23-12-2009, 11:09 PM
(This post was last modified: 24-12-2009, 03:26 AM by James H. Fetzer.)
About the nature of knowledge, in its ordinary sense, knowledge is defined as warranted, true belief. Belief is what we take to be the case. When a belief is true, it is the case. Our only way to judge, however, is on the basis of evidence and logic to determine if the evidence is sufficient to warrant the belief, in which case it may be treated as "knowledge".
Knowledge claims in matters empirical--about the contents and events of the world and its history--are incapable of being known with certainty. When we come to discussing aspects of the assassination, including the identities of those seen in photographs taken in the plaza, we are not going to be able to determine their identities with certainty.
This means that empirical knowledge is both fallible (it can still be false, even when we have ample proof that it is true) and tentative (since the discovery of new evidence or alternative hypotheses may require that we revise our conclusions), which are never beyond the possibility of empirical disproof. There is no way around this.
On the other hand, we may be able to rule some identifications out on the basis of known features of those who are involved. That appears to be the case here, when Jack has ruled out the identification of Mainman with Robert Adams on the basis of multiple differences in their features, including the shapes of their heads and distances between their brows.
Before I go further, I should explain that there are two (or three) kinds of warrants. Some are DEDUCTIVE, where given the evidence -- typically, in the form of sentences that describe it, which are known as "premises" -- the conclusion (hypothesis, conjecture, or whatever at stake as described by another sentence) cannot be false if the premises are true.
These kinds of arguments are conclusive. Simple examples include "2 + 2" equals "4", "If John is a bachelor, then John is unmarried; and John is a bachelor; therefore, John is unmarried"; or "If we assume that the bullet entered here (at the base of the back of the neck), pass through without hitting any bony structures (which is anatomiically impossible), and came out here (just above the necktie), then this wound (in the front of the neck) would qualify as a wound of exit"!
Others, however, are INDUCTIVE, where the given evidence provides support for the conclusion but is not conclusive. Speaking generally, if the conclusion of an argument does not follow from the meaning of the words involved or the grammar of those sentences ALONE, as is the case with the examples I have given, then it will not qualify as deductive.
Reasoning about matters of fact is inductive and therefore inconclusive. Examples include reasoning about the future based upon the past, from samples to populations, and from the observable to the unobservable. Even if every observed rabbit has been white, that may make it probable that all rabbits are white but it does not make that conclusion certain.
Perceptual inference is "narrowly inductive", since inferences are being drawn that have more content than the sensations upon which they are based, yet their inductive risk is typically restricted to narrow portions of space and time, such as the appearance of a figure heading toward you on the street.
Taking that figure to be a friend of yours, you may hurry up and call out a greeting, only to discover, as they approach closer, that their features no longer resemble those of your friend -- and their voice may reinforce your realization that you were wrong. You simply committed a mistake, which was exposed by the acquisition of further evidence.
The most important part about inductive reasoning is that, unlike the case of deductive, the content of the conclusion goes beyond the content of the premises. This is the case with regard to photographs, too, where making a positive identification involves inferring from "It looks like Conein" to "It is Conein", which is obviously an ampliative inference.
The principles of reasoning that apply here are the same as those in other inductive contexts. The strength of the evidence for hypothesis h, given evidence e, is equal to the probability of e, assuming that h is true. The relative preferability of hypotheses is dependent upon their likelihoods.
The probability that the image looks like Conein when it is Conein is very high. The probability that the image looks like Conein when it is not Conein is typically very low. A strikingly similar-looking person, such as Robert Adams, raises the probability from very low to their degree of similarity.
When one hypothesis has a higher likelihood -- because, if it were true, the probability of the evidence would be greater than its probability would be on the alternative -- it is preferable. And when sufficient evidence become available, then the preferable hypothesis is also acceptable -- in the tentative and fallible fashion of science.
It follows from the principle of identity that x and y are identical if and only if they share every property in common at each instant of their lives. So I Conein had a hair cut the day before the assassination and Conein is Mainman, then the same must be true of Mainman. If Conein wore a hat on a certain occasion, then so too must have Mainman.
If one of them did wear such a hat or have such a haircut but the other did not, then they cannot be the same person. More importantly, if their faces do not have the same structure, then -- absent plastic surgery or the use of facial disguises -- they cannot be the same person. This turns out to be the case with respect to Mainman and Adams, as Jack has shown.
From (1.5), we know Adams has a long face, long chin, and left ear top-in, while Mainman has a square face, short chin, and left ear top-out. That is also true of Conein, who has a square face, short chin, and left ear top-out.
From (2), we learn that he hairline peaks do not match, since Adam's peak is an odd shape and does not point to his nose. Conein's peak points to his nose, but he seems to have more hair than Mainmain. Adams' left ear does not flare out at the top, but Mainman and Conein's left ears flare out.
From (3), also learn that the supranasal ridge of Adams is about twice as wide as on Mainman and that his left ear is vertical, while Mainman has a left ear that flares out the the top. Adams has wide flaring nostrils, while Mainman does not.
Since hair can easily be cut (it's called a "haircut") but the supernasal ridge, the general features of the face (absent plastic surgery) and of the left ear are (more or less) permanent features, Jack has adduced more than enough proof that Adams is not Mainman -- nor Conein, for that matter.
When Allan Eaglesham asserts that Adams is a "dead ringer" for Mainman, he is thereby ignoring the evidence that Jack has provided and that I have now reiterated for the third or the fourth time. Adams has a long face, long chin, and left ear top-in, while Mainman, like Conein, has a square face, short chin, and left ear top-out.
They are clearly not the same. Moreover, Adam's peak is an odd shape and does not point to his nose. Conein's peak points to his nose, but he seems to have more hair than Mainmain. Adams' supranasal ridge is about twice as wide as on Mainman and Adams has wide flaring nostrils, while Mainman does not.
What is there about these differences that Eaglesham does not understand? For him to persist in his claim that Adams is Mainman -- much less that Adams is Conein, which I took to be a Freudian slip -- he must be ignoring the obvious differences between them (in which case he is incompetent) or he is aware of them but asserting the opposite (in an apparent endeavor to deceive). They are obviously not "dead ringers"!
Jack's work is empirical and could be mistaken, but I can find no reason to think that is the case. The principle of identity is fundamental to logic. So the differences that Jack has discovered are sufficient to falsify the claim that Mainman is Adams. We also have a phony plaque, which suggests that someone is trying to pull a fast one. If we apply logic to the evidence, it follows that Adams is not Mainman and Eaglesham is wrong.
One could continue to argue as to whether the evidence to conclude that Mainman is Conein is sufficient, but there are striking similarities. Indeed, in the absence of a reasonable alternative, the evidence appears to make that inference the clearly preferable hypothesis. What those who would deny this inference need is a reasonable alternative explanation.
It is always possible to hold out for more proof. If there are eight points of similarity in fingerprints, for example, you could hold out for eight more. If there are major points of comparison between Mainman and Conein, you could hold out for more. But even those who knew him, such as Fletcher Prouty, have concluded that Mainman is Conein. And that they have said their identifications are not certain does not discount them.
If we are waiting for certainty in matters of this kind, we will be waiting forever. It is not possible for empirical conclusions to enjoy the kind of certainty that deductive arguments possess. We must therefore be very circumspect in dismissing conclusions on the ground that they are not certain. Certainty in cases of this kind is not possible.
Before I address the possible identities of those at the Ambassador Hotel, I would like to know if there is any serious disagreement with anything I have said here. So far as I can tell, there is nothing wrong with what I have explained. So if there is a disagreement, I would like to know the nature of that disagreement.
Knowledge claims in matters empirical--about the contents and events of the world and its history--are incapable of being known with certainty. When we come to discussing aspects of the assassination, including the identities of those seen in photographs taken in the plaza, we are not going to be able to determine their identities with certainty.
This means that empirical knowledge is both fallible (it can still be false, even when we have ample proof that it is true) and tentative (since the discovery of new evidence or alternative hypotheses may require that we revise our conclusions), which are never beyond the possibility of empirical disproof. There is no way around this.
On the other hand, we may be able to rule some identifications out on the basis of known features of those who are involved. That appears to be the case here, when Jack has ruled out the identification of Mainman with Robert Adams on the basis of multiple differences in their features, including the shapes of their heads and distances between their brows.
Before I go further, I should explain that there are two (or three) kinds of warrants. Some are DEDUCTIVE, where given the evidence -- typically, in the form of sentences that describe it, which are known as "premises" -- the conclusion (hypothesis, conjecture, or whatever at stake as described by another sentence) cannot be false if the premises are true.
These kinds of arguments are conclusive. Simple examples include "2 + 2" equals "4", "If John is a bachelor, then John is unmarried; and John is a bachelor; therefore, John is unmarried"; or "If we assume that the bullet entered here (at the base of the back of the neck), pass through without hitting any bony structures (which is anatomiically impossible), and came out here (just above the necktie), then this wound (in the front of the neck) would qualify as a wound of exit"!
Others, however, are INDUCTIVE, where the given evidence provides support for the conclusion but is not conclusive. Speaking generally, if the conclusion of an argument does not follow from the meaning of the words involved or the grammar of those sentences ALONE, as is the case with the examples I have given, then it will not qualify as deductive.
Reasoning about matters of fact is inductive and therefore inconclusive. Examples include reasoning about the future based upon the past, from samples to populations, and from the observable to the unobservable. Even if every observed rabbit has been white, that may make it probable that all rabbits are white but it does not make that conclusion certain.
Perceptual inference is "narrowly inductive", since inferences are being drawn that have more content than the sensations upon which they are based, yet their inductive risk is typically restricted to narrow portions of space and time, such as the appearance of a figure heading toward you on the street.
Taking that figure to be a friend of yours, you may hurry up and call out a greeting, only to discover, as they approach closer, that their features no longer resemble those of your friend -- and their voice may reinforce your realization that you were wrong. You simply committed a mistake, which was exposed by the acquisition of further evidence.
The most important part about inductive reasoning is that, unlike the case of deductive, the content of the conclusion goes beyond the content of the premises. This is the case with regard to photographs, too, where making a positive identification involves inferring from "It looks like Conein" to "It is Conein", which is obviously an ampliative inference.
The principles of reasoning that apply here are the same as those in other inductive contexts. The strength of the evidence for hypothesis h, given evidence e, is equal to the probability of e, assuming that h is true. The relative preferability of hypotheses is dependent upon their likelihoods.
The probability that the image looks like Conein when it is Conein is very high. The probability that the image looks like Conein when it is not Conein is typically very low. A strikingly similar-looking person, such as Robert Adams, raises the probability from very low to their degree of similarity.
When one hypothesis has a higher likelihood -- because, if it were true, the probability of the evidence would be greater than its probability would be on the alternative -- it is preferable. And when sufficient evidence become available, then the preferable hypothesis is also acceptable -- in the tentative and fallible fashion of science.
It follows from the principle of identity that x and y are identical if and only if they share every property in common at each instant of their lives. So I Conein had a hair cut the day before the assassination and Conein is Mainman, then the same must be true of Mainman. If Conein wore a hat on a certain occasion, then so too must have Mainman.
If one of them did wear such a hat or have such a haircut but the other did not, then they cannot be the same person. More importantly, if their faces do not have the same structure, then -- absent plastic surgery or the use of facial disguises -- they cannot be the same person. This turns out to be the case with respect to Mainman and Adams, as Jack has shown.
From (1.5), we know Adams has a long face, long chin, and left ear top-in, while Mainman has a square face, short chin, and left ear top-out. That is also true of Conein, who has a square face, short chin, and left ear top-out.
From (2), we learn that he hairline peaks do not match, since Adam's peak is an odd shape and does not point to his nose. Conein's peak points to his nose, but he seems to have more hair than Mainmain. Adams' left ear does not flare out at the top, but Mainman and Conein's left ears flare out.
From (3), also learn that the supranasal ridge of Adams is about twice as wide as on Mainman and that his left ear is vertical, while Mainman has a left ear that flares out the the top. Adams has wide flaring nostrils, while Mainman does not.
Since hair can easily be cut (it's called a "haircut") but the supernasal ridge, the general features of the face (absent plastic surgery) and of the left ear are (more or less) permanent features, Jack has adduced more than enough proof that Adams is not Mainman -- nor Conein, for that matter.
When Allan Eaglesham asserts that Adams is a "dead ringer" for Mainman, he is thereby ignoring the evidence that Jack has provided and that I have now reiterated for the third or the fourth time. Adams has a long face, long chin, and left ear top-in, while Mainman, like Conein, has a square face, short chin, and left ear top-out.
They are clearly not the same. Moreover, Adam's peak is an odd shape and does not point to his nose. Conein's peak points to his nose, but he seems to have more hair than Mainmain. Adams' supranasal ridge is about twice as wide as on Mainman and Adams has wide flaring nostrils, while Mainman does not.
What is there about these differences that Eaglesham does not understand? For him to persist in his claim that Adams is Mainman -- much less that Adams is Conein, which I took to be a Freudian slip -- he must be ignoring the obvious differences between them (in which case he is incompetent) or he is aware of them but asserting the opposite (in an apparent endeavor to deceive). They are obviously not "dead ringers"!
Jack's work is empirical and could be mistaken, but I can find no reason to think that is the case. The principle of identity is fundamental to logic. So the differences that Jack has discovered are sufficient to falsify the claim that Mainman is Adams. We also have a phony plaque, which suggests that someone is trying to pull a fast one. If we apply logic to the evidence, it follows that Adams is not Mainman and Eaglesham is wrong.
One could continue to argue as to whether the evidence to conclude that Mainman is Conein is sufficient, but there are striking similarities. Indeed, in the absence of a reasonable alternative, the evidence appears to make that inference the clearly preferable hypothesis. What those who would deny this inference need is a reasonable alternative explanation.
It is always possible to hold out for more proof. If there are eight points of similarity in fingerprints, for example, you could hold out for eight more. If there are major points of comparison between Mainman and Conein, you could hold out for more. But even those who knew him, such as Fletcher Prouty, have concluded that Mainman is Conein. And that they have said their identifications are not certain does not discount them.
If we are waiting for certainty in matters of this kind, we will be waiting forever. It is not possible for empirical conclusions to enjoy the kind of certainty that deductive arguments possess. We must therefore be very circumspect in dismissing conclusions on the ground that they are not certain. Certainty in cases of this kind is not possible.
Before I address the possible identities of those at the Ambassador Hotel, I would like to know if there is any serious disagreement with anything I have said here. So far as I can tell, there is nothing wrong with what I have explained. So if there is a disagreement, I would like to know the nature of that disagreement.