01-04-2010, 09:52 PM
JIM REPLIES TO GREG BURNHAM ON A GREAT SUGGESTION
[NOTE: The table has been garbled in posting, which I will attempt to fix and repost.]
My friend Monk has advanced an excellent suggestion for conducting an inventory of the
state of the argument, which I am going to pursue by an enumeration of the criticisms
that have been directed to Judyth, the posts in which they were raised and those where
she has replied. That will thereby demonstrate what we have been learning about who
has and who has not been advancing positions that are or are not rationally defensible.
This will require that I conduct a review of this entire thread, which I am going to do. In
the meanwhile, however, I want to respond in a general way to some of his observations.
I have remarked that many of Judyth's reports about her life with the man she knew are
highly implausible, which means that they are difficult to believe and, on initial consideration,
appear to be more likely to be false than true. The point I have made is that, when claims
that are initially implausible turn out to be true (or, at least, supported by better arguments
than the alternatives), that has the effect of greatly increasing the credibility of the source.
Monk concedes that this is a human psychological tendency, but expresses hesitation over
whether it is warranted rationally as a matter of logic. The answer, however, is that it is.
The study of the impact of new evidence upon our beliefs (or degrees of belief) is among
the most extensively studied subjects in the philosophy of science and epistemology, where
the predominant approach is known as "Bayesianism" for its appeal to a theorem due to a
mathematician by the name of Thomas Bayes. It interprets probability as a measure of the
strength of our beliefs in relation to the evidence available to us. There are objectivist and
subjectivist interpretations of Bayesianism, but the core of the objectivist interpretation has
it (correctly) that there are definable objective standards relating evidence to hypotheses.
This means that rational agents are not free to believe or not believe when confronted with
relevant evidence. Suppose, for example, that you believe all rabbits are white. When you
encounter a brown rabbit, that belief is no longer rationally warranted. If you are rational in
your adherence to the principles of deductive reasoning, in this case, then when confronted
with a brown rabbit, you will reject your belief that all rabbits are white. Analogously, with
respect to the claim that there is a pink elephant in your living room, if you visit your living
room and detect no signs of a pink elephant, if you are rational, you will reject that belief.
Deductive reasoning is conclusive in the sense that, given the truth or the existence of the
premises as evidence, the conclusion cannot be false. In the examples I have just given,
we are dealing with deductive reasoning, where the existence of even a single brown rabbit
guarantees the truth of the conclusion that it is not the case all rabbits are white, and where
the absence of evidence that would have to be present if the elephant hypothesis were true
provides (virtually) conclusive evidence that no elephant is present based upon perception,
which is not as definitive because of the possibility of visual problems, mental states, etc.
Perceptual reasoning tends to be a highly reliable form of inductive reasoning, where the
content of the conclusion goes beyond the content of its premises by adding something to
it. Familiar examples of inductive reasoning include drawing inferences about populations
on the basis of sampling, reasoning from the past to the future, and from the observable
to the unobservable. But there are well-established standards, in general, for the weight
that should be assigned to the evidence, which is the domain of the study of logic, which
is concerned with the investigation and certification of those standards for rational belief.
In general, for a person to be rational, there should be an approximate correspondence
between their degree of belief (or strength of conviction) and the strength of the evidence
for that belief when objective standards are applied to the available relevant evidence. As
a general indication of this relationship, consider the following schematization that applies:
![[Image: 21xvex.jpg]](http://i39.tinypic.com/21xvex.jpg)
where persons are rational in relation to their beliefs when there is an appropriate correspond-
ence (which need not be an exact alignment) between their degrees of subjective certitude and
the objective degrees of evidential support. Persons should properly be incredulous about what
cannot possibly be true (such as that 2 + 2 = 5 in pure mathematics, for example, or that rabbits
are not animals in ordinary English) and completely credulous about what cannot possibly be false
(such as that 2 + 2 = 4 in pure mathematics and that bachelors are unmarried in ordinary English).
With respect to measures of truthfulness, therefore, we might employ a truth-quotient index as a
ratio of true statements made to statements made. Persons who are truthful obviously have high
truth-quotient indices, while those who are not have low. In a case where it is suspected that a
person might be a non-truth teller, presumably their truth quotient index will be low. And that is
certainly going to be the case for someone who is presumed to be a fabricator (teller of tall tails).
If such a person's story seems far-fetched initially, then that creates the presumption that they are
not truth-tellers because they have what appears to be a low truth-quotient. But should it turn out
that initially implausible elements of their story are true, the situation reverses itself dramatically.
More to come . . .
[quote name='Greg Burnham' post='188319' date='Mar 31 2010, 07:13 AM'][quote name='Jack White' post='188302' date='Mar 30 2010, 09:06 PM']
Monk...
Many JVB claims appear "plausible" and some cannot be "refuted", simply because all are
her OPINIONS, things she SAYS she witnessed, without proof offered. I do not care whether
her tales are true or not.[/quote]
Yes, Jack--but, Jim's argument is the opposite, in a sense... He is saying that many of her claims are extremely IMPLAUSIBLE (an opinion with which I think we all agree). He is further observing, correctly IMHO, that every time one of her "improbable claims" turns out to be TRUE--that serves to bolster perception of her overall credibility. I will not defend the logic of that perception, but I will acknowledge his accuracy as to human tendencies--logical or not.
GO_SECURE
monk
[/quote]
[NOTE: The table has been garbled in posting, which I will attempt to fix and repost.]
My friend Monk has advanced an excellent suggestion for conducting an inventory of the
state of the argument, which I am going to pursue by an enumeration of the criticisms
that have been directed to Judyth, the posts in which they were raised and those where
she has replied. That will thereby demonstrate what we have been learning about who
has and who has not been advancing positions that are or are not rationally defensible.
This will require that I conduct a review of this entire thread, which I am going to do. In
the meanwhile, however, I want to respond in a general way to some of his observations.
I have remarked that many of Judyth's reports about her life with the man she knew are
highly implausible, which means that they are difficult to believe and, on initial consideration,
appear to be more likely to be false than true. The point I have made is that, when claims
that are initially implausible turn out to be true (or, at least, supported by better arguments
than the alternatives), that has the effect of greatly increasing the credibility of the source.
Monk concedes that this is a human psychological tendency, but expresses hesitation over
whether it is warranted rationally as a matter of logic. The answer, however, is that it is.
The study of the impact of new evidence upon our beliefs (or degrees of belief) is among
the most extensively studied subjects in the philosophy of science and epistemology, where
the predominant approach is known as "Bayesianism" for its appeal to a theorem due to a
mathematician by the name of Thomas Bayes. It interprets probability as a measure of the
strength of our beliefs in relation to the evidence available to us. There are objectivist and
subjectivist interpretations of Bayesianism, but the core of the objectivist interpretation has
it (correctly) that there are definable objective standards relating evidence to hypotheses.
This means that rational agents are not free to believe or not believe when confronted with
relevant evidence. Suppose, for example, that you believe all rabbits are white. When you
encounter a brown rabbit, that belief is no longer rationally warranted. If you are rational in
your adherence to the principles of deductive reasoning, in this case, then when confronted
with a brown rabbit, you will reject your belief that all rabbits are white. Analogously, with
respect to the claim that there is a pink elephant in your living room, if you visit your living
room and detect no signs of a pink elephant, if you are rational, you will reject that belief.
Deductive reasoning is conclusive in the sense that, given the truth or the existence of the
premises as evidence, the conclusion cannot be false. In the examples I have just given,
we are dealing with deductive reasoning, where the existence of even a single brown rabbit
guarantees the truth of the conclusion that it is not the case all rabbits are white, and where
the absence of evidence that would have to be present if the elephant hypothesis were true
provides (virtually) conclusive evidence that no elephant is present based upon perception,
which is not as definitive because of the possibility of visual problems, mental states, etc.
Perceptual reasoning tends to be a highly reliable form of inductive reasoning, where the
content of the conclusion goes beyond the content of its premises by adding something to
it. Familiar examples of inductive reasoning include drawing inferences about populations
on the basis of sampling, reasoning from the past to the future, and from the observable
to the unobservable. But there are well-established standards, in general, for the weight
that should be assigned to the evidence, which is the domain of the study of logic, which
is concerned with the investigation and certification of those standards for rational belief.
In general, for a person to be rational, there should be an approximate correspondence
between their degree of belief (or strength of conviction) and the strength of the evidence
for that belief when objective standards are applied to the available relevant evidence. As
a general indication of this relationship, consider the following schematization that applies:
where persons are rational in relation to their beliefs when there is an appropriate correspond-
ence (which need not be an exact alignment) between their degrees of subjective certitude and
the objective degrees of evidential support. Persons should properly be incredulous about what
cannot possibly be true (such as that 2 + 2 = 5 in pure mathematics, for example, or that rabbits
are not animals in ordinary English) and completely credulous about what cannot possibly be false
(such as that 2 + 2 = 4 in pure mathematics and that bachelors are unmarried in ordinary English).
With respect to measures of truthfulness, therefore, we might employ a truth-quotient index as a
ratio of true statements made to statements made. Persons who are truthful obviously have high
truth-quotient indices, while those who are not have low. In a case where it is suspected that a
person might be a non-truth teller, presumably their truth quotient index will be low. And that is
certainly going to be the case for someone who is presumed to be a fabricator (teller of tall tails).
If such a person's story seems far-fetched initially, then that creates the presumption that they are
not truth-tellers because they have what appears to be a low truth-quotient. But should it turn out
that initially implausible elements of their story are true, the situation reverses itself dramatically.
More to come . . .
[quote name='Greg Burnham' post='188319' date='Mar 31 2010, 07:13 AM'][quote name='Jack White' post='188302' date='Mar 30 2010, 09:06 PM']
Monk...
Many JVB claims appear "plausible" and some cannot be "refuted", simply because all are
her OPINIONS, things she SAYS she witnessed, without proof offered. I do not care whether
her tales are true or not.[/quote]
Yes, Jack--but, Jim's argument is the opposite, in a sense... He is saying that many of her claims are extremely IMPLAUSIBLE (an opinion with which I think we all agree). He is further observing, correctly IMHO, that every time one of her "improbable claims" turns out to be TRUE--that serves to bolster perception of her overall credibility. I will not defend the logic of that perception, but I will acknowledge his accuracy as to human tendencies--logical or not.
Quote:Some of her tales are irrelevant. What is the relevance to JFK studies if she claims an illicitIt does strain the mind...indeed.
affair with a man she just met? What does it matter that she thinks she resembles Marina?
What does it matter that she thinks she and LHO pledged to meet somewhere in Mexico and
explore ancient ruins? What does it matter that she claims to have personally met Shaw,
Banister, Ferrie, Ochsner, Sherman, etc. etc.? Her knowing these well documented figures
adds NOTHING to the information already known.
Quote:Her information changes frequently as it suits her purpose. I will even grant that if everything she saysWell, Jack, my friend--I have known you a very long time (or so it seems) and have never "read you" using profanity. And you still escaped it tonight...albeit by inventing a new word! New word: "bigratsass" -- and it conveyed your meaning (and mine) very well, indeed!
is true it does not amount to a bigratsass in the overall study of the investigation. Cancun or Kan Kun...
who cares?
Thanks, Monk.
Jack
GO_SECURE
monk
[/quote]