21-11-2008, 02:33 PM
(This post was last modified: 21-11-2008, 03:56 PM by Charles Drago.)
Elsewhere, Nathaniel Heidenheimer has posed the question that comprises the title of this thread. I'd like to offer at least a partial answer by quoting from George Michael Evica's The 81 Promises: Contexts of the Crime.
Professor Evica's original pamphlet analyzed JFK's efforts to collect and address all of the promises he had made to the American people during the 1960 campaign. During the transition, President-elect Kennedy assigned this task to Richard Goodwin, who in turn created a number of task forces to complete the job.
The excerpt from 81 herein provided may be of value to Nathaniel.
What about regional versus state redevelopment?
This task force report was titled, blandly, "Area Development," but its text presented the first great government intervention since FDR between an often indifferent industrial complex and a less powerful citizenry. Relief for "personal hardship," food for the needy, and increased unemployment compensation were called for. Assistance was to be focused on children in an emergency public works projects drive, and still another task force was called for in this area alone. But jobs need employers, and the report urged the support of new industries in needy, often depressed areas.
"Area development" legislation was proposed that seriously disturbed the sluggish fifties-oriented Congress. Calls for laws supporting techincal assistance, loans for privately-financed new projects, loans and grants for public facilities, job training combined with subsistence allotments for workers in "distressed areas," a "secondary market for industrial mortgages," and more loan insurance were correctly perceived by the powerful as attempts to establish a large and significant economic welfare plan. And the bloated Pentagon felt the winds of change blowing in from the Kennedy task forces; federal procurement contracts and programs were to be placed in "substantial labor surplus" areas; high unemployment pockets were to get first crack at important Federal orders and purchases from private industry.
But the areas of physical need in the country were to be matched by attention to educational opportunities, and even a hint of what was called "equal" education for all must have set the country's racists' teeth on edge.
Training in job skills, placement support, examination in detail of "special employment problems," and that the unemployed be trained in and matched with the country's needs in highways, forest reclamation, parks, agricultural conservation, and fuels and minerals research and development were strongly argued, and, again recalling FDR, a domestic "Youth Conservation Corps" was called for. If private industry agreed to move to distressed areas, the government would be prepared to offer "special tax amortization" plans.
Finally the idea of united regions encompassing several states or parts of states was advocated, especially where "special regional development problems" were historically present: the Appalachian area, for example, stretching across eleven states. An "early warning system to detect the beginning of [negative economic] trends ... " was to be developed to forestall future Appalachian type disasters.
There is more. Much more.
As Professor Evica noted,
John F. Kennedy was reaching the people [on the issue of disarmament]. A victory in the 1964 election, a Congress more in concert with the vision of his 81 promises, was anticipated. And his arguments for nuclear disarmement, for detente with the Soviet Union, for peace, had helped energize important members of congress, led by Senator George McGovern.
Senator McGovern, working with Professor Seymour Melman of Columbia University, drafted the National Economic Conversion Act (to establish a National Economic Conversion Commission) and introduced it in the Senate on October 31, 1963. The legislation, McGovern reported, was "co-sponsored by thirty-one members of the Senate. Parallel bills were filed in the House of Representatives, notably under the leadership of F. Bradford Morse (R., Massachusetts) and William Fitts Ryan (D., New York)."
Conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy ... When have we heard about this pipedream in recent history?
Evica again:
But there was to be no peace issue in the 1964 campaign, and Senator McGovern's economic conversion for peace legislation was to be in serious jeopardy. Less than one month after the introduction of the National Economic Conversion bill, President John F. Kennedy was killed in a deadly crossfire ...
The [Johnson} Administration effectively stalled the McGovern peace legislation.
On June 22, 1964, at the bill's second and closing hearing ... [a] group of "official witnesses" from the Johnson Administration, ram-rodded by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, protested the bill's provisions.
... And we now know exactly why the peace initiative of Senator McGovern during the last month of JFK's life was so rudely rejected by the succeeding Johnson Administration. Six months prior to the faked Tonkin Gulf incident in August of 1964, [LBJ] had already been running covert military operations against North Vietnam. At the same time, Johnson was " ... planning to obtain a Congressional Resolution ... the equivalent of a Declaration of War."
I am currently working from Professor Evica's research notes to expand this work. I hope to complete and publish Beyond the 81 Promises during 2009.
Professor Evica's original pamphlet analyzed JFK's efforts to collect and address all of the promises he had made to the American people during the 1960 campaign. During the transition, President-elect Kennedy assigned this task to Richard Goodwin, who in turn created a number of task forces to complete the job.
The excerpt from 81 herein provided may be of value to Nathaniel.
What about regional versus state redevelopment?
This task force report was titled, blandly, "Area Development," but its text presented the first great government intervention since FDR between an often indifferent industrial complex and a less powerful citizenry. Relief for "personal hardship," food for the needy, and increased unemployment compensation were called for. Assistance was to be focused on children in an emergency public works projects drive, and still another task force was called for in this area alone. But jobs need employers, and the report urged the support of new industries in needy, often depressed areas.
"Area development" legislation was proposed that seriously disturbed the sluggish fifties-oriented Congress. Calls for laws supporting techincal assistance, loans for privately-financed new projects, loans and grants for public facilities, job training combined with subsistence allotments for workers in "distressed areas," a "secondary market for industrial mortgages," and more loan insurance were correctly perceived by the powerful as attempts to establish a large and significant economic welfare plan. And the bloated Pentagon felt the winds of change blowing in from the Kennedy task forces; federal procurement contracts and programs were to be placed in "substantial labor surplus" areas; high unemployment pockets were to get first crack at important Federal orders and purchases from private industry.
But the areas of physical need in the country were to be matched by attention to educational opportunities, and even a hint of what was called "equal" education for all must have set the country's racists' teeth on edge.
Training in job skills, placement support, examination in detail of "special employment problems," and that the unemployed be trained in and matched with the country's needs in highways, forest reclamation, parks, agricultural conservation, and fuels and minerals research and development were strongly argued, and, again recalling FDR, a domestic "Youth Conservation Corps" was called for. If private industry agreed to move to distressed areas, the government would be prepared to offer "special tax amortization" plans.
Finally the idea of united regions encompassing several states or parts of states was advocated, especially where "special regional development problems" were historically present: the Appalachian area, for example, stretching across eleven states. An "early warning system to detect the beginning of [negative economic] trends ... " was to be developed to forestall future Appalachian type disasters.
There is more. Much more.
As Professor Evica noted,
John F. Kennedy was reaching the people [on the issue of disarmament]. A victory in the 1964 election, a Congress more in concert with the vision of his 81 promises, was anticipated. And his arguments for nuclear disarmement, for detente with the Soviet Union, for peace, had helped energize important members of congress, led by Senator George McGovern.
Senator McGovern, working with Professor Seymour Melman of Columbia University, drafted the National Economic Conversion Act (to establish a National Economic Conversion Commission) and introduced it in the Senate on October 31, 1963. The legislation, McGovern reported, was "co-sponsored by thirty-one members of the Senate. Parallel bills were filed in the House of Representatives, notably under the leadership of F. Bradford Morse (R., Massachusetts) and William Fitts Ryan (D., New York)."
Conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy ... When have we heard about this pipedream in recent history?
Evica again:
But there was to be no peace issue in the 1964 campaign, and Senator McGovern's economic conversion for peace legislation was to be in serious jeopardy. Less than one month after the introduction of the National Economic Conversion bill, President John F. Kennedy was killed in a deadly crossfire ...
The [Johnson} Administration effectively stalled the McGovern peace legislation.
On June 22, 1964, at the bill's second and closing hearing ... [a] group of "official witnesses" from the Johnson Administration, ram-rodded by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, protested the bill's provisions.
... And we now know exactly why the peace initiative of Senator McGovern during the last month of JFK's life was so rudely rejected by the succeeding Johnson Administration. Six months prior to the faked Tonkin Gulf incident in August of 1964, [LBJ] had already been running covert military operations against North Vietnam. At the same time, Johnson was " ... planning to obtain a Congressional Resolution ... the equivalent of a Declaration of War."
I am currently working from Professor Evica's research notes to expand this work. I hope to complete and publish Beyond the 81 Promises during 2009.