very serious examination. In particular, I
view her allegations about Joss Cardwell with great concern because it
illustrates the political difficulties we are likely to face if we become involved.
9. Reference B which deals with the circumstances surrounding the murder of
Brian McDermott last year puts forward the theory that the killing had both
sexual and witchcraft overtones. The only link that can be identified between
the murder and the homosexual community is via John McKeague (see flag
"S"). McKeague's own statements raise more questions than they answer.
Certainly his boast that he will not be prosecuted because "he knows too much
about some people" merits serious investigation, but I suspect that he will not
be prepared to talk until he is released. It is also rather remarkable that no
charges have been preferred against him ......
Our own investigations of instances of alleged witchcraft or other satanic rites
in the province would tend to dismiss the RUC's theory that Brian McDermott's
murder could be part of these activities. In the past "black magic" practices etc
have been mainly confined to groups operating from republican areas, with the
possible exception of three cases in C. Antrim. I think, however, that from a
press point of view we would be very foolish to give any credence to such
claims without the most convincing evidence. The forensic reports on the
McDermott murder (see flag 'T') would tend to indicate that someone tried to
dispose of the body by cutting it into pieces and burning them. The insinuation
made in the document regarding the boy's disappearance, and the proximity of
.......... is dangerous nonsense.
10.Reference A claims that a number of key personalities in the political arena
"are aware of the Kincora situation and, in particular of McGrath's
background." It does not explain the extent of their awareness nor of each
individual's involvement with McGrath. In summary it would appear that the
document is claiming that:
a. ... ... of the Grand Orange Lodge are aware of the situation because of
the discussions and correspondence relating to McGrath within the
Orange Order. It is further alleged that ........ and .......... have blocked
any action against McGrath.
b. ........... is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because
of the possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with
McGrath,....... and John McKeague. On the face of it the statements
made by .......... and .......... (see flag "F") would tend to support only
part of such a claim. There are also a number of inconsistencies:
McGrath would appear to be strongly anti-communist and anti-UVF
and this conflicts with the document's views on links with Tommy
Herron, Ernie 'Duke' Elliot, 'The Ulster Citizens Army" etc.
c. Various public and political figures who hold positions of power and
who are also homosexuals protect each other from prosecution. The
claim of a prostitution ring involving juveniles is not really
substantiated other than by ..........'s own personal account. It would be
interesting to check, however, the number of charges brought against
people involved in homosexual activities in greater Belfast area in the
last 5 years. I also think the RUC report on drug abuse in this
connection merits close examination because this is a natural area of
fund raising of terrorists. There is, of course, the obvious problem of
security with the possible blackmailing of civil servants, politicians etc.
Conclusions and recommendations
I am very far from happy with the quality of the information on this matter, and I am
even more unhappy because of the, as yet unexplained, failure of the RUC or the NIO
to take on this task.
I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC consistently failed to take action on such
serious allegations unless that (sic) had specifically received some form of policy
direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police
level. If that is the case then we should be even more wary about getting involved.
On the other hand, if the allegations are true then we should do everything possible to
ensure that the situation is not allowed to continue. The youngsters in these hostels
almost certainly come from problem families, and it is clear that no one will fight their
fight unless we do. Those responsible for the murder of Brian McDermott must be
brought to trial before another child is killed, and if it can be proved that there is a
connection with this homosexual group, then the RUC must be forced to take action
irrespective of who is involved.
I would therefore recommend that:
a. We make one final attempt to get the RUC to investigate the matter or at least
discuss the matter with RUCLO.
b. We obtain very clear and unambiguous authority from London to proceed with
a press disclosure.
c. We approach a responsible journalist whom we are confident will make a
thorough investigation of the matter and not simply write a sensational type
story purely on the information he is given.
d. We continue to look for additional information on this matter to ensure that we
are not just being used as part of some political disinformation scheme.
J.C.Wallace (Senior Information Officer)
Notes
1. In Internal Security Defence Review No 1 (March 1983) p 45, the anonymous
authors quote from an account of the wars against the American Indian,
suggesting that the use of 'pseudo gangs' goes back at least as far as the 1870s.
2. The FBI and the American Legion Contact Program, Athan Theoharis in
Political Science Quarterly Summer 1985
3. It is worth noting that Kitson's book appeared after the revised Army Manual:
Land Operations Vol 2 (counter revolutionary operations) appeared in 1969. I
haven't seen this and have no way of knowing how much, if any, input into it
Kitson made. The manual is briefly discussed in State Research
October/November 1978 pp20-21. The outline given there suggests that it is
similar, in broad terms, to the Kitson/ Evelegh view of the world.
4. See Special Operations in Counter-Insurgency: the Farren Case, Palestine
1947 - David Charters in Journal of Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
June 1979
There is, quite clearly, a study to be written of the continuities through the
experience of SOE to the post-war counter-insurgency operations. To give just
one example, some of the people imported into the Malayan operation came
from Palestine and were (apparently) resented as 'the Palestine mob'. Charters
shows one example of SOE methods being (wrongly, in his view) used in a
counter-insurgency situation.
5. Charters - see note 4
6. On E4A, most recently and accessibly, see Chris Ryder, Sunday Times 11
August 1985.
7. On 'Four Square' see Faligot's The Kitson Experiment p 30/31. The MRF is
openly acknowledged as an army 'counter gang' both by William Seymour in
his British Special Forces (London 1985) p308, and by Tony Geraghty in his
Who Dares Wins (London 1980 pp 193/4.)
8. This is extremely complicated. There is little doubt that between 1969 and
1974 something akin to chaos reigned in the British counter-insurgency efforts
in Northern Ireland. All accounts agree on this, and also that from around 1975
the chaos was reduced. How this was done, and how effective it was in practice
is difficult to determine in any detail. Faligot describes lots of bits and pieces,
many of which look like aspects of a Kitsonesque coordinated counterinsurgency
campaign. But, to give just one recent example (and there are others
in Fred Holroyd's piece here), the Belfast Sunday News 21 July 1985 reports
the existence of SAS-trained 'ghost squads' of armed civilians, squads whose
existence had not been notified to the RUC.
The essential difficulty for any integrated counter-insurgency campaign in
Northern Ireland has always been that Northern Ireland is part of the British
state and so all the civil arms of that state are present and, as far as I am aware,
unwilling to surrender their powers over to the Army. Solving this particular
problem is one of the main threads of Evelegh's book.
9. See Evelegh, especially around p 110
10."Regional Commissioners" are a part of current government Emergency
Powers proposals on the stocks in case of an international crisis (ie the threat of
war). These "Regional Commissioners" would be junior Cabinet Ministers.
(see Duncan Campbell in New Statesman 6 September 1985). It isn't clear to
me if this represents any kind of adoption of Evelegh's proposals. But then it
isn't clear to me exactly what the relationship is between these 'Emergency
Powers' and possible mainland insurgency. If anyone has information on this I
would like to hear from them.
11.The lack of clarity mentioned in note 10 above extends to my understanding of
the relationship between the Civil Defence structure and possible reactions to
insurgency in the UK. This whole area is - looks like - a complicated muddle.
If someone could clarify it they would be doing us all a big favour.
12."The Army's counter-insurgency doctrine ... was not designed for domestic
use, that is, for a semi peace-keeping role between two warring communities
within the UK." David Charters, "Intelligence and Psychological Warfare-
Operations in Northern Ireland" in RUSI journal, September 1977 p 25
Nor, of course, was it designed to combat people capable of highly
sophisticated technical operations. On the Provos use of intercepts of British
signals see Sigint Used by Anti-state Forces by Frank Doherty in War and
Order ed. Celina Bledowska (London 1983)
13.The essence of the programme is in The Listener, 31 October 1985
14.in Listener (above)
15.Chris Ryder in Sunday Times see note 6 above.
16.Don Parsons, Politics Beyond the Point of Production: class struggle and
regional underdevelopment in Northern Ireland in Review of Radical Political
Economy (New York) Summer 1985

[Jan Klimkowski]

Second Lobster piece from 1984.

Kincoragate: More Bodies
Steve Dorril
Sir George Terry's report on Kincora has at last been made public. But if Terry had
hoped to quash further speculation he failed.(l) In a second debate in the Northern
Ireland Assembly on Kincora there was widespread criticism of the report, particularly
of Terry "stepping outside his brief" in suggesting that the matter need no more
investigation. The Assembly called on James Prior, N.I. Secretary of State, to
"announce the setting up of a judicial inquiry." (Irish News 10th November 1983) This
he did on January l8th.
Released quietly on a Saturday morning in a clear attempt to minimise publicity,
Terry's conclusions - for only the conclusions were published - centred on the
allegations of the homosexual vice-ring at the boys home involving British
Intelligence. Terry described the allegations as fictional and, even though the
journalists who had uncovered the scandal had received information from an RUC
'deep throat', laid most of the blame for their circulation on journalists.(2)
Terry probably aimed the report at the mainland where Kincora has received little
attention. By undermining the credibility of the journalists he hoped to keep the lid on
Kincora's darker side - the involvement of British Intelligence and the piling up of
bodies connected to the boys home. His bottom line was that the battle against
terrorism was the first priority, which left little time for the authorities to adequately
investigate the allegations - an excuse as feeble as that other establishment cop-out, ' in
the interests of National Security'.
George Terry actually had little to do with the investigation which was carried out by
two of his former subordinates: Chief Supt. Gordon Harrison and Chief Insp. Dick
Henley. An original report on the affair by these two was apparently scrapped, no
doubt because the material they uncovered strayed inevitably into the British
Intelligence connection. Henley, Special Branch, has since been promoted to
Superintendent.
The investigation could never claim to be 'independent'. Terry's links to British
Intelligence through his Chairmanship of Polygraph Security Services, which imports
the lie-detector, are worth investigation. Harrison was Special Branch liaison officer
between the Sussex Police and MI5, and the officer who interrogated Captain Colin
Wallace in Brighton after Wallace killed his lover's husband. Small world.(3)
* * *
Still unreleased is the 'Whiteside Inquiry'. In December 1981 R.U.C. Chief Sir John
Hermon set up an internal investigation to discover what happened to missing files and
why the Kincora buggers weren't prosecuted earlier. In charge was Assistant Chief
Constable John Whiteside. Another 'independent' choice, Whiteside was a former head
of Special Branch and the R.U.C. man most closely linked with British Intelligence
during the seventies. He was a former R.U.C. member of the Security Liaison
Committee set up by Sir Maurice Oldfield.
* * *
Gradually the pieces are coming together, though it will turn out to be a very large
jigsaw. Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) set up a Northern Irish section in
the Conway Hotel at Dunmurray. Headed by Frank Howard Smith with Philip
Woodhead as his desk man in London, MI6 handled their Kincora agents through a
number of 'cut-outs' - the normal way of distancing SIS officers from events which
might go wrong. The man who orchestrated the various activities of the Kincora Ring
has been identified as a Lt. Colonel in the British Army, (4) attached to the E
Department (Special Branch) of the R.U.C. whose staff code was F5. The links
between F5 and Kincora were known by E3 (the Superintendent in charge of the
intelligence section of the R.U.C. at Knock H.Q.) and his deputy in charge of
intelligence on Loyalists, a Chief Inspector whose code was E3(B). The Terry Report
uncovered, though did not report, links between the homosexual vice-ring and senior
MI5 member P.T.E. 'Peter' England, now dead. Kincora resident John Baird visited
England at a house on the Old Hollywood Road in Belfast. The house was a Britintelligence
base used as a pickup point for Provisional IRA leaders during the peace
talks in 1976 which led to the setting up of Republican 'Incident Centres' paid for by
the British. England was then C(Int)NI - the Chief of British Intelligence in Northern
Ireland, a key figure in the Security Service (MI5).
Another senior intelligence man involved in the vice-ring directed, but took no part in
the 'truce' talks at British Intelligence HQ in Craigavan, Co. Down. He moved to a
crucial position in Britain's defence structure. R.U. C. men have made statements
about his homosexual associations. The Provisionals dealt with him indirectly through
MI6 officer James Allan.(5) In a bizarre twist the Provos became convinced from
contacts abroad that he was a KGB agent.(6)
Who Is/Was Who
Brian McDermott - aged 11, was found in the River Lagan, Sept. 1973,
not far from the Kincora home. His body had been mutilated.
Stephen Waring, a teenager who had been sexually abused at Kincora,
ran away from another home to which he had been sent and made his
way to Liverpool. He was picked up by police and put on the Ulster
Monarch Ferry that night so that the R.U.C. could pick him up at the
other end. He never arrived. Passengers saw a boy fall into the water. An
R.U.C. inquiry into details given by Liverpool police reported that "it
was not established, and no evidence was produced or tendered, that
directly (emphasis added) connected his death with misconduct at
Kincora".
Pastor Billy Mullan, a close friend of Ian Paisley, William McGrath and
Joss Cardwell, was found dead with a legally held gun beside him during
the probe into Kincora.
Robert Bradford MP, a former member of Tara and close associate of
McGrath, was shot dead in the middle of the R.U.C. investigation.
R.U.C. men privately claim that he was set-up for the killing in the same
way that British Intelligence tried to set up the assassination of Ian
Paisley in 1974.
Roy Garland, young Unionist leader, friend of Paisley, protege of
McGrath and founder member of Tara is still alive.
John McKeague at the beginning of the seventies was the most
important paramilitary figure in N. I. He had overthrown Terence O'Neil
by a series of 'agent provocateur' bombings and street disturbances which
backed Paisley's political agitation with devastating effect. He became
leader of the Red Hand Commando Loyalist paramilitary group set up
with the help of British Intelligence as a pseudo-gang. It was directed
from 'Six' local HQ in the Culloden Hotel at Craigavad, beside MI6
administrative HQ in Laneside House on Station Road.
Michael Wright a young UDA man associated with McKeague, was
killed in a mystery booby-trap explosion. UDA issued statement saying
he was murdered by the Security Forces 'dirty tricks' department.
John Hiddlestone is still alive. He recently returned from South Africa
and is now apparently living in fear, having been branded a British agent
by the UDA. He is a former activist in a number of right-wing Protestant
paramilitary groups, including Ulster Vanguard and the United Ulster
Unionist Party. In the mid 1970s he edited the National Front's Northern
Ireland journal 'British Ulsterman', printed by John McKeague who he
knew well. It has been suggested that Hiddlestone was reporting to
British Intelligence on contacts between Loyalist groups, the NF and
South African right-wingers besides his 'pseudo-gang' activity. (see
Searchlight No 99, September 1983) Independent sources in South
Africa and London suggest that another man, a former member of
McGrath's Ireland's Heritage Orange Lodge, and a UVF supporter, is
among the most influential in building links between South Africa and
Ulster. (Sunday News 24/7/83).
Edgar Graham, Unionist politician although not directly connected to
Kincora, he seems to have suffered the fate of Bradford and McKeague
when he became an embarrassment to British Intelligence. Graham was
working in secret on the infamous 'romper room' killings in which 22
Catholics were assassinated over a short period in East Belfast in 1972.
Evidence emerged that linked the killings to senior British officials who
were directed from London by Sir Maurice Oldfield, then Head of MI6.
Graham also discovered that vital official papers connected to the case,
including the transcript of all court hearings, were missing.
A soldier in the Royal Irish Rangers (RIR) and ex-SAS man, Albert
Baker, confessed to the killings, admitting that he had helped to set up a
pseudo-gang to terrorise Catholics. He had also infiltrated the UDA in
1972 to 1973. None of the others in the gang were ever charged with
murder, but Baker was jailed after pleading guilty. He was secretly
visited in his cell by Lord Windlesham, then Minister of State at
Stormont. He was later taken by plane to Ireland. Today he is not to be
found in any British prison. His family, quickly relocated in England,
admitted he had been working for Military Intelligence.
It is suggested that information was supplied by British Intelligence to
Republican gunmen enabling them to kill Graham. At the time of his
death he was investigating the role Military Intelligence played in
framing three UDA men who were charged with the 'romper room'
killings but later discharged. (Sunday News 18/12/83)
Michael Bettaney the former intelligence officer now on remand at
Brixton prison may have connections to Kincora. A high flier, Bettaney
found himself in 'F' Department, the section which deals with Irish
affairs. He arrived in Northern Ireland at the height of the Kincora vicering.
Bettaney is homosexual and while at Oxford was involved in Nazi
politics, forming a right-wing student alliance at the University. He was
charged with passing on British Intelligence assessments of a KGB
network operating in Britain, and of disclosing details of the expulsion of
three Soviet diplomats from Britain in Apri1 1983. Soon after the court
appearance (Bettaney was on loan to the MOD) a government spokesman
stated that no one had been expelled from the country. True, but a few
days earlier Mr Guennadi Saline (codename 'Silver') First Secretary and
Press Attache to the Soviet Embassy in Dublin, was expelled from Eire,
as were Victor Lipassov and his wife Evotokia. Mrs Lipassov is believed
to be a KGB agent and to have used the lack of passport regulations
between Ireland and Britain to travel to areas restricted to diplomats. She
made at least three visits to Britain using scheduled flights. (Times 12th
September 1983). The man handling the case is old Irish hand Det. Supt.
John Wescott of Scotland Yard's Special Branch. He has made frequent
visits to the Phoenix Park in Northern Ireland where all the intelligence
stuff goes on. Bettaney's lawyer is Larry Grant, on the MI5 blacklist of
lawyers, a former chairman of NCCL whose previous clients include
Philip Agee and Kenneth Lemon.
Notes
1. See Lobster 1 for article on Kincoragate. This follow-up piece is based on
articles which have appeared in the excellent Irish magazine The Phoenix - 44
Baggot St, Dublin 2; subs £12 per 26 issues - specifically issues 7th January,
16th September, 11th November and 9th December 1983.
2. Referring to the Kincora article in Lobster 1, it has been pointed out that
Robert Fisk's landlady, whose husband was in the RUC, was probably a plant.
It would be an easy way to keep an eye on a journalist who received leaked
papers and information.
3. More on Wallace. His wife, Eileen, was personal secretary to the Duke of
Norfolk, the same Duke accused by Charles Haughey of being a British spy
chief. In September 1983 the RUC leaked to the Belfast Newsletter the
information that a file on British Army psy ops (black propaganda) was
missing when the Terry investigators went to look for it. They were told that it
had been sent to the MOD in London and that it could not be seen because of
the Official Secrets Act. No doubt it revealed the activities of Wallace.
4. Could this be Lt. Col. Sidney Hawker, a member of the 'Ulsterisation'
Committee?
5. Allan became head of the Overseas Information Department (the I.R.D. as was)
in 1979. He directed the propaganda campaign against Arthur MacGraig's film
on Ireland, 'The Patriot Game'. In January 1981 he was made High
Commissioner to Mauritius.
6. Nominations? The descriptions fit Sir Frank Cooper, ex Permanent UnderSecretary
at the Ministry of Defence. Sir Frank has recently retired and been
appointed a Director of Westland, one of the MOD's biggest suppliers. KGB?!
7. The Alliance Party's Mr John Cushnahan said in the Northern Ireland
Assembly (Irish News 10th Nov 1983) that he believed a number of Assembly
members had been actively involved in Tara. He gave a short history of Tara,
including alleged gun-running and the organisation's receiving various types of
weapons and plastic explosives.
The Sunday News (22nd May 1983) gave details of a paper given to trainee spies at the
Joint Services Intelligence Centre at Ashford Kent. It reads "Tara is a Loyalist
organisation which is shrouded in mystery, but is basically a small 'hate-taig' group of
homosexuals. They are all evangelists and one of its aims is the proscription of the
Catholic Church. It has aspirations to become a paramilitary organisation". The paper
is dated April 1977, but was still being used to train intelligence officers in 1980,
although homosexuality was illegal at that time in Northern Ireland.

[Jan Klimkowski]

More on the Elm House network.

The claim is made: "During the current investigation, Downing Street has been anxious to keep abreast of developments, but police have sought to maintain strict confidentiality."

You reckon?

Abuse victims 'trafficked abroad'

Seventies paedophile ring in Barnes extended to Amsterdam, say two men who claim they were abused in brothels

James Hanning , Paul Cahalan

Sunday 03 February 2013

The Independent on Sunday

Two alleged victims of a sophisticated paedophile ring at the centre of a police investigation claim they were taken on trips to Amsterdam where they were sexually abused in brothels in the 1980s.

One male victim had been taken from the Grafton Close care home in Richmond, south-west London, it is claimed, and, as well as being trafficked in Amsterdam, was rented out to customers at the Elm Guest House, a bed and breakfast nearby. Another man has claimed he was taken to Amsterdam on a different trip.

Police are understood to be looking into the men's claims as part of Operation Fernbridge, an investigation into historic child abuse set up in the wake of the Jimmy Savile scandal. Detectives are building a picture of the reach of the network which allegedly used the property and have seized a number of files from local authorities.

The Elm Guest House in Rocks Lane, Barnes, said to have been frequented in the Seventies and Eighties by prominent peoples including former Tory politicians, is at the centre of the investigation.

An Independent on Sunday investigation last week revealed the disgraced former MP Cyril Smith was a frequent visitor to the property, and it is understood detectives have also looked at the role of Carole Kasir, the guest house manager who died in suspicious circumstances.

To some, German-born Kasir's liberal-minded attitudes prompted her, in the mid-1970s, to offer a meeting place for gay men embarrassed by their sexual orientation just a decade after it was made legal. To others it was the starting place that ultimately led her to accumulate substantial sums of money by letting rooms where child porn videos were shot and exploitative men could abuse underage boys brought in from a local care homes.

Kasir who ran the guest house with her husband Haroon Kasir, died on 17 June 1990, aged 47, eight years after a specialist police team raided the guest house, which has since been turned into flats.

At the inquest into her death, the court heard Kasir, a diabetic, was found by a friend about 11am with "numerous injections and phials of insulin" next to her body, but that did little to stem a series of outlandish allegations. The inquest was shown suicide notes allegedly written by Kasir to her lover, but three witnesses two child protection workers and a private detective queried the provenance of the notes, telling the court Kasir feared for her life because of what she knew. She had been receiving threatening phone calls, was being harassed by police and told them she was being followed by an unmarked car, they said.

After adjourning the case several times, the coroner ruled she had "taken her own life" and that she died from hypoglycaemia caused by an insulin overdose. Friends claimed there were questions that were not adequatelyanswered, such as why Kasir was injected several times in the bottom, when she always took her injections in the arm. One witness at the inquest said he was shown photos of illustrious public figures in compromising poses, an allegation recently backed up by another witness.

Those friendly with Kasir said that, in the months before her death, she spoke about lifting the lid on the guest house, including listing those who visited, in a book.

In October last year, the Labour MP Tom Watson alleged in the Commons that there was evidence of child abuse in senior Tory circles. During the current investigation, Downing Street has been anxious to keep abreast of developments, but police have sought to maintain strict confidentiality. They are now pursuing a number of leads resulting from witness statements and documents seized after detectives raided the home of a former child protection worker last month. Anyone with information should contact Operation Fernbridge on 020 7161 0500.

[Jan Klimkowski]

Councils have legal duties to protect children in their care.

Investigative reporter Eilenn Fairweather found that councils frequentlyl sent children to Jersey and sometimes lost their files...

Birmingham council illegally sent children into care in Jersey, MP report reveals

By Eileen Fairweather

UPDATED: 11:39, 4 August 2008

Daily Mail

MP John Hemming

At least five children were illegally placed in care on Jersey by Birmingham social services, which then lost track of them.

Four of the youngsters - who are now adults - are still on the island and have been traced by local police. But the whereabouts of the fifth, a male born in the Fifties, remains unknown.

The revelation comes amid continuing police investigations into 100 charred bone fragments and 65 milk teeth found at Jersey's now notorious Haut de la Garenne former children's home.

Liberal Democrat MP John Hemming, who discovered that his local city council had sent children to Jersey, believes other children from the UK 'were also placed in care there'.

The MP for Birmingham Yardley added: 'The Government has refused to order councils to check properly because it does not want to open a can of worms, on the links between abusers in England and Jersey.'

The Mail on Sunday has also learned that children from UK local authorities, which have also been the subject of abuse allegations, were taken on holiday to Haut de la Garenne, where the bone fragments are said to belong to five children whom detectives believe were killed.

The inquiry suffered a setback last week when forensic experts revealed that the age of the remains cannot be dated, meaning a murder inquiry is unlikely. But nearly 100 former care residents have alleged gross physical and sexual abuse.

Birmingham council only discovered it had placed five children in foster care on Jersey because, at Mr Hemming's request, it checked old accounts. It found it made payments to Jersey for child care between 1960 and 1990. Yet a social work file survived on only one child.

Haut de la Garenne

Jersey children's care home Haut de la Garenne

Mr Hemming praised the council for 'doing what every council should do now'. He added: 'It is not responsible for what happened under earlier administrations, and I can't believe it was the only British authority which used Jersey. The system nationally is not properly accountable. Children are taken into care never to be seen again.'

Schools Minister Kevin Brennan has told the Commons that checks are unnecessary because children from the UK cannot be placed in care in Jersey without a court order. Yet the five Birmingham children were sent to Jersey without such orders.

Although he has no information suggesting any crime took place, Mr Hemming is concerned that the fifth man's history and whereabouts remain unknown. 'How many other councils dumped kids there and forgot about them?' he said.

Birmingham City Council said: 'We will co-operate fully if needed by the Jersey authorities to investigate the whereabouts of adults from any placements made historically by Birmingham City Council.'

Mr Hemming has asked English councils to check their records under the Freedom of Information Act. He said: 'Most seem only to have done cursory checks, just checking recent electronic files, or asking around the office.'

Responses obtained by The Mail on Sunday confirm this. A handful of councils refused to check at all.

They included Islington in North London, whose 12 children's homes were infamously infiltrated between the Seventies and Nineties by a child sex and pornography network, while Margaret Hodge was council leader.

Key staff, The Mail on Sunday recently revealed, were from Jersey or had strong Channel Islands connections. The council told Mr Hemming that checking its records would cost too much.

Liz Davies, the former Islington senior social worker who bravely blew the whistle on the scandal, said last night: 'It is becoming clear that children at Haut de la Garenne were sent on holiday to children's homes in England which were also notorious for abuse, while the children in the English homes they went to were sent to Haut de la Garenne. They literally swapped beds.'

She did not feel able yet to reveal which authorities were involved.

'But I am perturbed that police in Britain have not written to all local authorities on the mainland to demand they check which children they sent to Jersey,' she added.

'During the North Wales abuse scandal in the Nineties, when I was a child protection manager in London, police asked all councils to check had we sent any of our children to its care homes. Many had, then just forgotten about them.

'Children in care are often shipped about, and paedophiles love placing them far from home.'

Mr Hemming is furious the Government has refused to respond to the call for councils to check records until after the summer break.

He said: 'They are stalling because they are embarrassed by the size of the problem, and because it involves English authorities, too.'

[Jan Klimkowski]

In post #174 onwards in this thread, information - some of it from Hansard - can be seen about the attempts of Geoffrey Dickens MP to expose paedophile activity.

The account also details the efforts of the Thatcher government and security to protect members of the Paedophile Information Exchange.

Now we learn that Geoffrey Dickens handed a file containing details of of alleged paedophile activity to Thatcher's Home Secretary, Leon Brittan.

This file has apparently been lost by Her Majesty's Government.

Leon Brittan resigend as Secretary of State for Trade & Industry in January 1986, was knighted in 1989, and became a Eurocrat. He's now Baron Brittan of Spennithorne.

Anyway...

Once again we get some proper reporting from the Sunday People / Mirror.

Elm guest house: Home Office was warned by top Tory 30 years ago of VIP paedophile ring

10 Feb 2013 00:00

Geoffrey Dickens MP handed over a 50-page dossier detailing VIP child abuse in 1984
Geoffrey Dickens (left) was assured his allegations would be investigated Geoffrey Dickens (left) was assured his allegations would be investigated
Rex

A senior Tory MP handed an explosive dossier *alleging VIP child abuse to the Government almost 30 years ago, the Sunday People can reveal.

The 50 pages contained information about suspected paedophile rings, police misconduct and abuse of boys in a care home.

There are suggestions the dossier contained links to the notorious Elm guest house in south-west London which is currently the focus of the Met Police's investigation Operation Fernbridge.

But the file has disappeared.

It was presented to the Home Office by Geoffrey Dickens MP in 1984.

Later he had a half-hour meeting with the then-Home Secretary Leon Brittan which Mr Dickens described as encouraging.

The MP for Littleborough and Saddleworth said he had been assured his allegations of a UK-wide paedophile ring would be fully investigated.

But there is no evidence Mr Dickens' findings were ever followed up and the Home Office admits it has no idea where the file is now.

Our revelations support claims first made in the Commons last October by campaigning MP Tom Watson that evidence of a VIP paedophile ring with links to the heart of government was not *followed up in the early 1980s.

The Front of the Barnes Brothel at Rocks Lane South West London The Front of the Barnes Brothel at Rocks Lane South West London


Together they raise concerns that a cover-up perhaps orchestrated by MI5 or Scotland Yard's Special Branch may have protected senior figures mentioned in the dossier.

Mr Watson has now tabled a Parliamentary question asking Home Secretary Theresa May to track down the Dickens dossier and make it available to MPs.

Mr Dickens, who died in 1995 aged 63, spent years collecting his evidence. The colourful MP was convinced he had solid proof of a VIP paedophile network with links to Parliament, Buckingham Palace and other areas of public life.

It is believed he handed at least two dossiers to the Government.

In 1981 he used Parliamentary privilege to name diplomat Sir Peter Hayman as a paedophile.

Three years earlier an envelope containing obscene literature and written material had been found on a London bus.

A police investigation found vile correspondence between Sir Peter and several other people.

But no prosecution was brought against the diplomat, who worked for MI6 and was High Commissioner to Canada.

The police uncovered Hayman's links to the *infamous Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE).

The twisted pressure group lobbied for child-sex perverts to be given equal rights and for the age of consent to be lowered to four.

In 1983, Mr Dickens said there were "big, big names people in positions of power, influence and responsibility" and threatened to expose them in Parliament if no action was taken against PIE.

The MP handed a *one-million strong petition against the group to Home Secretary Mr Brittan.

In 1984 he revealed he had called for Mr Brittan to investigate the allegations in his dossier.

He added: "The dossier contained allegations of a child offence in a children's home."

Flats that used to be Elm guest house Flats that used to be Elm guest house


Reports at the time said the file described a youth worker abusing boys in his care, and a TV boss *allegedly abusing a child.

Now investigators are keen to see the dossier as the probe into the Elm guest house gathers pace.

Operation Fernbridge was set up to investigate claims the Elm a gay brothel was used by high-profile paedophiles to abuse boys in the late 1970s and early 80s.

Documents seen by police and first revealed in a joint investigation between the Sunday People and Exaro website show that guests at the Elm had connections with the royal household, politics and showbusiness.

Last week one victim told the Sunday People how as a 13-year-old he was taken from nearby Grafton Close care home to the Elm where he was plied with drink, dressed in a fairy costume and then abused by "posh men".

A Home Office spokesman said: "We are aware of media reports from the 1980s about papers *collected by Geoffrey Dickens.

"Files from that time are no *longer held centrally by the department, but work is underway to find out what relevant documents have been archived."

[Jan Klimkowski]

There's a 50-minute documentary about the Sidney Cooke and his paeophile gang linked earlier in this thread.

The evidence of the involvement of powerful figures has been known for decades.

Will justice now be done?

I'm not holding my breath.

VIP paedophile ring

The net closes: Ex-Tory chief faces child sex arrest over claims girl was raped and boys were abused

Sunday Mirror 16 Feb 2013 22:30

The probe into a former Cabinet minister, the notorious paedophile Sidney Cooke, Jimmy Savile and MP Cyril Smith
Ex-minister: He allegedly raped a girl Ex-minister: He allegedly raped a girl

Police are *preparing to arrest a former Tory Cabinet minister after a woman came forward to claim she had been raped by him as a girl.

Detectives are also investigating claims that he abused boys.

We can reveal that the former minister is suspected of being part of a VIP *paedophile ring that was regularly handed boys by child rapist and killer Sidney Cooke for vile sex orgies.

The former high-ranking MP, who we cannot name, is under investigation by Scotland Yard's paedophile unit.

Sources close to the probe gave details of the new allegations to the Sunday *Mirror and investigative news website *Exaro.

A former detective who worked on the original investigation into Cooke told the Sunday Mirror that the minister was among those alleged to have been *photographed in a 1986 police surveillance on premises where boys had been dropped off.

Others allegedly included Jimmy Savile, MP Cyril Smith and top judges though none of them were ever arrested.

Cooke, 85 dubbed Britain's most notorious paedophile after he tortured and killed 14-year-old Jason Swift in 1985 would pick the unsuspecting teenage boys up off the streets around Kings Cross.

He would drive them to locations across North London where paedophiles lay in wait to repeatedly rape them.

Last week the former officer, who worked on Operation Orchid which convicted Cooke and his gang, said they had taken pictures of the minister.

Jimmy Savile Sick Jimmy Savile was 'part of the gang'



The former officer said up to 16 high profile figures were due to be arrested. But the day before they were to be carried out detectives were told the operation had been disbanded.

The revelation means Scotland Yard knew about allegations concerning the Cabinet Minister and Savile in 1986 but did nothing about it, instead choosing to cover up the claims.

A source told Exaro last week that senior officers, including Commander Peter Spindler, the head of the Paedophile Unit, have had a secret briefing on preparations to arrest the ex-minister.

It is understood that the investigation is at an early stage but there is a plan to arrest him in the next few weeks.

After the 1986 operation into Cooke was disbanded the former officer went to check the file only to find the pictures had disappeared and any mention of the men involved had also vanished.

The former officer said: "It was clear a cover-up had taken place.

"The investigation showed that Cooke would pick up rent boys and take them back to flats or garages where large groups of men were waiting to abuse them.

"These paedophiles, which included a lot of high-profile figures that were said to include the former Cabinet Minister, Savile and MP Cyril Smith, all knew each other and all operated together. They would lie in wait and Cooke would turn up with the boy who wouldn't know what was going to happen.

"We had photographic evidence of these high-profile figures entering or leaving buildings where the abuse was taking place. Everyone knew Savile was a paedo but nothing was ever done.

"Cyril Smith was photographed going into one of the properties with a high-profile film director.

"All of the others were pictured and were going to be arrested before the plug was pulled. I was sickened and to this day I wonder how many children we could have saved if we had been allowed to arrest those men.

"I feel guilty they weren't arrested but there was nothing I could do at the time as the evidence had gone."

Cyril Smith MP MP Cyril Smith was spotted in surveillance


The Sunday Mirror knows the identity of the paedophiles in the gang but has chosen not to name them.

In 1993 Detective Superintendent Ed Williams tried to track down the Orchid file on Cooke to see if there were any similarities with the abduction and murder of nine-year-old Daniel Handley, but he struggled to find the folder.

He eventually found it in the basement of Arbour Square Police Station in Stepney, East London.

While there were references to a "wider paedophile ring" there were no photographs or names.

Mr Williams said: "I was very upset about the way the Met treated paedophile cases but I was a voice in the wilderness at that time and people thought I was being over-emotional.

"I found the Orchid files where they had been put for storage purposes and somebody had completely forget to send it back to the Yard. I was trying to look for paedophiles and connections with other cases as I was trying to build up a profile of the offender.

"The report spoke about boys being passed around from paedophile to paedophile.

"There were no pictures on the file. It did mention that there was a wider ring of individuals but did not mention Jimmy Savile or a cabinet minister."

Sidney Cooke Child killer: Rapist Sidney Cooke


Sidney Cooke, along with three accomplices Leslie Bailey, Robert Oliver and Steven Barrell was found guilty of the manslaughter of Jason Swift in May 1989. They have been linked to up to 20 murders.

Cooke was believed to have murdered seven-year-old Mark Tildesley but the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to bring charges as he was already serving 19 years for Jason's death.

He was released in 1998, to a public outcry, but was rearrested the following year for systematically abusing two boys in the 1970s and jailed for life.

Savile was exposed last year as one of the UK's most prolific paedophiles, with 450 victims. Police said he "groomed a *nation" by avoiding justice while *abusing hundreds of children over 54 years.

Officers on Operation Yewtree, which investigated the claims, have also *arrested celebrities including Gary Glitter, comedian Freddie Starr, DJ Dave Lee Travis, publicist Max Clifford and comedian Jim Davidson. All have denied any wrongdoing and not all the allegations involve under-16s.

Scotland Yard said they would not comment on an on-going investigation.

Visit the Exaro website for more on this story.

[Jan Klimkowski]

And on it goes....

Meanwhile, will any meaningful arrests take place?

Jimmy Savile: police inspector 'may have acted on star's behalf'

Police watchdog working to expose 'catalogue of institutional failings' that left TV personality free to attack hundreds

Vikram Dodd
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 20 February 2013 12.32 GMT

Jimmy Savile, who died in 2011, is thought to have commited 200 offences over several decades. Photograph: Fiona Hanson/PA

The police watchdog has began examining the police's dealings with Jimmy Savile, as it promises to help expose "a catalogue of institutional failings" that left the TV star free to molest hundreds of people.

The Independent Police Complaints Commission said an investigation had begun into a police inspector from the West Yorkshire force who may have "acted on behalf" of Savile ahead of an interview by detectives from the Surrey force.

The IPCC is also asking a total of seven forces to examine their files to see if there are any concerns about the way their officers dealt with Savile and related matters.

The Guardian understands this is in part triggered by material passed to the IPCC by an inquiry already under way into police dealings with Savile. That inquiry is being conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, and was ordered by the home secretary.

Savile attacked hundreds of people, including children, across several decades of sexual offending. Police say re-investigation has led them to record over 200 offences.

Failings by police and prosecutors meant the one chance to bring Jimmy Savile to justice while he was alive was lost, the director of public prosecution has admitted.

Official reports already released revealed that police across the country including the Metropolitan police, Surrey, Sussex and Savile's home force, West Yorkshire failed to share information, in some cases failed to record allegations against him and in other cases even warned victims off.

When Savile was finally interviewed by detectives in 2009, the encounter was "perfunctory" and he was allowed to control the proceedings, a review by Surrey police found.

Ahead of that 2009 interview, a former inspector from the West Yorkshire police contacted the Surrey force. According to a report from Surrey police, the inspector said he was known to Savile; said the entertainer had lost a number for the detectives who wanted to interview him; and passed on a number where Savile could be reached.

According to the Surrey report, when interviewed by their detectives, Savile said he knew senior police officers from Leeds, named one inspector, and said that officers had been to his home socially to have tea.

The IPCC said it will investigate the former West Yorkshire police inspector's relationship and dealings with Savile.

In a statement the IPCC said: "The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) has received a referral from West Yorkshire police in relation to the alleged actions of a former police inspector. The allegations refer to the officer having 'acted on behalf' of the late Jimmy Savile by contacting Surrey police ahead of a police interview in 2009.

"The referral follows a direction from the IPCC to record and refer the conduct of the former inspector, identified in a Surrey police report as 'Inspector 5'."

The IPCC added that it had asked seven forces to start inquiries to examine if police misconduct had helped Savile escape justice. The IPCC said: "These forces are West Yorkshire, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley, Greater Manchester, the Metropolitan and Lancashire police forces. They have been asked to re-look at all information relating to the late Jimmy Savile. The IPCC has asked that each force provides the relevant documents and, if they decide not to record or refer any matters, the rationale for not doing so."

IPCC commissioner Rachel Cerfontyne said: "Having had the opportunity to assess all the information that is available to us, I directed West Yorkshire police to record and refer the conduct of a former inspector.

"Furthermore I believe all the forces that may have had intelligence concerning the late Jimmy Savile should now go back and consider all the relevant information and materials they possess that may highlight any recordable conduct issues for the IPCC to assess.

"A number of bodies are already working to address the deep-rooted public concern in this case and have published reports. It is now for the IPCC to assess thoroughly whether or not there are matters in relation to the conduct of individual officers that require an IPCC investigation. This may be of little comfort to victims of crime, but I hope that the IPCC can play some part in addressing what many see as a catalogue of institutional failings."

[Jan Klimkowski]

In a shameful day, Tim Davie, the stooge - sorry acting Director-General - running the BBC refused all interview requests from media organisations, instead granting a solitary interview to the BBC itself to be used on a pool basis. Needless to say, the interview was about as challenging as a relaxing sojourn on the sofa watching Neighbours....

This prompted the quote of the day from rival Channel 4 News:

Channel 4 News editor Ben De Pear has been venting his frustration at the BBC in no uncertain terms this afternoon.

"So as the BBC release a publicly funded report into a public body the acting DG of the BBC will only be interviewed by the BBC about the BBC. In my time as a TV journalist I have been offered interviews with the following people produced by their own organisations; President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad of Iran, President Charles Taylor of Liberia, & Tim Davie of the BBC. We got Mugabe and Ahmedinejad ourselves but not Taylor & turned down his offer of self interview; we are still trying for Tim Davie."

The testimony of Jeremy Paxman, the notoriously grumpy BBC2 Newsnight presenter, has been heavily redacted.

What remains of Paxman's testimony has the whiff of inconvenient truth.

Personally, I have very little doubt that the decision to kill the investigation into Savile's paedophilia was corporate.

Jeremy Paxman: Newsnight's failure to tackle Jimmy Savile was 'pathetic'

Presenter told internal inquiry he believed BBC's decision not to pursue abandoned investigation was a 'policy judgment'

John Plunkett
guardian.co.uk, Friday 22 February 2013 13.50 GMT

Jeremy Paxman: criticised the BBC's decision not to pursue the claims about Jimmy Savile that emerged from a Newsnight investigation. Photograph: Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

Newsnight presenter Jeremy Paxman has described as "pathetic" his programme's failure to tackle the Savile scandal sooner and said he believed it was a BBC "policy judgment" not to pursue the original investigation abandoned by the current affairs show in late 2011.

Paxman told the BBC's internal inquiry into the Savile scandal that he believed it was a "corporate decision" to drop Newsnight's investigation into the late Jim'll Fix It presenter in December 2011. He was also critical of BBC News management, which he said had made a raft of politically-based appointments with a similar mindset.

He said it was "pathetic" that Newsnight did not cover the Savile issue sooner. "We wouldn't even tackle a bloody story that was about our own programme. This is pathetic."

Paxman told Nick Pollard, the former head of Sky News who ran the inquiry, that he disagreed with the decision to drop Newsnight's Savile investigation but said it was unfair that the programme's then editor, Peter Rippon, had been treated as the "fall guy".

The Newsnight presenter's comments were revealed in the transcripts of his evidence to the Pollard inquiry, published on Friday.

They revealed that Paxman had also pressed Rippon to run a Savile story on the days leading up to the 3 October 2012 broadcast of the ITV exposé which plunged the corporation into crisis. But he said Rippon's response was a "blanket refusal to entertain the idea".

"What struck me about his reply ... He said, 'I am sorry, I just can't do this'," said Paxman.

"And I thought that was a very, very unusual word to use, 'can't', because the normal judgment I mean, no, we are not going to do it, because we have got - we haven't got time or we are doing politics or we are doing too many social stories.

"'Can't' was a very, very unusual word to use, and I didn't say, 'What do you mean 'can't'? Someone has told you that you can't, or you physically can't face it?'"

Paxman added: "Now I think my suspicion is that there may well have been an element of both."

Paxman told his editor in an email that the decision to drop its Savile report in 2011 "must have been a corporate decision, whatever your blog says".

The Newsnight presenter told the Pollard inquiry: "It is my belief, but I have no evidence."

Paxman said: "The BBC's line had been that decisions are in the hands of individual editors. This is an attempt to demonstrate that it is not some great corporate monolith.

"In fact, it doesn't need to be, because the the cast of mind that has overtaken the senior echelons, the sort of people that they appoint ... there is a raft of appointments now that have been made of people who are clearly not the most creative, and decisions appear to be being made about appointments which are politically I mean 'politically' with a small 'P' politically based, and they are to do with perpetuating a particular type of journalism."

Paxman's evidence to the inquiry had been keenly anticipated after he issued a statement lambasting BBC management on the night of George Entwistle's resignation as director general in November last year.

There is no explicit criticism of the then BBC News director Helen Boaden, but Paxman was scathing about the way the division has been run in recent years, saying it had been taken over by "radio people".

He said the BBC News operation had become more centralised in the wake of the Hutton report in 2004, what he described as a "general drawing in of horns" and a "cultural change".

Boaden became the BBC's first female director of news in 2004, six months after the publication of Hutton report, which was heavily critical of the corporation's journalism in relation to the Iraq war dossier and led the resignation of the corporation's director general Greg Dyke and chairman Gavyn Davies.

"Post Hutton there has been a greater centralisation, or a desire for greater centralisation of editorial decision making ... at the expense of the sort of independence previously exercised at the time when George Entwistle was running Newsnight or Peter Barron or various distinguished figures," said Paxman.

Paxman added that the BBC's news division had been "taken over by radio ... Helen Boaden, a radio person. Steve Mitchell, a radio person. Peter Rippon was a radio person. These people belong to a different kind of culture."

On the appointment of Rippon much of Paxman's evidence appears to be redacted.

But he described radio people as having a greater "preoccupation with the institution ... In television it tends to be a younger person's game, There are - with fewer older people in it and fewer people - I would say, preoccupied with their pensions".

Paxman told the inquiry: "I don't think you are the sort of BBC lifer that he [Rippon] is without absorbing the mindset of the organisation. They all had it, whether it is Helen, or Steve or Peter Rippon or many others ... One man making an apparently independent decision while in fact reflecting a corporate culture."

When he read reports about ITV's planned Savile documentary, Paxman asked Rippon to run a Newsnight report about the disgraced presenter as soon as possible, the day before the Exposure documentary's broadcast or even the same night.

But Paxman said Rippon's response was a "blanket refusal to entertain the idea".

Paxman told Rippon in an email that the decision to drop the Savile report "must have been a corporate decision, whatever your blog says".

Rippon denied it was a corporation decision, telling Paxman: "It wasn't corporate, honestly. I guess I may have been guilty of self-censorship."

While he thought the decision not to run the investigation was wrong, Paxman said in an email that it was "very unfair, and frankly not at all untypical, that the BBC has dumped all this on one individual [Rippon]." He said the BBC's behaviour was "contemptible".

Paxman told the inquiry: "He was being used as the fall guy ... I profoundly disagree with the BBC's refusal to engage with it and to justify or attempt to justify its position."

He said he had "no evidence" about Jimmy Savile's behaviour but described it as "common gossip".

On several pages of Paxman's transcripts, more words are redacted than actually appear.

Asked by Pollard how he thought Newsnight had performed in 2011 under Rippon, Paxman was reluctant to discuss it, saying he would rather do so "over a cup of tea or something". But when it was pointed out that the programme won the Royal Television Society news programme of the year, he was disparaging.

"Oh come on! You of all people know how those things are worked out. I mean, we didn't I did not feel ... it was a really unhelpful thing to have happened to the programme, to be able to boast, even if it is a rather pointless sort of award. To have been given such a gong was not really terribly helpful, nor did it seem to be based upon any particularly informed judgment."

Paxman said BBC management should have "got on the front foot" once the crisis began to break. He said the BBC's press operation was "terrible" and should have been more proactive.

Paxman said the BBC had "never felt comfortable with popular culture" which was why it gave so much airtime to Savile.

"What was the BBC doing promoting this absurd figure, this absurd and malign figure? They have never felt comfortable with popular culture and they have therefore given those who claim to perpetrate it too much licence ... that is the bigger challenge the organisation faces."

Paxman said he did not watch the ITV documentary about Savile. "Why should I have done? It is sleazy, sleazy behaviour in a world I dislike," he added.

He did not watch the Panorama programme either, although he did ask for a script. "Clearly it was going to make life difficult for us, I thought ... one needed to know what was going to be in the Panorama in order to deal with it."

[Jan Klimkowski]

And then some..

BBC knew of Jimmy Savile's 'dark side' before tribute aired

Transcripts from the Pollard review reveal some senior executives were 'queasy' about tribute programme

Vanessa Thorpe
The Observer, Saturday 23 February 2013 21.28 GMT


The BBC was aware of allegations surrounding Jimmy Savile.

The BBC misled the public by broadcasting glowing tributes to Jimmy Savile although key managers knew he had "dark sides" to his personality, detailed interviews with BBC staff reveal.

Celebrations of the life and work of Savile that were aired on the BBC after his death helped to continue to mask his criminal behaviour and hide the damage he had left behind him, aside from the now notorious dropping of the planned Newsnight investigation into his crimes at a children's home.

The BBC inquiry transcripts that were made public on Friday show that those who commissioned programmes about the late radio DJ and television presenter were "queasy" about portraying his personality. Interviews given by top BBC executives to last year's inquiry panel, chaired by Sky's Nick Pollard, have now laid bare the extent of the corporation's communication failures and errors of judgment when it came to telling the truth about Savile.

Helen Goodman, the shadow culture minister with responsibility for media reform, called this weekend for a thorough review of BBC policy on communication about potentially difficult programmes. "The transcripts reveal the total chaos at the BBC's higher management when it came to communication. Some people seem to have known, while other people were busy working on tributes."

New evidence shows that Jan Younghusband, the BBC's head of music and obituaries, told George Entwistle, who was then in charge of television output, that she had been asked not to make an obituary "because of the darker side of the story". Nick Vaughan-Barratt, the BBC's head of events, who had worked closely with Savile, informed colleagues that he was "queasy" and told Younghusband the BBC should not make a straight obituary film because they could not cover his personal life. A tribute to his broadcasting career was thought preferable.

"We have to be clear at that point I didn't know what that dark side was," Younghusband told Pollard's panel. "I just thought he was a creepy guy." She went on to explain that "In the entertainment industry all kinds of things happen, but if they were going to celebrate his television career at that point I knew nothing that would prevent you celebrating his television career."

She told the inquiry she had a suspicion that "he was into boys".

Savile was being lauded elsewhere in the media, she told Pollard, explaining that she could not make a film based on rumour. Pollard replied: "But you could refrain from making an unalloyed celebratory film if there was a dark side, even if you hadn't defined it completely?"

Younghusband made no film, but was given a tribute to run, put together by the TV production company, True North. "The half hour, I imagine, was taken because it was available," she told Pollard. "And it was convenient to take it, and inexpensive."

Later Younghusband emphasised that, had she known of Savile's crimes, she would have demanded the tribute was cancelled.

Labour's Goodman said this weekend that new evidence shows the BBC dodging responsibility for Savile. "The difference between an obituary and a tribute would be lost on most people watching, to be frank," she told the Observer. "I don't think they should have been playing about with these words. They should have got control of the situation much earlier."

In his evidence to Pollard the Newsnight presenter Jeremy Paxman blamed the BBC's "aloofness". "They have never felt comfortable with popular culture and they have therefore given those who claim to perpetrate it too much licence," he said.

Alan Yentob, the BBC's creative director, denied the charge that the programme makers are aloof and told the Observer that Danny Cohen, the head of BBC1, and other commissioning editors, including Younghusband, have repeatedly reviewed what went wrong and are changing procedures following the death of controversial figures.

"In the world of blogs and tweets on the web there is just so much rumour out there about celebrities, much of it anonymous, and so it is even harder now to handle these issues. It is more difficult to authenticate things," Yentob said.

"But you do have to interrogate such rumours and, at the point you take them seriously, you then have to pursue an inquiry."

The psychologist Oliver James said that rumours abound about celebrities who behave badly, so it can be hard to draw a line. "But the BBC is riddled with micro-managers and when there is an issue like this it becomes a question of micro-blindness," he said.

When Pollard published the findings of his report last December he said Cohen and Entwistle were guilty of mishandling the tribute shows, but transcripts now show that grave doubts about Savile's personality were widespread. Younghusband was one of the few to raise the issue explicitly.

The evidence of Liz MacKean, the former Newsnight reporter who wanted to investigate Savile, reveals that BBC website moderators took down a succession of negative comments about Savile following his death, including a number that accused him of paedophilia. Website moderation, or monitoring, Entwistle explains to Pollard's panel, is done by an independent company.

One experienced BBC production insider told the Observer the divisions in the BBC have made it malfunction. "If everyone on Newsnight knew it was true that Savile was a paedophile, it should not have run a tribute to someone who was molesting girls in wheelchairs before they went on to Top of the Pops. A culture of secrecy has taken over at the BBC that would make the Greek Junta of the 1960s green with envy."

Entwistle, who left the BBC after 54 days as director-general, told Pollard that the question of how to handle the death of a celebrity with a dubious personal life was one of judgment. "You might feel that the key thing was that you wanted to get it out as fast as you possibly could, because the fact that there was one popular attitude to Savile needed to be corrected by the journalistic revelations that would indicate that another attitude should be taken," he said.

He later added he had no sense that Savile commemoration was "a massive part of our Christmas plan" in the TV schedules.

The BBC has formally advertised for directors of TV and news, as its incoming director-general, Lord Hall, assembles a new team.