Coup Underway in Turkey

[Magda Hassan]

Curious how that fake article about the Boston Bomber getting attacked in jail surfaced about this time. Just saying.

[Paul Rigby]

Henry Barkey is the co-author of a book with Graham Fuller titled Turkey's Kurdish Problem - although the spelling is presented as Henri J Barkey (HERE). And HERE is the genuine Henri J Barkey. His bio, brief as it was, shouted CIA to me, so a quick Google effort was called for.


Apparently Henri Barkey is a former CIA type and his wife, Helen is a highly placed officer in the CIA.

Adding an interesting twist to the story is ScottNet website, which has a story credited to Istanbul police saying that both Fuller and Barkey were involved in the planning of the coup and that Barkey used to be CIA:

Turkey names second American coup plotter, CIA's Henri Barkey, held secret meeting in Istanbul on night of coup



Yeni Safak
Tue, 26 Jul 2016 16:58 UTC

Henri J. Barkey, former CIA personnel and the current Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, known as the policy maker for U.S. authority, was the second top American figure who orchestrated the coup attempt in Turkey.

According to Istanbul Police's Intelligence, Counter Terror, Cyber Crime and Criminal Units, Barkey was holding a meeting with 17 top figures, most of them foreign nationals, at a hotel on Istanbul's Princes Island on July 15, the day of the failed coup attempt in Turkey.

Barkey was staying in the Splendid Hotel, which was used as a British Military Headquarters during the days of occupation in 1919, between July 15 and 17.

According to the hotel management, Barkey had held a meeting that lasted hours in a special room.

"Barkey and his entourage had been holding a meeting 'till the morning on July 16 in a special room. They have been following the coup attempt over TV channels," the hotel personnel told police.

They said that Barkey welcomed the attendees of the meeting, most of them either foreign policy analysists or academicians, in groups of two or three persons at the hotel entrance.

After receiving all guests, they went into a special room and held the "secret" meeting, according to police.

Meanwhile, Barkey also told the hotel management, "I will make a live interview with CNN International at 4 p.m. and with Voice of America at 6 p.m.," requesting them to arrange "all necessary infrastructure."

Barkey was accused of making several telephone conversations on the coup night.

The police units, who launched a search operation in the hotel, said Barkey was carrying an ex-model cell phone void of internet connection technology, as well as a laptop and smart phone.

Police are investigating the "log" registrations of internet connections and computers of the hotel.

CCTV footage of the hotel, roads and the island's piers are also being investigated.

The coup attempt on July 15, which has been foiled by popular resistance, was organized by a group of Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) members who infiltrated the Turkey's military.

Fetullah Gülen, the U.S.-based leader of FETÖ who has been working with the CIA for several years to design Turkey's political arena, was the mastermind of the coup attempt and Turkey demands his extradition from the U.S.

In early statements, the U.S. repeated denied Turkey's allegations and rejected the extradition request. And now, the U.S. authority is trying to protect him by indicating to form an international commission rather going through direct legal process.

Following the failed coup attempt, millions of Turkish nationals, regardless of their religious identity, political views and ethnic background, are standing united against the coup plotters as well as FETÖ terror group.

All political parties voiced their solidarity with the government and urged the U.S. to extradite Gülen and support Turkey's legal process against coup plotters.

Main squares and streets across the country are filled with people from every age and parts of the society, as they continue celebrating in the evenings the victory of Turkish democracy for the 11th day.

But Barkey tried to cast a shadow on the victory of Turkish people, government and democracy.

"This is a coup attempt where you have no winners. Everybody loses, including the government that survived it," he told the American National Public Radio (NPR) at 3.30 a.m. local time on July 16 from Istanbul.

He also accused that Turkey would be enter in a more chaotic environment though the country entered into a more strong and more democratic environment.

"But I will submit to you that this president [ErdoÄŸan] has been weakened much more now. Even though he will probably have extra constitutional powers, he's weakened, because the face that he projected of an impregnable confident leader is now not there anymore. So he's will be looking over his shoulder all the time. He's going to be less trusting. He already was not trusting of the opposition. I suspect that relations will become much tenser in Turkey, and he will not be able to govern with consensus. Instead, he's going to be governing more and more by dictate, and that is..." he said.

Barkey, an academic from Pennsylvania University, is widely known in Turkey with his book "Turkey's Kurdish Question," which he prepared with former CIA vice chairman, Graham Fuller.

Fuller is also known for his unfaltering support to Gülen and his organization, for he requested the U.S. authority not to extradite Gülen to Turkey.

Barkey has been toiling on recent developments in Turkey and the Middle East. He met PKK terror leader Abdullah Öcalan in Italy and suggested him to stay there before being arrested by Turkey's authority.

His wife Elen Barkey has been working in a high position in the CIA for several years.

Source

Besides writing a book with Graham E Fuller, Barkey has written an article with Morton Abramovich who was earlier also named as a former CIA officer and one of those who signed for Gulen to get his Green Card in the US (HERE).

Have a snifter on me for that lot.

No, make it the bottle.

[David Guyatt]

Being somewhat precognitive, I had a couple of glasses last night on account.... ::

[Drew Phipps]

From the "Delicate Operatons" article:

Some forgot, that on the eve of the putsch, Russian geopolitician and Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin was on a several-day visit to Turkey. His presence on the evening of July 15th at a Turkish airport, is perceived as a fun coincidence that doesn't deserve attention. But in fact he was in Turkey as a guest of Turkish nationalists-Eurasianists of the organization "Ergenekon", which a decade ago tried to overthrow Erdogan. The organization consists of Turkish military-Eurasianists, most of whom were then rounded up by the Turkish authorities to jail. Aleksandr Dugin was again in Turkey, just before "Ergenekon" members were arrested. What a coincidence!

You got to wonder why Erdogan didn't heap blame on the Russians for the coup.

You also have to wonder why a "CIA guy leading the "coup"" (Barkey) would need to watch it unfold on CNN (You know, that's exactly how I got my information about the coup, right here in Texas...), or why he would need the hotel to arrange a phone call to CNN when he had a cell phone, a smart phone, and a laptop (I have a cell phone, a smart phone, and a laptop...), especially in light of the ominous fact that he was "accused of making several telephone conversations on the coup night." (I'm pretty sure I did that too...)

[Peter Lemkin]

Henri J. Barkey

Henri J. Barkey is a visiting scholar in the Carnegie Middle East Program and the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor at Lehigh University.

He served as a member of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff working primarily on issues related to the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and intelligence from 1998 to 2000. He has taught at Princeton, Columbia, the State University of New York, and the University of Pennsylvania.

Barkey has authored, co-authored, and edited five books, among them Turkey's Kurdish Question with Graham Fuller, Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, and most recently, European Responses to Globalization: Resistance, Adaptation and Alternatives.

His opinion editorials have appeared in Newsweek, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Daily Star, and Los Angeles Times, and he is a frequent guest on the Newshour with Jim Lehrer and NPR.

Published on: July 18, 2016
THE TURKISH COUP
The Gang That Couldn't Shoot StraightHENRI J. BARKEYThe coup failed, and Erdogan survived, but the events of July 15 left only losers in their wake.

The failure of the attempted Turkish coup portends both good and bad news for the future of Turkish democracy. The good news is that the coup failed and the Turkish body politic stood its ground. But that's about it. The bad news is that the government will try to overcompensate by accelerating the pace of constitutional changes that may make Turkey's less democratic.
The coup attempt was a half-baked idea by a conspiratorial group within the military that clearly relied on hope as much as on action in their push for regime change. The rebellious officers, who may have been motivated by rumors of a major purge of officers at an upcoming Military High Council meeting in August, assumed that other units would join once they took to the streets and skies. It was quite evident from the start that they were poorly organized; if you want to coup, the first thing you need to make sure of is precisely where the country's leadership is situated.It was clear from the beginning that they had no clue where the civilian leadership was. (However, the plotters did manage to arrest the military leadership.) Also, as in past coups they went directly to the official state television network to broadcast their message, forgetting that there are myriad news outlets that could continue to broadcast undisturbed. Worse, these officers didn't have a strong command of their own history: In the early 1960s, junior officers twice tried to overthrow the government and their fellow senior officers only to find that they had no support.Military coups, successful or unsuccessful, are severe body blows to a country's political make-up. Years later, as with wounds that never properly heal, they continue to hurt the body politic by altering everyone's behaviorfrom politicians down to ordinary citizens. All past Turkish coups have had the unintended result of ensuring that the outcome the officers least wanted would be realized. This time, too, the military personnel will end up strengthening Erdogan in the short term.However, the most important outcome of this coup is that there were only losers on the night of July 15. The military's internal weaknesses have been exposed; its top echelon missed the warning signs, and now an anti-military mob mentality has taken over in a small segment of the population.Erdogan has survived this coup attempt but does not come out unscathed. His aura of invincibility has taken a blow. He thought he had tamed the military dragon, which had overthrown four Turkish governments since 1960. He will naturally worry that this could happen again and, as a result, will calibrate his policies accordingly. This will mean that the purges in the bureaucracy, the military, and even in society will pick up pace. There is an opportunity for him to be magnanimous and acknowledge that society and the political opposition stood behind the constitutional order, thus mending fences with his political opponents. His behavior of late, however, as well as that of his closest advisors and the bulk of the Turkish press that supports him, points to this being an unlikely outcome.What does this mean for Turkey's foreign policy? Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim were quick to blame their former ally, the Pennsylvania-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, as the mastermind of the coup. Gülen, who has a vast network of followers in Turkey and abroad, is thought to have triggered the corruption charges against Erdogan, his family, and allies when tapes were leaked in 2013 backing up allegations of official misconduct. Ever since, Erdogan has tried to get Gülen extradited from the United States to be charged as a member of a terrorist organization. One expect that in coming months the calls for extradition will increase in volume and stridency. Because it is the courts, not the Executive Branch, that by and large will make the decision, we can expect U.S.-Turkish relations to take a hit.For the United States, the stakes are quite high: Turkey is a NATO ally and more. The two are cooperating to defeat the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). They do, however, vehemently disagree on methods: Turkey stridently objects to the U.S. alliance with Syrian Kurds, so far the most effective fighting force against ISIS. The Syrian Kurds are anathema to Ankara because of their alliance with the Turkish Kurds, who are in open revolt against Turkey. We should expect the conversations between American and Turkish officials to get far more acrimonious in the months to come. Even if it's likely that the two sides will eventually find a modus vivendi, the terrorist attacks in Nice, Istanbul, and Brussels remind everyone that there is no time to waste in the fight against ISIS.The good news is that the gang that could not shoot straight failed, but the damage done and the potential for more will continue to overshadow not just Turkish domestic politics but also its relations with the outside world.
Henri J. Barkey is the Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center. The views expressed here are his own.

Accused expert Henri J. Barkey was actually invited to Ä°stanbul by officials
27.07.2016 19:54 BÄ°RGÃœN DAÄ°LY
Henri J. Barkey had been claimed by pro-AKP news sources to be the secret service agent of CIA behind the coup attempt but it has been revealed that they had invited him to the Princes' Island themselves. A writer in Karar newspaper, Dr. Akgün, who talked to Barkey in the island on that night, said: "How could they make up these kinds of fantasies? It's really saddened us that Barkeyhas been put in this position because of his identity."
TWEET PAYLAÅž +


DERVÄ°Åž CEMAL
Henri J. Barkey, who had been claimed by pro-AKP media as being a secret service agent of CIA behind the July 15 coup attempt, has been reported to have been invited to İstanbul by officials close to the current administration. News sources such as Yeni Şafak, Star, Akşam, Sabah, and Haber 7 had alleged on their frontpages for days that Barkey had fled Turkey and gone to Greece. However, it has been explained that Barkey was actually invited by a group of officials and professionals to a conference at the Princes' Islands, where Kültür University Associate ProfessorMensur Akgün, who is a Karar newspaper writer known for his affinity to the government, had also attended.
Dr. Akgün said he could not make any sense of the claims spread by certain sources and the media in support of the current government about Barkey being the name behind the foreign connection of the coup attempt.
Yes, Barkey was indeed at the Princes' Island on that night
In his statement, Akgün said the meeting at the Princes' Island had actually been held, on the first anniversary of the treaty signed for nuclear disarmament of Iran, in order to evaluate the situation in the region, adding that the claims reported after the meeting, where Wilson Center's Middle East expert Henri J. Barkey had attended, were nonsense. Akgün also explained that the meeting had been arranged previously but been postponed due to certain complications in Turkey; then, by coincidence, it was held on that night. Furthermore, Akgün added that the topic of the meeting was not on Turkey.
People went up to their rooms and watched the news about the coup attempt
Akgün shared further details, stating: "The meeting did not start on Friday evening, though it has been claimed to be so. It started in the morning on Saturday but we met there on Friday evening. Actually, we were even a little late. People dined at two separate tables, then, at around 22:00, my wife called me and said there is a coup.' I said, No' but then it was understood. So, I and, other people, too, I assume - went up to our rooms and started watching the news. We got up the next morning and held our program as planned. I started off the first session on Saturday morning; gave a speech; and, then, left there in order to write my report. Actually, we thought about cancelling the meeting but there were too many people who had come from abroad for it. So many experts from around the world were together and we were to release a report after the meeting; so, we thought it would be more appropriate to continue with the program. Of course, people were really worried. There was a coup attempt; and, the airport was attacked and shut down. They were thinking about how they were going to fly back. The participants were not only from America. There were participants from Afghanistan, as well. Actually, a very important Saudi expert was also to attend but he cancelled it at the last minute. From Turkey, Şaban Kardaş and Bayram Sinkaya were there,too.
It saddened us that Barkey was accused'
Akgün pointed out that although he was not listed in the program, Sinkaya came, with his wife who was on vacation, adding, "because, he works on Iran. The names there were those who are important in the field of Middle East. The meeting was held with these people but then we felt really saddened because of the accusations on Henri Barkey after the meeting was finished."
Akgün expressed that he has submitted an official disclaim and will file a lawsuit against those have released such reports, putting himself, the school, and the participants in a difficult situation.Akgün said he thinks someone from a news-source made the wrong connection between an article published on the newspaper and the meeting; then, the allegations spread. He added, "Supposedly, I were to threaten the government".
Of course, he will speak'
Pressing that such thing does not fit Turkey's media, Akgün expressed, "Considering the situation that Turkey is now in, we must be talking about much more serious things. Where could we go with these unreal fantasies? It was nothing but a completely technical meeting. It took place at a hotel in Princes' Islands and the doors were open. Participants sat together with all other people. What is the secret about it? Plus, the people we've held the meeting with are experts. How could they make up such fantasies? Also, Henri Barkey is an expert on the Middle East from Wilson Center. Of course, he will speak. If there had been a coup at that time, of course, people would call him up and talked to him. But what he had said does not matter to me."
He left after staying for four days
It has been proved through official records that the moderate Islam' theoretician Barkey, who often praises Gülen, had arrived in İstanbul on July 15, the day of the coup attempt and left after staying for four days. According to the records from Atatürk Airport, Barkey arrived in İstanbul at 10:24 on July 15th and departed at 04:05 on July 19th. It's been reported that Barkey stayed at the Princes' Islands during these days and held several meetings in İstanbul.
Barkey, who does have connections with CIA, talked to several people during his stay at the Princes' Islands Splendid Palace. Those names included Iran expert at International Crisis Group Ali Vaiz; Egyptian researcher Ahmet Morsy; Middle East expert at Yıldırım Beyazıt UniversityBayram Sinkaya, and Kültür University lecturer Prof. Dr. Mensur Akgün.
Who is Barkey?
Henri J. Barkey is a moderate Islam' theoretician who has personally given reference for FethullahGülen to receive green card from the USA. Having been in close connections with the Gülenists,Barkey has been often attending meetings at the organization's schools, especially in the Middle East. Originally from İzmir and born in İstanbul, Barkey speaks Turkish fluently, at the level of a native-speaker; he had previously caught attention for his statements where he said Gülen has no ties with the CIA.' Barkey is also a close friend of Graham Fuller, a former CIA agent who had also given reference for Gülen to receive a green card.
Source: http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/darbenin-arkasindaki-isim-dedikleri-cia-ci-barkey-i-adaya-kendileri-cagirmis-121752.html

[Magda Hassan]

From the "Delicate Operatons" article:

Some forgot, that on the eve of the putsch, Russian geopolitician and Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin was on a several-day visit to Turkey. His presence on the evening of July 15th at a Turkish airport, is perceived as a fun coincidence that doesn't deserve attention. But in fact he was in Turkey as a guest of Turkish nationalists-Eurasianists of the organization "Ergenekon", which a decade ago tried to overthrow Erdogan. The organization consists of Turkish military-Eurasianists, most of whom were then rounded up by the Turkish authorities to jail. Aleksandr Dugin was again in Turkey, just before "Ergenekon" members were arrested. What a coincidence!

You got to wonder why Erdogan didn't heap blame on the Russians for the coup.

You also have to wonder why a "CIA guy leading the "coup"" (Barkey) would need to watch it unfold on CNN (You know, that's exactly how I got my information about the coup, right here in Texas...), or why he would need the hotel to arrange a phone call to CNN when he had a cell phone, a smart phone, and a laptop (I have a cell phone, a smart phone, and a laptop...), especially in light of the ominous fact that he was "accused of making several telephone conversations on the coup night." (I'm pretty sure I did that too...)

::bluebaron:: Surely just checking out the air base that Erdogan had offered to share with the Russians?

[David Guyatt]

From the "Delicate Operatons" article:

Some forgot, that on the eve of the putsch, Russian geopolitician and Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin was on a several-day visit to Turkey. His presence on the evening of July 15th at a Turkish airport, is perceived as a fun coincidence that doesn't deserve attention. But in fact he was in Turkey as a guest of Turkish nationalists-Eurasianists of the organization "Ergenekon", which a decade ago tried to overthrow Erdogan. The organization consists of Turkish military-Eurasianists, most of whom were then rounded up by the Turkish authorities to jail. Aleksandr Dugin was again in Turkey, just before "Ergenekon" members were arrested. What a coincidence!

You got to wonder why Erdogan didn't heap blame on the Russians for the coup.

Maybe it was because it was the Russians warned him the coup was going to happen and that warning meant he was able to evade capture...

You also have to wonder why a "CIA guy leading the "coup"" (Barkey) would need to watch it unfold on CNN (You know, that's exactly how I got my information about the coup, right here in Texas...), or why he would need the hotel to arrange a phone call to CNN when he had a cell phone, a smart phone, and a laptop (I have a cell phone, a smart phone, and a laptop...), especially in light of the ominous fact that he was "accused of making several telephone conversations on the coup night." (I'm pretty sure I did that too...)

Well, let me see... Since we're hypothesizing, how about:

1) The White House often watch fast-moving events unfold on CNN and other news channels. And, blimey! so do the CIA too, I think. Public perception is critical to the success of a covert operation. Hence the floated false story that Erdogan had fled to Germany.

2) CNN and some of its reporters are fairly well known to be very "cooperative" with - and agents for - the CIA (see HERE). And, of course, Operation Mockingbird (HERE) factors into this.

3) Setting up a sophisticated and tamper free communications network away from a CIA station, or a US military base, or an embassy etc, is fraught with difficulties and would almost certainly create an immediate and glaring fingerprint to the domestic and foreign intelligence listening stations that perpetually monitor the airwaves. It's far safer and more sensible to monitor breaking events via a commercial network like CNN, especially for a covert operation where deniability is an absolute requirement.

4) Speaking about watching the airwaves, it was the Russian listening station in Syria who picked up unusual signals traffic that alerted them that a coup was imminent and give a warning to Erdogan.

Btw, Barkey's got a Twitter page. Perhaps you should ask him? But I don't know how anyone might be able to judge the reliability of his replies.

He was born in Turkey btw and speaks fluent Turkish.

[Drew Phipps]

I don't do Twitter, or any other social media for that matter. Contributing to this forum is as far into that brave new world as I am willing to go.

[David Guyatt]

From Dani Rodrik's blog:

JULY 23, 2016

Is Fethullah Gülen behind Turkey's coup? (with update)

If what Erdogan said on TV today is correct, there is no longer much doubt about the answer to this question. According to Erdogan, the officers who detained the chief of general staff, Hulusi Akar, on July 15 offered to put Akar in contact with Gulen. As of this writing, Akar has not made any statements confirming this. (See update on this at the end of this entry.) But if he does, it will be manifest that responsibility for the coup attempt reaches all the way to Pennsylvania. It will be very difficult for the U.S not to extradite Gulen, subject, of course, to (some huge) fair trial concerns back in Turkey.
What evidence, other than Erdogan's word, is there that Gulen is behind the coup attempt?
Years ago when my wife Pinar Dogan and I first began to investigate the bogus documents in the Sledgehammer case, we were stuck by how quick many observers were at assigning blame: "it's the Gulenists' work of course," they would say, "this is the kind of thing they do." We did not know much about the Gulen movement at the time. So we hesitated, and in our early writings we listed Gulenist involvement as only one of the possibilities.
Over time, we learned a lot. The evidence that Gulenists were heavily involved in and quite likely stage managed Sledgehammer and many other similar sham trials accumulated. By now it should be clear to any objective observer that the Gulen movement goes much beyond the schools, charities, and inter-faith activities with which it presents itself to the world: it also has a dark underbelly engaged in covert activities such as evidence fabrication, wiretapping, disinformation, blackmail, and judicial manipulation.
In late 2013 the fight between Erdogan and the Gulen movement became public. Ever since, the AKP has purged suspected Gulenists from many state institutions and closed down their largest media and business operations. There was one state institution which had remained immune from these purges: the army. Perhaps because the top brass were reluctant to relive a trauma similar to the Ergenekon-Sledgehammer, none of the suspected Gulenists in the military had been touched.
But that was about to change. In the run-up to the July 15 coup attempt, a few officers were detained for allegedly fabricating evidence in the infamous Izmir espionage case. There were indications that a much larger sweep was being readied. And rumors were flying that in August's Supreme Military Council meeting a large number of Gulenists would be finally be discharged.
Traditionally, Turkish coups are produced by Kemalist secularists. But hardline secularists have lost their control of the military thanks to the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials during 2008-2011, which led to their imprisonment and discharge. Their ranks had been filled by officers more pliant to Erdogan (and, in all likelihood, to Gulen himself). An analysis by Hurriyet's Sedat Ergin found that a disproportionate number of the new appointees were involved in the July 15 coup attempt.
It is possible that many remaining Kemalist officers below the very top ranks still harbored considerable animosity towards Erdogan. But another consequence of Ergenekon and Sledgehammer was that these trials shattered any sense of secularist solidarity and esprit de corps in the military. They sowed fear and suspicion among the ranks: you couldn't tell who was informing on whom and had to watch your back. I find it inconceivable that a cabal of Kemalists would have been foolhardy enough to get together to plan a coup, and even if they did, that they would not have been found out by Gulenists hiding among them.
And in any case, there was no reason for Kemalists to act now or to rush into what was clearly an ill-planned coup. The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer verdicts had been reversed and Erdogan had long distanced himself from these trials, explicitly acknowledging they were plots against the military. Erdogan was also reversing many of his foreign policy actions that must have grated on the military: he had just reconciled with Russia and Israel and was pulling back on Syrian adventurism. Before the coup, there was not the slightest hint of tension between the government and the military establishment.
For its part, the Gulen movement has a long history, going back to the 1980s, of trying to place its sympathizers in the military ranks. And while the high command systematically tried to purge them, it is quite likely that the Gulenists were able to outwit them. To evade suspicion, Gulen is said to have instructed his sympathizers to go to great lengths, including not letting their wives wear the headscarf a telltale sign of religiosity in Turkey and even to drink alcohol. The steady stream of document leaks that enabled the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, as well as the mysterious way in which investigations of these leaks have been blocked, also suggests the presence of a large number of Gulenists in the military.
All of this points to the Gulen movement as the immediate culprit behind the coup attempt. Gulenists had both the capability and the motive to launch the coup. The timing just after military officers began to be detained and before a major sweep also supports this theory. Many have suggested that the Gulenists decided to move early and quickly because they learned that the impending sweep had been moved forward. This is plausible, and also helps explain why the coup attempt seemed rushed and poorly planned. Under this theory, the botched coup was a last-gasp, desperate attempt to reclaim their one final remaining institutional bastion and ensure their survival in Turkey.
My best guess is that the coup was planned and organized by Gulenists but that they were joined by quite a few others as well. The joiners may have had diverse motives: personal ambition, hatred of Erdogan, or simply the belief that they were obeying orders from the higher-ups.
One of the curious aspects of the coup attempt is that it had no public face or apparent leader. I know of no coup attempt, in Turkey or elsewhere, successful or otherwise, where a clear leader was not obvious or did not emerge very quickly. In Turkey, the clearest instances of failed coup took place in the early 1960s, and these attempts were spearheaded by a well-known renegade, Colonel Talat Aydemir.
This lack of a public face is a lot less anomalous from the standpoint of Gulenist modus operandi. Gulenists always prefer to operate in the shadows, behind the scenes, and never take direct ownership of operations they launch and control. They have never formed (or explicitly joined) political organizations or parties, even though they clearly have political aims, choosing to operate within existing political parties instead. In Ergenekon and Sledgehammer, the bogus documents that led to the trials were first leaked to a "liberal" newspaper (Taraf), which thereafter acted as a front. When public support for the trials waned, leading Gulenists kept arguing that it was Erdogan who pushed for the prosecutions.
Similarly, it looks like Gulenists were hoping to remain behind the scenes and have others appear as leaders if the coup were to succeed. The putchists asked chief of general staff Hulusi Akar to lead the coup before they detained him (he refused). The declaration they drafted and that was read on state TV has a definite Kemalist tone, which suggests they wanted to make it look like the typical secularist coup. They might have hoped to be the power behind the throne once the coup succeeded, just as they shaped a large part of Erdogan's agenda during 2007-2012.
Some of the evidence that has emerged since the coup also points to Gulenist involvement. Akar's aide-de-camp, who was among the putschists, has confessed to being a closet Gulenist. His testimony is tainted by the fact that he was apparently badly beaten after being captured, but it is quite detailed, names names, and rings true. One of the soldiers who tried to capture Erdogan in the hotel he was vacationing had a hand-written note on him with religious invocations attributed to "H.E." (an acronym for "Hoca Efendi," the appellation Gulen's disciples use for him). A police officer who had previously been removed on suspicions of being a Gulenist sympathizer was captured in one of the putschists' tanks, wearing military camouflage.
None of these pieces of evidence (or others presented by the pro-government media) is completely dispositive on its own especially with respect to Gulen's own culpability. There is always the possibility that this was a rogue, pre-emptive operation by a number of Gulenists along with others, carried out without the knowledge or blessing of Gulen. Gareth Jenkins, who knows the Turkish military perhaps even better than it knows itself, is inclined to think so and is skeptical that this was a Gulenist operation planned from the top.
Erdogan's claim about putschists' attempt to put Akar in touch with Gulen, if true, would of course belie this scenario. But beyond that, it is well known that the Gulen movement is a highly hierarchical organization. People who have followed it closely over the years (such as Hanefi Avci or Rusen Cakir) report that very few important decision take place without Gulen's blessing. There is certainly no tradition of autonomous, independent decision-making or dissent in the movement. It would be surprising if Gulenist officers had planned this on their own, without seeking at least the assent of their spiritual leader.
Then there is the objection that a violent military coup lies outside the modus operandi of the Gulen movement. This is true, and it is one of the things that made me cautious early on about Gulenist responsibility. Gulenists have engaged in a wide range of dirty tricks, but they have been rarely accused of armed action of explicit violence. Firing on unarmed civilians and bombing the parliament seems not the kind of thing that they would do. But then again, it is the first time that their sympathizers in the military have been called into action.
Gulenists may have eschewed assassinations in the past, but their past operations have not lacked ruthlessness. They have a disturbing record of targeting, slandering, harassing, imprisoning their perceived opponents military officers, journalists, police commissioners, politicians -- leading on a few of occasions to their deaths.
The case against Gulen is not shut and dried. There are many things about the coup attempt that remain unclear and mysterious. If the government has serious evidence beyond what I have discussed here, it has been very coy about releasing it and sharing it with the public.
At present, the argument that Gulen was the mastermind behind the coup attempt rests mostly on circumstantial evidence. But among all the scenarios that one could come up with, it remains the only one that makes at least some sense.
UPDATE: Since I wrote this, a journalist close to the AKP claimed that the officer who proposed to put Akar in contact with Gulen was General Hakan Evrim, commander of the air base that apparently served as the headquarters of the putschists. And newspapers have now published images of Akar's complete testimony to the prosecutors, in which Akar describes what happened when putschists descended upon his office. The relevant part of the testimony reads: "...upon which, Hakan Evrim said something along the lines of 'if you'd like we can put you in touch with our opinion leader [kanaat onderi] Gulen'. I rebuffed him by saying I wouldn't talk to anyone."
In Turkey, any and all kind of documentary evidence can be forged, and it is possible that these images are doctored as well. But they look real to me. And even though Akar is clearly beholden to Erdogan at this point, I doubt that the government would choose to put such words in his mouth. In all, the statement greatly strengthens the possibility of a direct link between putschists and Gulen.

BIOGRAPHY

I am an economist, and a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School. My most recent book is Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science (Norton, 2015). For my full bio and other publications, go to drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu.
I was born and grew up in Istanbul, Turkey. I still follow Turkish politics very closely, as you will find out if you spend any time with this blog.






And, of course, if Gulen was behind the coup it is inconceivable that the CIA didn't know and green-light it too...

[Dawn Meredith]

I don't do Twitter, or any other social media for that matter. Contributing to this forum is as far into that brave new world as I am willing to go.

And we're very glad you're here Drew. I remember back over twenty years ago now when I still did criminal defense in Travis county we would sometimes discuss the JFK assassination. I had no clue then just how much of an expert you were- or would become.

How time flies. You and (now judge) Mike Coffey were the two witnesses on our marriage license. 11/2 will be twenty years for Erick and me.

You really should do facebook. (I will never have a twitter a/c).

Dawn