1980 Turkish Coup

[Magda Hassan]

1980 Turkish coup d'état




The daily Hürriyet ran an extra edition, whose headline read "The army has seized control".


The 12 September 1980 Turkish coup d'état, headed by Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren, was the third coup d'etat in the history of the Republic after the 1960 coup and the 1971 "Coup by Memorandum".
The 1970s were marked by right-wing and left-wing armed conflicts—proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively.[1] In order to create a pretext for a decisive intervention, the Turkish military allowed the conflicts to escalate;[2][3] some say they actively adopted a strategy of tension.[4][5] The violence abruptly stopped afterwards,[6] and the coup was welcomed for restoring order.[2]
For the next three years the Turkish Armed Forces ruled the country through the National Security Council, before democracy was restored.[7]

Prelude

In 1975 Süleyman Demirel, president of the conservative Justice Party (Turkish: Adalet Partisi, AP) succeeded Bülent Ecevit, president of the social-democratic Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) as Prime Minister. He formed a coalition with the Nationalist Front (Turkish: Milliyetçi Cephe), Necmettin Erbakan's fundamentalist National Salvation Party (Turkish: Millî Selamet Partisi, MSP) and Alparslan Türkeş' far right Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). The MHP used the opportunity to infiltrate state security services, seriously aggravating the low-intensity war that was waging between rival factions.[8]
The elections of 1977 had no winner. First, Demirel continued the coalition with the Nationalist Front. But in 1978 Ecevit was able to get to power again with the help of some deputies who had shifted from one party to another. In 1979, Demirel once again became Prime Minister. At the end of the 1970s Turkey was in an unstable situation with unsolved economic and social problems facing strike actions and partial paralysis of politics (the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was unable to elect a President during the six months preceding the coup). Since 1968-69, a proportional representation system made it difficult to find any parliamentary majority. The interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, which held the largest holdings of the country, were opposed by other social classes such as smaller industrialists, traders, rural notables, landlords, etc., whose interests did not always coincide between themselves either. Numerous agricultural and industrial reforms requested by parts of the middle upper classes were blocked by others.[8] Henceforth, the politicians seemed unable to combat the growing violence in the country.
Unprecedented political violence had erupted in Turkey in the late 1970s. The overall death toll of the 1970s is estimated at 5,000, with nearly ten assassinations per day.[8] Most were members of left-wing and right-wing political organization, then engaged in bitter fighting. The ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves, youth organisation of the MHP party, claimed they were supporting the security forces.[7] According to the British Searchlight magazine, in 1978 there were 3,319 fascist attacks, in which 831 were killed and 3,121 wounded.[9] In the central trial against the left-wing organization Devrimci Yol (Revolutionary Path) at Ankara Military Court the defendants listed 5,388 political killings before the military coup. Among the victims were 1,296 right-wingers and 2,109 left-wingers. The others could not clearly be related.[10] The 1978 Bahçelievler Massacre, the 1977 Taksim Square massacre with 35 victims and the 1978 Kahramanmaraş Massacre with over 100 victims are some notable incidents. Martial law was announced the Kahramanmaraş Massacre in 14 of (then) 67 provinces in December 1978. At the time of the coup martial law had been extended to 20 provinces.
Ecevit was warned about the coming coup in June 1979 by Nuri Gündeş of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT). Ecevit then told his interior minister, İrfan Özaydınlı, who then told Sedat Celasun—one of the five generals who would lead the coup. The deputy undersecretary of the MİT, Nihat Yıldız, was demoted to the London consulate and replaced by a lieutenant general as a result.[11]

Coup


Evren's letter to Demirel, dated September 12.


On 11 September 1979, Evren ordered a hand-written report from full general Haydar Saltık on whether or not a coup was in order, or if the government merely needed a stern warning. The report, which recommended preparing for a coup, was delivered in six months. Evren kept the report in his office safe.[12] Evren says the only other person beside Saltık who was aware of the details was Nurettin Ersin. It has been argued that this was a ploy on Evren's part to encompass the political spectrum as Saltık was close the left, while Ersin took care of the right. Backlash from political organizations after the coup would thereby be prevented.[3]

Kenan Evren declaring coup d'état on the national channel TRT.


On 21 December, the War Academy generals convened to decide the course of action. The pretext for the coup was to put an end to the social conflicts of the 1970s, as well as the parliamentary instability. They resolved to issue the party leaders (Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit) a memorandum by way of the president, Fahri Korutürk, which was done on 27 December. The leaders received the letter a week later.[12]
A second report, submitted in March 1980, recommended undertaking the coup without further delay, otherwise apprehensive lower-ranked officers might be tempted to "take the matter into their own hands".[12] Evren made only minor amendments to Saltık's plan, titled "Operation Flag" (Turkish: Bayrak Harekâtı).[3]
The coup was planned to take place on 11 July 1980, but was postponed after a motion to put Demirel's government to a vote of confidence was rejected on 2 July. At the Supreme Military Council meeting (Turkish: Yüksek Askeri Şura) on August 26, a second date was proposed: September 12.[12]
On 7 September 1980, Evren and the four service commanders decided that they would overthrow the civilian government. On September 12, the National Security Council (Turkish: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK), headed by Evren declared coup d'état on the national channel. The MGK then extended martial law throughout the country, abolished the Parliament and the government, suspended the Constitution and banned all political parties and trade unions. They invoked the Kemalist tradition of state secularism and of the unity of the nation, which had already justified the precedent coups, and presented themselves as opposed to communism, fascism, separatism and religious sectarianism.[8]

Economy

One of coup's most visible effects was on the economy. On the day of the coup, it was on the verge of collapse, with three digit inflation. There was large-scale unemployment, and a chronic foreign trade deficit. The economic changes of the 1980-1983 period were credited to Turgut Özal, who was the main person responsible for the economic policy by the Demirel administration since January 24, 1980. Özal supported the IMF, and to this end he forced the resignation of the director of the Central Bank, İsmail Aydınoğlu, who opposed it.
The strategic aim was to unite Turkey with the "global economy," which big business supported,[13] and gave Turkish companies the ability to market products and services globally. One month after the coup, London's International Banking Review wrote "A feeling of hope is evident among international bankers that Turkey's military coup may have opened the way to greater political stability as an essential prerequisite for the revitalization of the Turkish economy".[14] During 1980-1983, the foreign exchange left free. The foreign investment encouraged. The national establishments, initiated by Ataturk reforms, were promoted to involve with of joint enterprises with foreign establishments. The 85% pre-coup level government involvement in economy forced for a reduction in the relative importance of the state sector. Just after the coup, Turkey revitalized the Atatürk Dam and the Southeastern Anatolia Project, which was a land reform project promoted as a solution to the underdeveloped Southeastern Anatolia was transformed into a multi-sector social and economic development program, a sustainable development program, for the 9 million people of the region. The closed economy, produced for only Turkey's need, subsidized for a vigorous export drive.
The drastic increase in the economy during this period was relative to the previous level. The domestic product remained well below those of most Middle Eastern and European countries. Some undesirable results were the freezing of wages, a significant decrease of the public sector, a deflationist policy, and several successive mini-devaluations.[8]

Tribunals

The coup moved the members of the sides into court system. Within a very short time, there were 250,000[7]-650,000 people detained. Among the detainess, 230,000 were tried, 14,000 were stripped of citizenship, and 50 were executed.[15] In addition, hundreds of thousands of people were tortured, and thousands are still missing. A total of 1,683,000 people were blacklisted.[16] Apart from the militants killed during shootings, at least four prisoners were legally executed immediately after the coup; the first ones since 1972, while in February 1982 there were 108 prisoners condemned to capital punishment.[8] Among the prosecuted were Ecevit, Demirel, Türkeş, and Erbakan, who were incarcerated and temporarily suspended from politics.
One notable victim of the hangings was a 17-year-old Erdal Eren, who said he looked forward to it in order to avoid thinking of the torture he had witnessed.[17]
After having taken advantage of the Grey Wolves' activism, General Kenan Evren imprisoned hundreds of them; a move reminiscent of the Night of the Long Knives. At the time they were some 1700 Grey Wolves organizations in Turkey, with about 200,000 registered members and a million sympathizers.[18] In its indictment of the MHP in May 1981, the Turkish military government charged 220 members of the MHP and its affiliates for 694 murders.[9] Evren and his cohorts realized that Türkeş was a charismatic leader who could challenge their authority using the paramilitary Grey Wolves.[19] Following the coup in Colonel Türkeş's indictment, the Turkish press revealed the close links maintained by the MHP with security forces as well as organized crime involved in drug trade, which financed in returns weapons and the activities of hired fascist commandos all over the country.[8]

Constitution

The military system adapted administrative reforms against terrorism, which included organizational changes and adaptations. The administrative reforms established coordination agencies, state of emergency (OHAL) rules, and a specialized section under police department. The coup members were convinced of the unworkability of the existing Constitution. They decided to adopt a new constitution that included mechanisms to prevent what they saw as impeding the functioning of democracy. On 29 June 1981 the military junta appointed 160 people as members of an Advisory Assembly to draft a new Constitution. The new constitution brought clear limits and definitions, such as on the rules of election of the President, which was stated as a factor for the coup d'état.
On 7 November 1982 the new Constitution was put to a referendum, which was accepted with a resounding 92% (some say due to pressure). On 9 November 1982 Kenan Evren was appointed President for the next seven years.

Aftermath

After the approval by referendum of the new Constitution in June 1982, Kenan Evren organized general elections, held on 6 November 1983. This transition to democracy has been criticized by the Turkish scholar Ergun Özbudun as a "textbook case" of a junta's dictating the terms of its departure.[20]
The referendum and the elections did not take place in a free and competitive setting. Many political leaders of pre-coup era (including Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Alparslan Türkeş and Necmettin Erbakan) had been banned from politics, and all new parties needed to get the approval of the National Security Council in order to participate in the elections. Only 3 parties, two of which were actually created by the junta were permitted to contest.
The secretary general of the National Security Council was general Haydar Saltık. Both him and Evren were the strong men of the regime, while the government was headed by a retired admiral, Bülent Ulusu, and included several retired military officers and a few civil servants. Some alleged in Turkey, after the coup, that general Saltuk had been preparing a more radical, rightist coup, which had been one of the reason prompting the other generals to act, respecting the hierarchy, and then to include him in the MGK in order to neutralize him.[8]
Out of the 1983 elections came one-party governance under Turgut Özal's Motherland Party, which combined a neoliberal economic program with conservative social values.
Yildirim Akbulut became the head of the Parliament. He was succeeded in 1991 by Mesut Yılmaz. Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel founded the center-right True Path Party in 1983, and returned to active politics after the 1987 Turkish referendum.
Yılmaz redoubled Turkey's economic profile, converting towns like Gaziantep from small provincial capitals into mid-sized economic boomtowns, and renewed its orientation toward Europe. But political instability followed as the host of banned politicians reentered politics, fracturing the vote, and the Motherland Party became increasingly corrupt. Ozal, who succeeded Evren as President of Turkey, died of a heart attack in 1993 and Süleyman Demirel was elected president.
The Özal government empowered the police force with intelligence capabilities to counter the National Intelligence Organization, which at the time was run by the military. The police force even engaged in external intelligence collection.[21]

American involvement


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The command structure of the stay-behind forces, as suggested in Field Manual 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces. The Host Country in this case is Turkey.


Recognizing the power vacuum in Europe after World War II, President Harry S. Truman formulated the Truman Doctrine to prevent European countries from being pulled into the Soviet sphere of influence.[22] As "the West's easternmost bulwark against communism",[23] Turkey was an especially "strategic ally in the containment of Soviet communism".[24] To this end, the United States set up a secret paramilitary network under Operation Gladio whose members were trained to subvert a possible Soviet invasion, and stage false flag attacks that would be pinned on communists. Anti-communist groups were also funded to debilitate communism's support from within. The name of the Turkish branch of the operation was revealed by prime minister Ecevit in 1974 to be the "Counter-Guerrilla".
Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Washington had lost its main ally in the region, while the Carter doctrine, formulated on 23 January 1980 stated that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region. Turkey received large sums of economic aid mainly organized by the OECD and military aid from the NATO but the USA in particular.[25] Between 1979 and 1982 the OECD countries raised $4 billion in economic aid to Turkey.[26]
Washington started developing the Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) in implementation of the Carter doctrine, for a quick intervention in areas outside NATO, particularly in the Persian Gulf, and without having to rely on NATO troops. On 1 October 1979 President Jimmy Carter announced the foundation of the RDF. One day before the military coup of 12 September 1980 some 3,000 American troops of the RDF started a maneuver Anvil Express on Turkish soil.[27] Just before the coup, the general in charge of the Turkish Air Forces had travelled to the United States.[8] At the end of 1981 a Turkish-American Defense Council (Turkish: Türk-Amerikan Savunma Konseyi) was founded. Defense Minister Ümit Haluk and Richard Perle, then US Assistant Secretary of Defense of the new Reagan administration, and the deputy Chief of Staff Necdet Öztorun participated in its first meeting on 27 April 1982. On 9 October 1982 a "Memorandum of Understanding" (Turkish: Mutabakat Belgesi) was signed with a focus of extending airports mainly in the Southeast for military purposed. Such airports were built in the provinces of Batman, Muş, Bitlis, Van and Kars in the south-east.
The U.S. support of this coup was acknowledged by the CIA Ankara station chief Paul Henze. After the government was overthrown, Henze cabled Washington, saying, "our boys [in Ankara] did it."[28][29] This has created the impression that the USA stood behind the coup. Henze denied this during a June 2003 interview on CNN Türk's Manşet, but two days later Birand presented an interview with Henze recorded in 1997 in which he basically confirmed Mehmet Ali Birand's story.[30][31] The US State Department itself announced the coup during the night between 11 and 12 September: the military had phoned the US embassy in Ankara to alert them of the coup an hour in advance.[8]
After the coup, State Security Courts were set up, as prescribed in U.S. Army Field Manual 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces (translated into Turkish in 1965 as ST 31-15: Ayaklanmaları Bastırma Harekâtı);[22] the Counter-Guerrilla's bible.[32][33] According to senior PKK member Selahattin Çelik,[34] the coup was "the State Security Courts are a product of the Special Warfare Department and they are assigned the task of restructuring the judicial process to fit the demands of the contra-guerrillas."[22] The manual instructs the courts "not to condemn the defendants according to the punishments set out for the political crimes, but to administer punishments as severe as those set out for murder and other crimes against the person".[35] Severe punishments were indeed legion in the wake of the coup.
Imprisoned Grey Wolves members were offered amnesty if they agreed to fight the Kurdish minority and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the south-east of the country[36] as well as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). They then went on to fight separatist Kurds, under the guidance of the "Counter-Guerrilla", killing and torturing thousands in the 1980s, and also carrying "false flag attacks in which the Counter-Guerrilla attacked villages, dressed up as PKK fighters, and raped and executed people randomly".[37] The dirty war had a toll of 37,000 victims.[38] Retired staff lieutenant colonel Talat Turhan, who has devoted three decades to exposing the Counter-Guerrilla, confirmed that they had engaged in torture, having been a victim in July 1972.[39] In his book Zordur Zorda Gülmek, journalist Oğuz Güven enumerated the methods employed, including but not limited to bastinado, urination, and submersion in sewage.[40]
Based on incidents such as the aforementioned, a growing number of people are reaching the conclusion that the United States, acting through the Counter-Guerrilla, directed the coup.[22][33][41]

References

1. ^ Beki, Mehmet Akif (1997-01-17). "Whose gang is this?". Turkish Daily News (Hürriyet). http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-502523. Retrieved on 2008-10-12.
   
2. ^ a b "Önce ortam hazırlandı, sonra darbe haberi" (in Turkish). Haber7. 2008-09-12. http://www.haber7.com/haber/20050912/Onc...-darbe.php. Retrieved on 2008-10-15.
   
3. ^ a b c Oğur, Yıldıray (2008-09-17). "12 Eylül’ün darbeci solcusu: Ali Haydar Saltık" (in Turkish). Taraf. http://www.taraf.com.tr/yazar.asp?mid=1942. Retrieved on 2008-12-23.
   
4. ^ Ganser 2005, p. 235: Colonel Talat Turhan accused the United States for having fuelled the brutality from which Turkey suffered in the 1970s by setting up the Special Warfare Department, the Counter-Guerrilla secret army and the MIT and training them according to FM 30-31
   
5. ^ Naylor, Robert T (2004). Hot Money and the Politics of Debt (3E ed.). McGill-Queen's Press. p. 94. ISBN 9780773527430. http://books.google.com/books?id=78UhNfUIFC8C&pg=PA94. "The fact that militias of all political tendencies seemed to be buying their arsenals from the same sources pointed to the possibility of a deliberate orchestration of the violence - of the sort P2 had attempted in Italy a few years earlier - to prepare the psychological climate for a military coup."
   
6. ^ Ustel, Aziz (2008-07-14). "Savcı, Ergenekon’u Kenan Evren’e sormalı asıl!" (in Turkish). Star Gazete. http://www.stargazete.com/gazete/yazar/s...113287.htm. Retrieved on 2008-10-21. "Ve 13 Eylül 1980’de Türkiye’yi on yıla yakın bir süredir kasıp kavuran terör ve adam öldürmeler bıçakla kesilir gibi kesildi."
   
7. ^ a b c Amnesty International, Turkey: Human Rights Denied, London, November 1988, AI Index: EUR/44/65/88, ISBN 0862101565, pg. 1.
   
8. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Gil, Ata. "La Turquie à marche forcée," Le Monde diplomatique, February 1981.
   
9. ^ a b Searchlight (magazine), No.47 (May 1979), pg. 6. Quoted by (Herman & Brodhead 1986, p. 50)
   
10. ^ Devrimci Yol Savunması (Defense of the Revolutionary Path). Ankara, January 1989, p. 118-119.
    
11. ^ Ünlü, Ferhat (2007-07-17). "Çalınan silahlar falcıya soruldu" (in Turkish). Sabah. http://www.sabah.com.tr/2007/07/18/haber...8FEF6.html. Retrieved on 2008-12-18.
    
12. ^ a b c d Doğan, İbrahim (2008-09-01). "Evren, darbe için iki rapor hazırlatmış" (in Turkish). Aksiyon (Feza Gazetecilik A.Ş.) 717. http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/detay.php?id=31053. Retrieved on 2008-10-16. "Haydar Paşa, size vereceğim bu görevden sadece kuvvet komutanlarının haberi var. İç güvenliğimizin tehlikede olduğunu pek çok defa konuştuk. Silahlı Kuvvetlerin içine de sızmalar başladığını biliyorsunuz. Sizden bir çalışma grubu kurmanızı istiyorum. İki kurmayı görevlendirin. Araştırmanızı istediğim, yönetime müdahale için zamanı geldi mi? Ya da uyarıda mı bulunmak daha uygun olur? Bu hususlar etüt edilecek. Arada rapor verin. Hiçbir şey kayda geçmeyecek. Tek nüsha yazılsın. Elle… Bugün 11 Eylül, altı ay içinde tamamlayın. Bir de görevlendireceğimiz kişilere maske görev verin. Etrafın dikkatini çekmesin.".
    
13. ^ Ekinci, Burhan (2008-09-12). "12 Eylül sermayenin darbesiydi". Taraf. http://taraf.com.tr/haber.asp?id=16756. Retrieved on 2008-09-13.
    
14. ^ Naylor, R. Thomas (2004). "6. Of Hope, Debt, and Dictatorship". Hot Money and the Politics of Debt. McGill-Queen's University Press. p. 92. ISBN 9780773527430.
    
15. ^ "Turkey still awaits to confront with generals of the coup in Sep 12, 1980". Hurriyet English. 2008-10-09. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/home/....asp?scr=1. Retrieved on 2008-10-09.
    
16. ^ "12 Eylül'de 1 milyon 683 bin kişi fişlendi" (in Turkish). Hürriyet. ANKA. 2008-09-12. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/987778...&oid=0&l=1. Retrieved on 2008-10-09.
    
17. ^ Türker, Yıldırım (2005-09-12). "Çocuğu astılar" (in Turkish). Radikal. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=163885. Retrieved on 2008-12-23. "Cezaevinde yapılan (neler olduğunu ayrıntılı bir biçimde öğrenirsiniz sanırım) insanlık dışı zulüm altında inletildik. O kadar aşağılık, o kadar canice şeyler gördüm ki, bugünlerde yaşamak bir işkence haline geldi. İşte bu durumda ölüm korkulacak bir şey değil, şiddetle arzulanan bir olay, bir kurtuluş haline geldi. Böyle bir durumda insanın intihar ederek yaşamına son vermesi işten bile değildir. Ancak ben bu durumda irademi kullanarak ne pahasına olursa olsun yaşamımı sürdürdüm. Hem de ileride bir gün öldürüleceğimi bile bile."
    
18. ^ (Herman & Brodhead 1986, p. 50).
    
19. ^ Ergil, Dogu (1997-05-02). "Nationalism With and Without Turkes". Turkish Daily News (Hürriyet). http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-502384. Retrieved on 2008-12-11. "The leaders of the 1980 military coup d'etat knew that the paramilitary force of the NAP would dilute their authority because the party was an alternative organization directly attached to the personality of Turkes."
    
20. ^ Özbudun, Ergun. Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, pg. 117. "The 1983 Turkish transition is almost a textbook example of the degree to which a departing military regime can dictate the conditions of its departure (…)."
    
21. ^ Sariibrahimoglu, Lale (2008-12-07). "Turkey needs an intelligence coordination mechanism, says Güven". Today's Zaman. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detayl...ink=160856. Retrieved on 2008-12-10. "Shortly after the 1980 military coup, the government, under the late Prime Minister Turgut Özal, introduced a law that strengthened the power of the police forces to counter the MİT, which was headed by a general at the time."
    
22. ^ a b c d Çelik, Serdar (February/March 1994). "Turkey's Killing Machine: The Contra-Guerrilla Force". Kurdistan Report 17. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/017.html. Retrieved on 2008-09-20.
    
23. ^ Lee, Martin A (2008-01-24). "Turkey's Drug-Terrorism Connection". Consortiumnews.com. http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/012408a.html. Retrieved on 2008-11-05.
    
24. ^ Darnton, John (1995-03-02). "Uneasy Crossroads—A special report. Discontent Seethes in Once-Stable Turkey". New York Times. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.ht...=permalink. Retrieved on 2008-11-05.
    
25. ^ U.S. Military Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey (see 1980-1992), Federation of American Scientists. General Accounting Office report NSIAD-93-164FS.
    
26. ^ Alternative Türkeihilfe, Militärs an der Macht (An alternative aid for Turkey, Military in Power) Herford (Germany), August 1983, pg.11.
    
27. ^ Alternative Türkeihilfe, Militärs an der Macht (An alternative aid for Turkey, Military in Power) Herford (Germany), August 1983, pg.6.
    
28. ^ Birand, Mehmet Ali. 12 Eylül, Saat: 04.00, 1984, pg. 1
    
29. ^ Hear Paul Henze say it: Fethullahçı Gladyo at YouTube 8m20s in.
    
30. ^ Balta, Ibrahim. "Birand’dan Paul Henze’ye ‘sesli–görüntülü’ yalanlama," Zaman, 14 June 2003.(Turkish)
    
31. ^ "Paul Henze ‘Bizim çocuklar yaptı’ demiş" (in Turkish). Hürriyet. 2003-06-14. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/h...wid=279384. Retrieved on 2008-10-09.
    
32. ^ "Gladyo-Ergenekon yol kardeşliği" (in Turkish). Radikal. 2008-08-13. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?a...egoryID=77. Retrieved on 2008-10-15.
    
33. ^ a b Turhan, Talat (1976-10-11). "12 Mart Hukuku'nun Ardındaki ABD mi?" (in Turkish). Politika Gazetesi. http://www.talatturhan.com/gazete-17.htm. Retrieved on 2008-11-04.
    
34. ^ Kutschera, Chris. "Revelations on the PKK". http://www.chris-kutschera.com/A/Revelations%20PKK.htm. Retrieved on 2008-11-05. "Selahattin Celik participated in the secret meetings which preceded the foundation of the PKK and was one of the small number of PKK leaders who organised the armed struggle and the first military operations against Turkish army bases on 15 August 1984, a historic date in the history of the PKK." Originally published in The Middle East magazine, May 2000; Al Wasat, 24 January 2000; L'Express, 10 Février 2000; Le Temps, 22 Février 2000.
    
35. ^ FM 31-15, quoted in Celik.
    
36. ^ Former Grey Wolves member İbrahim Çiftçi speaking to Milliyet on 13 November 1996. "They have used and discarded us". Turkish Daily News. Milliyet. 1996-11-14. http://turkishdailynews.com.tr/archives.php?id=1457. Retrieved on 2008-10-22. Çiftçi was assassinated by the Ergenekon network ten years later.
    
37. ^ (Ganser 2005, p. 241)
    
38. ^ Oberlé, Thierry (2006-05-02). "Les Kurdes de Turquie redoutent un retour aux années de plomb" (in French). Le Figaro. http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/200...plomb.html. Retrieved on 2 May 2006.
    
39. ^ Ketenci, Şükran (1975-11-11). "Kontrgerilla Köşküne Girdik" (in Turkish). Cumhuriyet. http://www.talatturhan.com/gazete-13.htm. Retrieved on 2008-10-22.
    
40. ^ "12 Eylül'ün inanılmaz işkence yöntemleri" (in Turkish). Hürriyet. 2008-09-12. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/9882487.asp. Retrieved on 2008-09-12.
    
41. ^ Dündar, Can (2008-01-23). "Güncele Dair: Ergenekon" (in Turkish). http://www.candundar.com.tr/index.php?Did=5983. Retrieved on 2008-11-07.
    

Bibliography

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Turkish Wikisource has original text related to this article: Kenan Evren'in radyo ve televizyon konuşması

• Ganser, Daniele (2005), NATO's Secret Armies. Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe, London: Frank Cass
  
• Herman, Edward S; Brodhead, Frank (1986), The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection, New York: Sheridan Square Publications, ISBN 0-940380-06-4