The truth and bare facts about the Bay of Pigs

[David Josephs]

[size=12]http://history.eserver.org/bay-of-pigs.txt

Immediately after the failed invasion, on[/SIZE]
April 22, Kennedy ordered Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the President's special military
representative, Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, Dulles,
and Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, to conduct a ful linvestigation of why
the invasion had failed. This was submitted on June 13,1961, but did not become
available to the public until twenty years later, when a transcript of the
report was published as a book called Operation Zapata (University Publications
of America, 1981). "Operation Zapata" was the code name for the invasion.
=====

Question: Did you regard the Joint Chiefs as defenders and spokesmen of themilitary aspects of this operation?

Burke: No. That's one of the unfortunate misunderstandings. We sent military
people over to CIA, but CIA gave the orders, and they had the people, and they
had control. We examined the plan and that was it.

==========
Shoup: ...The intelligence indicated that there were quite a number of people
that were ready to join in the fight against Castro (p.243)...My
understanding was that the possibilities of uprisings were increasing, that
people were just waiting for these arms and equipment, and as soon as they heard
where the invasion was that they would be coming after them(p. 245).

Question: The success of this operation was wholly dependent upon popular
support?

Shoup: Absolutely. Ultimate success (p. 253).

============


Question: Did somebody tell you there'd be 30,000 Cubans?
Gen. Shoup: No, they didn't, but we were getting materials ready for them (p.
253).
The intelligence Shoup refers to came from the CIA:

Question: Who gave you this information on the uprisings?

Shoup: I don't know. I suppose it was CIA. Well, it's obvious we wouldn't be
taking 30,000 additional rifles if we didn't think there was going to be
somebody to use them. I don't think any military man would ever think that this
force could overthrow Castro without support. They could never expect anything
but annihilation (p. 253). Lemnitzer also makes it clear that the CIA was the
source of information on the uprisings:

Question: What impression did the JCS have of the likelihood of an uprising?

Lemnitzer: We had no information. We went on CIA's analysis and it was reported
that there was a good prospect. I remember Dick Bissell, evaluating this for the
President, indicated there was sabotage, bombings and there were also various
groups that were asking or begging for arms and so forth (p.334).


Obviously, despite Dulles's denial, the CIA had convinced Rusk, McNamara, and
the Joint Chiefs that the uprisings were both likely and essential to the
success of the mission.

=============


What basis did the CIA have for this"information"? The Zapata Peninsula, where
the Bay of Pigs is located, was swampy, isolated, and uninhabited,so there
could have been no possibility of a spontaneous uprising, because no indigenous
Cubans would have seen the landing. Therefore, pre-invasion propaganda would
have been essential to prepare the Cuban people for what wasc oming. This was
the mission of 12 CIA-controlled radio stations in the region, including one on
Swan Island that had been set up in March 1960 by the infamous Gen. Edward
Lansdale. There were also supposed to be "extensive leaflet drops" on the day of
the invasion (Taylor's Memorandum 1, para. 38). According to Cuban sources,
however, writes Luis Aguilar in the introduction to Operation Zapata, "With the
pretext of secrecy, no clear explanation of the expedition's objectives was
given to the Cuban people, and no appeal was made to their anti-Communist
feelings" (xii). Indeed, it would have been quite a feat to let the Cuban people
know about the impending invasion without letting Castro know too, and as it
turned out, Castro was one of the first Cubans to hear about it. He had
thousands of potential opponents arrested on April 13, days before they even
heard about the coming invasion, thus quelling the"uprising" before it had a
chance to get started. The leaflets were not dropped either,because "the
military situation did not permit the diversion ofeffort" (Memo. 1, para. 38),
although as it turned out the planes that could have dropped them never took off
from Nicagagua.
====================

Question: What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful
lodgment but there was no uprising?

Sec. Rusk: In that case they would commence guerrilla operations, move into the
swamps and the into the hills. This swamp area was stated to be the home of
guerrillas.

Question: Was the point made that this area had not been used for guerrilla
operations in this century?

Sec. Rusk: I don't recall (p. 220).


Gen. Lemnitzer makes it clear that the CIA was the source of the plan:

It was our understanding of the plan without any doubt that moving into the
guerrilla phase was one of the important elements of the plan, and any idea that
the Chiefs considered that they were making a indefinite lodgment on the
beachhead is not right. Every bit of information that we were able to gather
from the CIA was that the guerrilla aspects were alwaysc onsidered as a main
element of the plan (p. 318).



Statement: The President had the same impression that you did --that if worse
came to worst, this group could become guerrillas, but as we've gotten into it,
it's become obvious that this possibility never really existed.

Lemnitzer: Then we were badly misinformed (p. 318).

======Lemnitzer: On the morning of D+2, I made a comment to the President that this
was the time for this outfit to go guerrilla.

Question: How were your comments received?

Lemnitzer: I received a surprise when Mr. Bissell said they were not prepared to
go guerrilla.

Question: This was the first time you'd known about that?

Lemnitzer: Yes (p. 330).

=========

Question: What was your impression of what would happen if the landing was made
but there were no uprisings?

Burke: It was my understanding that the landing force would go guerrilla. I
never knew they had orders to fall back to the beachhead. The first time I knew
that they were not prepared to go guerrilla was when Mr.Bissell made this point
on the night of D+1 (p. 331).

The troops, however, were told the opposite:

Question: Was there ever any mention of your becoming guerrillas?

Mr. Estrada: No, we had no plan to go to the mountains (p.296).

Question: Was there ever any talk, when it appeared thingswere becoming
critical, of going guerrilla?

Mr. Betancourt: Not that I know of. Question: During your training, was there
any talk of this?

Mr. Betancourt: No (p. 310).
============================
Dulles: I wouldn't wholly buy that. These people had a cadreof leaders--20
percent to 30 percent would be the leaders. They knew aboutguerrilla warfare.
The guerrillas in WW II never had any training until theygot into a guerrilla
operation.

===============
Question: Who was the proponent of the D-2 strikes, Allen? Idon't recall that
point.

Dulles: I think that it was partly in our shop and partlywith Mac Bundy, as I
recall. The idea of the defections--this was one of the keysto the idea that
the planes that were striking Cuban airfields were operatingfrom Cuba. I can't
say whether that limited strike concept was ever broughtover here [to the
Pentagon] or not. I think it must have been known to Gen.Gray, but I don't know
whether it was discussed in the Joint Chiefs (p.257). Hedoesn't know if it was
discussed by the military? Why was the military involved atall, then? What
Dulles says in this case is probably the truth: it was aCIA-Bundy plan. (The
feigned defections and the limited strike were the plan.)Interestingly,
however, Bundy does not even mention the D-2 strikes in hisletter to Taylor.