The truth and bare facts about the Bay of Pigs

[Scott Kaiser]

I had a long thought-out answer on how I would want to intelligently respond to Mr. Josephs remarks, I now have no need, Mr. Phipps, did just that.

I whole heartedly agree with Mr. Phipps when he says, "I feel quite certain that the real "plan" at the policy level allowed for both success or failure, and the planners would derive some benefit from either possibility."

I further agree with him when he says, "As far as the Bay of Pigs goes, it appears to me that, whether or not it was "designed" to fail, that it actually came fairly close to a "military success".

I don't believe that a plan is deliberately "designed" by anyone to fail, but in this case, it did.

I also believe, although, a few here may know exactly what I'm talking about, other's would much rather argue the case. And, I get it, but ask yourself, is it worth arguing over something that is really not the case?

I'm not talking about what part of the "plan" could've or would've been successful, that part of the conversation I was dug into. My point has always been that a plan is NOT deliberately "designed" to fail. I truly hope that Mr. Josephs understands what it is I'm trying to say without reverting back into time 5,000 years ago.

a plan is NOT deliberately "designed" to fail.

Unless, that person(s) are complete dumb ass-ets. Or, there is truly an anterior motive for the plan to fail. But, it the case of the Bay of Pigs, this plan was NOT deliberately "designed" for failure. And, I'm sure President Eisenhower would have disagreed, who knows, perhaps, if Nixon would have won the elections, would he have used the military to oust Castro from Cuba, something the world will never know.

[Scott Kaiser]

And, I also completely agree with Jim DiEugenio, I too believe that the BOP's is the prelude to the Big Event.

[David Josephs]

Or, there is truly an anterior motive for the plan to fail

Finally... progress.

[David Josephs]

[size=12]http://history.eserver.org/bay-of-pigs.txt

Immediately after the failed invasion, on[/SIZE]
April 22, Kennedy ordered Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the President's special military
representative, Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, Dulles,
and Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, to conduct a ful linvestigation of why
the invasion had failed. This was submitted on June 13,1961, but did not become
available to the public until twenty years later, when a transcript of the
report was published as a book called Operation Zapata (University Publications
of America, 1981). "Operation Zapata" was the code name for the invasion.
=====

Question: Did you regard the Joint Chiefs as defenders and spokesmen of themilitary aspects of this operation?

Burke: No. That's one of the unfortunate misunderstandings. We sent military
people over to CIA, but CIA gave the orders, and they had the people, and they
had control. We examined the plan and that was it.

==========
Shoup: ...The intelligence indicated that there were quite a number of people
that were ready to join in the fight against Castro (p.243)...My
understanding was that the possibilities of uprisings were increasing, that
people were just waiting for these arms and equipment, and as soon as they heard
where the invasion was that they would be coming after them(p. 245).

Question: The success of this operation was wholly dependent upon popular
support?

Shoup: Absolutely. Ultimate success (p. 253).

============


Question: Did somebody tell you there'd be 30,000 Cubans?
Gen. Shoup: No, they didn't, but we were getting materials ready for them (p.
253).
The intelligence Shoup refers to came from the CIA:

Question: Who gave you this information on the uprisings?

Shoup: I don't know. I suppose it was CIA. Well, it's obvious we wouldn't be
taking 30,000 additional rifles if we didn't think there was going to be
somebody to use them. I don't think any military man would ever think that this
force could overthrow Castro without support. They could never expect anything
but annihilation (p. 253). Lemnitzer also makes it clear that the CIA was the
source of information on the uprisings:

Question: What impression did the JCS have of the likelihood of an uprising?

Lemnitzer: We had no information. We went on CIA's analysis and it was reported
that there was a good prospect. I remember Dick Bissell, evaluating this for the
President, indicated there was sabotage, bombings and there were also various
groups that were asking or begging for arms and so forth (p.334).


Obviously, despite Dulles's denial, the CIA had convinced Rusk, McNamara, and
the Joint Chiefs that the uprisings were both likely and essential to the
success of the mission.

=============


What basis did the CIA have for this"information"? The Zapata Peninsula, where
the Bay of Pigs is located, was swampy, isolated, and uninhabited,so there
could have been no possibility of a spontaneous uprising, because no indigenous
Cubans would have seen the landing. Therefore, pre-invasion propaganda would
have been essential to prepare the Cuban people for what wasc oming. This was
the mission of 12 CIA-controlled radio stations in the region, including one on
Swan Island that had been set up in March 1960 by the infamous Gen. Edward
Lansdale. There were also supposed to be "extensive leaflet drops" on the day of
the invasion (Taylor's Memorandum 1, para. 38). According to Cuban sources,
however, writes Luis Aguilar in the introduction to Operation Zapata, "With the
pretext of secrecy, no clear explanation of the expedition's objectives was
given to the Cuban people, and no appeal was made to their anti-Communist
feelings" (xii). Indeed, it would have been quite a feat to let the Cuban people
know about the impending invasion without letting Castro know too, and as it
turned out, Castro was one of the first Cubans to hear about it. He had
thousands of potential opponents arrested on April 13, days before they even
heard about the coming invasion, thus quelling the"uprising" before it had a
chance to get started. The leaflets were not dropped either,because "the
military situation did not permit the diversion ofeffort" (Memo. 1, para. 38),
although as it turned out the planes that could have dropped them never took off
from Nicagagua.
====================

Question: What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful
lodgment but there was no uprising?

Sec. Rusk: In that case they would commence guerrilla operations, move into the
swamps and the into the hills. This swamp area was stated to be the home of
guerrillas.

Question: Was the point made that this area had not been used for guerrilla
operations in this century?

Sec. Rusk: I don't recall (p. 220).


Gen. Lemnitzer makes it clear that the CIA was the source of the plan:

It was our understanding of the plan without any doubt that moving into the
guerrilla phase was one of the important elements of the plan, and any idea that
the Chiefs considered that they were making a indefinite lodgment on the
beachhead is not right. Every bit of information that we were able to gather
from the CIA was that the guerrilla aspects were alwaysc onsidered as a main
element of the plan (p. 318).



Statement: The President had the same impression that you did --that if worse
came to worst, this group could become guerrillas, but as we've gotten into it,
it's become obvious that this possibility never really existed.

Lemnitzer: Then we were badly misinformed (p. 318).

======Lemnitzer: On the morning of D+2, I made a comment to the President that this
was the time for this outfit to go guerrilla.

Question: How were your comments received?

Lemnitzer: I received a surprise when Mr. Bissell said they were not prepared to
go guerrilla.

Question: This was the first time you'd known about that?

Lemnitzer: Yes (p. 330).

=========

Question: What was your impression of what would happen if the landing was made
but there were no uprisings?

Burke: It was my understanding that the landing force would go guerrilla. I
never knew they had orders to fall back to the beachhead. The first time I knew
that they were not prepared to go guerrilla was when Mr.Bissell made this point
on the night of D+1 (p. 331).

The troops, however, were told the opposite:

Question: Was there ever any mention of your becoming guerrillas?

Mr. Estrada: No, we had no plan to go to the mountains (p.296).

Question: Was there ever any talk, when it appeared thingswere becoming
critical, of going guerrilla?

Mr. Betancourt: Not that I know of. Question: During your training, was there
any talk of this?

Mr. Betancourt: No (p. 310).
============================
Dulles: I wouldn't wholly buy that. These people had a cadreof leaders--20
percent to 30 percent would be the leaders. They knew aboutguerrilla warfare.
The guerrillas in WW II never had any training until theygot into a guerrilla
operation.

===============
Question: Who was the proponent of the D-2 strikes, Allen? Idon't recall that
point.

Dulles: I think that it was partly in our shop and partlywith Mac Bundy, as I
recall. The idea of the defections--this was one of the keysto the idea that
the planes that were striking Cuban airfields were operatingfrom Cuba. I can't
say whether that limited strike concept was ever broughtover here [to the
Pentagon] or not. I think it must have been known to Gen.Gray, but I don't know
whether it was discussed in the Joint Chiefs (p.257). Hedoesn't know if it was
discussed by the military? Why was the military involved atall, then? What
Dulles says in this case is probably the truth: it was aCIA-Bundy plan. (The
feigned defections and the limited strike were the plan.)Interestingly,
however, Bundy does not even mention the D-2 strikes in hisletter to Taylor.

[Scott Kaiser]

Or, there is truly an anterior motive for the plan to fail

Finally... progress.

Why did I have a feeling you'd like that quote? I wonder, if I'm still misunderstood, I suppose so.
::pullhairout::

[Scott Kaiser]

You are so stuck on Bundy what makes you think that JFK didn't tell Bundy to call the CIA and cancel the air strikes? Not that it would have made a difference, the CIA had no more planes left anyways, but getting back to the cancellation, what makes you think that JFK didn't say something to Bundy to cancel them? Bundy would have had to pull some strings to have called the CIA and cancel the strikes, (on his own), and why do you suppose the CIA obliged to Bundy's request in the first place when Bundy is nothing more than a Security Advisor to the president who has NO jurisdiction over the CIA?

Things that make you go Hmmmm?

[Scott Kaiser]

President Kennedy may have initially looked to a strong Secretary of State to take charge of foreign policy-making, but turned to other strategies when it became apparent that the Department of State did not have sufficient authority over other departments. Kennedy, who preferred policy-making with ad hoc groups, dismantled Eisenhower's elaborate NSC machinery and allowed the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and his staff to assume the primary coordination role. Kennedy's freewheeling style tended to erase the distinction between policy-making and operations that President Eisenhower's regimented staff system so carefully observed.

[Scott Kaiser]

I believe that everyone here may now understand what it is I'm trying to say without coming here to teach or preach, including Jim. I also believe that Mr. Josephs is stuck on the plan rather than it's design, and I can understand that, but, both the plan and design all started under Eisenhower's administration. Problem is, Eisenhower's time was up, so the buck got passed. Don't think that I'm not truly sorry for what happened to JFK, and to see how it effected both my parents. Millions of Americans were effected in some way or another, I wasn't quite born yet, and even if I was, I could have only published the fact that I was born when it happened. My mother was seven months pregnant with me when it did happen, something she constantly reminds me about. No folks, I didn't come here to preach to anyone, only to share with you our experiences. I mean no disrespect to anyone here, and forgive me if I offended you, anyone. That was not my attention.

[David Josephs]

Scott.. please do not tell me or others what it is I mean to say or what my concentrations are... I am more than capable to do so on my own.
If these are your opinions of what I am saying, state it that way... you clearly do not speak for everyone here. thanks.

---

It is sad that you cannot be open enough to follow some of the info I've offered and incorporate it into your understand. Connecting dots takes work... work you obviously do not appear to want to perform.
That you do not know how the cancellation of those strikes occurred gives me great pause as to what else you've misunderstood and presented as general fact and your opinion.

Read my posts or not. When you or anyone wants to title a thread "The TRUTH AND BARE FACTS... " about anything... you really ought to offer some substantiating historical evidence..
or present it as your humble opinion... as that's how your posts all read on the BOP topic.

Do you have any evidence that JFK and Bundy conferred about the decision or not? Or do you simply dismiss the actuall events as they took place as propaganda?

why do you suppose the CIA obliged to Bundy's request in the first place when Bundy is nothing more than a Security Advisor to the president who has NO jurisdiction over the CIA?

Why indeed Mr Kaiser... why indeed. (if you bothered to read the "Bay of Pigs revisited" essay quoting the report on the BOP Failure, you wouldn't need to ask that question... )

In fact Mr Kaiser... how about going back and doing your homework before coming here and challenging us to believe you over history... this amazing thing called the INTERNET is your friend.
It will lead you to the SOURCES of information.... When opinion does not jive with the SOURCES.. it is your responsibility to debunk the SOURCES as we have done to the SOURCES within the WCR, HSCA and beyond....

The SOURCES were the conspiracy...


If what you read below is a fabrication or distortion of history as you understand it... please prove why you feel that way.
If it is not, please stop asking such ill-informed questions, while sitting at a computer, when in less than 5 minutes, you can base your posts on FACTS and not opinion.

K?

::


As he recalled in his autobiography, As I Saw It, Rusk (JFK SEC of STATE) did not have a good relationship with President Kennedy. The president was often irritated by Rusk's reticence in advisory sessions and felt that the State Department was "like a bowl of jelly" and that it "never comes up with any new ideas".

Mr. Kaiser, sure does appear as if Dean Rusk and McGoerge Bundy were not exactly serving the needs of their President in making those decisions without his consult... Does it not dawn on you that this was part of the "alterior motive" you eluded to in an earlier post and commented on when I quoted you? Hmmmm Cabell's name pops up alot, doesn't it.... Didn't he have a brother?

At about 9:30 P.M. on 16 April, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the
President, telephoned General C.P. Cabell of CIA to inform him that the dawn air
strikes the following morning should not be launched until they could be
conducted from a strip within the beachhead. Mr. Bundy indicated that any
further consultation with regard to this matter should be with the Secretary of
State (Memo. 1, para. 43).

General Cabell, accompanied by Mr. Bissell, went at once to Secretary Rusk's
office, arriving there about 10:15 P.M. There they received a telephone call
from [deleted reference to one of the brigade commanders] who, having learned of
the cancellation of the D-Day strikes, called to present his view of the gravity
of the decision. General Cabell and Mr. Bissell then tried to persuade the
Secretary of State to permit the dawn D-Day strkes. The Secretary indicated that
there were policy consideratons against air strikes before the beachhead
airfield was in the hands of the landing force and completely operational,
capable of supporting the raids. The two CIA representatives pointed out the
risk of loss to the shipping if the Castro Air Force were not neutralized by the
dawn strkes. They also stressed the difficulty which the B-26 airplanes would
have in isolating the battlefield after the landing, as well as the heavier
scale of air attack to which the disembarked forces would be exposed. The
Secretary of State indicated subsequently that their presentation led him to
feel that while the air strikes were indeed important, they were not vital.
However, he offered them the privilege of telephoning the President in order to
present their views to him. They saw no point in speaking personally to the
President and so informed the Secretary of State. The order cancelling the D-Day
strkes was dispatched to the departure field in Nicaragua, arriving when the
pilots were in their cockpits ready for take-off. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
learned of the cancellation at varying hours the following morning (Memo. 1,
para. 44).

------
Raised in Boston, Massachusetts, Bundy came from a wealthy family long involved in Republican[SUP][1][/SUP] politics. His mother, Katherine Lawrence (Putnam), was the daughter of two Boston Brahmin families listed in the Social Register. His father, Harvey Hollister Bundy, was from Grand Rapids, Michigan and was a diplomat who helped implement the Marshall Plan.
Bundy attended the elite Dexter School in Brookline, Massachusetts and then the Groton School, where he placed first in his class and ran the student newspaper and debating society. He was then admitted to Yale University, one year behind his brother William. At Yale, where he majored in mathematics, he served as secretary of the Yale Political Union and then chairman of its Liberal Party. He was on the staff of the Yale Literary Magazine and also wrote a column for the Yale Daily News. Like his father, he was inducted into the Skull and Bones secret society, where he was nicknamed "Odin". He remained in contact with his fellow Bonesmen for decades afterward.[SUP][2][/SUP] He graduated Yale in the class of 1940. During World War II he served as a U.S. Army intelligence officer.


Boston
Wealth
Republican
Brahmin
Yale
Skull and Bones
Army Intelligence
Calls off airstrikes
Tells AF-1 that Oswald did it alone and there is no conspiracy
Believes that US involvement in Vietnam was necessary and justified
Ford Foundation
Carnegie Corp
Council on Foreign Relations
Henry Stimson
John J McCloy
Cravath, Swaine and Moore....

[Scott Kaiser]

Mr. Josephs,

Everything I've said, for some reason has gone over your head, you seem to be out there in la-la land, I thought there could be a ray of hope, my mistake for thinking so, I apologize that you just don't get it.

I have said some things that only you have intentionally over looked, and may never understand, reading between the lines, I understand is not your forte.

What you think I haven't read, I have, what you think I haven't learned, I did, please stop with the notions of thinking I need to read, learn or understand everything you put out there, this is not new to me, and if you seem to think so, you're only fooling yourself.