Putin: Great Visionary or Just Lost

[Magda Hassan]

Not really. Swing was popular at the time. But I get your point and agree.

It was huge in the US, but was it a part of Soviet Russian life during WWII?

If not, then this is very curious.

Yes, it was not as big a part as in the UK but that music was representative of the time but well loved and supported in some parts of society. At one stage for a little while the US and USSR were on the same side.
http://www.dieselpunks.org/profiles/blog...viet-union
http://www.russia-ic.com/culture_art/music/720/
http://patefon.knet.ru/kdf/main.html

Thanks for the info. Just shows how uninformed (misinformed?) about Russian culture I have been.

My pleasure. Not just you though. In your country (and mine and David's) there are whole industries devoted to keeping you and everyone else misinformed/uninformed about that place and time. And they also had rock and roll. Even had a rock and roller defector from the west. Went to live in East Germany.

[Lauren Johnson]

Yah, Maggie, I spent much of my life being horrified by the Russian bogey man.

Here's an article that reflects only indirectly on Putin in that he has expressed his full support for the RCB. Here's an article from Russia Insider by Alexander Mercouris. This article demonstrates just how committed the RCB is to the neo-liberal model.

As regular Russia Insider readers know, Jon Hellevig and I have for some time been baffled by the Russian Central Bank's insistence on keeping interest rates high at 11%.

This despite the fact inflation is falling rapidly, and despite the fact the high interest rates are prolonging the recession.

The latest figures from Rosstat (the Russian Federal Statistics Service) show inflation at the end of February had fallen to an annualised rate of 8.2%, and weekly inflation had fallen to 0.1% in the last week of February.

The Economics Ministry is now predicting inflation will continue to fall in March, and will be well below 8% by the end of the month.

This is the diametric opposite of the course for inflation the Central Bank was predicting at the start of the year.

At that time the Central Bank was saying inflation would rise because of the further fall in the rouble. It even said it might reach 16%.

Jon Hellevig has explained why this prediction was wrong.

The Central Bank underestimated the degree to which it was the growth of import prices that was behind the historic increases in inflation.

Following the collapse of imports caused by the rouble's devaluation and the ban on EU food imports, this is now a rapidly diminishing factor, which is why inflation is falling fast.

The mystery however is why, despite inflation going in the opposite direction to the one it predicted, the Central Bank is persisting with its high interest rate policy.

As of the time of writing it is hinting it will not cut interest rates until the third quarter despite pleas from the Economic Ministry that it start cutting interest rates at its next scheduled meeting later this month.

Central Bank First Deputy Governor Ksenia Yudayeva has now provided the answer in an interview to the TV station Rossiya 24.

She admitted that the level of the rouble is having less of an effect on the economy than it did last year, and that the coefficient of the exchange rate to the rate of inflation has changed.

She also admitted inflation risks are becoming less marked, though she insists it is too early to speak of this as a stable tendency, and that inflation risks remain "quite high".

What however is holding the Central Bank back is - in her own words - the following:

"What worries us quite seriously is that medium-term inflationary expectations, in particular those of the professional community, not only economic agents, but professionals, not anchored at a level even close to 4% to this target, which we have. And us there is a very serious task is to make it so that all believe that we a) want to reach it and b) will carry out such a policy, which will allow for reaching it".

In plain language, what principally worries the Central Bank is not inflation, the rouble's exchange rate, the savings rate, or the general state of the economy, but the Central Bank's credibility - or lack of it - with the financial community (ie. bankers, financial analysts and traders) who doubt it is serious about its 4% inflation target.

In other words the Central Bank is keeping the interest rates high - and the economy in recession - so that it can gain the confidence of these people.

Behind this one senses the Central Bank's festering sense of humiliation for what happened in December 2014, when it briefly lost control of the rouble because it hesitated to raise interest rates and did not intervene aggressively enough to support the rouble in the currency markets.

All one can say about this is that gaining credibility is one thing, and running scared is another.

The route to the first is never gained through the second. The reason there is now a crisis of confidence in Western Central Banks' ability to manage the Western economy is because for far too long Western Central Banks did whatever the West's financial community wanted.
The Russian Central Bank should learn this lesson and should not fall into the trap of doing the same thing.

If general economic conditions point to the need for a reduction in interest rates - which in Russia they do - then the Russian Central Bank should have the courage of its convictions and just do it, and not worry too much about what the financial community thinks.

That is the way to gain credibility, and to show to the financial community who is the master.

---

Source URL (retrieved on 03/07/2016 - 15:42): http://russia-insider.com/en/business/hi...tion-about
Links:
[1] http://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=htt...tion-about
[2] https://twitter.com/share?text=Don%27t+B...tion-about
[3] https://plus.google.com/share?url=http:/...tion-about
[4] http://russia-insider.com/en/print/13164
[5] http://russia-insider.com/user/92
[6] http://russia-insider.com/user/feed/92
[7] http://russia-insider.com/en/business/hi...qus_thread
[8] http://russia-insider.com/support
[9] http://russia-insider.com/sites/insider/...vmOXRl.jpg
[10] http://russia-insider.com/sites/insider/...vmOXRl.jpg
[11] https://www.facebook.com/RussiaInsider
[12] http://russia-insider.com/en/commenting-guidelines

Here's a more sympathetic read Putin and the RCB. My money is that it is way too optimistic. but it does explain why the RCB is such disaster for Russia -- it's a law made specifically for Russia that Putin is committed to following -- proudly.:hock::

I would be glad to be proven wrong.

The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) belongs to a foreign state the City of London. The City of London still hands out orders to the Russian financial institution, with Washington watching closely over her shoulder. Should the CBR wish to print currency, it can only do so with a corresponding change to its foreign currency cash flow, and can only buy US bonds for dollars paid for Russian oil. It's a situation that much resembles a noose around the neck of the Russian economy. Once the knot is pulled tight, the economy will struggle and choke.[1]Putin is a man renowned for his defensive tactics. He also appears to have some foresight into financial matters, calculating his every move as though it were a game of chess. East versus West. Both sides are currently playing for checkmate.

"The law says that the Central Bank is governed by international agreements." Let's dissect this statement. Firstly, no other central bank in the world is not permitted to support its own national economy. The Russian Central Bank is the only one in existence with laws governing it that do not support, or even abide by the requirements of the Russian economy. [2] Indeed, there are detailed pages regarding the running of the institution from abroad. The following quote sums up the situation Russia is facing:
"If you have low interest rates in developed countries, free rate works for you. If you have high interest rates, as in underdeveloped countries, free rate works against you. The free rate is good when you have a free country. When a country is a colony with high stakes, then the free rate, on the contrary, is pumping money out of the country." [3] Russia is still considered an underdeveloped country by the West, and so we know which side it is on in that regard.

Putin is under pressure from a lot of sides: geopolitically, economically and militarily. This is why we should watch the Central Bank of Russia closely. Nationalizing it would give us the first signals that things have changed. Changing the ownership from Private to State ownership could indicate Putin's need to raise money for other projects, not approved of by the West. This would show the West that the Rothschild stronghold (over the bank and therefore Russia) would no longer be tolerated.

---

[1] Anders. (2014, December 15). Putin´s Confident: Putin to Nationalize Rothschild´s Central Bank and Purge "Collaborators" with West. "War till One Side Collapses inevitable." Retrieved fromhttp://new.euro-med.dk/20141215-putins-c...itable.php
[2] Coppola, F. (2014, November 1). Why The Russian Central Bank Can't Defend The Ruble. [Forbes]. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppo...the-ruble/
[3] (2014, December 30). USA instructs Russian Central Bank how to strangle Russian economy.Retrieved from http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economic...al_bank-0/

[Lauren Johnson]

The critics of Putin I place most stock in are from his left. Sometimes they quote info from the right. This time, it's Stratfor. It seems as though he is pulling off the mask.

Russia just got yet another security service. On Tuesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the creation of a Russian national guard. Officially, the new national guard will combat terrorism and organized crime and will take over riot and SWAT duties from the Interior Ministry's troops. But more than law enforcement or security concerns, the surprise announcement signals that the Putin administration is worried about instability, in Russia as well as the Kremlin itself. Putin is not the first Russian president to propose the creation of a national guard. His predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, floated the idea in a 1991 New Year's Eve address. At the time, Yeltsin was a new president with a shallow political base and little loyalty among security circles. After 1993's so-called constitutional crisis, a failed coup attempt by the Russian parliament, Yeltsin revisited the proposition. During the standoff, pro-parliamentary paramilitary factions formed, and many of the internal troops defected to support the parliament. The Russian military stalled for two days before finally complying with Yeltsin's orders to send tanks and troops to storm the parliament building. Yeltsin never really trusted the military after that, leading him to resume discussion of a national guard.
In 1995, the newspaper Izvestia published leaked memos between Yeltsin's aides. According to the memos, Yeltsin had already drawn up the orders for the new force, envisioned to serve as his personal army in case of domestic uprisings. Russian media attributed Yeltsin's plans to his growing insecurity over the consolidation of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the KGB. The leaks further noted that Gen. Alexander Korzhakov would control the national guard. Korzhakov, Yeltsin's former bodyguard and head of the Presidential Security Service, was one of the few Russian security elites whom Yeltsin trusted personally. But despite recurring interest in a national guard, Yeltsin's administration lacked the strength to create one.
What is a Geopolitical Diary?

Similarly, this is not the first time Putin's administration has discussed a national guard. In 2012, amid months of mass protests over controversial parliamentary elections and Putin's second re-election as president rumors of a national guard resurfaced. And, as was the case under Yeltsin, the rumors fell by the wayside. The protests died down, and the new force was never realized.
Thus, the sudden decision to finally create a national guard indicates that the Kremlin is bracing for instability to come. The force's stated function rings hollow since the internal troops and police forces already exist to combat terrorism and organized crime. Instead, the initiative may anticipate the upcoming parliamentary elections, the first of their kind since the 2011 elections, which sparked political unrest. Although details concerning the guard's structure, size and deployment have yet to be announced, the force could serve as another means to suppress any disturbance stemming from the elections in September.
Alternatively, Putin, like Yeltsin, may intend to build the national guard as his own personal army. Without a specific and distinguishing function, the new guard would be yet another security force, sharing responsibilities with the internal troops and the FSB. Then again, the president has appointed Viktor Zolotov, commander of the internal troops, as commander of the new national guard, relieving him of his previous duties. Zolotov is Putin's former bodyguard and reportedly one of the president's most trusted loyalists just as Korzhakov was for Yeltsin. By appointing Zolotov to head the national guard, Putin may have revealed the apparently redundant security force's true nature. As an added distinction, Zolotov was further propped up today with an appointment onto Russia's Security Council.

For years, Zolotov's rise has been a topic of great interest in Russia. During the 10 days Putin was reportedly "missing" in March 2015, the Russian rumor mill even reported that the FSB had assassinated Zolotov, an indication of his prominent role in the struggle between security elites. In calling for a national guard, and appointing Zolotov as its commander, Putin could be fortifying his administration against the threat of a coup. This may suggest that the Russian president doubts whether other security forces the FSB, Interior Ministry troops or even the military would remain loyal to him in the event of a coup. A keen student of Russian history, Putin may be trying to avoid the insecurity that his predecessor felt throughout his rule.

[Richard Coleman]

The critics of Putin I place most stock in are from his left. Sometimes they quote info from the right. This time, it's Stratfor. It seems as though he is pulling off the mask.

Russia just got yet another security service. On Tuesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the creation of a Russian national guard. Officially, the new national guard will combat terrorism and organized crime and will take over riot and SWAT duties from the Interior Ministry's troops. But more than law enforcement or security concerns, the surprise announcement signals that the Putin administration is worried about instability, in Russia as well as the Kremlin itself. Putin is not the first Russian president to propose the creation of a national guard. His predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, floated the idea in a 1991 New Year's Eve address. At the time, Yeltsin was a new president with a shallow political base and little loyalty among security circles. After 1993's so-called constitutional crisis, a failed coup attempt by the Russian parliament, Yeltsin revisited the proposition. During the standoff, pro-parliamentary paramilitary factions formed, and many of the internal troops defected to support the parliament. The Russian military stalled for two days before finally complying with Yeltsin's orders to send tanks and troops to storm the parliament building. Yeltsin never really trusted the military after that, leading him to resume discussion of a national guard.
In 1995, the newspaper Izvestia published leaked memos between Yeltsin's aides. According to the memos, Yeltsin had already drawn up the orders for the new force, envisioned to serve as his personal army in case of domestic uprisings. Russian media attributed Yeltsin's plans to his growing insecurity over the consolidation of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the KGB. The leaks further noted that Gen. Alexander Korzhakov would control the national guard. Korzhakov, Yeltsin's former bodyguard and head of the Presidential Security Service, was one of the few Russian security elites whom Yeltsin trusted personally. But despite recurring interest in a national guard, Yeltsin's administration lacked the strength to create one.
What is a Geopolitical Diary?

Similarly, this is not the first time Putin's administration has discussed a national guard. In 2012, amid months of mass protests over controversial parliamentary elections and Putin's second re-election as president rumors of a national guard resurfaced. And, as was the case under Yeltsin, the rumors fell by the wayside. The protests died down, and the new force was never realized.
Thus, the sudden decision to finally create a national guard indicates that the Kremlin is bracing for instability to come. The force's stated function rings hollow since the internal troops and police forces already exist to combat terrorism and organized crime. Instead, the initiative may anticipate the upcoming parliamentary elections, the first of their kind since the 2011 elections, which sparked political unrest. Although details concerning the guard's structure, size and deployment have yet to be announced, the force could serve as another means to suppress any disturbance stemming from the elections in September.
Alternatively, Putin, like Yeltsin, may intend to build the national guard as his own personal army. Without a specific and distinguishing function, the new guard would be yet another security force, sharing responsibilities with the internal troops and the FSB. Then again, the president has appointed Viktor Zolotov, commander of the internal troops, as commander of the new national guard, relieving him of his previous duties. Zolotov is Putin's former bodyguard and reportedly one of the president's most trusted loyalists just as Korzhakov was for Yeltsin. By appointing Zolotov to head the national guard, Putin may have revealed the apparently redundant security force's true nature. As an added distinction, Zolotov was further propped up today with an appointment onto Russia's Security Council.

For years, Zolotov's rise has been a topic of great interest in Russia. During the 10 days Putin was reportedly "missing" in March 2015, the Russian rumor mill even reported that the FSB had assassinated Zolotov, an indication of his prominent role in the struggle between security elites. In calling for a national guard, and appointing Zolotov as its commander, Putin could be fortifying his administration against the threat of a coup. This may suggest that the Russian president doubts whether other security forces the FSB, Interior Ministry troops or even the military would remain loyal to him in the event of a coup. A keen student of Russian history, Putin may be trying to avoid the insecurity that his predecessor felt throughout his rule.

You're joking right? Yeltsin = Putin! Last I heard, Putin had approval ratings up around 80%! Maybe there are terrorism threats that warrant a new agency, given Russia's kicking the living shit out of ISIS/ISIL or whatever it calls itself this week. BTW, who would be dancing an Irish jig at the thought of a coup against Putin do you think? Maybe the CIA? Maybe the Neocons who infest our foreign policy establishment like killer bees in a bee farm? Maybe Obama hisself? Or the EU? Or and or and or......you? As Nero Wolfe would say, pfui.

[Lauren Johnson]

My current view of Putin is that he is the equivalent of Obama to the US (as seen by liberals). While he is supposedly wildly popular (assuming his pole ratings are the truth), he is working for the Russian elites. His foreign policies seem at times to serve Western interests vis a vis the Donbass and Syria by stopping both military efforts when they were clearly winning.

This is how would my read of Putin would be falsified: 1) Syria does not end up being split up into enclaves with Assad being eased out of power, 2) if Russia abandons the Minsk accords and supports the independence of the Donbass.

Well, number 2 looks like it is in real trouble. Here is a commentary by V Suchan:

Poroshenko declared on April 22 that, in the near time, OSCE in Donbass will become a new "police force," which will be armed and that this is his initiative. As we know, at his recent press conference, Putin said during his last press conference on April 14 that Poroshenko had this idea and that he supports it.

We also know that OSCE (and Russian acquiescence) helped the junta seize nearly all of the so-called "no-man's zone" or as it was officially called "the buffer zone," for which, if you remember, Lavrov had been fighting especially very valiantly. It is also a common knowledge that OSCE has been helping the fascist junta in many other ways--even accompanying them when their troops were pushing forward their firing positions.

In this way, yet another piece has emerged from what Kerry brought to Putin during his recent visit to Moscow.

Since OSCE is to get arms, the question arises against whom they are supposed to use it or in defense from whom. Once the question is asked and reached the threshold of the mind, the answer emerges as well and, in this case, it is very clear.

According to Putin, Poroshenko's (Bandera-in-chief) proposal to turn OSCE into "a police force" is to serve implementation of the Minsk Agreements. It should also provide for better control of the non-existing ceasefire. In the latter case (with respect to "ceasefire"), OSCE would be hardly a police force, but more a military force, but, clearly, beholden to pulling wool over the eyes of the Russians, both Putin and Poroshenko were at great pains to avoid saying as much. The frog needs to continue to be boiled gradually. Declaring OSCE as some new sort of "Protection Donbass Force" similar to UNPROFOR and KFOR in Bosnia and Kosovo in the interest of the US and NATO would be still too early at this stage. Remember, Russia back in those days supported creation of both UNPROFOR and KFOR. Lavrov made sure of that as Russia's then representative at the UN Security Council.

However, if OSCE is to perform (also) police duties, then the logical and necessary question is: What policing duties? I.e., policing in the place of whom? The police is an arm of INTERNAL order and its enforcement. If so, then OSCE in its police form would not exactly be suitable for frontlines in between two heavily armed armies. Rather it would be more likely to expect that the ingenious, cunning plan of Putin, if there is such, is not Putin's, but the true masterminders'--planning to install OSCE as the new internal police in the DPR and the LPR, thus effectively putting them in charge of enforcing new (pro-junta; fasicst/Banderas-friendly order) behind the back of the Novorossiya militia AND with the Kremlin's support. This policing, which will further change the system of the republics away from its current oligarcho-mafia one fostered by Surkov in the name of the oligarchic Kremlin, which replaced the budding original form of people's power, toward a dia or triumvirate--the current stooges (Plotnitsky and Zakharchenko), Moscow, and OSCE as a proxy for the West and Kiev on the way of further empowering Kiev and "reintegrating" Donbass into the sadistic fold of the fascist, anti-Russian regime.

This "policing" via OSCE would be especially crucial in staging the several times put-off "elections" which should satisfy Minsk and the intent behind it--"restoring fascist sovereignty" over the whole of Ukraine, as Starikov once said "the whole of Ukraine is needed." But not for the Russians any more.

So, yes, the Kremlin has a plan. It was brought to them by Kerry in his briefcase.

For more than two years now, fascists in Ukraine using the of the state, which they usurped, have been making war on the Russians and Ukraine's Russian soul. And all Putin can say about this is that OSCE should expand and acquire firearms and that he likes this Poroshenko's idea. Who placed this nonentity above the great Russian nation?

Putin confirms that he is adamantly committed to Minsk, as Gorbachev was adamantly committed to the destruction of the system and the country allegiance to which he swore and as adamantly as Yeltsin was committed to the same principle--destruction and degradation of one's own country and its people. This makes a series of three.

During the latest Minsk talks, the fascist junta demanded that the DPR and the LPR cancel their prepared celebrations of V-Day in World War II, i.e., the military parades. We already know that since last Fall, the fasicst regime had effectively exercised thanks to Moscow's position a veto on elections in the DPR and the LPR.

There is a little doubt that Putin would like to oblige the fascists in this too. But he is also concerned with his image, which appears to be diving regardless of the official polls which the Western media playing up to this artificially constructed cult of (non)personality helped to spread without any critical question asked.

[Magda Hassan]

Yes, Donbass looking very bad right now. Some one is selling some one out.

[Lauren Johnson]

The Saker is a self-confessed Putin Fan Boy. He thinks Putin is about to clear out the Fifth Column. Saker has been holding his breath for years waiting for just such a thing to happen (as I used to do). Could be any day now. Mark Sleboda disagrees (strongly):

This article was written for the Unz Review:http://www.unz.com/tsaker/is-putin-prepa...tal-purge/As he does once a year, last week President Putin spend over three and a half hours answering 80 questions out of the 3+ million questions which were received. The show, which was aired live on Channel One, Rossiya-1 and Rossiya-24 TV channels, and the Mayak, Vesti FM and Radio Rossii was an unprecedented success which was watched and commented upon by millions of Russians. You can read the full transcript of the show by clicking here, and the transcript of a conversation between Putin and the journalist corps following the show here.
The main Russian TV channel, Rossia-1, also aired not one, but two special talk-shows (see here andhere) solely dedicated to a discussion of Putin's performance. These talk-shows are the famous "Evening with Vladimir Soloviev" by far the highest visibility talk-show on Russian TV. Just for the record, Rossia-1 is the crown-jewel of the powerful and state-controlled All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) media holding. Between the call-in show with Putin (3 hours and 40 minutes), the first talk show (2 hours and 12 minutes) and the second talk show (1 hour 44 minutes) the Russian public was exposed to a stunning seven and a half hours of discussion. Some will call it "propaganda", which can be viewed as negative or as positive, but which changes little. The main issue here is that this was a major, huge, public-communications effort. So what was the overall message which was conveyed by all this? Let me summarize it for you:
First, Putin is the unchallenged and beloved leader of all the Russian people, he is an extremely effective manager, a defender of the simple Russian people everywhere and he is the last recourse for those who have been wronged by the authorities. Let me add here that all the opposition party heads fully agreed with this. Right now, nobody in Russia dares to criticize Putin personally, not because some KGB goons are going to come in the night and drag you away to a concentration camp, not at all, but simply because bad mouthing Putin is now tantamout to political suicide. Even some members of the non-system political opposition (aka 5th columnists) are realizing this now.
Second, a lot of Russian people are hurting, badly. Not because of sanctions or the drop in the prices of gas and oil, but because of the corruption, incompetence and ideological blindness of the "economic block of the Russian government". The economy is a mess due to corrupt governors, lazy government bureaucrats and outright sabotage by a quasi-universally hated "economic block of the government". Sanctions (especially the denial of credits) and the fall in the price of oil do make things worse, but they are not the real problem or even a major part of the problem.
Third, the individuals responsible for this mess are regularly mentioned by name. This hatred for the "economic block of the government" is never openly encouraged by Putin himself who, when directly asked, praises the work of the government's ministers. Everybody else, however, including all the opposition figures and even the host Vladimir Soloviev, is now openly calling not only for resignations but even for jail terms for the guilty governors and even ministers. While Medvedev himself is rarely the personal target of such denunciations, Arkadii Dvorkovich (Deputy Prime Minister), Igor Shuvalov (First Deputy Prime Minister), Alexei Uliukaev (Minister of Economic Development) and Anton Siluanov (Minister of Finance) are now "openly hated" on Russian TV.
For example, when a woman calls in to denounce the horrible condition on the main road of her city and Putin promises to take action, all the commentators agree that it is a crying shame and a disgrace that only the President is willing to listen to such concerns, while all those who are directly responsible for such matters are indifferent, are doing nothing or, even worse, corrupt to the bone. Another example: workers treated like slaves by a gang of thugs on an island of the Russian Far East have complained to the local police and prosecutors and were completely ignored. One call to the President, and the Russian Investigative Committee (roughly the equivalent of the US FBI) will now investigate not only the mobsters involved, but also the local police forces and regional prosecutor himself. As for Putin, he personally apologized to these workers in the name of the entire Russian government. By the way, it is well known in Russia that the local bureaucrats are absolutely terrified by these call-in shows with the President, as they never know who might call. What they do know is that the investigation and sanctions "from above" will be swift and merciless. As for the Russian general public he absolutely love it.
Still, there is a strong sense that as soon as the call-in show is over, all those who did not get caught this time are breathing a huge sigh of relief and are immediately returning to their (bad) old ways. The truth is that there is only that much that such an event can deal with and that it is, alas, very much in the Russian mentality to hope that "maybe" (авось) the next again "another guy will be caught but not me". And thus very little changes in reality.
I should add that some Ministers receive extremely high praise on Russian TV. These are Foreign Minister Lavrov, Defense Minister Shoigu, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Puchkov (Minister of Emergency Situations), Dmitri Rogozin (Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, in charge of defense industry, a ministerial-level rank) and a few others. Notice an interesting pattern here?
All the the "Putin allies" (I call them "Eurasian Sovereignists") are getting high marks. All the "Medvedev allies" (whom I call "Atlantic Integrationists") are getting all the blame. Not only that, but the worse the economic situation becomes, the better Putin and "his" men look and the worse all the "westernizers" in power look. In fact, the latter now are openly blamed for it all.
Trust me, seven and a half hours of Atlantic Integrationists bashing on Russian TV did not "just happen" by some coincidence. In Russian way would say that Putin is clearly "digging under" (which could be translated as "scheming against") the 5th columnists in power.
And now let's look again at the nomination of Viktor Zolotov as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian National Guard. As I wrote in my initial commentary about this, I do not think that Putin needs any Praetorian Guard to protect himself, not with the Military and Special Services solidly behind him, not to mention some 85% plus popularity rating. However, I do think that the position is Commander in Chief is important enough to make the person holding it a member of the Russian Security Council. And, in fact, Putin did make Zolotov member of this body which gives the "Putin camp" a very powerful ally in a top position. True, Putin did remove another powerful ally from the Security Council, Boris Gryzlov, the Speaker of Russia's State Duma and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the United Russia Party, but he did so to have him in charge of the "Ukrainian policy" of Russia (Gryzlov will now represent Russia at the Contact Group on the Ukraine). But that is an advantageous trade for Putin, because even of both Gryzlov and Zolotov are equally loyal to him, Zolotov bring a lot more "muscle" to the table. Besides, with the Ukraine now clearly in its death throes, a real Putin-man needs to be on top of the situation as things are about to get very serious there.
There is another most interesting development taking place: the meteoritic rise of Putin's "All-Russia People's Front" or "ONF" which is, by itself, quite an amazing organization. Let's look into this unique phenomenon.
The ONF and its role in Russian politics
The ONF is not a political party, at least not officially, but a movement of "like-minded political forces". Still, Putin is the official leader of the ONF. His co-chair and, I would say, acting leader is Stanislav Govorukhin, a very talented and popular film director who is very ideologically close to Putin (and to the late Alexander Solzhenitsyn, would I add). The ONF is an immense patchwork of private individuals, social and political organizations, entire corporations, unions, clubs, social organizations, government agencies (such as the Russian Post Office or Rail Service) and many other entities. Officially, the ONF shares the strategic and tactical goals of the President's "United Russia" Party, so this begs the question of what the main difference between the two is?
The answer is simple: United Russia was founded by a group of individuals which included Sergei Shoigu, but also the late Boris Berezovskii and its purpose was to promote the "Putin+Medvedev" tandem. The ONF was created by Putin himself. You could say that the ONF is Putin's personal "political Praetorian guard" without being wrong. In fact, the ONF serves a number of very important political functions for Putin:
1) This is the main non-governmental "organizational tool" Putin has to know what is really going on in the country. The ONF is always at the forefront of all the denunciations about corruption, nepotism, bureaucratic abuse, administrative incompetence, etc. The ONF creates special investigative groups which put a great deal of effort into finding and reporting what is really going on in the country. Recently, ONF activist made a survey of over 65'000km or roads in Russia and reported to the President and the general public a rating of each and every one of these roads thereby exposing the governments, cities and towns who let the road infrastructure decay to public criticism. In fact, the ONF plays a key role in Russia as a type of "watchdog for the President" and the ONF is regularly featured in Russian TV and its leaders are often guests on Russian talk-shows.
2) The ONF also makes it possible for Putin to completely bypass the United Russia party apparatus and deal with the Russian public directly. More relevantly, the ONF could be turned into a "regular" political party literally overnight. Thus, if there was an attempt inside the United Party to somehow weaken Putin or to otherwise take action against him, Putin would have the option to create a nation-wide "Putin Party" almost instantly.
3) The ONF is extremely dangerous for the local mobsters and the corrupt politicians who cannot dare to use their usual intimidation tactics against the ONF least they get a visit from an FSB SWAT team acting directly on the order of the ONF Chairman, Vladimir Putin himself. Precisely because the ONF is clearly Putin's personal and much beloved creation, nobody in his/her right might would dare challenge or, even less so, threaten it.
4) The ONF is a big pain in the rear for all the government agencies who are supposed to be responsible for overseeing the situation inside Russia. When the ONF unveils a case of the corruption of a local governor or the plight of factory workers who don't get their salaries for months, this begs the question of what the responsible government agencies paid to monitor such situations are doing. Each government agency and minister know that they are in direct competition with the ONF. Worse, the ONF might even begin investigating them. A very scary thought.
Bringing it all together
Let's bring it all together now. The worse the economic situation in Russia is, the stronger Putin becomes and the weaker the Atlantic Integrationists are. Therefore, far from trying to conceal the economic problems in Russia, Putin and his supporters are constantly and publicly speaking about them. Putin is now clearly using the ONF as a tool to take action against the corrupt local authorities. Furthermore, Putin is also using the ONF as a way to denounce the various forms of sabotage committed by the 5th columnists while deflecting any criticisms from himself. At the same time there is a massive media ongoing PR campaign directed directly at the "economic block" of the government who, it so happens, is composed solely of "Atlantic Integrationists" and Medvedev allies. And just to make sure that all his bases are covered, Putin bring an ally with a lot of "muscle" into the Security Council.
Does this indicate that Putin is preparing purge of the 5th columnists?
I am neither a prophet nor a mind reader. I cannot tell what Putin is planning or what the future holds. But I think that when we look at all the facts listed above we can say that they certainly seem to point in that direction. And if we look at the way Putin deal with similar challenges in the past we also can observe a pattern.
Putin has a history of deliberately letting a situation rot before taking action.
In 1999 Putin did wait for the invasion of Dagestan and the Moscow city bombings before ordering the a Russian counter-attack which developed into what became known as the 2nd Chechen War.
In the Ukraine Putin let the Ukronazis lead a massive attack on Novorussia not once, but twice, before allowing the Novorussian to successfully counter-attack and force the junta to sign Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 agreements.
In Syria Putin waited until Daesh was threatening Damascus before ordering a very limited but most effective Russian military intervention.
Putin haters will say that the man is weak and indecisive and that in each situation he should have taken action much earlier. Maybe. But my sense is that Putin likes to take action only once he let a situation become so bad that his action seem like an already unhoped for miracle. This kind of "psychological preparation of the battlefield" would be, I think, very typical of how the Russian secret services operate. I also believe that this approach is the key to the entire Russian policy towards what is left of the Ukraine today.
In theory, instead of Putin, it could also be a "deep insider" like Sergei Ivanov, Chief of the Presidential Administration of Russia, who could be coordinating such a pre-purge campaign, especially if there are reasons to avoid having untrusted members of the Security Council in the loop. But my gut feeling is that Putin likes to be in control, especially of crucial developments.
Whatever may be Putin's final goal, what is certain is that no government can indefinitely survive the kind of constant political thrashing the Medvedev government has been increasingly subjected to in the Russia media. Again, I should immediately add here that we are not talking about a situation where the media criticizes "the government" in the sense of "those in power". In the Russian case, the media is heaping praise on the President and the Ministers which are associated with him, while very deliberately targeting either the so-called "economic block" or the government (as opposed to the Presidential Administration). It is all very carefully focused.
On one hand, 2016 will be an important elections year in which the Russian people will elect a new Parliament. Furthermore, the risks of yet another, desperate, Urkonazi attack on Novorussia is very real, if only to distract the public from the apocalyptic domestic situation in the Ukraine. On the other hand, the Russia economy might well come out of its slight, but real, recession and the inflation numbers are steadily getting better. Is that a good time to initiate the purge of the government? Maybe.
One possible scenario would be that the opposition parties (Communists, the Liberal-Democrats of Zhirinovsky and the Fair Russia Party) would do better than expected in the next elections. That could give Putin a pretext to get rid of the "economic block" and replace these Ministers with members of the Communist Party (believe it or not, even if Ziuganov looks like an old Brezhnev era figure, there are quite a few very sharp and interesting young(er) leaders in the CP). One way or another, I have a strong feeling that the "economic block" of the Medvedev government will not last to the end of the year.

Mark Sleboda from his FB page said this in response:

I'm very sorry to say I see no signs of this at all, and respectfully disagree in the strongest possible terms with this analysis & projection.With Putin himself hinting at the return of the odious neoliberal Kudrin to the fold, even after he walked out "into the Swamp" several years ago and joined the White Ribbon protests calling for the overthrow of the government - we instead should expect the polar opposite from the Kremlin in the near to mid future.
https://www.rt.com/busi…/339305-kudrin-russia-putin-economy/
Unfortunately, the "civiliki" are if anything sitting secure in their positions and looking for a return to policy prominence when the West's sanction regime collapses, if not before. That will be the signal for the Kremlin's intent to return to "business as usual" with the EU as it tries to rekindle capital inflow and return to GDP growth.

I'm afraid we have to read the Saker's latest article as wishful thinking of the most illusionary and thus damaging kind. More's the pity...I would sorely like to be proven wrong on this.

[Lauren Johnson]

The essence of Putinism is expressed in this one statement from today. Vladimir Komoedov, the chairman of the Duma Committee on Defense, on the downing of the Russian MI-8 and the death of five Russian servicemen: "Russia will respond with determination, we will pay back. HOWEVER, we must cannot use force (not militarily), we must act politically. That's because this was not done to us by ISIS, but by the opposition which the US is supporting. It is necessary to sit at the negotiation table."

[Lauren Johnson]

The Lavrov/Putin pattern is to threaten force but default to diplomacy -- it's consistent so far.

Currently we a number of offensive actions by the US/NATO coalition -- first, the assassination of Motorola, stepping up offensive action against Novorussiya including phosphorus cluster bombs against civilians, the coordinated bombing with ISIS of Deir Azor during a negotiated cease fire, the bombing of Allepo by the Belgian air force, and others aggressive action. (Note I see Syria and Ukraine as two fronts of the same war.)

Russia responds with regards to the Ukraine front negotiating a tough agreement allowing the OSCE to make sure the DLPR does not attack the ukrops (groan). Secondly, we have this with software translation of the latest Lavrov statement:

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia will not denounce the so-called Great friendship treaty with Ukraine.

According to him, currently the main task is the development of friendly relations between the two countries and peoples. So Lavrov responded to the corresponding vapros Duma deputies.

"We share the concern about the events on the border with Crimea and other anti-Russian actions of the current Ukrainian authorities" - quote "News" Lavrov said - "However, the proposed initiative of denunciation of the agreement referred to in the present circumstances, it is premature and not entirely justified."

According to Lavrov, the output of this agreement will not help solve the existing problems, which, according to him, due to the accumulated actions of Kiev.

"In connection with the above, the main task of the Russian side at this stage to consider the implementation of actions aimed not at breaking bilateral relations and their preservation, creation of conditions for recovery and active development of friendly relations between the two countries and peoples," - said the Minister.

Recall, the Russian Federation and Ukraine signed a treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership between the two countries in May 1997. Its action was extended for ten years in 2008.

The accumulated actions on the part of Russian policy is that US/NATO aggression will be met with a stern lecture and further negotiations. As far as we can tell, the future Clinton presidency will count on this pattern to continue.

[R.K. Locke]

Just been revisiting this old Peter Dale Scott article in light of recent events & thought others might be interested:

http://www.lobster-magazine.co.uk/articl...l-drug.htm