Germany/Switzerland-Death of Rainer Barschel 1987 in Geneva

[Carsten Wiethoff]

Hello Forum,

this is my first post, so bear with me.

Recently I got interested (again) in the strange death of Rainer Barschel in Geneva in the night from 10 to 11 October 1987 in Room 317 of the Hotel Beau-Rivage in Geneva/Switzerland. Rainer Barschel had been the "Ministerpräsident" (Governor?) of Schleswig-Holstein, until he stepped down on 2. October 1987 because of allegations brought against him, into which I do not want to dive now.
What I find much more interesting is the connection to deep political events surrounding secret weapons deals by Israel on behalf of the US, supplying arms to Iran. Of course, as you know, the US was at that time also supporting the Iraq in the ongoing war against Iran. Anybody shouting Iran-Contra yet? Right.
Officially this was a suicide hot:, by taking a highly complex mix of medicaments and then stepping into a cold bathtub in full clothes.
In the official documentation of the case (in German) http://www.schleswig-holstein.de/GSTA/DE...onFile.pdf
there is a citation from an unsigned affidavit by a south african weapons dealer called Dirk Stoffberg, who could not complete and sign this affidavit because he (guess what...) officially killed himself hot: and his wife on 20. July 1994 in Hartebeespoort, northwest of Johannesburg.
In this affidavit he claims that Mr Robert Gates (yes, this one) personally called Barschel to Geneva, that there was a meeting between CIA, Irani and Israeli officials. Robert Gates was in Geneva, flying with three agents in the same Lufthansa plane as Barschel from Frankfurt to Geneva, when Barschel was on his way to Gran Canaria on 6. October 1987. Barschel had threatened to go public with some of these secret weapons deals and that a CIA hit-man called Thomas Sunde “did his job”. Also mentioned (blacked out, but easily deduced) is Reiner Jacobi, a german investigator currently living in Australia, who has tracked some of Marcos’ millions (or was it bullions?) to certain bank accounts in Switzerland . This Jacobi is also known for his 10 year long fight (with his attorney David A. Chaikin) against his extradition, for an indictment based on the word of (guess who…) Thomas Sunde. And to make it complete, all three of them (Stoffberg, Sunde, Jacobi) are claimed to have worked for Adler Research, Boston, a mysterious CIA front company claimed to be charged with killing peoplehot:, out of Hong Kong.
To give you an idea of other things I read about Stoffberg:
He had been incarcarated in the US in 1992 (United States v. Stoffberg, 782 F.Supp. 17, 19 (E.D.N.Y.1992)) for dealing of 1000 pistols to a US customs official posing as Chilean customer, then he assisted the congressional committee that investigated the October Surprise, and was set free for that.
Some people claim Stoffberg was murdered for his involvement in dealing with red mercury, a substance claimed to enable mini-nukes. Some people claim red mercury was a CIA sting operation.
Okay, and I am of course also aware of the story that Victor Ostrovski tells, that a mossad hit team did the dirty work on Barschel. (This does not exclude, of course, that Thomas Sunde did his job, whatever this may have been.)
So at this point I am seriously confused and I ask the forum, who can possibly connect some dots for me or who can support (or destroy) some of this “tangled yarn”.
By the way, does anybody know the CIA cover name "Rabbi"? I think that a high ranking Mossad officer was called "Rabbi", any more details?

Thanks for your attention and assistance.

[Jan Klimkowski]

Carsten - welcome!

I cannot directly answer your questions.

However, Robert Gates has always been a bag-carrier for the elite, and quite possibly an operational player.

Former senior CIA analyst, Ray McGovern, knows Gates as well as anybody, having worked with him boy and man, at Langley and the White House. McGovern made his views on Gates clear on the latter's return to visible power.

Published on Saturday, November 11, 2006 by CommonDreams.org
Robert Gates-Gate
by Ray McGovern


Full disclosure: I am in Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s debt for TV notoriety on May 4, when my impromptu questioning of him elicited denials easily shown to be false. I have known Robert Gates, whom the president has picked to succeed Rumsfeld, for 36 years, starting when Gates was a journeyman analyst in CIA’s Soviet Foreign Policy branch which I headed.

As the occupation of Iraq chews up a more and more of our troops, President George W. Bush has jettisoned “stay the course” in favor of “necessary adjustments.” This week he showed how quickly he can adjust to the mid-term election results when he jettisoned Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, barely a week after telling reporters Rumsfeld was doing a “fantastic job” and that he wanted him to stay on for the next two years.

It had been clear for weeks that the election would be a referendum on the war in Iraq and that Republican losses would be substantial. And Rumsfeld and Bush saw a mutual need to avoid the acute political embarrassment that would inevitably attend Rumsfeld’s grilling by congressional committees chaired by Democrats. Besides, who better to try to blame for the “long, hard slog” in Iraq than the fellow who not only coined the expression but made it a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Rumsfeld may even have been willing to acquiesce reluctantly in serving as scapegoat for the Iraq fiasco. He would have seen merit not only in avoiding another acrimonious tangle with Sen. Hillary Clinton (D, NY), but also in helping Bush project an image of flexibility and decisiveness in the face of the post-election sea change in Congress. And one cannot rule out possible pangs of conscience for the horrific human cost resulting from his supreme arrogance and his susceptibility to the illusory strategic dreams of “the crazies”—the so-called “neo-conservatives” whom President George W. Bush brought back to Washington.

Neo-Conservatives Eat Their Own

Former allies are the most prominent among the legions now denouncing Rumsfeld. The abandonment is enough to pin down even an old wrestler like Rumsfeld. Perhaps the most unkindest cut of all came from longstanding supporter “Cakewalk-Ken” Adelman who, like other neo-conservatives, have turned mercilessly on their old, now discredited friend and colleague. In an interview for David Rose’s “Neo Culpa” in Vanity Fair, Adelman comes across as feeling jilted.

“We’re losing in Iraq... I’ve worked with [Rumsfeld] three times in my life. I’ve been to each of his houses in Chicago, Taos, Santa Fe, Santo Domingo, and Las Vegas. I’m very, very fond of him, but I’m crushed by his performance. Did he change, or were we wrong in the past? Or is it that he was never really challenged before? I don’t know. He certainly fooled me.”

As the saying goes, with friends like that, who needs Hillary?...or the kind of pummeling Rumsfeld has already received from the likes of the Army-Navy-Air Force-Marine Corps Times?

I almost feel sorry for Donald Rumsfeld. And I’m not just saying that because, with the “Military Commissions Act” now signed into law, he can declare me—or anyone—an unlawful enemy combatant, “disappear” me into some black hole, and have me tortured for the rest of my days. Rather, it is a conspicuous case of betrayal by fair-weather friends—and chutzpah-laden disingenuousness. Et tu, Cakewalk-Ken! The neo-conservatives are attempting to push the blame onto Rumsfeld for the debacle of which they were the intellectual authors. Parallel attempts by administration officials to scapegoat Rumsfeld will be equally transparent and unconvincing.

The “Cheney-Rumsfeld cabal” (coined by Col. Larry Wilkerson who, as chief of staff to former Secretary of State Colin Powell, was in a position to know) is now down to one. And how much clout the vice president has lost with the election results and departure of his bosom buddy is perhaps the largest unanswered question. But if Cheney remains éminence grise and if past is precedent, Gates will defer to Cheney—probably even more than the president does. For if there is one distinctive hallmark of Eagle Scout Gates’ career, it is that he has always earned what might now be called the “Colin Powell Loyalty Patch”—loyalty to the next person up, whatever the content of their character.

A Fresh Approach?

Gates will help bring, in the president’s words, “a fresh perspective and new ideas on how America can achieve our goals in Iraq.” How could he not? But there are distinct limits to what he can contribute, and he has never been one to adopt positions independent of what the boss thinks or says. Most important, as noted this week by Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA), prospective chair of the House International Affairs Committee, “You can’t unscramble the omelet and the tremendous mistakes that were made after major military operations; I don’t see any magical solutions.”

It seems only fair at the outset to give Gates the benefit of the doubt. He could conceivably whittle away some of the influence Cheney has enjoyed over the past six years—the need for a fresh approach to Iraq being so obvious and urgent. At very least, Gates can hardly match the disaster Rumsfeld wrought with his fancy language and fanciful ideas; but this amounts to damning with faint praise. Unless Gates’ years outside the Beltway have wrought major behavioral change, it is highly likely that in the end he will bend obediently to the wishes of Cheney and Bush. Those close to Gates now say he has been privately critical of the way the war has been conducted. But he is the consummate chameleon, with an extraordinary capability to change colors quickly in adapting to a new environment.

Clearly the beneficiary of the compared-to-what syndrome, Gates has been getting unduly positive press treatment since the announcement of his nomination. It is one thing to give him the benefit of the doubt; it is quite another to ignore the considerable baggage he brings with him from past service.

Character Counts; So Does Integrity

Those of us who had front-row seat to watch Gates’ handling of substantive intelligence cannot overlook the manner in which he cooked it to the recipe of whomever he reported to. A protégé of William Casey, President Ronald Reagan’s CIA Director, Gates learned well from his mentor. In 1995, Gates told the Washington Post’s Walter Pincus that he watched Casey on “issue after issue sit in meetings and present intelligence framed in terms of the policy he wanted pursued.” Gates followed suit, cooking the analysis to justify policies favored by Casey and the White House.

The cooking was consequential. Among other things, it facilitated not only illegal capers like Iran-Contra but also budget-breaking military spending against an exaggerated Soviet threat that, in reality, had long since passed its peak.

I was amused to read in David Ignatius’ Washington Post column this week that Gates “was the brightest Soviet analyst in the [CIA] shop, so Casey soon appointed him deputy director overseeing his fellow analysts.” He wasn’t; and Casey had something other than expertise in mind. Talk to anyone who was there at the time (except the sycophants Gates co-opted) and they will explain that Gates’ meteoric career had mostly to do with his uncanny ability to see a Russian under every rock turned over by Casey. Those of Gates’ subordinates willing to see two Russians became branch chiefs; three won you a division. I exaggerate only a little.

To Casey, the Communists could never change; and Gorbachev was simply cleverer than his predecessors. With his earlier training in our Soviet Foreign Policy branch (and a doctorate in Soviet affairs no less), Gates knew better. Yet he carried Casey’s water, and stifled all dissent. One consequence was that the CIA as an institution missed the implosion of the Soviet Union—no small matter. Another was a complete loss of confidence in CIA analysis on the part of then-Secretary of State George Shultz and others who smelled the cooking. In July 1987 in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair, Shultz told Congress: “I had come to have grave doubts about the objectivity and reliability of some of the intelligence I was getting.”

Iran-Contra

And well he might. In the fall of 1985, for example, there was an abrupt departure from CIA’s analytical line that Iran was supporting terrorism. On November 22, 1985 the agency reported that Iranian-sponsored terrorism had dropped off substantially in 1985, but no evidence was adduced to support that key judgment. Oddly, a few months later CIA’s analysis reverted back to the pre-November 1985 line, with no further mention of any drop-off in Iranian support for terrorism.

It could be more than coincidental that the US illegally shipped Hawk missiles to Iran in late November 1985. When questions were raised later about this zigzag in intelligence, Stephen Engelberg of the New York Times quoted senior CIA official Clair George saying this was “an example of a desperate attempt to try to sort of prove something was happening to make the policy [arms to Iran for hostages] look good, and it wasn’t.”

Also in 1985 Gates commissioned and warped a National Intelligence Estimate suggesting that Soviet influence in Iran could soon grow and pose a danger to US interests. This provided additional “justification” for the illegal arms-for-hostages deal with Iran.

More serious still was Gates’ denial of awareness of Oliver North’s illegal activities in support of the Contra attacks in Nicaragua, despite the fact that senior CIA officials testified that they had informed Gates that North had diverted funds from the Iranian arms sales for the benefit of the Contras. The independent counsel for the Iran-Contra investigation (1986-93), Lawrence Walsh, later wrote in frustration that, despite Gates’ highly touted memory, he “denied recollection of facts thirty-three times.”

In 1991, when President George H. W. Bush nominated Robert Gates for the post of Director of Central Intelligence, there was a virtual insurrection among CIA analysts who had suffered under his penchant for cooking intelligence. The stakes for integrity of analysis were so high that many still employed at the agency summoned the courage to testify against the nomination. But the fix was in, thanks to then-chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, David Boren and his staff director, George Tenet. The issue was considered so important and the damaging evidence so abundant, however, that thirty-one Senators voted against Gates when the committee forwarded his nomination. Never before or since has a CIA director nominee received nearly as many nays.

A highly respected former CIA station chief, Tom Polgar, offered the following at the 1991 Gates nomination hearings:

“His proposed appointment as director also raises moral issues. What kind of signal does his re-nomination send to the troops? Live long enough, your sins will be forgotten? Serve faithfully the boss of the moment, never mind integrity? Feel free to mislead the Senate—Senators forget easily? Keep your mouth shut—if the Special Counsel does not get you, promotion will come your way?”

“Fixing” Intelligence Can Be Career Enhancing

Gates is the one most responsible for institutionalizing the politicization of intelligence analysis. He set the example and promoted malleable managers more interested in career advancement than the ethos of speaking truth to power. In 2002, it was those managers who then-CIA Director George Tenet ordered to prepare what has become known as the “Whore of Babylon”—the October 1 National Intelligence Misestimate on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He instructed them to adhere to the guidelines set by Vice President Dick Cheney in his Aug. 26, 2002 preemptive speech and to complete it in three weeks (in order to force a congressional vote before the mid-term election). To their discredit, senior sycophants saluted and produced the most fraudulent—and consequential—NIE in the history of American intelligence.

Those commenting on the Gates nomination so far seem largely unaware of this history. The exception is Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ), who worked in the State Department’s intelligence bureau and now sits on the House Intelligence Committee. Pointing out Gates’ reputation for putting pressure on analysts to shape their conclusions to fit administration policies, Holt called the nomination “deeply troubling” and stressed that the confirmation hearings “should be thorough and probing.” Too bad Holt is not in the Senate.

Confirming Gates Must Not Be a Slam Dunk

There are early indications that Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), ranking Democrat on the Armed Forces Committee, intends to acquiesce in the maneuvering of the White House’s cat’s paw chairman of that committee, Sen. John Warner (R, VA), to rush the nomination through the lame-duck Senate before a new Congress is in place. At times in the past Levin has shown considerable courage, but so many years in the minority seem to have dulled his edge, prompting him to acquiesce in compromises to which he would have been allergic in the past—the unsavory deal with Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC) on the rights of “detainees,” for example. Not to mention Levin’s sudden cave-in, in the aftermath of 9/11, on funding for the National Missile Defense program, which he earlier recognized as obscenely expensive, of unproven reliability, and of dubious utility given the changing nature of the threats to our security.

Whether Levin steps up to the plate on Gates will be an early indication of whether the election has implanted any spine into Democrats—whether they still have it in them to act like winners. Levin has had a running dispute with the Bush administration regarding what he calls a lack of candor (the correct word is “lies”) in sworn testimony on Iraq. If he allows the Gates nomination to sail through without a thorough investigation of Gates’ record, he will be giving a nihil obstat to the practice of no-fault dissembling before Congress.

In 1991, Levin joined 30 other Senators in voting against Gates’ confirmation as CIA director because Gates was a good deal less than candid about his role in Iran-Contra and unconvincing in his denials that he had politicized intelligence. But Levin said this week that he wanted to give Gates a “fair and fresh look; a lot of time has passed.”

Fair enough. If Levin wants to know what has happened in the interim, he can start with the fresh, documentary evidence adduced in award-winning investigative reporter Robert Parry’s recent article, “The Secret World of Robert Gates” [http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/110906.html]. Parry’s article contains unique and highly damaging information on Gates’ role in the original “October Surprise”—the successful Republican effort to prevent the release of the 52 American hostages imprisoned for 14 months in the US embassy in Tehran until Ronald Reagan had won the election in 1980—and on Gates’ involvement in the illegal sale of weapons, including cluster bombs to Iraq in the early eighties.

Another excellent source of updated information on Gates’ involvement in the secret arming of Saddam Hussein (yes, the same Saddam) and the Iran-Contra scandal is the transcript of an interview of Robert Parry and former CIA analyst Mel Goodman on Democracy Now, November 9th. [http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?s...09/1444242

Gates knew about many of Oliver North’s illegal activities, but under oath, he just couldn’t remember. And Gates has been able to escape close scrutiny of his own involvement in extralegal and illegal activities largely because there are far too few journalists with the enterprise and courage of Robert Parry. While all the above-mentioned escapades are significantly damaging, the corruption of intelligence should be placed front and center, given the huge role this played in 2002 in deceiving Congress in to voting for an unnecessary war.

Whether or not Levin is fully aware of it, Gates is the archetypal intelligence fixer, employing all the tricks of that dishonorable trade—including memory loss, when caught. I find myself wondering if Levin still has it in him to stand up and say, “Never Again.” Even before he formally becomes chair of Armed Services, Levin has the power to require a serious vetting of Gates’ past behavior and to make “Never Again” stick.

At a hearing on his first (abortive) nomination to be CIA director in 1987, Gates denied that he had tailored intelligence to please his superiors, adding, “Sycophants can only rise to a certain level.” Whether that was an unintentionally prophetic observation or not now depends largely on Carl Levin and his newly empowered, but apparently not yet emboldened, fellow Democrats.

Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, the publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the Saviour in Washington, DC. He was a CIA analyst from 1963 to 1990, and in 2003 co-founded Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).

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[Carsten Wiethoff]

Thanks Jan, for these pointers regarding Robert Gates. I had not heard the allegations before, that Robert Gates attended the actual meetings in Paris, regarding October Surprise.
By the way, for several reasons I am not convinced that George H. W. Bush actually attended the meeting in Paris, there is just too much information floating around that looks bogus to me, especially the stuff regarding Gunther K. Russbacher and his “Blackbird” flight. By the way, I do not know who actually claimed that a SR-71 would have been used, this seems to me more than unlikely and not very practical at all, I doubt that this would even have saved any time, compared to an efficient private jet or the concorde, by the way. Russbacher himself allegedly uses the word “Blackbird” also for a modified Lear Jet, allegedly the former plane of William Casey.
For more of this “fringe” stuff you could read http://www.rumormillnews.com/HARRY_MARTI...RPRISE.htm
Or http://www.whale.to/b/rm4.html and similar things.
But surely, actual bodily appearance in Paris is not the main issue of the October Surprise, the sabotage of Carter’s campaign by dealing with the Iranians is.
Anyway, for the interested, I quote an article in the NY times regarding Barschel and some CIA communication allegedly intercepted by the GDR Stasi.
[Begin Quote]
The cables apparently refer to Mr. Barschel as "Perch" -- in German it is "Barsch," for the fish -- but are otherwise quite cryptic.
"Jerry took Perch to temple, met with Lokal and Rabbi at 2130," said an excerpt from one cable, dated Oct. 9, 1987 and published this week by the daily Berliner Zeitung. "Perch unyielding, refuses coop."
Two years ago, the newspaper reported, an informant of German intelligence told prosecutors that Mr. Barschel had met in Geneva on that day with Ahmed Khomeini, a son of the late Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as with Israeli, German and other agents to talk about weapons deliveries.
Mr. Barschel refused to give in to Iranian demands, the informant said, and was then a marked man. He was found dead at the Beau Rivage Hotel in Geneva on Oct. 11.
[End Quote]
Full article here: http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/01/world/...urder.html[/FONT]


So much for now. C.

[Carsten Wiethoff]

Ah, yes, just for an interestin read the following text about Dirk Stoffberg, Reiner Jacobi and Thomas Sunde:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA

SECOND ( 2ND ) AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A CHAIKIN


I, Dr. David A. Chaikin, Australian citizen of legal age, and address at Frederick Jordan Chambers, 53 Martin Place, Sydney, NSW, Australia, after being duly sworn, do hereby state the following:


1. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge and review of documents as to the subject matter set forth within. This affidavit deals with the spurious and false allegations that have been made against Mr. Jacobi and shows how they have undermined his investigation into the secret Marcos accounts in Switzerland.


2. I am an expert in the law of extradition, international mutual assistance, anti-money laundering laws and international investigations. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached to my affidavit (No 1) sworn at today's date.


3. Since 1994 I have been retained by Mr. Reiner Jacobi as his counsel and attorney in relation to various matters. I have acted for Mr. Jacobi as his barrister in the Australia extradition proceedings, namely U.S. v Reiner Jacobi in U.S. District Court federal docket number QG 82 of 1985.


FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF MR. R. JACOBI BEING A CON-MAN


4. In September 1994 I had a meeting with Mr. Peter Cosandey, the then District Attorney of Zurich, at an international conference at Jesus College Cambridge, England. At that meeting, Mr. Cosandey informed me that Reiner Jacobi was a con man who was involved in the selling of fake Marcos gold certificates. Mr. Cosandey did not provide me with any material to support his allegation.


5. Mr. Cosandey's allegation against Mr. Jacobi is similar in content to allegations made by the attorneys of the Marcos family, including Attorney Dean Antonio Coronel and Attorney James Linn. These allegations first surfaced in 1991 at a time when Mr. Jacobi was publicly revealed as having discovered secret Marcos bank accounts in Switzerland. They have been repeated in various fraud cases involving the Marcoses in an attempt to smear Mr. Jacobi. Attached hereto and marked with the letter "DC1A" is a true and accurate copy of an article dated 9 August 1999 from the Philippine Daily Inquirer.


6. On 17 July 1991 Attorney Coronel, Imelda Marcos's lawyers, told the press that Mr. Reiner Jacobi was a "hustler" who had phoned him in March 1991 to offer information about the alleged Marcos accounts but was rebuffed by Mrs. Marcos. Attorney Coronel alleged that Jacobi subsequently offered his "gold tales" to the PCGG for a 10% commission. He said that "Jacobi is wanted in Europe and the United States for a string of bank fraud cases." Annexed hereto and marked with the letter "DC2A" is a true and accurate copy of a article dated 17 July 1991 from the Malaya newspaper quoting attorney Coronel.


7. I am informed by Mr. Jacobi and verily believe that he has never spoken to attorney Coronel. Furthermore, attorney Coronel's story is factually incorrect because Mr. Jacobi was working with the PCGG prior to 1991. In my opinion the accusation of Attorney Coronel that Mr. Jacobi was involved in "bank fraud” suggests that the Marcos' had already worked out in 1991 a strategy to neutralise the work of Reiner Jacobi in tracing the hidden Marcos assets.


8. The allegation that Mr. Jacobi is a con man grew in currency because it was supported by a case of mistaken identity. Attached hereto and marked with the letter "DC3A" is a true and accurate copy of an affidavit by Mr. Peter Muller, investigative journalist, dated 23 October 1995. In that affidavit Mr. Muller refers to a certain Ernst Jacobe who was investigated in relation to a Marcos-related fraud but who is not the same person as Reiner Jacobi.


9. The British Serious Fraud Office has also cleared Mr. Jacobi of any involvement in investment fraud. Attached hereto and marked with the letters "DC4A", "DC5A" and "DC6A" are true and accurate copies of a letter dated 25 June 1999 from Television Network International ("TNI") to the Serious Fraud Office ("SFO") and letters dated 30 June 1999 and 12 July 1999 from the SFO to the TNI respectively.


10. In relation to the same matter, Mr. Jacobi was also falsely accused of working with a number of American, including Mr. John Savage and Mr. Richard Kilbane in an investment fraud scam. The fraud documentation referred to a “Seller’s Common Collateral Code: EFG JACOBE/ICC400/322/C3416." The reference to "Jacobe" is a reference to Mr. Ernst Jacobe and not to Mr. Reiner Jacobi: see Exhibit "DC1A" for further details.


SWITZERLAND CHARGES OF ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE


11. Attached hereto and marked with the letter"DC7A" is a true and accurate copy of an English translation of the Order of Arrest dated 9 July 1991 issued by Mr. Peter Cosandey, District Attorney of Zurich, against Mr. Reiner Jacobi on a charge of economic espionage in violation of Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code and a charge of prohibited action on behalf of a foreign state (i.e. the Philippines) in violation of Article 271 of the Swiss Penal Code.


12. Attached hereto and marked with the letter "DC8A" is a true and correct copy of the English translation of the request for legal assistance dated 9 July 1991 by the District Attorney of Zurich to the German authorities in relation to Mr. Jacobi.


13. The circumstances surrounding the Swiss charges against Mr. Jacobi are detailed in "DC7A", "DC8A" and in a record of interview with Mr. Friederick Walser (aka) Fritz Walser. Annexed hereto and marked as"DC9A" is a true and accurate copy of the English language translation of the record of interview between Mr. Walser and Mr. Cosandey.


14. On 29 May 1991 Dr. Reichenbach, the Swiss lawyer for the PCGG, requested the Swiss authorities to freeze two ( 2 ) bank accounts at Credit Suisse which allegedly contained a balance of $1,300,000,000 billion. The request stated that the accounts at Credit Suisse were registered under the name of C. B. de Preux ( also known as Cecil B. De Preux ) the juvenile son of the Swiss lawyer for former President Marcos. At first Credit Suisse denied the existence of the accounts stating that it did not accord with its numbering system. Following the revelation that the Philippines Government had documentary evidence concerning the accounts, Credit Suisse stated that the accounts were genuine Marcos accounts but that they were closed and had no money in them.


15. With the knowledge of the PCGG, various intermediaries, including Mr. Walser, were used to check the veracity of the denials of Credit Suisse. In May 1991 a former bank employee entered into the computer system at Credit Suisse by using a special code and by using the videotext system and found that both accounts really existed. The same employee also used the same method to gain access to gold accounts at the Union Bank of Switzerland.


16. Attorney Hans Peter Kaspar, a Swiss lawyer for the PCGG, then informed Mr. Peter Cosandey, the District Attorney of Zurich, that he was in contact with a Mr. Walser who through a colleague had access to the Credit Suisse computer system. In or about 13 June 1991, Mr. Walser was interviewed by District Attorney Cosandey and he confirmed the above-mentioned details concerning the Credit Suisse accounts. He also stated that he has "absolute confidence" in his source's information that UBS had gold accounts corresponding to 1,241 Metric Tonnes of physical gold.


17. Instead of acting on Mr. Walser's information and investigating Credit Suisse and UBS for potential criminal offences such as money laundering, Mr. Cosandey opened up a criminal investigation into those who had accessed the Swiss bank's computers and/or had received secret bank information. On 11 July 1991 Mr. Jacobi was arrested in Munich on the Swiss request for extradition.


18. Annexed hereto and marked with the letters "DC10A" and "DC11A" are copies of two ( 2 ) letters, both dated 15 July 1991, from Mr. David Castro to Zurich District Attorney, Mr. Peter Cosandey, and to Swiss Federal Counsellor, Mr. Arnold Koller, protesting the arrest of PCGG agent Reiner Jacobi.


19. On 17 July 1991 the First Criminal Panel of the Higher Regional Court of Munich refused the application for the issue of a provisional arrest warrant for the extradition of Mr. Reiner Jacobi from Germany to Switzerland on a charge of economic espionage and a charge of prohibited action on behalf of a foreign state. The Court held that the charges were of a "political character “and therefore were not extraditable. Annexed hereto and marked with the letters "DC12A" is a true and accurate copy of the English translation of the decision of the Court dated 17 July 1991.


20. Annexed hereto and marked with the letter "DC13A" is a true and accurate copy of the English translation of a letter dated 19 July 1991 from Mr. Pierre Schmidt of the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters to the Bavarian Ministry of Justice stating that the Swiss authorities had withdrawn the extradition request but reserved the right to demand the return of the documents found in the possession of Mr. Jacobi.


21. Subsequently, Mr. Cosandey threatened to withdraw all mutual assistance to the Philippine Government in relation to the existing frozen Marcos accounts in Switzerland unless the Philippine Government stopped using the services of Mr. Jacobi. Mr. Cosandey also stated that he would no longer entertain any request made by PCGG Chairman Castro [ David Castro ] or his proxies. Annexed hereto and marked with the letter "DC14A" is a true and accurate copy of a letter from Mr. Cosandey to the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters dated 19 July 1991.


22. As a consequence of the action by the Swiss authorities, the PCGG did not test the claim of Credit Suisse that the Marcos accounts were closed. Nor did the PCGG make any request to freeze the alleged Marcos gold accounts at UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND ( UBS AG ).


23. On 23 July 1991 Dr. Reichenbach's law firm unilaterally resigned from its mandate to pursue the hidden accounts in circumstances where attorney Bruno De Preux had reported Dr Reichenbach for improper conduct to the Swiss Bar Association and Mr. Cosandey had threatened to open up a criminal investigation into Attorney Hans Peter Kasper.


24. UBS which had been silent about the ownership of the gold accounts later claimed that the precious metal certificate numbers that Mr. Walser had disclosed in his original confession "have no correlation to any account or customer numbering or identification system ever used at UBS." This became the official line of UBS and Mr. Peter Cosandey who together have publicly claimed that the Marcos gold deposits are a hoax and are being used by con men to raise monies.


25. In my opinion there is a fatal flaw to the UBS / Cosandey position. Mr. Cosandey first learnt about the gold account numbers from Mr. Walser on 13 June 1991. Mr. Cosandey opened a criminal investigation into Mr. Walser and his associates, issued arrest warrants and search warrants, and finally issued a request for mutual assistance and extradition to the Republic of Germany on the basis that the crime of economic espionage had been committed by Messrs Jacobi, Walser and others. That is, from 13 June 1991 to at least 17 July 1991, Mr. Cosandey treated Mr. Jacobi as a spy not as a con man. It was only after the failure to extradite Jacobi from Germany to Switzerland that Mr. Cosandey realised that he had made a foolish mistake in charging Mr. Jacobi with economic espionage. For the offence of espionage assumes that the banks have secrets, in this case the alleged Marcos cash deposits at Credit Suisse and the gold deposits at UBS. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that Mr. Cosandey did not consult with UBS as a "victim bank" during his investigation of economic espionage and prior to his request for the extradition of Mr. Jacobi. Mr. Cosandey would have been duty bound to inform UBS that its computer system had been penetrated. That is, if this was a fraud or hoax, UBS would have informed Mr. Cosandey during the investigation that the gold account numbers did not exist. Mr. Cosandey would then have investigated and pursued Mr. Jacobi and others for 'fraud' not for 'economic espionage'. The fact that Mr. Walser volunteered the information to Mr. Cosandey provides further support for the view that this was no hoax.


26. I am informed by Mr. Castro and verily believe that it is also the case that UBS knew of the alleged Marcos gold account numbers from as early as 5 February 1991. On that date Dr. Reichenbach and Mr. Castro had a meeting with Mr. Urs Wenzel, in-house counsel of UBS. I am informed by David Castro and verily believe that at that meeting Mr. Wenzel stated that the gold account numbers supplied by the PCGG were not in the name of a Filipino national but were in the name of a Swiss national. Mr. Wenzel did not state that the account number did not exist but merely stated that he could not give the name of the account holder because of Swiss bank secrecy laws. Subsequently, on 12 February 1991 Dr. Reichenbach wrote to Wenzel stating that the account holder was C. de Preux. If the gold account numbers supplied by the PCGG were fake then Mr. Wenzel would have informed Dr Reichenbach on 12 February 1991. Annexed hereto and marked with the letters "DC15A" is a true and accurate copy of a letter from the law firm of Reichenbach, Tuchshmid, Meili & Schubiger to Mr. Castro dated 18 April 1991 concerning the meeting with UBS and the identification of the account holder as being Mr. C. B. De Preux, also known as Cyril B. DePreux.


UNITED STATES INDICTMENT


27. On 29 March 1991 a grand jury in the United States brought an indictment accusing Mr. Reiner Jacobi of violating United States criminal law. That indictment charged him with one ( 1 ) count of conspiring with Mr. Thomas Sunde and others to 'import' and 'distribute' hashish in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 846. The conspiracy is alleged to have occurred between February 1985 and November 1986 at Dade County, Florida and elsewhere.


28. The allegation against Mr. Jacobi is that he conspired with Mr. Sunde & others to import drugs into the United States of America aboard a 'vessel' known as Axel D. The core of the conspiracy allegation is that Mr. Jacobi had agreed through Mr. Sunde to supply confidential information, which would assist the conspirators to avoid detection and prosecution. In particular, Mr. Jacobi's role in the drug importation allegedly consisted of informing Mr. Howard Marks, the principal organiser and manager of the Enterprise, as to the location of a 'surveillance bug' onboard a 'boat' named Axel D, which had been secretly planted by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration ( D.E.A. ).


29. The conspiracy case against Mr. Jacobi relies substantially, if not entirely, on assertions made by witness Mr. Sunde. Mr. Sunde's statements are not corroborated in respect of any material particular of the alleged offence. According to his own statements, Mr. Sunde worked with the Marks / Combes drug organisations from 1975 to 1986 acting as a "money courier, organising international smuggling routes and obtaining intelligence worldwide." In contrast, it was Mr. Jacobi while working as an undercover operative for the United States Customs Service who persuaded Mr. Sunde to co-operate with U.S. law enforcement authorities to break the international drug ring.


30. Sunde was later indicted on a charge of conspiracy arising out of his long-time involvement with the drug trafficking ring. On 23 March 1991, he pled guilty to conspiring with Mr. Marks to distribute hashish. On 17 July 1991, he was sentenced to informal ( non-reporting ) probation for 5-years which was then 'suspended'. Mr. Sunde then left the United States and settled in Japan. He received an incredibly lenient sentence, notwithstanding his admission that he had been involved in high-level drug trafficking for a period of 11-years.


31. The evidence suggests that in or around March 1991 Mr. Sunde was facing prosecution on serious charge and that he then presented the U.S. authorities with the allegations against Mr. Jacobi. It is likely that Sunde made a deal with the Government authorities and that part of the deal involved him making a statement to the effect that in 1986 he and Mr. Jacobi had jointly sold information to the drug trafficking ring.


32. On 29 March 1991 (which was seven days after pleading guilty to the above offence), Mr. Sunde was charged with Mr. Jacobi on a separate indictment to engage in drug trafficking. There is no evidence suggesting that Mr. Sunde has been prosecuted on this indictment.


33. I am informed by Mr. R. Jacobi and verily believe that he detests drug dealers and has spent a great deal of his life working against them. Mr. Jacobi has been a confidential source to the United States Customs authorities providing information about drug dealers including the Marks/Combes drug organisations of which Mr. Sunde was a member. Mr. Mark Bastan of the United States Customs stated in an affidavit dated 21 December 1993 that the information supplied by Mr. Jacobi to U.S. Customs Special Agent Larry Ladage led to the seizure of more than 4,800 pounds of hashish in December 1984.


HONG KONG EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS


34. On 27 July 1991, Mr. Jacobi was arrested in HongKong on a provisional arrest warrant issued on the same date and based on the above-mentioned U.S. indictment. Mr. Jacobi's arrest occurred 10-days after the German court had rejected his extradition to Switzerland on a charge of 'economic espionage'.


35. On 1 July 1992 the Honourable Peter White, Hong Kong Magistrate, rejected the extradition of Mr. Jacobi from Hong Kong to United States on a single count of conspiracy to import and distribute hash. Annexed hereto and marked with the letter "DC16A" is a true and accurate copy of the decision of the Hong Kong court dated 1 July 1992.


36. The Hong Kong court rejected the extradition of Mr. Jacobi on the ground that "there was insufficient evidence in the affidavits of the witness Mr. Sunde upon which a properly instructed jury could convict." The court noted that no weight could be properly attached to the evidence of Mr. Sunde because his "evidence had been given in a careless manner and included basic and significant allegations of which little or no sense can be made."


37. An examination of the affidavits of Mr. Sunde dated 13 August 1991, 27 September 1991, 27 December 1991 reveals inconsistencies concerning critical facts. Attached hereto and marked with the letters "DC17A" "DC18A" and "DC19A" are true and accurate copies of the affidavits of Mr. Sunde which were submitted to the Hong Kong court in the extradition hearing.


38. During the Hong Kong extradition hearing in June 1992 and July 1992, a Mr. Cheung Wing Lok Ronald of HongKong gave evidence that he had known Mr. Sunde for approximately 10-years and that he was aware that Mr. Sunde was working with a group of Japanese businessmen who were working with Mrs. Imelda Marcos to protect the gold deposits secreted in a Swiss bonded warehouse by former President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. He claimed that in February 1991 Mr. Sunde told him that he was to appear before a Grand Jury in the United States and that it was very important that he involve Mr. Jacobi in those proceedings because:

(a) It would ameliorate his sentence; and,

(b) It would help the Japanese group to protect Mrs. Marcos' interests in Switzerland.

Mr. Cheung also gave evidence that Mr. Sunde had sought to entrap Mr. Jacobi by sending faxed messages so as to get Mr. Jacobi to travel to Zurich where it was hoped that he would be arrested by the Swiss authorities. Attached hereto and marked with the letters "DC20A " and "DC21A" are true and accurate copies of two affirmations by Cheung Wing Lok Ronald both dated 2 June 1994, which were presented to the Hong Kong court.


39. The relationship between Mr. Sunde, the Swiss authorities and the U.S. authorities at this point of time has never been fully explored, but suffice to say that Mr. Sunde appeared to be assisting District Attorney Peter Cosandey in his efforts to capture Mr. Jacobi and destroy the investigation into the secret Marcos accounts in Switzerland.


AUSTRALIA EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS


40. On February 23, 1994 the United States made a request to the Australia government for the provisional arrest of Mr. R. Jacobi based on the same charge of drug trafficking as he had faced in Hong Kong. Although Mr. Jacobi was living openly on the Gold Coast, Queensland, and was travelling into and out of Australia under a passport in his own name, no attempt was made to arrest him for 5-months that is until 26 July 1994.


41. On 6 September 1994 the United States Government made a request of the Australian Government to extradite Mr. Jacobi to the United States.


42. The affiants relied on by the United States Government in its request of the Australian Government for Mr. Jacobi's extradition were the same as those that the United States Government had relied on in its failed request to extradite Mr. Jacobi from Hong Kong. In the Australian extradition hearing the United States Government presented only one affidavit of Mr. Sunde dated 13 January 1994. This affidavit is nearly exactly the same as the third affidavit, which Mr. Sunde had sworn on 27 December 1991 for the Hong Kong extradition proceedings. The United States government did not present to the Australian court the material in Mr. Sunde's affidavits dated 13 August 1991, and 27 September 1991, which the Hong Kong court had relied on in its finding that no weight could be attached to Mr. Sunde's evidence.


43. Because of a procedural limitation under section 19(5) of the Australian Extradition Act 1988, the defence are not permitted to tender any evidence from a "fugitive" to contradict an allegation that he has engaged in criminal conduct. That is the American allegations of criminality are assumed to be correct and cannot be challenged by the defence; for example, by producing contradictory evidence even out of the mouth of the prosecution's own witnesses. The effect of this rule is that Mr. Jacobi was not entitled to tender in the Australian extradition preceding any of the inconsistent and contradictory affidavits of Mr. Sunde, which had previously been presented, to the Hong Kong court. Nor was Mr. Jacobi entitled to present other evidence, such as the evidence of Mr. Cheung, which attacked the credibility of Mr. Sunde's evidence.


44. On 31 May 1995 the Honourable Mr. Owens, Stipendiary Magistrate, held that Mr. Jacobi was eligible for surrender to the United States of America. This decision was reversed on appeal to the Federal Court of Australia. In a judgment dated 8 November 1996, Mrs. Justice S. Kiefel of the Federal Court rejected the United States request to extradite Mr. Jacobi and awarded Mr. Jacobi costs against the United States Government. Attached hereto and marked with the letter "DC22A" is a true and accurate copy of the extradition judgment of Mrs. Justice Keifel dated 8 November 1996.


45. It is nearly unheard of for an Australian court to reject an extradition request by the United States authorities based on the merits of the case. Under the Extradition Treaty between Australia and the United States, the court must find that the facts provide "reasonable grounds to believe" that the alleged offence was committed by the person whose extradition is sought. This test for extradition is much weaker than the Hong Kong "prima facie evidence" requirement. Despite this low threshold test, despite the fact that hearsay evidence was admissible in the extradition proceeding, and despite the limitations imposed on the defence, the Australian Federal Court rejected the United States extradition request. The Federal Court noted that the version of events as narrated by the alleged co-conspirator, Mr. Sunde, were "wholly uncorroborated "and "bizarre" and that his description of the events contained "too many strange and unexplained features for it to engender any belief." The Court went on to give detailed reasons as to why "there is nothing provided (in the U.S. extradition material) to give the story of Sunde reliability or credibility in any important respect."


CONTINUING UNITED STATES INTEREST IN MR JACOBI


46. The U.S. indictment and extradition cases raise serious questions as to the bona fides of the continued United States government's action against Mr. Jacobi, which may be summarised as follows:


(a) The courts of Hong Kong and Australia have rejected the United States extradition requests because of the failure of the US prosecutor to satisfy a low threshold of proof. The United States has failed to produce anything, which is reliable. The failure to obtain corroborative evidence of key elements of Mr. Sunde's evidence after seven years of investigation is a reflection of the profound weakness of the United States case.. This also explains why the United States government did not appeal against the adverse decisions of the Hong Kong and Australian courts;


(b) Prior to making of the extradition request of Australia, the United States had ample opportunity of obtaining additional material, if it existed, to buttress its case against Mr. Jacobi. Furthermore, the United States authorities have not made a second extradition request of Australia, even though there is no legal obstacle to making such a request backed by new evidence;


© The United States did not include in its extradition case in Australia the material in Mr. Sunde's affidavits dated 13 August 1991 and 27 September 1991 which contain inconsistencies and discrepancies which were relied upon in the Hong Kong extradition case The conduct of the American authorities may be viewed as an exploitation of section 19(5) of the Extradition Act 1988 in that the Australia courts were prevented from receiving the earlier affidavits of Mr. Sunde and that of Mr. Cheung;


(d) Mr. Howard Marks, the key drug trafficker who Mr. Jacobi is alleged to have conspired with, was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment pursuant to a plea bargain agreement with the United States authorities. Although Mr. Marks was released after serving less than half that sentence, he did not assist the US authorities in giving evidence against Mr. Jacobi. Indeed, Mr. Marks in his autobiography called "Mr. Nice" published in 1996 refer to his dealings with Mr. Sunde but fails to mention Mr. Jacobi. Furthermore, Mr. Marks gives a different version of the critical meeting between him and Mr. Sunde in London when the conspiracy is alleged to have been hatched. Mr. Marks states at pages 315-317 of his book that Mr. Sunde arrived unexpectedly at his home in London and informed him of the location of the radio transmitter installed by the DEA. Mr. Marks states that he paid Sunde $50,000 on the spot for the information but does not refer to any agreement to pay Sunde and/or Jacobi a share of the proceeds of the drug shipment. Without such an agreement, there can be no drug conspiracy;


(e) Mr. Jacobi's lawyers have collected significant material showing that Mr. Sunde's testimony is perjurious. They have made various formal and informal approaches to the US authorities and offered a proffer and other information concerning Mr. Jacobi's knowledge of the relevant events. On numerous occasions Mr. Jacobi's US lawyers have requested the US authorities to review the file, but this has not happened even though there is overwhelming evidence that the charges are unjust, oppressive and totally devoid of any merit;


(f) Mr. Jacobi has offered to voluntarily return to the United States to assist the United States authorities in its investigation provided that he gets bail and is allowed to travel. This offer has not been accepted. Mr. Jacobi's U.S. lawyers have advised that if Mr. Jacobi voluntarily returns to the United States, he will not get bail from a Miami court unless he puts up substantial assets. Mr. Jacobi is not in a financial position to put up a bond worth millions of dollars. Consequently, he has been advised that it is likely that he may be incarcerated for up to 6-months while waiting for a trial. Mr. Jacobi is not prepared to sit in an American jail for 6 months and then be told that the U.S. government is not proceeding with the case because, for example, Mr. Sunde is not prepared to testify. Mr. Jacobi's U.S. lawyers have been informed that because of his "extradition victories" the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. prosecutor want Jacobi to be "punished";


(g) A number of statements have been made, including one made by Mr. Sunde to a journalist, and at least one statement by a United States Department of Justice officer to a US attorney acting on behalf of Mr. Jacobi, to the effect that the extradition of Jacobi is not being sought for the purpose of prosecution on the Sunde allegations, but for other purposes. Attached hereto and marked with the letter "DC23A" is a true and accurate copy of the affidavit of Attorney Thomas Frey dated 22 November 1991.


47. The US authorities have deliberately blackened Mr. Jacobi's name by alleging that he has used a number of aliases presumably as a means of escaping justice. In the extradition request of Mr. Jacobi, the U.S. authorities state that Mr. Jacobi's aliases include Rex Johnson, Rolf Koenig, Dirk Stoffberg and Herbert Solomon.


48. I am informed by Mr. Jacobi and verily believe that he has only used aliases for legitimate purposes. For example: the name Rex Johnson was assigned to Mr. Jacobi by U.S. Customs District Director Ladage, who requested him to undertake a sensitive operation on behalf of the U.S. government. The name Rolf Koenig was assigned to Mr. Jacobi by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration for another operation.


49. The most dishonest claim is that Mr. Jacobi has used the aliases, Dirk Stoffberg and Herbert Solomon. The United States authorities are aware that the so-called alias Mr. Dirk Stoffberg was never used by Mr. Jacobi but that Mr. Stoffberg, a South African arms dealer, used Mr. Jacobi's name as his alias. The background to this matter is that Reiner Jacobi was requested by US Customs to carry out a sting operation against Mr. Stoffberg who was suspected of smuggling nuclear triggering devices to "rogue states", in particular Iraq. Mr. Stoffberg discovered Mr. Jacobi's role in the sting operation and in retaliation then used Mr. Jacobi's name to commit a series of crimes, including threatening a US Customs officer with violence, arms and fraud offences. On 24 April 1991 the United States authorities sought the arrest and extradition of Dirk Stoffberg (aka Reiner Jacobi, Rex Johnson, Ralph Koenig, Herbert Solomon) from Germany in relation to violations of the arms embargo to Chile. Mr. Stoffberg was eventually extradited to the United States and pled guilty to arms violations. PCGG'S BASELESS CLAIMS OF ESTAFA


50. The PCGG has recently claimed that Mr. Jacobi has misused his agreement with the Philippines Government to improperly raise money. This claim is not based on fact and is plainly wrong. The former Chairman of the PCGG, Chairman Gunigundo, authorised Mr. Jacobi to raise money for the purpose of "financing the project" and in particular the accounts at UBS under client account number 885931. As far back as 11 June 1996 Chairman Gunigundo authorised the raising of monies by Mr Jacobi because the PCGG had no budget. Consequently, Mr. Jacobi hired and paid for the professional fees of a Swiss lawyer for the purpose of assisting the PCGG in developing a strategy to recover the secret Marcos assets. In my Affidavit (No3) sworn at today's date I have set out these matters in greater detail.


51. Over a ten-year period Mr. Jacobi has provided intelligence and investigatory services to the PCGG without charging or receiving any fees from the Philippines Government and without claiming expenses. And what has Mr. Jacobi received for his work? He has been subject to a campaign of vilification and character assassination for carrying out his side of his contractual bargain, namely to identify and trace the secret assets of the Marcoses.

Affiant further says naught.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this ______ day of September 1999 David A Chaikin SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me in the City of Manila this ______ day of September 1999.

Reference

http://web.archive.org/web/20030628072458/www.marcosbillions.com/marcos/DCAF2.DOT

[Jan Klimkowski]

Carsten - I corresponded with Gunther Russbacher for a couple of years, and managed to blag my way into an Austrian prison to see him when Russbacher, or a version of Russbacher, was incarcerated there.

That whole October Surprize thing is, to steal a phrase:

"a riddle, wrapped in a question, locked inside an enigma."

Something very real and treacherous happened there.

But one needs several Texas chainsaws to slice through the layers of disinformation. :listen:

[Carsten Wiethoff]

This is absolutely fascinating.

What of this story are you willing to reveal, or have revealed somewhere already?
And how were you yourself connected to this case, what was your motivation and how did you know about the case?

The world never seizes to surprise me...

Carsten

[Carsten Wiethoff]

Found it. Thanks for the info.
Read it. Stunning.

Carsten

[Jan Klimkowski]

I've filmed surgery to remove a deep brain tumour, conducted by a world class doctor.

To get to the brain, the skull has to be drilled, sliced, carved open. It's highly skilled carpentry.

After the hard, rigid, coconut shell is cracked, the gooey, sloppy, brain matter - the seat of intelligence and perhaps the soul - is exposed and vulnerable.

Whomever Gunther Russbacher may have been - uber ONI agent, Hapsburg love child, elite insider, fantasist and bullshitter - They opened up his skull and rewired his brain, without any need for carpentry.

No clamps.

No drill.

No saw.

In the prison, an Austrian shrink, with top secret clearance, had a look inside Russbacher's mind and attempted to perform what one might term industrial espionage.

This shrink tried to steal the technological expertise that had been wired into Russbacher's brain.

In fact, quite a few very spooky shrinks knew how to open the door.

Jane Ryder - do you know who she is? - claims she took Russbacher to see Amnesty International in London. According to Jane, Amnesty had a man who knew how to get in there.

Trouble was, he couldn't get out again....

tickyman:

[Carsten Wiethoff]

Found also:

Pigeon Point Publishing's

VIDEOS

Checks Payable to:
Pigeon Point Publishing
P.O. Box 1784 Aptos, CA 95001-1784
Telefax 831-462-3949
(For Each $10.00, add $1.00 for shipping and handling)

The Mystery
Of a Covert Criminal Conspiracy
As related by Captain Gunther Russbacher
U.S. Navy Intelligence, C.I.A.
To Alexander Horvat, Publisher, Probe Magazine

For the first time, you will see Gunther Russbacher Topics include:

• The death of Paul Wilcher, which had recently occurred
  
• How the CIA funds its Black Ops through money shuffling
  
• Twenty year bogus bonds that are the reserve part of CIA banks and savings and loans
  
• Savings and Loans started by the CIA based on zero funds
  
• Unlimited money supply which is FDIC secured
  
• The Federal Reserve's 7-1 borrowing program. If you have one million dollars in your bank, you can borrow 7 million
  
• The story of his capture in SE Asia while trying to rescue POW's. It was at the height of the Paris negotiations, and Kissinger gave the North Vietnamese, the details of the mission. He was a POW for 18 months, and brutally tortured. The lack of fing ernails, which is shown at the beginning of the tape, is due to having them repeatedly ripped out with pliers.
  
• Terrorists used by the CIA to influence foreign elections
  
• The New World Order and their Anti-gun policy
  
• The Bildebergers
  
• NAFTA and slave labor
  
• Ross Perot
  
• Factions within the Intelligence Community
  
• The United Nations
  
• The Knights Templars
  

Over 90 minutes long. This tape should be in the library of every serious CIA researcher. Russbacher candidly lays open the entire covert side of the CIA. It is truly a tape you will not forget. You will be surprised by the information and details he give s.

1 Tape $20.00 + $4.00 Shipping

Also available from the Human Rights Foundation:

The Short Road to Chaos and Destruction

An Expose of the Federal Reserve by Gunther Russbacher
$5.00 + $1.00 Handling

The AmeriKan Gulag

RMNews Profiles Three PolitiKal Prisoners Congressman George Hansen, American Patriot Maynard Cambell and Navy Captain, Gunther Russbacher. Over 60 pages long.
$7.00 + $1.00 Shipping

Credit Card orders CALL 800-400-1999 or order online from the Human Rights Foundation

1 Tape $20.00 + $4.00 Shipping

We're Losing Our Country

1 Tape $10.00

The Obergon Chronicles

The video tape of the lecture by Rayelan Russbacher at the 1997 Global Sciences Conference

1 Tape $20.00

Seems like Jan was not the only person in contact with Russbacher.
I am still unsure what to make of some of the stories I read. Maybe that's by design.
Did anybody see that tape?

Back to the original topic of Dirk Stoffberg, because of his relation to the death of Rainer Barschel:

Dirk Stoffberg obviously said something of value to the committee investigating the October Surprise, because he was set free for it shortly afterwards. I would like to know, what exactly he said. So I need the report
"October Surprise Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran"
(102-0125) 1992.

It's available from the printing office, supposedly, but I did not find an online source. If someone knows, please advise.

I also found a very critical look on the whole story, by Frank Snepp.
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_cr/...ctober.htm
Still, the involvement of the German Der Spiegel, and of Ari ben-Menashe and Stoffberg amazes me.


Peace
Carsten

[Carsten Wiethoff]

Re: Jan

I did not know about Jane Clyde.
Now I read http://www.rumormillnews.com/clyd.htm.

:hmmmm2: