27-05-2014, 09:25 PM
The CIA wrote the script with very high-placed assistance. the DESIGN of the plan was never to achieve operational objectives but to maneuver JFK...
http://history.eserver.org/bay-of-pigs.txt
1. Responsibility for the operation It is generally knownthat Zapata was a
CIA-planned and CIA-run operation from its beginnings at theend of the
Eisenhower administration, but it is interesting to see howDulles tried to
weasel out of the responsibility. At one point in the testimony,Admiral Burke
reminds Dulles that the actual conduct of the operation"was all in one place
and that was in CIA" (p. 249):
Dulles: But that was done by military personnel.
Burke: But not under our command structure.
Gen. Lemnitzer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, puts itmore clearly, when he
is asked if he "or the Joint Chiefs were the defendersof the military aspects
of the operation, or was it CIA?" (p. 323):
Lemnitzer: The defenders of the military parts of the planwere the people who
produced it and that was CIA. We were providing assistanceand assuring the
feasibility of the plan.
Admiral Burke's answer the next day is equally clear (p.347):
Question: Did you regard the Joint Chiefs as defenders andspokesmen of the
military aspects of this operation?
Burke: No. That's one of the unfortunate misunderstandings.We sent military
people over to CIA, but CIA gave the orders, and they hadthe people, and they
had control. We examined the plan and that was it.
================
Robert Kennedy pursues him:
Kennedy: Then what was the objective of the operation?
Dulles: Get a beachhead, hold it, and then build it up.
Kennedy: How could you possibly do that--take a thousand or 1,400 men in there
and hold the beachhead against these thousands of militia?
Dulles has no answer to this. If he wasn't counting on an uprisng, everyone
else was, including the Secretaries of Defense and State:
McNamara: It was understood that there was a substantial possibility of
uprisings... (p. 202)
Rusk: There was a very considerable likelihood of popular uprisings.
Question: How essential was such an uprising regarded for the success of the
operation?
Rusk: It was believed that the uprising was utterly essential to success in
terms of ousting Castro (p. 220).
Gen. Shoup, the Marine Commandant, had also been convinced by the CIA that there
would be an uprising:
Shoup: ...The intelligence indicated that there were quite a number of people
that were ready to join in the fight against Castro (p. 243)...My
understanding was that the possibilities of uprisings were increasing, that
people were just waiting for these arms and equipment, and as soon as they heard
where the invasion was that they would be coming after them (p. 245).
Question: The success of this operation was wholly dependent upon popular
support?
Shoup: Absolutely. Ultimate success (p. 253).
Question: You'd say then that they would still be on thebeach if the plan had
been carried out as conceived and depended upon popularuprisings throughout the
island of Cuba? Otherwise they would have been wiped out?
Shoup: Absolutely. I don't think there is any doubt at all.Eventually 1,500
people cannot hold out against many, many thousands.
Question: Would you send 1,200 Marines in there to do that?
Shoup: No, I wouldn't, unless 1,200 Marines are going to beassisted by 30,000
Cubans.
http://history.eserver.org/bay-of-pigs.txt
1. Responsibility for the operation It is generally knownthat Zapata was a
CIA-planned and CIA-run operation from its beginnings at theend of the
Eisenhower administration, but it is interesting to see howDulles tried to
weasel out of the responsibility. At one point in the testimony,Admiral Burke
reminds Dulles that the actual conduct of the operation"was all in one place
and that was in CIA" (p. 249):
Dulles: But that was done by military personnel.
Burke: But not under our command structure.
Gen. Lemnitzer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, puts itmore clearly, when he
is asked if he "or the Joint Chiefs were the defendersof the military aspects
of the operation, or was it CIA?" (p. 323):
Lemnitzer: The defenders of the military parts of the planwere the people who
produced it and that was CIA. We were providing assistanceand assuring the
feasibility of the plan.
Admiral Burke's answer the next day is equally clear (p.347):
Question: Did you regard the Joint Chiefs as defenders andspokesmen of the
military aspects of this operation?
Burke: No. That's one of the unfortunate misunderstandings.We sent military
people over to CIA, but CIA gave the orders, and they hadthe people, and they
had control. We examined the plan and that was it.
================
Robert Kennedy pursues him:
Kennedy: Then what was the objective of the operation?
Dulles: Get a beachhead, hold it, and then build it up.
Kennedy: How could you possibly do that--take a thousand or 1,400 men in there
and hold the beachhead against these thousands of militia?
Dulles has no answer to this. If he wasn't counting on an uprisng, everyone
else was, including the Secretaries of Defense and State:
McNamara: It was understood that there was a substantial possibility of
uprisings... (p. 202)
Rusk: There was a very considerable likelihood of popular uprisings.
Question: How essential was such an uprising regarded for the success of the
operation?
Rusk: It was believed that the uprising was utterly essential to success in
terms of ousting Castro (p. 220).
Gen. Shoup, the Marine Commandant, had also been convinced by the CIA that there
would be an uprising:
Shoup: ...The intelligence indicated that there were quite a number of people
that were ready to join in the fight against Castro (p. 243)...My
understanding was that the possibilities of uprisings were increasing, that
people were just waiting for these arms and equipment, and as soon as they heard
where the invasion was that they would be coming after them (p. 245).
Question: The success of this operation was wholly dependent upon popular
support?
Shoup: Absolutely. Ultimate success (p. 253).
Question: You'd say then that they would still be on thebeach if the plan had
been carried out as conceived and depended upon popularuprisings throughout the
island of Cuba? Otherwise they would have been wiped out?
Shoup: Absolutely. I don't think there is any doubt at all.Eventually 1,500
people cannot hold out against many, many thousands.
Question: Would you send 1,200 Marines in there to do that?
Shoup: No, I wouldn't, unless 1,200 Marines are going to beassisted by 30,000
Cubans.
Once in a while you get shown the light
in the strangest of places if you look at it right..... R. Hunter
in the strangest of places if you look at it right..... R. Hunter