09-06-2013, 04:28 PM
"Kennedy's experiences with Gullion may have formed his national sovereignty views"
The book has been out for over six months, and some have not read it yet.
The Gullion meeting in Saigon in 1951 is the jumping off point for the book. One of its central keystones.
And one of the reasons I wrote the volume was to counter JFK and the Unspeakable. As much as I liked that book, I did criticize it for insinuating that the Missile Crisis somehow "turned" Kennedy.
Jim Douglass may not have meant that, but his second publisher picked that as the tag line for the trade paperback edition.
IMO, that is just wrong. And it distorts the record. So this is why in the first four chapters of my book I painstakingly show that the key event in Kennedy's political consciousness evolution was the meeting with Gullion. And, in fact, one of the goals of the book was to make Gullion's name commonplace in any discussion of Kennedy. Since, in my view, it is a disgrace that he was not even mentioned in any assassination book until the Douglass tome.
I then trace Kennedy's rhetorical battles with the Dulles brothers in the fifties, and then show how IN 1961 Kennedy broke with the foreign policy consensus. In fact, I have a chapter subhead with that title. And as Albert notes in his review, I outline snapshots of the three major areas this happened in that year: Laos, Congo, Indonesia.
Then at the end of the book, to show just how bad LBJ was in foreign policy, I demonstrate how things went back to the Dulles view, after JFK's assassination, in those three places. With horrible results for the people in those three countries.
So in addition to countering disinfo about Garrison for the 50th, the book is meant to counter disinfo about who Kennedy really was.
The book has been out for over six months, and some have not read it yet.
The Gullion meeting in Saigon in 1951 is the jumping off point for the book. One of its central keystones.
And one of the reasons I wrote the volume was to counter JFK and the Unspeakable. As much as I liked that book, I did criticize it for insinuating that the Missile Crisis somehow "turned" Kennedy.
Jim Douglass may not have meant that, but his second publisher picked that as the tag line for the trade paperback edition.
IMO, that is just wrong. And it distorts the record. So this is why in the first four chapters of my book I painstakingly show that the key event in Kennedy's political consciousness evolution was the meeting with Gullion. And, in fact, one of the goals of the book was to make Gullion's name commonplace in any discussion of Kennedy. Since, in my view, it is a disgrace that he was not even mentioned in any assassination book until the Douglass tome.
I then trace Kennedy's rhetorical battles with the Dulles brothers in the fifties, and then show how IN 1961 Kennedy broke with the foreign policy consensus. In fact, I have a chapter subhead with that title. And as Albert notes in his review, I outline snapshots of the three major areas this happened in that year: Laos, Congo, Indonesia.
Then at the end of the book, to show just how bad LBJ was in foreign policy, I demonstrate how things went back to the Dulles view, after JFK's assassination, in those three places. With horrible results for the people in those three countries.
So in addition to countering disinfo about Garrison for the 50th, the book is meant to counter disinfo about who Kennedy really was.