25-09-2017, 10:43 PM
Henry Cabot Lodge had first cabled Washington demanding the removal of the John H. Richardson, the CIA's Saigon station chief, on 13 September 1963. In a UPI despatch published the following day by, among many others, the Washington Post, Saigon bureau chief Neil Sheehan had sought to portray the unnamed CIA station chief in Saigon as "the only civilian official still strongly in favor of going along with the Ngo family" and who was "opposed by most of the working level and staff of the CIA members here." This was devious - if Kennedy sacked Richardson, as Lodge demanded, the President could thus be portrayed as removing a major impediment to Diem's overthrow: Should he fail to, he could then be castigated as a President who betrayed his Ambassador but hardly sustainable or, in the event, sustained, despite the heroic endeavours of David Halberstam in his 1965 The Making of a Quagmire, where all the old CIA alibis for Richardson were trotted out by rote. The reality was, of course, the reverse, even by Richardson's own unreliable account of his relationship with Nhu, as reported by Malcolm Brown in the NYT on 8 October 1963. Here, Richardson was quoted as blaming Nhu for the August 23 move against the Buddhist temple armouries, with the unmistakable inference that the CIA station chief disapproved, and broke with Nhu as a consequence.
At least one American journalist, present in Saigon throughout the period in question, and quoted in Richardson's New York Times obituary, more or less concurred with this interpretation. After reprising the standard Agency guff concerning Richardson's initial alleged closeness to Nhu, the journalist conceded that Richardson "changed his mind" and "decided that the regime" was "impossible" prior to the August arrival of Lodge. The latter thus "forced Richardson to leave" a curious formulation not because he was an impediment to the coup, "but because Richardson was a kind of symbol of American support for Nhu." From lone American pillar of the regime to "a kind of symbol"? The name of the journalist contributor to Richardson's 1998 obituary sheds interesting light on the September 1963 claim that the CIA station chief was "the only civilian official strongly in favor of going along with the Ngo family": The very same Neil Sheehan.
The revised line on Richardson was hardly original to Sheehan. As with so much else in his work, it had its origins elsewhere, in this case, in the work of Halberstam, the Agency's Vietnam propaganda point-man. In his 1973 book, The Best and the Brightest, a work memorably characterised by Warren Hinckle as "one of the great bullshit books of all-time," Halberstam parenthetically claimed that "Richardson had been sent home at Lodge's request because he was too much of a symbol of the direct US relationship with Nhu." Earlier in the same work, Halberstam had reverted to the Malcolm Brown line of 8 October 1963. Richardson had cast off that alleged closeness to Nhu in the immediate aftermath of the pagoda raids, to become "a surprising advocate of a coup, and a prophet that the coup would come and come quickly." Richardson's son, in the course of a lengthy and emotional piece for Esquire, first denied that his father was at any time pro-coup, then admitted that his father had indeed changed his mind, but only "briefly in a moment of great pressure that he spent the rest of his life regretting." Who or what was responsible for this pressure was left unspecified.
The internal documentary record is not kind to Richardson fils' interpretation. On 26 August 1963, in the approach to the planned coup against Diem of 28/29 August, the station chief cabled Langley:
In short, when Lodge first demanded Richardson's dismissal in mid-September 1963, the latter was unquestionably pro-coup.
Not that Halberstam's 1973 depiction of Richardson was entirely consistent with his 1965 one, as contained in his much-hyped volume of that year on the Vietnam war, The Making of a Quagmire: "Nor is it true, at least during the time that I was in Saigon, that the CIA was in conflict with other parts of the mission, that it was foiling the plans of more honorable and better-behaved agencies. Indeed, just the opposite is true, and that was precisely the trouble: there was no conflict between the various elements of the mission at all." For the dutiful servant of totalitarian power, no somersault is too obvious or spectacular to induce embarrassment.
In fact, as Sheehan and Halberstam doubtless well knew, the Diem government had named Richardson as the leader of the abortive coup of 28/29 August 1963 in the early editions of the Times of Vietnam on 2 September 1963, an offence that saw the paper disappear from the streets within hours. Undeterred, the paper reprinted 6,000 copies of the 2 September edition a week later, on the ninth, whereupon its printing presses were smashed. (The paper's offices were again attacked in the immediate aftermath of the CIA's successful coup on 1-2 November.) Madam Nhu, in conversation with a German correspondent in the same period, had placed the station-chief's name at the top of the list of coup conspirators.
At least one American journalist, present in Saigon throughout the period in question, and quoted in Richardson's New York Times obituary, more or less concurred with this interpretation. After reprising the standard Agency guff concerning Richardson's initial alleged closeness to Nhu, the journalist conceded that Richardson "changed his mind" and "decided that the regime" was "impossible" prior to the August arrival of Lodge. The latter thus "forced Richardson to leave" a curious formulation not because he was an impediment to the coup, "but because Richardson was a kind of symbol of American support for Nhu." From lone American pillar of the regime to "a kind of symbol"? The name of the journalist contributor to Richardson's 1998 obituary sheds interesting light on the September 1963 claim that the CIA station chief was "the only civilian official strongly in favor of going along with the Ngo family": The very same Neil Sheehan.
The revised line on Richardson was hardly original to Sheehan. As with so much else in his work, it had its origins elsewhere, in this case, in the work of Halberstam, the Agency's Vietnam propaganda point-man. In his 1973 book, The Best and the Brightest, a work memorably characterised by Warren Hinckle as "one of the great bullshit books of all-time," Halberstam parenthetically claimed that "Richardson had been sent home at Lodge's request because he was too much of a symbol of the direct US relationship with Nhu." Earlier in the same work, Halberstam had reverted to the Malcolm Brown line of 8 October 1963. Richardson had cast off that alleged closeness to Nhu in the immediate aftermath of the pagoda raids, to become "a surprising advocate of a coup, and a prophet that the coup would come and come quickly." Richardson's son, in the course of a lengthy and emotional piece for Esquire, first denied that his father was at any time pro-coup, then admitted that his father had indeed changed his mind, but only "briefly in a moment of great pressure that he spent the rest of his life regretting." Who or what was responsible for this pressure was left unspecified.
The internal documentary record is not kind to Richardson fils' interpretation. On 26 August 1963, in the approach to the planned coup against Diem of 28/29 August, the station chief cabled Langley:
Quote:"Situation here has reached point of no return. Saigon is armed camp. Current indications are that Ngo family have dug in for last ditch battle. It is our considered estimate that General officers…understand that they have no alternative but to go forward…
Situation has changed drastically since 21 August. If the Ngo family wins now, they and Vietnam will stagger on to final defeat at the hands of their own people and the VC. Should a generals' revolt occur and be put down, GVN will sharply reduce American presence in SVN…
It is obviously preferable that the generals conduct this effort without apparent American assistance. Otherwise, for a long time in the future, they will be vulnerable to charges of being American puppets, which they are not in any sense…"
In short, when Lodge first demanded Richardson's dismissal in mid-September 1963, the latter was unquestionably pro-coup.
Not that Halberstam's 1973 depiction of Richardson was entirely consistent with his 1965 one, as contained in his much-hyped volume of that year on the Vietnam war, The Making of a Quagmire: "Nor is it true, at least during the time that I was in Saigon, that the CIA was in conflict with other parts of the mission, that it was foiling the plans of more honorable and better-behaved agencies. Indeed, just the opposite is true, and that was precisely the trouble: there was no conflict between the various elements of the mission at all." For the dutiful servant of totalitarian power, no somersault is too obvious or spectacular to induce embarrassment.
In fact, as Sheehan and Halberstam doubtless well knew, the Diem government had named Richardson as the leader of the abortive coup of 28/29 August 1963 in the early editions of the Times of Vietnam on 2 September 1963, an offence that saw the paper disappear from the streets within hours. Undeterred, the paper reprinted 6,000 copies of the 2 September edition a week later, on the ninth, whereupon its printing presses were smashed. (The paper's offices were again attacked in the immediate aftermath of the CIA's successful coup on 1-2 November.) Madam Nhu, in conversation with a German correspondent in the same period, had placed the station-chief's name at the top of the list of coup conspirators.
"There are three sorts of conspiracy: by the people who complain, by the people who write, by the people who take action. There is nothing to fear from the first group, the two others are more dangerous; but the police have to be part of all three,"
Joseph Fouche
Joseph Fouche