22-02-2014, 04:39 PM
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb457/
Earlier this year, a mandatory declassification review request to the National Archives for Air Force records on the Cuban missile crisis produced a Joint Chiefs of Staff report, dated 28 October 1962, to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on "Alternative Actions if Build-up in Cuba Continues Despite Russian Acceptance of the Quarantine." Prepared just as the crisis was ending, but before the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement had been announced, the Chiefs wanted the White House to be ready for action in the event that negotiations failed and "Soviet offensive weapons are not eliminated."
Chairman Maxwell Taylor suggested to Secretary of Defense McNamara a series of "direct and indirect" and "provocative" actions against Cuba (with their pros and cons). The Chiefs had been itching for an air attack and an invasion and may have believed a diplomatic failure would give the Pentagon a chance to take action. Therefore, they proposed indirect measures, such as pressures from the Organization of American States, and direct actions, ranging from an air blockade to covert operations to an all-out invasion. The proposed covert operations included the assassination of "leading Russians and Cuban communists." Moreover, the Chiefs suggested a series of "provocative" actions to induce Fidel Castro "to make a mistake" and give the United States an excuse to launch an attack. Among the provocations were harassments such as destroyer patrols around Cuba and inciting riots on the "Cuban side of the Guantanamo fence" by using base workers as "agents" and providing military aid to them.
Such proposals may not be too surprising to readers familiar with the history of the period. An infamous JCS proposal from earlier in 1962, "Operation Northwoods," suggested a variety of wild pretexts, disregarded by civilian policymakers, for a U.S. invasion of Cuba. Declassified by the Kennedy Assassination Review Board, Northwoods included proposals for phony "Cuban" terrorist attacks in U.S. cities and a "Remember the Maine" attack on a U.S. ship. Moreover, actual covert operations against Cuba, including Operation Mongoose and assassination plots against Fidel Castro and other foreign leaders during the early 1960s, were exposed years ago so comparable proposals from the JCS are less than revelatory. In this context, it made sense for declassification reviewers to release the 28 October report [See document 1A] in its entirety earlier this year, in a release of Air Force records on the crisis.
The story is more complicated, however, because a different copy of the same JCS report has gone through parallel declassification reviews. The second copy is in a special collection of Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense "sensitive records" on Cuba during 1961-1964. It was first released earlier in 2013 in a massively excised form, before the unredacted version in Air Force records had become available. Challenging the excisions, the National Security Archive filed an appeal with the National Archives. As a result of the appeal, reviewers at NARA gave some ground but nevertheless kept significant sections "secret" [See document 1B]. Many of the proposed "provocative" actions were excised along with the covert operations proposals, such as assassinations.
Earlier this year, a mandatory declassification review request to the National Archives for Air Force records on the Cuban missile crisis produced a Joint Chiefs of Staff report, dated 28 October 1962, to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on "Alternative Actions if Build-up in Cuba Continues Despite Russian Acceptance of the Quarantine." Prepared just as the crisis was ending, but before the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement had been announced, the Chiefs wanted the White House to be ready for action in the event that negotiations failed and "Soviet offensive weapons are not eliminated."
Chairman Maxwell Taylor suggested to Secretary of Defense McNamara a series of "direct and indirect" and "provocative" actions against Cuba (with their pros and cons). The Chiefs had been itching for an air attack and an invasion and may have believed a diplomatic failure would give the Pentagon a chance to take action. Therefore, they proposed indirect measures, such as pressures from the Organization of American States, and direct actions, ranging from an air blockade to covert operations to an all-out invasion. The proposed covert operations included the assassination of "leading Russians and Cuban communists." Moreover, the Chiefs suggested a series of "provocative" actions to induce Fidel Castro "to make a mistake" and give the United States an excuse to launch an attack. Among the provocations were harassments such as destroyer patrols around Cuba and inciting riots on the "Cuban side of the Guantanamo fence" by using base workers as "agents" and providing military aid to them.
Such proposals may not be too surprising to readers familiar with the history of the period. An infamous JCS proposal from earlier in 1962, "Operation Northwoods," suggested a variety of wild pretexts, disregarded by civilian policymakers, for a U.S. invasion of Cuba. Declassified by the Kennedy Assassination Review Board, Northwoods included proposals for phony "Cuban" terrorist attacks in U.S. cities and a "Remember the Maine" attack on a U.S. ship. Moreover, actual covert operations against Cuba, including Operation Mongoose and assassination plots against Fidel Castro and other foreign leaders during the early 1960s, were exposed years ago so comparable proposals from the JCS are less than revelatory. In this context, it made sense for declassification reviewers to release the 28 October report [See document 1A] in its entirety earlier this year, in a release of Air Force records on the crisis.
The story is more complicated, however, because a different copy of the same JCS report has gone through parallel declassification reviews. The second copy is in a special collection of Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense "sensitive records" on Cuba during 1961-1964. It was first released earlier in 2013 in a massively excised form, before the unredacted version in Air Force records had become available. Challenging the excisions, the National Security Archive filed an appeal with the National Archives. As a result of the appeal, reviewers at NARA gave some ground but nevertheless kept significant sections "secret" [See document 1B]. Many of the proposed "provocative" actions were excised along with the covert operations proposals, such as assassinations.